A hundred years after De Ruyter's time, the flames of war burst out in every quarter of the globe where Englishmen could meet Frenchmen, Dutchmen or Spaniards, or where colonies and commercial outposts were to be won and lost through fighting on the land or on the sea. To this general conflagration the newly born United States, adding their quantum of fuel, appeared before the world as a nation, poor, weak and scattered to be sure, but still not to be neglected in itself, and entering as a factor in the solution of the perplexing problem whose importance depended purely upon its ability to create a serious diversion remote from the larger issues at stake.
It is foreign to my purpose to write afresh the history of this great war so fraught with consequences that reach down even to our own day, but a general conception of the different theaters of operations is essential to a right understanding of the special occurrences in which our forefathers were deeply interested. We shall gain from this larger view some valuable light on the strategic policy of the attack in a theater of naval war which comprised nearly every navigable sea, and we shall be in a better position to understand the limitations which marked the operations of the British and French fleets on our coast in 1778.
The War of Independence began when England was exceptionally free from entanglement. Still she was not entirely without apprehension of difficulties nearer at home. There were certain grievances between her on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other, which might lead to grave trouble, and both of these powers had recently made such notable additions to their fleets as to threaten to compromise British supremacy.
Had the British ministers realized to what extent the dissatisfaction in the American colonies would develop, or the vast importance of England's concern there, they would have acted more promptly and effectively and have endeavored to crush the rebellion before it had made serious head. Instead of immediately despatching a force ample for the speedy reduction of the revolting colonies, and thus finishing at one stroke that comparatively easy task, the British government sought present economy at great subsequent loss; the war dragged along with varying fortunes for several years until, in 1778, France recognized the independence of the United States and joined in the struggle against England, to be followed a year after by Spain and Holland, The chance for success in America had passed by, and England found herself fighting at once in every corner of the known world.
For a critical discussion of this great maritime war reference may be made to the concluding chapter of Captain Mahan's first volume. We are only concerned in the general drama so far as is necessary to gain a right understanding of the objects of the allies:—viz., first the destruction of England's supremacy, second France's territorial expansion in the West Indies, third the recapture from the English of Minorca and Gibraltar, fourth the invasion of England itself, fifth the weakening of England by aiding the colonies in their insurrection. In general terms, the downfall of England's commercial supremacy was France's object, and the restoration of Minorca and Gibraltar that of Spain. All else was subsidiary. And England was essentially on the defensive.
As her commercial superiority was, ultimately, based upon England's fleet, the true objective of the allies was that fleet. Suffren alone among the commanders grasped this fundamental idea, and he alone won laurels to be envied of all. With this general error in strategy at the outset it is not strange that the allies failed to achieve their major aims. The annals of the war tell of numberless insignificant affairs, but of few possessing a determining importance like the fall of Port Mahon, Rodney's victory over De Grasse, April 12th, 1762, or De Grasse's holding the mouth of the Chesapeake against Graves, which precipitated the surrender of Cornwallis.
There were operations of both a naval and a military nature at points abroad: Gibraltar was besieged and relieved, blows were exchanged in the East and West Indies, but the invasion of England was never even attempted.
One phase of the war which is of especial value to us occurred in 1778 when d'Estaing sailed, on the declaration of hostilities by France, to the relief of the American colonies.
The local military situation at this moment may be thus described. The British army was in. Philadelphia, with Washington's force close at hand. New York had been in possession of the British since July, 1776, and was their base by every reason, geographical and political. As soon as the English government had news of d'Estaing's contemplated sailing, orders were sent to America to evacuate Philadelphia and concentrate on New York. The mere threat of d'Estaing's coming forced the British back on their base with all speed. The integrity of their line of communications became paramount.
News traveled slowly in those days, and d'Estaing seems to have traveled even more slowly. "It is said that he wasted much time in drills, and even uselessly." However that may be, he did not reach his destination, the Capes of the Delaware, until the 8th of July, making a passage of twelve weeks from Toulon, of which four were spent in getting out of the Mediterranean. Lord Howe's movements were in marked contrast with d'Estaing's. "First, assembling his fleets and transports in Delaware Bay, and then hastening the embarkation of stores and supplies, he left Philadelphia as soon as the army had marched from there for New York. Ten days were taken up in reaching the mouth of the bay [through calms], but he sailed from it the 28th of June, ten days before d'Estaing arrived, though more than ten weeks after he had sailed. Once outside, a favoring wind took the whole fleet to Sandy Hook in two days. War is unforgiving; the prey that d'Estaing had missed by delays foiled him in his attempts upon both New York and Rhode Island." [*]
"The day after Howe's arrival at Sandy Hook the English army reached the heights of Neversink after a harassing march through New Jersey, with Washington's troops hanging upon its rear. By the active co-operation of the navy it was carried up to New York by July 5th, and Howe then went back to bar the entrance to the port against the French fleet, whose arrival on the Virginia coast had been observed and reported."
"The problem before him was to defend a practicable pass with six sixty-four gun ships and three of fifty, against eight of seventy-four guns or more, three sixty-four and one fifty," practically double his own force.
Had d'Estaing entered immediately on reaching Sandy Hook, he would have encountered but little resistance, for a number of Howe's ships were up the bay, but, instead, he anchored off the bar, afraid to cross. Here he spent eleven precious days in sounding out a channel. In the meantime Howe ranged his ships in a curve inside the Hook and anchored them head and stern so as to command the channel. Two small batteries were placed on -the shore flank, one of two howitzers, one of three 18 pounders. It is needless to go into further details.
On the 22nd of July, 1778, "a high northeast wind coinciding with a spring tide, raised the water on the bar to thirty feet. The French fleet got under way and worked up to windward to a point fair for crossing the bar. Then d'Estaing's heart failed him under the discouragements of the pilots; he gave up the attack and stood away to the southward."'
Captain Mahan says of this incident: "Naval officers cannot but sympathize with the hesitation of a seaman to disregard the advice of pilots, especially on a coast foreign to him; but such sympathy should not close their eyes to the highest type of character. Let any one compare the action of d'Estaing at New York with that of Nelson at Copenhagen and the Nile, or that of Farragut at Mobile and Port Hudson, and the inferiority of the Frenchman, as a military leader, guided only by military consideration, is painfully apparent. New York was the very center of the British power; its fall could not but have shortened the war. In fairness to d'Estaing, however, it must be remembered that other than military considerations had to weigh with him. The French Admiral doubtless had instructions similar to those of the French minister, and he probably reasoned that France had nothing to gain by the fall of New York, which might have led to peace between America and England and left the latter free to turn all her pressure against his own country. Less than that would have been enough to decide his wavering mind as to risking his fleet over the bar."
This suggestion is quite true and is conceived in the author's well known charity of thought, but it appears that if d'Estaing was unwilling or forbidden to unduly hazard his ships, they would have been quite as effective at Toulon as off Sandy Hook, and that lack of backbone was the real cause of his failure to press home his advantage.
D'Estaing's own account reads thus: ''Both officers and crews were kept in spirits…by the desire of delivering America from the English colors, which we saw waving on the other side of a simple barrier, on and upon so great a crowd of masts. The pilots procured by Colonels Laurens and Hamilton (under Washington's direction) destroyed all illusion. These experienced persons declared that it was impossible to carry us in. I offered in vain a reward of 50,000 crowns to any one who would promise success. All refused, and the particular soundings I caused to be made myself too well demonstrated that they were right." [D'Estaing to Congress.]
Reinforcements from England now began to arrive at New York in the shape of straggling vessels of Admiral Byron's fleet, which had been scattered by a heavy easterly gale, and of others.
"On the 28th of July Howe was informed that the French fleet, which had disappeared to the southward, had been seen heading for Rhode Island. In four days his fleet was ready for sea, but, owing to contrary winds, did not reach Point Judith till the 9th of August. There he anchored and learned that d'Estaing had run the batteries the day before and anchored between Gould and Canonicut Islands; the Seakonnet and Western Passages had also been occupied by French ships." [Mahan.] On arriving at Narragansett Bay, d'Estaing immediately proceeded to land 4,000 men to strengthen General Sullivan in his attempt to drive the English out of Rhode Island, but hearing of Howe's appearance off the port, he hastily recalled his landing party, and the prevailing summer S.W. wind having suddenly shifted to the northward, he put to sea with all his fleet.
The next day, August nth, was spent in maneuvering, for Howe was yet too inferior to engage except when the conditions seemed favorable to him. A violent gale of wind dispersed both fleets the following night and did much damage, especially to the French ships.
"The English fell back to New York. The French rallied again off the entrance of Narragansett Bay; but d'Estaing decided that he would not remain on account of the damage to his squadron, and, accordingly, sailed for Boston on the 21st of August. Rhode Island was thus left to the English, who retained it for a year longer, evacuating then for strategic reasons. Howe on his part diligently repaired his ships and sailed again for Rhode Island, when he learned of the French being there; but meeting on the way a vessel with word of their going to Boston, he followed them to that harbor, in which they were too strongly placed to be attacked. Taking into consideration his, enforced return to New York, the necessary repairs, and the fact that he was only four days behind the French at Boston, it may be believed that Howe showed to the end the activity which characterized the beginning of his operations." [Mahan.]
On November 4th, his repairs effected, d'Estaing sailed from Boston for the West Indies, Sullivan withdrew from Rhode Island.
Speaking of the occurrences thus hastily depicted. Captain Mahan says:
"Scarcely a shot had been exchanged between the two fleets, yet the weaker had thoroughly outgeneraled the stronger. With the exception of the maneuvers for the weather-gauge after d'Estaing left Newport, which have not been preserved, and of Howe's dispositions to receive the expected attack in New York Bay, the lessons are not tactical, but strategic, and of present application. Chief among them undoubtedly stands the value of celerity and watchfulness, combined with knowledge of one's profession. Howe learned of his danger by advices from home three weeks after d'Estaing sailed from Toulon. He had to gather in his cruisers from the Chesapeake and outside, get his ships of the line from New York and Rhode Island, embark the supplies of an army of ten thousand men, move down the Delaware—which unavoidably took ten days—and round to New York again. D'Estaing was ten days behind him at the Delaware, twelve days at Sandy Hook, and only one day ahead of him in entering Newport, outside of which harbor he had lain ten days before sailing in."
"The same industry and watchfulness marked his remaining operations. As soon as the French ships had sailed off to the southward, lookout vessels followed him, and preparations continued (notably of fire ships) for pursuit. The last ship that joined from England crossed the bar at New York on the 30th of July. On the 1st of August the fleet was ready for sea with four fire ships. The accident of the wind delayed his next movements, but, as has been seen, he came up only one day after the entrance of the enemy into Newport, which his inferior force could not have prevented. But the object of the enemy, which he could not oppose, was frustrated by his presence. D'Estaing was no sooner in Newport than he wished himself out. Howe's position was strategically excellent. With his weatherly position in reference to the prevailing winds, the difficulty of beating a fleet out through the narrow entrance to the harbor would expose the French ships trying it, to be attacked in detail; while if the wind unluckily became fair, the admiral relied upon his own skill to save his squadron."
…"The sortie of the French, the subsequent gale, and the resulting damage were all what is commonly called luck; but if it had not been for Howe's presence off Point Judith threatening him, they would have ridden out the gale at their anchors inside. Howe's energy and his confidence in himself as a seaman had put him in the way of good luck, and it is not fair to deny his active share in bringing it about. But for him, the gale would not have saved the British force in Newport."
Washington wrote on August 20, 1778, in relation to d'Estaing's further mission: "The length of the passage, in the first instance, was a capital misfortune; for had even one of common length taken place, Lord Howe, with the British ships of war and all the transports in the river Delaware, must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profession under such circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least the fate of Burgoyne. The long passage of Count d'Estaing was succeeded by an unfavorable discovery at the Hook, which hurt us in two respects—first in a defeat of the enterprise upon New York and the shipping and troops at that place, and next in the delay occasioned in ascertaining the depth of water over the bar which was essential to their entrance into the harbor of New York. And, moreover, after the enterprise upon Rhode Island had been planned and was in the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British ships should interpose merely to create a diversion and draw the French fleet from the island was again unlucky, as the Count had not again returned on the 17th to the island, though drawn off from it on the 10th, by which means the land operations were retarded, and the whole subjected to a miscarriage in case of the arrival of Byron's squadron."
The English were strictly on the defensive, although they were maneuvering in a country which was largely, although not entirely, hostile, and although they had initiated an enterprise of a aggressive nature.
There were two theaters of operations—one, minor, in Rhode Island, where they held Newport and its approaches, the other, major, which included Philadelphia as the front with New York as the base.
These two theaters were dependent upon the sea for their intercommunication, and in the lesser the English were the more vulnerable, although a reverse in this quarter would have been less serious than in the other and greater theater. It was open to d'Estaing to inflict great damage at either, for he was notably superior to Howe, and the troops he carried, though few in number, would have turned the scale in favor of the colonists, whether added to Washington's forces or to Sullivan's.
As an argument in favor of an immediate attack on Howe, and at New York, was the possibility of his receiving reinforcements, and the great desirability of beating him before any contemplated reinforcements could reach him; coupled with the greater effect which would be derived from a blow at or the capture of the English base. Up to the time of his appearance off Sandy Hook, d'Estaing's movements were strategically sound, although marked by a woeful lack of energy. The knowledge of his departure from Toulon was sufficient to make Clinton and Howe rally on the base thus threatened even in a very remote way. Until they could be sure that d'Estaing was bound elsewhere, they were forced back to New York to abandon the ground they had gained at much cost, and were temporarily paralyzed so far as any fresh advance was concerned. Such is the result of any right strategic move.
The reply of Howe and Clinton was correct in its turn, but the conditions of the game and imperative orders from London left them no other course. Howe, perceiving the danger, displayed a zeal and industry beyond praise and saved New York to his side.
At this remote date it is impossible to account for d'Estaing's fatal hesitation off Sandy Hook. He may have been hampered by secret instructions of a military or political nature not to unduly risk his ships in a general engagement, a favorite policy of the French during that century which did their navy much harm, or not to bring matters in America to a crisis, the prolonging of the struggle being more to the advantage of the French than its termination. His subsequent conduct, however, warrants us, in lack of other evidence, in believing that the determining cause was rather moral and subjective, but we must not forget that he did not, as we do, possess the precedent of Copenhagen and the Nile. Profiting by the warning of his example, let us remember in the future that great results in war are seldom achieved without taking commensurate risks. This much seems certain, that he could have entered New York, and that in failing to do so a great opportunity was lost which would have covered him with glory, and doubtless brought the war to a close.
Whether his next step in appearing off Newport was proper or not depends on the motive. If he sought to decoy Howe away from New York with the intention of going in during the latter's absence, it was well conceived, but there is nothing to show that he had this or any other definite scheme in mind. He waited ten days off Point Judith and then ran the batteries at the mouth of Narragansett Bay, apparently forced by necessity into doing, or seeming to do, something—no matter much, what. This motive, a very inadequate and mistaken one, has not disappeared with d'Estaing, and it may return some day to trouble even us, who should be forewarned by the precedents in this case.
Having shut himself into the bay, the key of which lay now with Howe, in his possession of the weatherly position due to the prevailing breeze, d'Estaing found two courses open to him—to assist Sullivan or to seize the first opportunity to escape. He adopted the first only to abandon it in favor of the latter. How earnest his efforts were the next day to cross swords with Howe, his inferior by nearly one-third, is not known. Having come out of the bay with a leading breeze, he must have been in a position to engage had he really so desired. It is more probable that he was not averse to avoiding actual combat: again displaying that common error, failure to realize that the main objective in naval war is the adversary's fleet. He at all events proved that his entering Narragansett Bay was strategically unsound, unless he had strength enough to help Sullivan, without, at the same time, incurring too great a risk, at anchor, in an assault by Howe, who had the tactical advantages of the wind and the shore batteries on his side.
The succeeding gale diminished d'Estaing's superiority and afforded him an excuse for going to Boston to refit, whence he only sailed to quit the coast.
He seems, therefore, to have been strategically correct at New York, strategically wrong at Newport, and deficient in tactics and seamanship everywhere.
Howe, on the other hand, in command of the defense fleet, exhibited at all stages a professional ability and a personal example well worthy of emulation. His preparation for guarding the channel at Sandy Hook, his maneuvering outside of Newport, his promptness in attacking such French ships as could be engaged on favorable terms are admirable. The essence of coast defense strategy is exhibited by him in using his fewer and weaker vessels at all times so as to impede and harass the enemy, hanging on his flanks, observing him, ready at any moment to profit by a temporary advantage and to strike quickly and sharply. It is furthermore interesting to note that, in this instance of the appearance off our shores of a powerful attacking fleet, it was the defense fleet, although inferior, and not the land works that repulsed the enemy. There appears to be no reason why that which happened in 1778 should be regarded as exceptional in warfare or as failing to add one more convincing proof that, however valuable fortifications may be in harbor defense, ships alone can defend the coast.
[*] Mahan