Ten years ago, 9/11 changed our psyche concerning national security and personal privacy. Our economy has become fragile due in part to military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as reckless spending at several governmental levels. Homeland Security struggles to find a cost-effective strategy against domestic attacks, including grants for first-responder training, airport security, and measures to protect ports, harbors, and the vast U.S. coasts and inland waterways. The challenge is to seek opportunities for heightening security that are low-cost, efficient, and readily available. One such organization, already in some states, is the Naval Militia.
Initially the states’ naval force, the Naval Militia precedes the U.S. Naval Reserve, which in 1915 was established to consolidate training and personnel and relieved states of that expense. Traditionally the Navy has been a far-from-home service, performing its mission without a presence in most communities. But the past ten years have seen a resurgence of interest in the militia because it is an inexpensive force multiplier.
Title 10, Section 7854 of the U.S. Code provides federal recognition in maintaining State Naval Militias as long as 95 percent of members are active drilling reservists in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. These organizations provide trained, medically and physically qualified troops. They are available within hours’ notice to respond to state-declared disasters. A Naval Militia response is more expeditious than any federal one because personnel must live, work, or drill in their respective states. In many cases the person simply walks to the assembly point.
Since 9/11, a number of states have reestablished such militias or attempted to do so. South Carolina in 2009 stood up a unit under its state’s Maritime Security Council, with the full endorsement of the Coast Guard. Its motto is “At Home and On Duty,” summarizing the essence of an often underused resource. The qualified Naval Militia person, who could be a neighbor or coworker, may well be a first or second responder to local emergencies.
Virginia and Texas have recently commissioned Naval Militias. Ohio and New York have been operating for decades. In 2003 Wisconsin introduced legislation to reestablish the organization, only to see it defeated in its Senate, thereby losing an opportunity to make use of a fully trained and professional cadre at no educational or maintenance expense to the state. The Wisconsin argument was that its four Navy Reserve hospital units could be mobilized into a recognized militia. With 100 medically qualified personnel immediately available for recall in the event of an emergency, this would have been low-cost solution. Expenses of these efforts include issuing state orders for personnel to be paid according to their rates or ranks. In terms of indemnity risk, mobilized militias are equivalent to the Army and Air National Guard.
The New York Naval Militia, the flagship of these organizations, has for more than 100 years played a prominent role in responding to state emergencies, from Y2K planning to storms, wildfires, and 9/11. Some 4,500 members residing throughout the vast state have served honorably in the cities, suburbs, and river and lake regions.
A militia existed in New Jersey until 2002, and also contributed to the 9/11 response. But it did not comply with the Title 10 requirements and was, thus, found to be an unstructured liability that the state could not responsibly maintain. Currently New Jersey is eager to reestablish the organization, and advocacy groups are working in that direction.
Why are other states, especially in coastal areas, not more eager to have their own militias? Rhode Island is a case in point. Its General Laws 30-2-10 address a Naval Militia (if organized) to be available under the direction of the adjutant general. With a rich tradition of maritime and sea services, as of 2011 the state is home to approximately 500 active drilling reservists of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Rhode Island has 360 miles of coastal and navigable waterways and a high volume of commercial traffic in Narragansett Bay. Coupled with heavy seasonal recreational boating, this presents a scenario that challenges the Coast Guard. The state’s forces, Army and Air National Guard, are also contributing significantly to overseas deployments, at times depleting available response by half.
Therefore, this is the time to pursue reestablishing a Title 10 Naval Militia in Rhode Island and in every state. Threat experts do not say “if,” it is always in the context of “when.”