Motto:—"Peace with honor."
There has gradually crystallized in the international affairs of the United States a doctrine regarding- her relations with transoceanic, and more especially European, nations which, unless she is adequately prepared to enforce it, will only be permitted by them to prevail so long as it does not seriously conflict with their interests. To uphold that doctrine against all odds we must have a powerful fleet, and until we build it we are in daily jeopardy of national humiliation by seeing some strong foreign power deliberately ignore our doctrine, while we hold ourselves up to ridicule by impotent protest, or sacrifice our small nucleus of a navy in a futile attempt at enforcement.
The development and maintenance of a naval force sufficient for our predominance and security on the American continent is dependent upon a permanent naval building program which will raise the fleet to the desired number of war vessels by yearly increments as large as the finances of the country will permit, and continue it at that fighting strength by such further additions as might thereafter be necessary. Such a program, having in view the completion of a fleet adequate to enforce the foreign
policy which the nation now so vigorously proclaims, might, it is hoped, receive the support of every political party while in power.
Our permanent foreign policy may be stated as follows: first, prohibition of foreign nations from forcible acquisition of territory, or the extension of their non-republican governmental systems, on the American continents; second, the protection of American citizens the world over; third, absolute non-interference in disputes between nations on other continents. Hence it is reasonable to assume that, while we will never attempt the invasion of transoceanic territory belonging to another nation, we must be able to strike telling blows upon its nearer possessions and its commerce, if driven to war; to assist other American nations to resist foreign territorial encroachment; or to afford protection or asylum to our citizens abroad when they are threatened with injury; all the while having in reserve an additional naval force sufficient to make invasion of our own land impossible and bombardment of our home ports extremely hazardous.
Let us begin by considering the composition of a fleet necessary for our own defense. At a first glance the extent of our undefended coast line seems appalling, but we must remember that nature, in the shoals and surf of the Atlantic and the mountain walls of the Pacific coast, defends for us thousands of miles. On the west we have a mountainous breastwork, and on the east a seething moat. If we can defend the gateways and embrasures we are secure. Of these there are but three narrow ones on the west coast, but on the east there are many. Fortunately the latter can be grouped so that the same naval force may be used to defend more than one, by operating from one to another through interior waterways.
Our Atlantic coast presents almost the same strategic conditions to an enemy to-day that it did when the thirteen colonies struggled for independence, or when, in the new union, they again fought Great Britain in 1812. The waterways remain unchanged; the cities retain their same relative importance, only they have grown much richer, while their land defenses have practically crumbled away. We may, therefore, expect to be attacked at almost the same points now as then, viz. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and Norfolk. In addition to these, Portland, Maine, must now be considered, because of its open harbor and railroad terminals, while the southern Atlantic ports, and especially the mouth of the Mississippi river, cannot be neglected. Portland and Boston can be considered as in the same field of defense, which I will, for convenience, call the Boston District, being the bight between Cape Cod and Mount Desert Island. The defense of New York involves the holding of all internal water routes and bays from Nantucket to The Highlands; hence I shall call this the New York District. The defense of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and Norfolk is accomplished if we hold the mouths of Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, so I shall call this the Chesapeake District. Other districts will be styled the Charleston District, the Gulf District, and the Pacific District.
For the defense of the waterways leading to the cities named there is needed a class of vessels of comparatively light draught, wholly armored, yet presenting a small target, capable of steaming as fast as an enemy's fleet would dare to do in narrow or unmarked channels and shoal waters, having quick turning power, and carrying armor-piercing guns with as nearly as possible all-around fire; in short, floating fortresses which can never be passed, but which must be fought to the death before the enemy can proceed. The genius of Ericsson gave us such vessels, but we have somehow of late lost sight of their special usefulness in our coast defense. They should be double-barbette turreted, twin-screw monitors of not more than fifteen feet draught, capable of cruising at ten knots or speeding up to fifteen, and carrying four guns of ten or twelve-inch caliber. If we should give the Boston District eight, the New York District ten, the Chesapeake District eight, the Charleston District six, the Gulf District eight, and the Pacific District ten, we would place our need at forty such vessels on the Atlantic coast and ten on the Pacific; probably a most conservative estimate. At present we have six, or about one-eighth of that number, completed; five of them being sadly deficient in speed; and in addition we have none building nor contemplated. These vessels should not be hampered with an assorted lighter battery as those in commission now are. Six six-pounder and four one-pounder rapid-fire guns should constitute their secondary battery, for it will only be used against attacking torpedo boats or unarmored vessels at close quarters, when the utmost simplicity and rapidity of ammunition service must be maintained. These monitors should have electric or hydraulic turret machinery, and, if hydraulic, the water should be mixed with glycerine to prevent freezing.
No torpedo-tubes should be fitted in these vessels, for their field of operations would be the same as that for torpedo-boats, and no country on earth presents such a favorable field for the use, in its own defense, of these small and destructive craft as does our own. Speeding undetected through interior waterways from Cape Cod to the Carolinas, they could be quickly concentrated in threatened harbors. They should be of the highest attainable speed, of habitable dimensions, yet of draught, length and beam which will permit them to pass through all the canals and sounds which parallel our Atlantic coast. They should have no tube fixed in the bow, but three single, center-pivot tubes, one on each side forward, with an arc of fire from right ahead to sixty degrees abaft the beam, and one near the stern amidships, with an arc of fire from forty-five degrees on either bow to right astern. Assigning ten such boats to the Boston District, twenty to the New York District, twenty to the Chesapeake District, fifteen to the Charleston District, fifteen to the Gulf District, and twenty to the Pacific District, one hundred in all, we shall still have less than any first-rate naval power, yet be able to concentrate them in formidable numbers at threatened points. At present we have three completed and six building; less than one-tenth of the needed number.
Of the eight monitors proposed for the Boston District, four should protect Portland and four Boston. The ten for the New York District could mobilize toward Narragansett Bay or Sandy Hook, according to which was threatened. The eight in the Chesapeake District should be equally divided between the two bays. The six assigned to the Charleston District should be equally divided between Charleston and Savannah. The eight assigned to the Gulf District should use Key West and Mobile Bay as their bases, and operate to hold Key West and defend Pensacola, Mobile and the Mississippi.
The double-barbette-turreted monitor and the torpedo-boat are the only vessels needed for harbor defense, but other and stronger defense must be contemplated, and in providing for this we will be providing, too, our weapons of offense. We must have in the fleet an element which can fight the battle-ships of the enemy on the high seas. Keeping in mind that our more dangerous enemies must be transoceanic, and that our policy will compel them to send their battle-ships thousands of miles to attack us where we can fight them within easy reach of our own ports, we can dispense with some coal endurance in our line-of-battle ships and leave room to make them in other respects superior fighting machines to those of the adversary. This has fortunately been realized, and, in the Indiana and her sisters, we are building just such ships. Let us beware, however, of the craze for innovations and doubtful improvements in these vessels. Let us adopt and hold to a standardized distribution of battery, magazines, ammunition leads and auxiliary machinery, which will make one of these ships so like another that a whole ship's company could be transferred from one to another and go to quarters' without changing a station.
Of these magnificent war-ships we have six building, and it seems reasonably probable that Congress will add about two a year for some years to come. If to this program other war-ships are added in the proportions which I suggest, I believe the rate will be none too fast, whereas if the monitors do not enter into the program we must treble the number of battle-ships. Providing a monitor defense as proposed would leave us still in need of a score of battle-ships on our Atlantic coast, and perhaps half a score on the Pacific.
Next, we need the armored cruiser class to fall upon the enemy's communications, to strike at his outlying possessions which might form bases of operations against us, or to send quickly to our neighbors' aid if foreign powers attempt by force to encroach upon their territory. Of such vessels we have built three, somewhat dissimilar in design, and with these the Maine and Texas would be better classed than with the battle-ships. In a fleet engagement the armored cruisers should form a second line, or line of supports, their function being, in addition to reinforcement of the fighting line, to destroy or capture crippled adversaries or to pursue and destroy the individual vessels of a routed enemy. We should have, therefore, at least as many armored cruisers as we have battle-ships; as many New Yorks as we have Indianas.
An army preparing for battle has not only a fighting line and a line of supports, but scouts to send out in advance to locate the enemy. As on land, so on the sea, scouts are absolutely essential to success in battle; and as on land scouts are picked men specially fitted for such work, so on the sea scout vessels should be specially designed for their purpose. The duty of a scout vessel would be to make long individual journeys at great speed, to gather information of the enemy's strength and movements, to refuse battle, elude pursuit and rejoin the fleet. Scout vessels need not be large, but they must be seaworthy and thoroughly habitable. They might be equipped with torpedo-tubes, and they should have rapid-fire guns, but they should be otherwise unarmed and need carry only machinery protection. They should be modeled so closely after ocean coastwise passenger steamers as to be readily mistaken for them. Above all, they should have enormous speed and great coal endurance. I believe that such vessels could be built with a cruising speed of twenty-five knots per hour, and a maximum forced-draught speed of thirty knots. Keeping in mind their special purpose, much could be sacrificed to this end, even the protection and some of the armament already stated. Such vessels must be built expressly for their purpose. The fact that no country is attempting such a type is the best reason why we should lead the way, for the country best equipped with scout vessels will place an adversary at a great disadvantage in time of war. The torpedo cruiser somewhat approaches the type, but is lacking in seaworthiness, habitability and coal endurance, besides being unmistakable in her character when sighted. Ten or more scout vessels would be a valuable addition to our fleet.
The roving commerce destroyer is still another type needed for war. Such modern "Alabamas" will have many of the qualities of the scout class and might be used as scouts in the absence of specially designed scout vessels. Their speed should be twenty-two knots; their coal endurance enormous; their appearance that of an ocean liner, with straight stem, pole masts, no military tops, and smoke-stacks of a conventional number and size. Their armament should be five-inch or six-inch rapid-fire guns. The United States has come nearest of any nation to building such vessels in the Columbia and Minneapolis, but they have the ear-marks, so to speak, of men-of-war, and would not deceive a moment after their hulls appeared above the horizon. These vessels could be drawn from the merchant navy if we had one. We are taking some steps toward getting them from that source, and now have four available, but not a gun to put on board of them! We need at least ten such vessels on each coast.
There remains to be considered the type of vessel best suited to represent us in time of peace on foreign stations, and to be prepared to give protection and asylum to our citizens residing abroad. We have built many war-ships for this purpose, calling them second class protected cruisers and gunboats, and have a great variety of types from which to select a standard. The cruisers should be roomy and comfortable; should have main batteries of six-inch rapid-fire guns; should have twin screws and fore and aft sail; should be composite built and sheathed, and should have a cruising speed of twelve knots and a maximum speed of twenty knots. The Chicago, when renovated, although not composite, would be, if sheathed, an ideal cruiser of this type. The gunboats should be specially designed, in dimensions involving draught, for the stations on which they are to serve. They, too, should be composite and sheathed, with twin screws and a cruising speed of ten knots, or maximum of fifteen, and should be barkentine rigged, with all the coal endurance possible, plenty of living space, and an armament of four-inch, six-pounder and one-pounder rapid-fire guns. We have, however, second class cruisers and gunboats enough built and building for our present needs.
Rams, dynamite-gun vessels, submarine torpedo-boats and such experimental craft cannot be considered in the composition of the fleet until their usefulness is proven, but we have not yet reached the limit of human invention and should be prepared to add a new element whenever it is fully developed.
To sum up, it is assumed that the fleet for all purposes should be composed of the following elements:
No. | Character | Type | Provided |
30 | Battle-ships | Indiana | 6 |
50 | Double-barbette-turreted Monitors | Monterey | 6 |
30 | Armored cruisers | New York | 5 |
20 | Commerce destroyers | Columbia; St. Paul | 6 |
10 | Scout vessels | … | 0 |
20 | Protected cruisers and gunboats | Renovated Chicago Gunboats Nos. 14 & 15 | 25 |
100 | Torpedo-boats | Cushing improved | 9 |
On this basis we should, therefore, build, as rapidly as possible, twenty-four more battle-ships, forty-four more double-barbette-turreted monitors, twenty-five more armored cruisers, ninety-one more torpedo-boats, ten scout vessels; and should also build, or encourage by subsidies to be built as American ocean liners and auxiliary cruisers, fourteen more commerce destroyers, at the very least. Suppose that, with this end in view, we adopted the following yearly building program:
2 Battle-ships, $8,000,000
3 Monitors, $4,500,000
2 Armored Cruisers, $5,000,000
1 Scout Vessel, $800,000
12 Torpedo-boats, $1,200,000
Total $19,500,000
Allowing for a subsidy for the commerce-destroyer class, we would thus, by an investment of $20,000,000 a year, produce in ten to fifteen years such a formidable fleet that every principle of our foreign policy could be vigorously and assuredly maintained.
One of the most important points to be kept in mind in this building program is the necessity for similarity in designs. A new Kearsarge should be so similar to an Indiana, a New York to a Brooklyn, a Monterey to a Terror, sister ship to sister ship in each class, that the watch, quarter and station bill of one battle-ship or monitor or cruiser could be substituted for that of another, so that the man who pulled a lever, opened a valve, turned a crank, connected a primer or transported a shell in the one ship would find at hand the same apparatus in practically the same place in the other, for all these vessels could not be kept in commission at once in time of peace. A large number of them would have to be laid up in charge of a small force of ship-keepers, and the individual vessels commissioned in rotation by a wholesale transfer of officers and men from the vessels to be laid up in their places, and then maneuvered to see that each was maintaining its fighting qualities. Those lying "in ordinary" would prove excellent schools for our naval militia.
The life of a steel ship properly cared for has really never been ascertained. Half a century is perhaps a low limit. Moreover, while theorists will suggest a hundred radical changes in each ship of a class designed, the real improvements are simple and infrequent, and it is probable that the war-ship of to-day will be able to carry the latest weapons and fight with even chances a new-born adversary of her class thirty to fifty years hence. We must not let the unfounded fear of obsoleteness deter us from standardizing our designs.
Investing twenty million dollars a year for the next ten or fifteen years in such a fleet as is suggested would be paying a very low premium for a vast national insurance. At the end of that time further investment to maintain the fleet would be in much smaller yearly sums, and we would have practically a paid-up policy.
Reviewing this suggested composition of the fleet, the item which, I fear, will be most quickly challenged is that of monitors, because of the large number suggested, compared with the number of battle-ships. It is not that I place more reliance in monitors than in battle-ships, but that the former must be so differently disposed. The monitors must be distributed; the battle-ships can be mobilized. The latter correspond to the army in the field; the former to the garrisons of fortified places. If the enemy succeeds in defeating or eluding the mobilized battle-ships, he must find the monitors in force at any port which he may choose to attack. Some mobilization of the monitors in a district may become possible when the point of attack is disclosed by the movements of the enemy, but our geographical contour prevents the districts from being within supporting distance of each other; so I do not see how we can dispense with this class of vessel, nor how a smaller number than that proposed will suffice. Moreover, we can complete nearly three monitors for the money spent on one battle-ship, and a monitor requires about half the time to build. We must remember, too, that even our chief seaports are in no degree protected by land fortifications, and that it seems unlikely that they will be for many years to come. Farragut has shown us, moreover, that even unarmored vessels can ignore fortifications and proceed past them to the very city which they are striving impotently to protect. Even, therefore, if every city in the districts which I have mapped out were heavily fortified, I should not reduce the number of monitors assigned for their defense.
I would regard the number of special scout vessels suggested too small were it not that the commerce-destroyers can do efficient scout duty, sometimes even while engaged in their intended occupation. Torpedo-boat destroyers, or torpedo cruisers, as they are variously called, are too limited in their usefulness to warrant them a place in the fleet, but if scout vessels were built in large numbers they would, since they possess all the functions of these less useful vessels, be available in place of them when so needed.
I do not think that the number of torpedo-boats proposed can be criticized unless to say that it is too small.
To the Pacific Coast I have assigned ten monitors; four to operate in Puget Sound, four in defense of San Francisco, and two to defend San Diego, with twenty torpedo-boats to be distributed in similar proportions. These, behind a mobile squadron of ten battle-ships and ten armored cruisers, with ten commerce destroyers for scout duty and to harass routes of communication, should form an ample defense. Russia, Japan and Great Britain are the only nations which could strike a blow at us on the Pacific, and none of these could maintain a hostile fleet on that coast for any length of time if we had any force at all to throw upon their communications. England might for a time supply a Pacific squadron through Canada, but that would be the easiest link for us to break. England, however, would concentrate her efforts upon our Atlantic ports, operating from her strong near bases, and waste very little attention upon the Pacific side of the continent.
In this attempt to suggest the proper composition of the fleet I invite discussion more upon the elements proposed than upon the number of vessels in each class. Of the latter I will only add that I have endeavored to suggest a program which will not exceed twenty million dollars in yearly outlay, which will not overtax the capacity of our shipbuilding establishments, yet which will produce in fifteen years at most an adequate fleet. Considering that we have had literally to recreate a navy, we have advanced thus far with admirable discretion. We first had to build the cruisers and gunboats because the shipbuilders were then incapable of building anything more complex; the wooden navy was expended and had to be immediately replaced; appropriations were difficult to obtain, and the people had to be shown something for their money as quickly as possible in order that they would continue to give it. We have educated the shipbuilders step by step until they can now build anything from the swiftest torpedo-boat to the finest battle-ship afloat, and now is the time to profit by this readiness and this education which we have so carefully fostered. We have already finished one war vessel or more of nearly every type, and they can be used as object-lessons with which to educate the people as to their purposes and their necessity. We have, in fact, just reached a very critical period in our war-ship building. We must not now drift along in a desultory fashion, timidly watching the inclination of Congress and asking only for whatever ships it is disposed to give us, until the building impulse dies. We must earnestly and vigorously urge a systematic, progressive program, having as its outcome the production of an adequate fleet in the fewest possible number of years, explaining incessantly the need for each type of vessel, and illustrating the usefulness of all by constant organized maneuvers on our coasts and in their adjacent seas.
Since this essay I have been fortunate enough to attend the summer course at the Naval War College, where a more thorough study of the strategic and tactical situations produced by the conformation of our coasts and the location and character of our harbors, together with many side lights thrown upon the subject by able lecturers, has somewhat modified my views as to the relative number needed of battle-ships and barbette monitors.
The monitors find their special sphere of tactical usefulness in broad, land-locked waters traversed by comparatively narrow, deeper channels leading to important points. Here these powerful, light-draught vessels can choose positions of such tactical advantage in the shoaler waters, that the enemy's battle-ships, constrained to follow the deep channels, would suffer immeasurably more than if confronted only by vessels of their own kind limited to the same channels as themselves. Our Atlantic coast is remarkably penetrated by just such bodies of water: Nantucket, Vineyard, and Long Island sounds; New York, Delaware and Chesapeake bays.
On the other hand I am convinced that the monitor is of no advantage in uniformly deep harbors like Penobscot Bay, Portsmouth harbor, the Mississippi River and San Francisco Bay, and that this type is practically useless in harbors into which the enemy's battle-ships cannot penetrate, such as Boston, Portland and Charleston.
The gulf ports of Tampa, Pensacola and Mobile can be so readily deepened to battle-ship draught, and this is so likely to be done, that I still think it would be well to build monitors for their defense, as suggested in the essay.
Consequently I now regard the monitors suggested for the Boston and Charleston districts, as well as those proposed for San Francisco Bay, unsuited for the defense of those districts. In place of these twenty monitors, six battle-ships should be built and added to the Atlantic fleet. The yearly program would then be two battle-ships, two monitors, etc., with an additional battle-ship every other year until the desired number were completed.
It has been suggested to me that advocating the barbette-monitor type is impolitic, because Congress will too readily abandon the battle-ship in favor of the cheaper vessel, but I only wish to see the monitor receive its proper relative attention in a systematic and comprehensive building program. Whenever Congress, by falling short of the program, compels us to choose one type and abandon another, let us insist, with the utmost intensity, upon battle-ships.
John M. Ellicott, Lieut., U.S.N.
DISCUSSION.
Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, U.S. Navy.—There is no more important subject to the Navy than the one treated by Lieutenant Ellicott in this paper. The various types of vessels to enter into the composition of the fleet are more likely to be affected by the opinions of the naval officers, and therefore to be influenced by discussions in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute, than the number of vessels to be built for the Navy, which will be determined by economic considerations and the opinions of our legislators for the time being. Still, in the question of numbers, the public may be guided to some extent by the opinions of naval officers, as long as the opinions are conservative and appear to be based upon the present needs of the country, and not upon speculative views of future requirements or upon mere ambition for the acquirement of a large naval force.
Our first and principal need of a naval force is for the defense of the coast, which includes the lines of communications to and from the ports of our coast. Until this requirement is filled it is futile to consider anything further. In forming a scheme for coast defense a mobile navy and army and the immobile defenses pertaining to the army should all be considered together in order to design the strongest defense for the smallest expenditure of money, for in such schemes economical considerations control.
In the question of guns our naval vessels come in contact with the immobile defenses of the army and in the question of landing forces with the mobile force. It costs far more to mount and protect guns afloat than ashore, but the effective radius of the gun on shore is limited by its range, while that of the gun afloat is limited only by the coal endurance of the ship. Again, carrying troops on men-of-war is far more expensive than carrying them on transports, yet where a small force only is needed a landing party from a ship-of-war may be very effective. The scheme should be so designed as to utilize the best points of the mobile and the immobile defenses, and refrain from mixing their qualities. What can be best done on land assign to the army; what requires to be confined to one port or district assign to the fixed defenses, and leave to the naval forces their principal merit, mobility. Cases may arise where, because of certain topographical peculiarities, a harbor requires floating batteries for its defense; but they are fortunately few. Even torpedo boats, which are an inexpensive means of securing a certain amount of defensive power, when supported by a naval force and protected by fixed defenses or difficulties of navigation, should not be confined to the limits of particular ports.
The most expensive way of mounting guns, when due weight is given to their proportional effectiveness, is on monitors or floating batteries. The cost is far greater than mounting them on land, and the effective radius is but slightly increased, while accuracy of fire is decreased. I therefore strongly dissent from the writer's proposition to build fifty monitors, and firmly believe that we have sufficient of that type to meet our present needs, if we are to have adequate fixed defenses.
Commerce destroyers have but little military value and I should regret to see the nation's wealth diverted to such costly experiments; and while all naval officers must gladly welcome the addition of many St. Pauls to our merchant marine, it is to be hoped that a better employment than commerce destroying can be found for them in time of war.
Lieutenant Ellicott has confused the army scout with the spy, and in the same way has confused the functions of the vessels he compares with the army scouts. A fast vessel of great coal endurance with but little power of offense or defense, and resembling a merchant vessel, would partake more of the characteristics of a spy than a scout, and similar limitations must be placed upon the nature of the information that can be obtained by them. The vessels he proposes to build would be costly experiments while we have a suitable merchant marine to draw upon for the purpose. The true scout is the armored cruiser of from 6,000 to 7,000 tons displacement. I do not think Lieutenant Ellicott has grasped the true use of the armored cruiser, and I do not believe it is advisable to create more New Yorks. Our protected cruisers have sufficient offensive power for scouts, but are wanting in protection. We want a vessel that can take considerable punishment and endure a little fighting when endeavoring to obtain information. If two fleets were endeavoring to gain touch with each other with protected cruisers for scouts, either the scouts would destroy each other, or the only information that would be brought back by the runaways would be that the enemy's scouts were out. To bring news of the strength of the fleet we require the endurance of armored cruisers, and the necessary qualities have been obtained in other countries by building vessels of less than 7,000 tons.
The only objection I see to Lieutenant Ellicott's requirements as to torpedo boats is the difficulty of obtaining boats "of the highest attainable speed, of habitable dimensions, yet of draught, length and beam which will permit them to pass through all canals and sounds which parallel our Atlantic coast." I should have thought that it would have been necessary to improve a few of the canals and some of the channels in the sounds or else to be satisfied with inferior boats.
The most dangerous portion of Lieutenant Ellicott's paper, to my mind, is that which sets forth the formidable fleet that he believes should be produced in the next ten or fifteen years. His heresies as to types may not have very serious weight with those who have the shaping of our naval shipbuilding policy; but even now a portion of the public view the Navy with suspicion and suggest ambitious motives, when only an inadequate defense has been suggested. To give them cause for such suspicion, as Lieutenant Ellicott's paper does, is to jeopardize the future of the Navy and tends to prevent our having a naval force adequate for the defense of the coast and sufficient to maintain the integrity of our communications. I trust that many officers will register their disapproval of this ambitious program, for I know that there are but few who do not think it calls for a fleet far in excess of the present needs of our country.
We need more battle-ships, more armored cruisers and many torpedo boats, with some fixed defenses, both fortifications and mines. But to build Chinese walls on land or European armadas for the sea is not in accordance with the policy of this country, nor can it be for the good of any republic.
Lieutenant J. C. Wilson, U. S. Navy.—The subject which the writer has chosen for discussion is one not only of interest and importance to the naval service and country in general, but it is a subject which cannot be discussed and settled too soon; as upon "the composition of the fleet" depends our ability to protect our shores from invasion, our seaboard cities from devastation, as well as to enable us to deal damaging blows to the enemy:—in short, to make a successful defense of our property and honor, and to maintain that position of power and influence, as well as to assume the responsibilities which belong to the greatest nation of the Western hemisphere. Strategy and tactics, knowledge of our own waters and of methods of offense and defense, are of but little avail without the "Fleet"; and the "Fleet" is valuable in proportion to its properly constituted and balanced strength. Such proper constitution of naval forces cannot be obtained haphazard. It must be arrived at by systematic study by the best experts, and a regular program laid down by which in a reasonable time we shall possess a fleet commensurate with the requirements. Such a program should be accepted by Congress and an "Act" passed that the "Fleet" should be increased by so many tons per year, leaving to experts the details as to how this tonnage should be divided. I agree with the writer in the desirability of having a number of comparatively light-draught monitors for coast and harbor defense, but I think they should be capable of maintaining a speed of twelve knots, for reasons hereafter referred to. I do not agree with the writer as to the distribution of these monitors. Counting out the Pacific coast and accepting as sufficient thirty monitors for the Atlantic coast, I think the separating of these thirty into five divisions, most of them out of radius of mutual support, introduces an element of unnecessary weakness. If six monitors are good, twelve or more are better, and it will be conceded that if the twelve or more can be brought against the enemy together they will do more good than if half of their number were sealed up in harbor or inland waters. I think the monitors in question should not be divided into more than three divisions, the larger one (say of twelve) to rendezvous m the torpedo protected waters of the Vineyard Sound; another (say of ten) in those of the Chesapeake, so as to be within supporting distance of the main fleet of battle-ships, which would take the sea to meet an enemy approaching our coast. The third (say of eight) I would rendezvous in the Gulf, preferably at Mobile. The sea-going torpedo boats should be distributed with the monitors. Should an enemy succeed in eluding our fleet, the harbor defense of torpedoes and fortifications should be sufficient to hold them in check until our available floating force of battle-ships, monitors and all, could be brought against them. This point, however, is more a matter of detail than of the question of "the composition of the fleet." While agreeing with the writer as to the desirability of monitors, I do not agree with him as to the immediate necessity as compared to battle-ships and torpedo boats. In the program for yearly building I should build at least six battle-ships and twenty torpedo boats. I advocate, however, increasing the yearly expenditure to $30,000,000, so as to include the monitors, armored cruisers and scout vessels. I do not think it wise to construct more than six vessels of any one class (other than torpedo boats) per year, owing to the changes in details of construction and varying conditions of warfare which are developed from time to time. If $20,000,000 were all that could be expended in any one year I would devote the whole amount to battle-ships and torpedo boats.
I think the idea of having specially constructed scout vessels a very good one, though should our merchant marine ever become rehabilitated it might be depended upon for these vessels. The advantage, however, of having them specially constructed and always available as part of the fleet both for maneuvers and war service, is I think sufficient to warrant their special construction.
I do not agree with the writer as to the importance of similarity in design in vessels. It is a very easy matter to modify a "watch, quarter and station bill" so as to apply to any vessel, and whether the levers, valves and cranks are in the same position in all vessels or not is in my opinion a matter of no great importance, as the men whose duty it becomes to handle them can readily learn their positions and peculiarities of construction. It is very important, however, to have a "homogeneous fleet," that is, a fleet composed of vessels of equal or nearly equal speed, coal endurance and maneuvering qualities. All the vessels of a fleet should be at least up to a standard speed and coal endurance, and the units of each class as nearly equal in offensive and defensive qualities as practicable. In this connection the cruising speed of a "fleet" should be determined upon, and vessels built with this point in view. Of course, vessels intended for special work could be designed accordingly, but all should be equal to maintaining the "fleet" requirements. For this reason I advocate (as already mentioned) the monitors being able to maintain a speed of twelve knots so that they could act with the "fleet" whenever considered desirable. Taking into consideration the "armor and armament" and coal endurance considered necessary for a first-class battle-ship, moderate speed only can be obtained, and fifteen knots are considered by the best experts as the maximum speed necessary for a battleship under natural draught. This means a maintained speed of about twelve knots, and is accepted as the "fleet" speed of modern war vessels.
It is to be hoped that at no distant day we will be able to have "maneuvers" similar to those inaugurated by the English, where the attacking and defending fleets would be complete as to composition and maneuvered as in actual warfare. All drills, tactical exercises and strategical problems necessarily lead up to the point of giving practical illustrations of the part that our "fleet" is to play in case of war. The "War College" is doing invaluable and necessary work in expounding methods; but practice with the " fleet " under probable conditions of war is absolutely necessary before we can know what can be done with it; and in order to get the best, or even satisfactory results, "the composition of the fleet" must be carefully studied and the results of such study systematically carried out. I think, in this connection, it is well to call attention to the necessity of the same care being taken respecting the "personnel"—and I can think of no better way to insure the necessary and systematic increase of this force than by authorizing a per-tonnage increase. I am not prepared to say how much the personnel should increase to keep up with the "materiel," but I think it would be safe to say about five hundred per ten thousand tons. The writer has chosen a most important subject for discussion and has handled it in a most admirable manner, and I feel sure that the exposition of his views on the subject cannot but be productive of goods results.
Commander C. F. Goodrich.—I have never read a paper in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute which, in my opinion, exhibited no single redeeming feature, but the essay by Lieutenant Ellicott very nearly satisfies this exacting condition. Broadly speaking, he proposes nothing which commends itself to my judgment. The enviable ease and grace of his diction appear alone to have warranted the award of an honorable mention.
There is no evidence that "we are in daily jeopardy of national humiliation by seeing some strong power deliberately ignore our doctrine," etc. Yet upon this assumption he bases his demand for a colossal fleet. If he be correct, then the wonder arises as to how we have managed to escape a direful fate during the twenty-five to thirty years following the late war, when our navy was a negligible quantity.
Mr. Ellicott's plan rests upon a policy which he thinks the nation should adopt, but he fails to show any good reason for so radical a departure from the teachings of Washington that have gradually crystallized into the unwritten law of our dealings with foreign powers. Our predominance in the Western world derives from a consistent and honorable course of upright action towards others and from a recognition of our great contingent power. It loses no strength from our immediate lack of an overwhelming fleet. Some measure of available force is desirable, lest our interference be deemed capricious and our rights be ignored: but, surely, under no conceivable circumstances compatible with just regard for others can we ever have need of so stupendous a defense as is suggested. I am almost led to suspect that a joke has been perpetrated on those who take the essay seriously. Except for the fear that outsiders might be induced into misapprehending the general opinion of the Navy, I should spare my time and your patience in this discussion.
Mr. Ellicott is right in calling for a yearly increase of vessels "as large as the finances of the country will permit." We still need more ships of proper types, but things are come to a grievous pass if it is necessary to spend three hundred millions of dollars before we can be reasonably secure from molestation! As well write three thousand millions—one sum is quite as easy to secure as the other.
The fact is that the writer's premises are all wrong. He has unconsciously adopted the army notion of coast defense, and a great part of the fleet he proposes would be a mere adjunct to the fixed works. Now, the army has literally and absolutely nothing to do with coast defense. Its province is harbor defense pure and simple. It is time this distinction was drawn, before the unfortunate and unwarranted deduction is made that the defense of our seaboard can be effected by soldiers. History in general—our own in particular—teaches that attacks from over the water are repelled by ships. Yet we see military writers in high authority lamenting the money already spent on the Navy, and arguing that the same sum would have accomplished the complete protection of our coast. Towards such a mistaken notion this essay, if unchallenged, will be a positive and doubtless welcome contribution. The country needs fortifications—neither extravagant nor unduly developed—at the principal ports, for refuge, for bases, and against bombardment. More than this it does not want. The fleet can and will do the rest.
We want no coast defense vessels of any particular type, for, as Captain Eardly-Wilmot, R.N., has justly remarked, "The principle of building special ships for operations confined to the coast found no favor with our ancestors, taught by the experience of long wars that a sea-going fleet is the best defense against any attempt on the part of an enemy to approach our shores…It has been well said, also, that all ironclads are coast defense vessels, when coasts require to be defended; but when coasts do not require to be defended, a ship which can defend coasts and do nothing else is a ship out of place." What we do want is a few, a very few, more battle-ships and some torpedo boats. When we get these we shall be in a position to laugh at any enemy, no matter how strong his fleet may be at home. To attempt operations on our seaboard—our squadron of eight or more good battle-ships being in hand—is a task not lightly to be undertaken by any foe. Personally I incline to the belief that it would never be attempted, for time and locality are on the side of the defense.
To localize our naval defense as is proposed would be to scatter our forces, abandon strategy, surrender the command of our water approaches, and forget the teachings of the past. For one I record an emphatic protest. If Mr. Ellicott gets all the battle-ships his program calls for, his harbor defense ships will be needless. If he can't get his battle-ships, then his monitors will be misused. There is no tertium quid.
Mr. Ellicott further wishes as many armored cruisers as battle-ships. Now, while the armored cruiser may be a valuable unit, the fact has not yet been shown. She is a new type without analogue in the past. It would be unwise to build more vessels of this class until their true use has been demonstrated on sound tactical grounds. I only mean to imply that we have all taken her for granted and that, as yet, no one has made out a good case for her. We should postpone building armored cruisers until our fighting line is made up. Even then, few admirals, if given the choice, would prefer an armored cruiser to an additional battle-ship. When the Navy has money to burn it will be time enough to call for new and untried types.
Mr. Ellicott has a mistaken notion as to the scout. She should be large, for with increased size comes increased steaming radius and the ability to proceed in heavy weather. She should not have torpedoes, for her duty is to observe and report—not to fight. Her safety lies in her speed.
I am surprised to find at this day, and among naval officers, an advocate of commerce destroying. Wars are brought to a conclusion by defeating fleets and armies—not by letters of marque afloat and guerillas ashore. We won our independence, not by privateering, but in spite of it. Although we had at one time hard on to 90,000 men in armed vessels, we had to turn to France and her organized marine for the substantial aid that ended the war.
The War of 1812 was a drawn game. Both sides tired of the quarrel and agreed to stop. The treaty of peace contains no mention of the grievance that led us to throw down the gauntlet. Surely our wholesale adoption of this predatory warfare, had it been of real military value, ought to have gained us something on the credit side when the accounts came to be settled.
It is well known that commerce destroying had no influence on the result of the Rebellion, vast as was our loss. And yet, at this late date we find a thoughtful naval writer asking for more Columbias! It seems incredible.
I am sorry to differ so radically with a colleague of such capacity and intelligence, but believing, as I do, that the views he advances are certain to work great harm to the service, both inside and outside, I have not hesitated to speak strongly in opposition. We cannot afford to be thought by the country at large as favoring such draughts on the treasury for a shipbuilding policy which in many of its parts is absolutely condemned by many competent authorities and the necessity of whose extent is not proved beyond peradventure by historical precedent.
Lieutenant R. C. Smith, U. S. Navy.—I have read Mr. Ellicott's paper with interest, and I doubt if much fault can be found with the main propositions he advances. His essay is almost too brief in view of the importance of the subject, and its different features could well be dilated on.
Perhaps an amplification of the proposed torpedo flotilla might be considered. The last three or four years have witnessed a very extensive modification of opinions which had prevailed for a considerable period and were evidenced by certain lines of construction.
Thus there were torpedo boats pure and simple, of the first and second classes; the former more or less independent and some actually sea-keeping, the latter designed to be carried on the decks of vessels. There were the torpedo boat catchers of 400 tons and upwards, which could catch torpedo boats in rough weather but not in smooth, and could not follow them into shoal water. They had a fair torpedo armament to use against ships when they had a chance, as well as the rapid-fire gun armament to use against torpedo boats, vide the English Rattlesnake.
Then there were the torpedo cruisers, the use of which has never been demonstrated. They were too slow to catch torpedo boats, too slow for scouts, too weak to go near enough to larger ships to use their torpedoes when they could be seen, and too large to get near enough without being seen. They had usually a heavy gun armament and a large torpedo armament. The English Scout, from which our Yorktown class was developed, was a fair example.
The first-class boats were found to be unsatisfactory except when used from a fixed base. The crews could not live in them for extended periods at sea in all weathers. Their scope was found to be in operating with the squadron on its own coast and in raiding from a base.
The second-class boats are not in great favor because they cannot be used from ships except in fair weather, and if they are not lowered in action they will be shot to pieces in their cradles. The compromise is a vidette launch, now often of wood, under 60 feet in length, steaming 16 or 17 knots, armed with a light gun, carrying her torpedoes inside frames or leaving them aboard ship, as the case may be, and taking her chances in an action with the other boats of the fleet.
The torpedo boat catchers are absolutely discredited. In the struggle to make them seaworthy and habitable the size was increased to 1,100 tons as in the English Dryad class, in which the speed did not exceed 19 knots.
The torpedo cruisers were habitable, but had even less speed. The modern idea is to omit torpedoes in all the above types except torpedo boats proper, and to modify their batteries by substituting the greatest number of the lightest rapid-fire guns consistent with displacement. None others will probably be built except in the scout class proper.
From the above considerations sprang the torpedo boat destroyers. These vessels were to be fast enough to catch torpedo boats in rough or smooth weather, and were to have light enough draught to follow them into shoal water. They were to be large enough to be seaworthy and habitable, but not large enough to sacrifice invisibility under conditions suitable for torpedo attack, and were to have a good steaming radius. Their armament was to be primarily guns, but they were to have a few large torpedoes to use against ships. The requirements pointed to an enlarged torpedo boat. The result is the class from the Havock to the Desperate, from 220 to 300 tons, and from 27 to 30 knots.
As to our own needs, there seems to be little use in going beyond the Gushing until the destroyer class is reached. The Gushing of 138 feet and 106 tons, is large enough and has speed enough to operate from a shore base. This could well be the type for permanent harbor defense and for the use of the Naval Militia.
To accompany the fleet a boat of double the size is required, from 250 to 300 tons. It is difficult to find a use for intermediate sizes. They can be made faster than Cushings, but they are larger than necessary for their armament and the duties required of them, and are not large enough to keep the sea permanently.
Speed is useful in arriving on the scene of action and in getting out of action. In a surprise attack at night a moderate rather than a high speed is required both to prevent discovery by the bow wave and to enable the torpedoes to be launched with accuracy. Speed, however, is useful in catching torpedo boats. These considerations practically determine two types, torpedo boats proper and torpedo boat destroyers.
The short torpedoes are practically given up abroad for want of accuracy. The prevailing type for all boats except vidette launches is the long 18-inch (5 metres, 16 ½ feet). The tubes are preferably on the centre line, and are two or three in number according to the size of the boat. The long spoons permit a very fair angle of train on either beam. Bow tubes are abandoned, for structural and weatherly considerations, on account of the danger of overrunning the torpedo and because they cannot be used in a seaway. Short torpedoes may be mounted on the sides, as are the Cushing's, but for the longer type the practice would be preferably as above. For vidette launches the long 14-inch torpedo is preferred to the short 18-inch.
I should therefore increase Mr. Ellicott's allowance of 100 first-class boats, which he very properly stations in the ports of the various districts, by 50 torpedo boat destroyers to accompany the fleet wherever required. It is to be noticed, however, that these destroyers should be able to navigate all the canals and inland waters along the Atlantic coast. For this purpose they should not exceed 210 feet and 300 tons. Only special and local considerations will in some cases justify types different from the two indicated above.
Commander C.C. Todd, U.S. Navy.—Lieutenant Ellicott's article gives every evidence of much careful thought, but I must differ on one or more points, while agreeing in the main.
I assume our fleet is to be primarily a defensive one. Our future operations will be on this side of the western ocean, therefore the work devolving upon our Navy can be done by a smaller one than that called for by the essayist. The best harbor defense is the best coast defense by means of a force that will drive from our shores any sent across the water against us. As the monitor type is not an efficient sea-going fighting vessel, I would build no more of that class.
We now have, or are building, enough of the so-called cruiser type. Their use in war would be but incidental, their places and functions of scouts being replaced by auxiliary merchant steamers of equal or greater speed and very much greater steaming radius. This also applies to the Columbia class, as provided for by Lieutenant Ellicott.
I fully agree with the writer as to the necessity and value of the armored cruiser. In my own mind, they are only inferior to the battleship itself. I agree that one of this type should be provided for each battle-ship, but would not choose the New York as a type. I would prefer an enlarged Olympia of not exceeding 7000 tons, which would give her a light armor belt to keep out light projectiles.
Modern conditions call for the presence in a battle fleet of a proportion of torpedo-boat destroyers and torpedo-boats. The proportion of the former I would fix at one for each battle-ship, of about 800 tons displacement; of the latter, two (of about 150 tons displacement) for each battle-ship.
As to the battle fleet itself, we must in emergencies expect to have a percentage under repair, such that they cannot be brought quickly into service. But, in my judgment, for purely defensive purposes we could well fix the maximum at twenty; sixteen for the Eastern, four for the Western seaboard. But in fixing this number I would be understood as including only the later battle-ships, not the Maine or Texas. For coast defense the fleet suggested would be—
Battle-ships, 1st class, Indiana, 20
Armored cruisers, improved Olympia, 20
Torpedo-destroyers (800 tons), 20
Torpedo-boats (150 tons), 40
Auxiliary cruisers for scouting, 40
This does not of course apply to harbor defense by smaller torpedo-boats, etc., but with such a fleet efficiently handled we would have the best coast, harbor, and national defense from foreign assault.
Lieutenant W. F. Fullam, U. S. Navy.—Mr. Ellicott's essay is a model of brevity and logic. The practical principles that should govern the building of our Navy are presented so clearly and concisely that those who have not the inclination or patience to read the volumes that have been written on the subject may get, in these few pages, all the information that is really necessary. There are many such people. For the good of the Navy they should have a chance to read this essay.
The building program advocated is not an extravagant one for a country as large as ours with such an extensive coast. We have suffered greatly from the theory, heretofore advanced so generally, that this country only needs a small navy, and that the chances of war will be lessened by remaining in a defenseless condition. Considering the inevitable growth of the United States in population and wealth, and the expansion of trade that is sure to follow, the one hundred and sixty ships of all classes and one hundred torpedo-boats proposed by Mr. Ellicott will not constitute a large navy by any means. Those who believe that a navy is a necessity should stop treating the subject in a timid and apologetic tone. Instead of begging Congress for appropriations they should point out to the taxpayer in plain English just what this country must have to maintain its position and dignity as a nation.
Mr. Ellicott has selected the proper types of ships—there can be no doubt of that—and it is gratifying to find the proportion of fighting or battle-ships so large in his building program. Our Navy should, above all things, be built to fight.
In dividing the coast into districts and in taking account of strategic conditions and requirements the essayist has built his argument upon a rock. It is in this manner that the Naval War College—thanks to its influence—approaches this question. An intelligent "General Staff" would handle it in the same way. Every country should build its navy to suit such conditions.
There is, perhaps, one legitimate cause to criticize some of our new ships, due to the failure to suit the design to the peculiarities of our coast. Some of our ships draw too much water. It would be a great point of advantage in time of war if the draught of our ships could be kept down to the lowest practicable limit, so that they might safely enter certain channels and ports in all conditions of the tide. The latter condition might keep the enemy out and hamper his movements. At present we lose this advantage in some cases. Ships are compelled to wait two weeks for a high tide to get into dock, and two weeks more before they can get out. In the meantime they might be sadly needed. In advocating the standardizing of ships and their machinery and fittings, and uniformity in organization also, the essayist sounds one of the key-notes of readiness and efficiency for war. When we note the lack of precision in the evolution of a squadron made up of different types of ships with different turning circles, etc., the advantage of having one type in each line is at once apparent. It would bring order out of chaos very often. And if machinery and fittings are standardized in each type, fatal delays may be avoided. One ship may furnish another with spare parts in an emergency. The Indiana was once saved a long delay by getting a valve stem from the Massachusetts. The result of a battle might hinge upon such an incident.
It is time to come to a definite decision regarding certain matters in naval construction and in ship organization. The data at hand is sufficient. Pigeon-holes are well stocked with valuable information. Some of it should be taken out and used.
Lieutenant J. M. Bowyer, U. S. Navy.—I have read with great satisfaction the valuable paper on "The Composition of the Fleet," by Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, U.S. Navy, and am pleased to note that his subject has been carefully and well considered and ably handled.
It is nine years since I had the pleasure of taking the course at the Naval War College, but I think I recognize the ear-marks of that excellent institution in Mr. Ellicott's essay, not only in the soundness of his propositions, but also in the total absence of what may be called "snap-shots."
There was a time, not many years ago, when almost every officer of the Navy, regardless of rank or corps, was not only ready at all times, but willing and apparently anxious to take a "snap-shot" at the needs of the country as regards the Navy. Everybody had an opinion ready at hand, or would manufacture one on short notice and without sufficient deliberation.
The War College has taught us that the composition of the fleet is a problem which demands careful study and an intimate knowledge of all its factors.
I agree perfectly with the essayist in the following statement, which might well be adopted as the Navy platform: "To uphold that [the Monroe] doctrine against all odds we must have a powerful fleet, and until we build it we are in daily jeopardy of national humiliation by seeing some strong foreign power deliberately ignore our doctrine, while we hold ourselves up to ridicule by impotent protest, or sacrifice our small nucleus of a Navy in a futile attempt at enforcement." Recent events emphasize every word of the foregoing, and our legislators must be made to fully understand that we cannot do something with nothing—that we must have proper tools to work with; that a powerful fleet is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of our national honor.
While I agree with the essayist that we will probably never attempt the invasion of the territory of a transoceanic enemy, still I can conceive of a condition of affairs which might make it advisable to capture and hold portions of that territory as a secondary base for blockading; and quite as large a fleet would be required for the one as for the other.
As to the composition of the fleet, I agree with the essayist in the main. I think his proportions are good, and I like his idea of scout vessels. As for commerce-destroyers, we should get them from the merchant service and build no more Columbias. It is well that we have the Columbia and Minneapolis, because they can be used as transports in peace times.
Every officer that has served on a foreign station knows what a serious handicap it is not to be able to send home the sick and the prisoners and to receive drafts periodically to fill vacancies. If the Columbia and Minneapolis were used as transports they would add greatly to the efficiency and discipline of foreign stations, and would always be sufficiently near their fields of operation for war.
I accept with pleasure Mr. Ellicott's estimate of the number of vessels of each class required for our fleet. By all means let us unite on it or something substantially the same, and when we get them, if we then think that they are insufficient, let us ask for more, and, above all things, let us fight shy of expensive novelties in naval architecture which are always "going to," but seldom do "revolutionize naval warfare."