Throughout the general advance in the arts and sciences, nowhere has progress been more marked, more continuous, than in naval architecture. From the line-of-battle ship of fifty years ago, to the modern mast-less ironclad with ram bow, high speed, and few guns, is a long distance, marked by continuous change and improvement. In full and eager rivalry the guns have changed with the ships, from the old 32-pounders, along the line of smoothbore shell-guns and muzzle-loading rifles, until now the full-powered breech-loading steel gun cries halt to the constructor.
But with such radical changes in ships and guns, how slight have been the changes in the tactics for handling these ships and using these new weapons to the best advantage! A fond clinging to the traditions of the past signalizes most of the changes that have been made. It was some time after steam had been introduced before any change in the old system of naval tactics was attempted. The French were the first to put forth a clear, well-defined system of steam naval tactics. Upon their system ours is founded, and for purely evolutionary exercises it is, perhaps, all that is to be desired; but the changes in ships and in their armament during the last twenty years have, to my mind, made necessary as radical changes in the tactics of battle as were necessitated by the introduction of steam itself. The effect of these changes has been almost wholly ignored. Indeed, many of them have become established facts since our present steam tactics were written.
In the United States Naval Tactics there are only four signals having any reference to an order of battle, and there are virtually only two formations: order of battle in two lines, and in two columns. The latter, we are told, is to be used by vessels whose main strength lies in their broadside batteries. It is hardly to be conceived, however, at the present day, that any Admiral commanding a fleet of modern vessels would receive an attack in this formation, exposing the broadsides of his fleet to the rams of his enemy, and trusting to his guns to stop them. The remainder of the four hundred and odd signals are purely evolutionary, having little reference to actual warfare, or only such reference as the exercises of the gymnasium have to the fitting of the athlete for the river or the ball-ground. I do not mean to depreciate the value of evolutionary tactics; on the contrary, their importance can hardly be exaggerated. Nor do I sympathize with a remark I heard made by an officer during the drill in the Bay of Florida some years ago, that it would have answered just as well to have gotten together a dozen steam-launches with the commanding officers in charge of them. That would have defeated the main object of the drill, which was more a school for the nerves than for the understanding. In a week's time any schoolboy could master the principles of our steam tactics; but the difficulty experienced in the Bay of Florida, and in later drills as well, from what I have heard, was to get one vessel within a cable's length of another and keep her there. To instruct commanding and other officers in the speed and turning power of their vessels, under varying circumstances of wind and weather; to accustom them to maneuvering these vessels at all speeds in close proximity to others; to train the eye, the judgment, and above all, the nerves—these seem to me the true objects of evolutionary drills, fitting the fleet, as the evolutions of the parade-ground do the battalion, for actual warfare, each however to be discarded when the serious business of war begins.
The French system of naval tactics and our own, as Commodore Parker says in his introduction, are simply an adaptation of military to naval tactics. The Introduction of steam has, of course, added greatly to the mobility of our fleets, and to a great degree made such an adaptation practicable; but it appears to me that the military Idea may be carried too far.
In Parker's Steam Fleet Tactics, and even in a recent English Naval Prize Essay, plans of battle are proposed, the principal ideas of which are concentration on one wing, doubling on one wing, feinting on one wing, and attacking another. These are maneuvers that are frequently carried out on shore under cover of woods or broken ground, but are hardly practicable at the present day in the open sea and in the broad light of the sun. To gain the weather-gauge, to double on the van division and throw the rear or lee division out of action, were favorite maneuvers in the days of the old sailing vessels, and the brilliant success that has followed such strategy in the past still has its effect upon the tactics of to-day; but when we consider that hereafter fleets will go into action with a speed of at least ten knots, and that the right vessel of the largest fleet will be within easy range of the guns of the vessel on the left, it seems idle to talk of feinting on one wing and attacking the other, or to expect more than momentary advantage from concentration, at the expense, perhaps, of confusion and disorder in your own fleet. And here I will stop a moment to consider the great stress that is laid upon concentration; this seems to me a fallacy that we are most likely to fall into by following too closely the military idea. In the English Naval Prize Essay of 1880 (a very valuable paper), concentration is one of the main points insisted upon. In one instance given, of an imaginary naval battle of the future, B's fleet advances in column of vessels to attack A's fleet in line abreast (the favored formation). As soon as A discovers that it is B's intention to pierce his line in his present formation, he makes signal to his fleet, in accordance with a previous arrangement, and at the proper distance, determined by sextant, and after due consideration of the table of helm angles, he hauls down the signal, and the right and left wings simultaneously put their helms respectively to starboard and port. The result theoretically is the ramming of B's vessels, which, with a fatuity to be encountered only on paper, continue on their way; but, as the essayist in another place states that the difference between ramming and being rammed is only a ship's length, it seems more than probable that such a plan would bring the two wings of A's fleet together in dangerous, if not disastrous, confusion, and there would be as much likelihood of their ramming each other as of their ramming the enemy. A careful reading of a sextant, or an accurate application of the table of helm angles, at such a moment is hardly to be counted upon. I do not mean to discredit the usefulness of such tables, nor do I think there is any danger that we can know too much about such matters, or have too many scientific or mechanical aids to judgment. But it seems to me that the true time for the application of all these aids is during the evolutionary drills, all of which are simply to educate the eye and train the judgment of the captain for the time when he must throw aside such aids and act instantaneously, and without hesitation, upon the decision of the moment.
It is not, however, surprising that there should be a wide difference of opinion on the question of naval tactics; the whole subject is purely tentative. There has been only one combat between fleets since the introduction of steam—the battle of Lissa. In that action the Austrians in line abreast, attacked the Italians in line ahead; the latter appeared to have no especial plan of battle, while that of the Austrians seemed, as has been said by an English writer on naval tactics, very similar to those of Donnybrook Fair, "whenever you see a head, hit it." As far as tactical lessons go, there is little to be learned from Lissa, except perhaps the fact that to ram successfully, vessels must have speed and use it. The Austrians pierced the Italian line, but, strange to say, effected no damage in doing so. After this maneuver the action became a general melee. The Austrian vessels, without any general order, devoted themselves principally to attempts to ram, some of them even securing their broadside batteries. From lack of speed and an impression that it was necessary to slow down or stop the engines before collision, most of these attempts were failures, the sinking of the Re d'Italia being the only marked success.
Out of this victory of the Austrians, however, has grown up a strong sentiment in favor of attacking in line abreast, some writers favoring the single line, others the double line, still more, perhaps, the double line indented (the formation prescribed in our tactics), while some propose even three lines, as in the "Carre Naval" of Admiral Bouet Willaumez, where a squadron of nine vessels is formed in three lines, three abreast, and this square is considered the tactical unit, certainly the perfection of concentration; but it seems to me impossible to imagine that such a fleet can be carried into action without being completely broken up and disorganized by the first shock. An accident to any one of the vessels of the first and second lines must cause those in rear to run into her, or, in their endeavors to avoid collision, to break up the square. To reform it in action would seem impossible. Remembering that the modern ironclad is generally a vessel of from six to nine thousand tons displacement, with ram bow, and a maintained speed of from ten to twelve knots, that ships in close order are only one hundred fathoms apart, it would seem a fundamental rule for all orders of battle that no vessel of a fleet should be in the water of another. Certainly, in the moment of going into action a commanding officer should not be required to keep his eyes glued to the speed-ball of the next ahead, and his nerves at a high tension to avoid a collision with his leader or being rammed by his next astern.
At the present time there are two distinct systems of tactics in use: 1st, that in which the single vessel is made the tactical unit, as it is with us; 2d, the group system. The latter originated with the French, and has been adopted in part and with modifications by the English. The idea is the subdivision of the fleet into groups, generally of three, which shall be maneuvered as units, the vessels of each group maintaining the same relations toward each other through all evolutions, Nos. 2 and 3 confining their attention simply to maintaining their positions relative to the group leader, who is responsible for the group. It is claimed that this gives greater mobility to a fleet, greater capacity for concentrating and dispersing, and especially greater facility for reforming during the confusion of battle. It seems to me such claims are well founded. At the same time there has been much difficulty experienced in handling these groups as single vessels, at least by the English, for, according to Captain Freemantle (Naval Prize Essay, 1880), it is prescribed in their manual that "when ships are in group formation, any signal which entails an alteration of course is to be acted upon by all the ships in each group together, unless otherwise ordered, and group formation is not to be resumed until signal to that effect is made." This certainly would seem to show that the groups, as arranged by the English, are not handily maneuvered. As far as I know, there has been little if any similar complaint from the French; this is due probably to the difference in formation of groups adopted, and their systems of maneuvering. The English group is in the form of a scalene triangle, the French in the form of an equilateral triangle with the apex toward the enemy.
In maneuvering their groups, the English have endeavored to handle Nos. 2 and 3 of each group by helm and variations of speed, so that throughout all evolutions they would maintain their position relative to No. 1. The difficulty of this is apparent; to accomplish it would require the most careful management and the nicest calculations throughout. The French on the contrary have gone to the opposite extreme; Nos. 2 and 3 of their groups are required simply to gain their positions at the close of each evolution as best they can. As these orders apply to two-thirds of the vessels, it would seem as if a fleet must be very thoroughly exercised before evolutions can be performed without indecision, hesitation, and delay; unless well accustomed to work together, one commanding officer will naturally wait to see in what direction his consort will move before putting over his own helm. The French group formation or peloton d'attaque is criticized on the ground that Nos. 2 and 3 mutually mask each other's fire, while the scalene triangle, it is claimed, gives free use to each vessel of the group of her guns, ram, and torpedoes. In endeavoring to obtain all this, however, the English have sacrificed the mobility of the group, and consequently the very principle of the system, which makes it imperative that the groups should be handy and capable of being maneuvered as single vessels.
Firmly believing in the fundamental principle at the bottom of the group system, I would suggest that the groups consist of two vessels; in other words, that the fleet should be divided into pairs, mutually supporting and depending upon one another, the No. 1 of each pair in charge of, and responsible for, the movements of the two. There would be required only two original formations for the pairs as follows
In either case the position of No. 2 would be four points abaft the beam, distant two cable's-lengths. All evolutions should be performed by the pairs without change of form unless otherwise signaled; No. 1 of each pair maneuvering in accordance with present tactics for single vessels. No. 2 placing herself in the proper position from No. 1 by the shortest possible route and without reference to any other vessel. This it seems to me will secure the greatest possible mobility, and at the same time, as the groups are entirely distinct, and there is no provocation for No. 2 of one group to get in the way of No. 2 of another, this would obviate the indecision and danger likely to occur in following the same rule with the French groups of three. At the same time it seems to me as contrary to the true principle of the group system to require No. 2, in all evolutions, to move on a prescribed curve, as it would be to the true principles of military tactics to require a skirmish line in broken country to march with the regularity and precision of a battalion on review.
The value of this subdivision of a fleet into pairs seems to me capable of proof in many ways. It simplifies maneuvers, in that one-half of the fleet have no other duties to perform than to maintain their position in relation each to his own leader. Each leader of a pair will advance to the charge and use his ram or torpedo with more confidence, knowing that his consort is close at his back to support him if disabled, or aid him in overwhelming his adversary if successful. The reforming a fleet after once passing through the enemy's line will certainly be much simpler and shorter work if the vessels first group themselves in pairs.
Let us suppose two fleets of twelve vessels each advancing to the attack, A in line abreast by pairs, B in two lines. It will be perceived that A's formation is virtually the same as the indented line or the "order of battle in two lines" of our own tactics; but to my mind the strength of the formation and the mobility of the fleet are greatly increased by its subdivision into pairs.
Whatever may be the result of the next great naval war and the consequent tactics of the future, nothing seems better settled now than that in the next engagement of fleets the ram will be made the first and principal weapon, and fleets will, in one formation or another, advance on each other bows on. With this purpose we will suppose the two fleets A and B advancing at full speed. Should any or all of A's first line come into collision with B's first line, B's second line must get out of the way or ram their leaders. In doing this, should they put their helms a-starboard, they will present their broadsides to the rams of A's second line, the Nos. 2 of the pairs; should they put their helms a-port they will throw themselves out of position to render any assistance to their leaders, while the position of A's second line is the very best for assisting the first line, and as free as possible from danger of accidental collision. It is, however, after the fleets have passed through each other, after the crush and confusion of the first attack, when it is desirable to reform the lines, that the value of the formation in pairs is most decided. The fleet that can reform promptly and strike a decisive second blow before the enemy is ready, will in all probability win the victory, and to accomplish that is the real mission of tactics. And here the formation in pairs will have a marked advantage; one-half of the fleet has only to look out for its position relative to its leader, the difficulties of reforming are thus reduced one-half, and even if the fleet should become disorganized as a fleet, and the action become a general mêlée as at Lissa, the pairs, acting together, would certainly prove more effective than they could be, acting independently.
I am perfectly aware how easy it is to fight out battles on paper, how naturally the enemy does what you wish him to do, and how inevitable are the favorable results you desire; I will therefore refrain from carrying on this action any farther, though the temptation is strong and precedents are numerous and unexceptionable.
I will, however, repeat the statement made earlier in this paper, that a fleet in the formation of pairs in accordance with the plan I have proposed, could, in my opinion, be maneuvered with as much facility as a fleet of single vessels in all the more important evolutions of our signal book. To add the formation by pairs and the evolutions that would necessarily follow this change to our present authorized tactics, would require an addition of perhaps thirty, not more than forty, signals.
It is not proposed to replace or set aside the old tactics, but to add the formations and evolutions by pairs as a distinct drill, which will bear a relation to the old tactics somewhat similar to the relation that the skirmish drill bears to the battalion drill in the infantry tactics. If desired, the old fleet organization could be retained; but I should prefer dropping the squadrons of four, and dividing a fleet of twelve vessels simply into two divisions of six, each division being, in accordance with the system, subdivided into three pairs. The squadron of four is not small enough to act as a unit of the group system, nor is it large enough for an independent command in a fleet so organized.
As formations for battle, fleets organized in pairs would probably make or receive an attack either in line by pairs, or in columns of pairs abreast by divisions, or in formation of pairs in open echelon, each pair bearing, according to signal, one or two points abaft the beam of the one next on its right or left.
I have written this paper more with the hope of exciting discussion and interest in this important subject, than with the expectation that my ideas will meet with general acceptance. In that hope, I trust I shall not be disappointed.
DISCUSSION.
The Chairman.—The paper and the discussion have been highly interesting. But it is to be regretted that the author has not pursued the subject further and explained the evolutions and formations that are possible under his system of grouping.
In a naval engagement under steam, where both sides are anxious for battle, and where the contending vessels are rams and carry guns of great penetrating power, the result must be the destruction of such ships as are not well handled.
Imagine two fleets, or two single ships, approaching each other, each having a speed of ten knots; the resulting force of collision would be that due to a speed of twenty knots—one mile in three minutes. The crash would be terrific. Naturally, the commanding officers would make their best endeavors to seek rather than to avoid such an encounter. If, in addition to this, there were the possibility of being run into by his consort, we can imagine that the commanding officer's position would not be an enviable one.
The formation proposed by Lieutenant-Commander Elmer would, however, in a great degree preclude the possibility of such a contingency. The discussion of the paper has shown the great diversity of opinion on the subject of fleet and squadron maneuvers. Good results will undoubtedly follow from the consequent consideration that will be given it by those who take interest in the subject of the paper to which we have listened to-night.
I feel sure that all will join me in thanking the author for his valuable contribution to naval literature.