The challenge at sea with which the nations of the West find themselves confronted is sufficiently well known, Why then theory? Should we not rather concentrate on practical problems? And, moreover: Why do we not content ourselves with the naval teachings which we owe to Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan? The truth of his theories has been proven by two successive world wars.
Quite a number of reasons exist why, nevertheless, a renewed discussion on naval theory seems desirable, We witnessed a series of technical breakthroughs in the naval sector during and after World War II that had a more profound impact than any other previous technical revolution, They have—more than the simultaneous evolution of land warfare—greatly reshaped our conception of naval warfare. Such changes of the scenario of war at sea cannot leave theory untouched. Naval thinking must be re-evaluated from time to time. Not even Mahan can escape such re-evaluation. Just as Clausewitz' Theory of War acquired its full significance only after later developments freed it from many ephemeral details, so will Mahan's teachings profit, and will gain in clarity and persuasive power through the passing of time, Then only the perennial, universal quality of his theory will become evident. Our analysis will therefore deliberately be based on the core of Mahan's thinking.
Among the above-mentioned technological breakthroughs, "strategic" nuclear weapons have most profoundly changed military theory, and thereby, world politics. As far as naval warfare is concerned, professional writers of recent years have arrived at somewhat ambiguous conclusions, The British authors, Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton and Professor L. W. Martin from the Institute for Strategic Studies (to name just two) are prepared to admit only carriers of "strategic" atomic weapons for a general war at sea. They see no more basis for the exercise of sea-supremacy and control of merchant shipping. Thus the naval theory of Mahan and Corbett has, for them, become obsolete. The fleets that formerly mastered the sea are reduced to participation in a limited war overseas or to a minor role in situations of non-war.
This author does not share that view. But there is no doubt that today traditional naval theory must answer a challenge which it has not as yet completely succeeded in doing. We must ask: what will be the role of naval warfare in the era of nuclear balance? Within theory, what is the place of carriers of "strategic" nuclear weapons at sea? What significance do military activities at sea, beneath the umbrella of the balance of nuclear power, have in a situation of nonwar? These are questions on which Mahan fails us, and that fully justify a renewed study of theory.
In addition, there is one specific reason for again applying oneself to naval strategy. In their time, Mahan's books were carefully studied by all governments and all navies of the world. Statesmen, politicians, and admirals were inspired by his works and found in them a justification for their naval armament. Several big states, spurred by Mahan's ideas, incurred great sacrifices to build mighty fleets. When, soon after, they had to fight for national survival in World War I, these fleets turned out to be poor investments. They were hardly used in combat. Where was their "influence upon history"? These states—Tsarist Russia, Austria-Hungary, and, above all, Imperial Germany (all three countries with continental tradition and longstanding experience in land warfare)—had, as we can state retrospectively, misread Mahan's teachings, Why were these empires induced into error. It would be highly instructive to find out, since the present antagonist of the West, the Soviet Union, is, just like the old Russia, a state in geographical position far removed from disputed sea areas. At the same time it is a state with a continental tradition and much experience in land warfare. Nevertheless, it owns the second strongest navy in the world. One is struck by the contrast between naval armament of such enormous dimensions and the geographical area upon which it is based.
Mastery of the Sea
Mahan starts out in his most famous book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, by discussing the various elements of seapower. He sets out with the premise that traffic at sea must be protected in war. He focuses on commercial traffic because prosperity, obtained by overseas trade, can be transformed into political power. Today, it is not so much prosperity that is at stake in sea traffic during war: now we are dealing directly with political power. In a war between super-powers, the objective is, not todeliver precious commercial goods from far-away countries by methods of private trade, but tosatisfy immediate needs of warfare by transporting vital raw materials, foodstuffs, military goods, and troops. Sea traffic becomes military-strategic sea transport, a function of warfare itself.
As Mahan focuses on prosperity as a result of commercial exchanges by sea, his prime interest in controlling sea lanes is in the protection of shipping. Since today we are dealing directly with political power it becomes evident that the prevention of movement of enemy shipping (or of sea traffic conducted in the interest of the enemy) becomes a goal ranking equally with the protection of one's own shipping: the enemy's shipping is, indeed, part of his power.
The twin goals, then, are the protection of one's own sea traffic and the stopping of the enemy's. The shipping of both sides must be controlled. Control of shipping, friendly and hostile, is the ultimate purpose and objective of naval warfare. In this essential insight we must recognize the core and the universally true basic idea of Mahan.
Apart from the economic effect of control of the sea, there is the military component. Control of the sea enables the power that holds it tobring tobear military might by disembarking troops, and by employing aviation on all coasts within its reach.
Control of the sea means—to restate it with more precision—that one's shipping remains essentially fluid while the enemy's is prevented from flowing. In an age of far-reaching air and satellite reconnaissance which permits the scanning of entire oceans, hardly a surface ship can hope tocruise unobserved in waters controlled by the adversary. Surface blockade runners will not reappear. In those parts of the sea one controls, prevention of the movement of the enemy's shipping will, therefore, tend tobe total.
"Fluid traffic" implies an element of duration. For this condition, the effects of which we have indicated, Mahan uses (as we have done so far) the word "control" of the sea. In reality, this is not quite correct. Control is not a condition, but an activity. For the condition which is characterized by the ability to exert control, a different term is needed. In the paragraphs that follow this state is described with a term which Mahan also uses, although with no sharp differentiation between it and control, "mastery of the sea."
Mastery of the sea is identical to "sea supremacy." Mahan teaches us that all naval warfare culminates in the "contest of supremacy." For Mahan, the quality of a naval leader lies in his ability to force the enemy's fleet into battle under the best possible circumstances, and tobeat and destroy it. He never becomes tired of describing how one naval commander succeeds in this, and how another fails. He is highly critical when an admiral loses the grasp of the battle, or when he presents his fleet for battle without the proper concentration of forces. The battle at sea—often describeddown tothe most minute details of sailing maneuvers—becomes not only the quantitative center of his writings, but intuitively becomes the qualitative focus of attention as well.
But we should be precise about this: The battle at sea—the elimination of the enemy's fleet—is by no means the only prerequisite for mastery of the sea. Combat is nor a purpose in itself. It receives its significance from the final objective of naval warfare—tocontrol the sea. Fighting at sea is only justified if the ultimate goal requires it. If the enemy's fleet, for whatever reasons, appears unable w challenge one's own mastery of the sea, i.e., if one possesses sea supremacy without risking a contest, then so much the better.
One can have mastery of a limited, geographically confined sea, or a very extensive one. Most comprehensive, and most desirable, is, of course, a global mastery of the sea that encompasses all oceans. In summing up, the following criteria can be given todescribe mastery of the sea:
Mastery of the sea is a power condition of a certain duration in a sea area in which one's own sea traffic is fluid, while the enemy's has ceased to flow. To reach and maintain this state is the objective of naval warfare. It is obtained by seapower.
Oceanwide mastery of the sea permits economic warfare against an adversary who depends on sea communications, dominance over all countries outside the enemy's continental sphere of influence, sequestration of their human and material potential (including their merchant shipping capacity), and exclusion of the enemy from the enjoyment of these resources.
Mastery of the sea permits the bringing to bear of military might across the sea area dominated.
Sea power
Another term needs closer definition. While reading the general introductory remarks to Mahan's most influential book, one notices that he uses "sea power" and "control of the sea" without differentiating between them. In practice, overwhelming seapower may indeed easily be transformed into control. It is nevertheless necessary to distinguish between the two concepts. Control, to repeat, is the objective, sea power is the instrument to achieve this objective in war. Seapower is the instrument to win the contest of supremacy, and to maintain mastery of the sea.
But what does the concept of seapower comprise? Clearly naval forces form an integral element. Mahan, nevertheless, omits this chief element in enumerating the component parts of seapower; obviously, he implies it from the outset. The elements which he discusses all refer to naval forces. But, we should ask, are all the elements that appear on Mahan's list true components of seapower? Are they perhaps, in part, mere accessories, more or less desirable for the successful exercise of seapower? And finally, have the respective roles which individual elements played in Mahan's times changed under present circumstances?
First of all, it seems important to name naval forces as an element of seapower instead of simply presupposing them or even confusing them with seapower itself. Not all naval forces are of equal value in acquiring and maintaining sea supremacy. For instance, mere coastal defense craft are, surely, of lesser importance here than, say, aircraft carriers. For simplicity's sake, we shall call those naval forces that are needed for sea supremacy "fleet," even though today a fleet hardly appears as an integrated whole at sea. In this sense, a fleet would, of course, not only comprise surface fighting ships, but also the naval air arm, submarines, and support ships as well; in short, everything that is required and appropriate for the contest of supremacy.
Now let us discuss Mahan's elements.
The first element, "geographical position" is overwhelming in its significance. Mahan describes which qualities of a geographical position are advantageous for seapower, and which are less favorable. He also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the elements he lists thereafter as "physical conformation" and "extent of territory."
Under present-day circumstances, Mahan's analysis of these three elements—they are interconnected—is not entirely relevant. The relation of advantage and disadvantage has changed with modern technology. Shipping routes, which formerly could be attacked in a consistent fashion only where they converged, have changed, inasmuch as today cargo ships can be detected and stopped or destroyed anywhere, thanks to an oceanwide surveillance system. Today, it is less important than formerly how favorably situated a geographical position is in relation to shipping routes, for the oceans themselves have become shipping routes in their entirety, and what counts is how the geographical position is situated in relation to them. For this reason, it seems necessary to redefine "geographical position" and to rethink the relationship between naval forces and geographical position.
For one thing, geographical position must exist as close as possible to the sea area in which mastery is desired. This area must at least be accessible in times of war so that the "fleet" can present itself for the contest of supremacy. For cargo ships, the geographical position must be such that sea traffic can start to "flow" from there. This sounds pretty trivial, so trivial even that Mahan never bothered to mention this prerequisite of seapower. But precisely by not mentioning it, he occasionally caused misunderstandings. A coast—even with ideal physical conformation and extent—that does not give a fleet access to the sea or the ocean on which sea traffic appears vital for both sides, might just as well not exist. But precisely this situation, absurd perhaps by Mahan's thinking, existed for the European continental powers during World War I.
Mahan was most patently misread by the Imperial German Navy. The geographical position of the High Seas Fleet was the German North Sea coast with its fine ports. Admiral Tirpitz had based his excellent fleet on this geographical position, in the innermost southeastern corner of the North Sea. His strategic aims were, quite exclusively, to make his fleet the equal of the British Grand Fleet in number and quality of battleships. The German navy had firmly counted on one or more battles in the North Sea soon after a war with England would break out. Its numerical inferiority notwithstanding, it hoped for a victory, and was certain that it could sway a naval war its way. But the decisive battle did not materialize. The Battle of Jutland—left uncompleted one day, and not renewed the next morning—proved to be a much-noticed German military success. From the viewpoint of naval strategy, however, it remained without aftermath. This would have been the case even if the German success had been more sizeable. For the strategic situation would not have been changed a bit even by a memorable—and resounding victory. The English had all they desired: mastery of the sea throughout the Atlantic. Why should they wage a battle in the North Sea? Itis clear that they expressly avoided another big naval battle with the Germans.
The Germans faced this situation helplessly. They thought they had learned from Mahan that what counts most in naval war is to concentrate one's forces and seek the battle at sea to bring about a decision. This theory fitted in with their experience in land war. In a land war, where a given territory is to be conquered, the combat of the armies comes about automatically, and is indeed decisive. During the war and even after, the Germans were unable to answer the question why this should be different at sea. They did not manage to solve the riddle of the non-occurrence of the battle at sea.
And yet, the solution should have been simple. The Germans would have just had to remember that sea traffic is the object of naval war. They had completely lost sight of this object in devising their naval strategy in the North Sea. They did not become aware of the fact that in a war against England the North Sea had become a sea without traffic, a "dead" sea indeed. They failed to see that shipping on the Atlantic, which it was their vital interest to control, was completely unaffected by a battle in the North Sea. They were unable to recognize that their North Sea coast, locked off geographically by England, did not at all constitute a geographical position in relation to the Atlantic. Without a geographical position on the disputed sea area, the German fleet, so far as Atlantic sea traffic was concerned, did not exist and, with all its might, did not constitute seapower.
Trueenough, the British were deterred from landing on the North Sea and Baltic coasts of Germany, and prevented from maintaining communications with the Russians by means of the Baltic. But those were not the purposes of the big German fleet. They could have been achieved much more cheaply by torpedo-boats, submarines, mines, and coast artillery.
From this specific World War I example, we can learn a great deal about the concept of seapower:
By itself a fleet, no matter how strong it is, is not seapower.
A fleet needs a geographical position adjacent to the disputed sea, from which it can set out upon the contest of supremacy.
Seapower thus becomes a product of fleetand position. If one factor is zero, the product itself becomes zero: the fleetis worthless without position and, without a fleet, position does not count.
The stronger the fleetand the more favorable the position, the bigger the product, and the stronger seapower becomes.
In our interpretation, the concept of geographical position takes a different meaning from the one Mahan stipulated. We are not asking how relatively advantageousor disadvantageous a particular geographical position is for seapower, but we consider position as a constitutive element of seapower. In order to stress the distinction with Mahan's terminology, this paramount element of seapower—a combination of geographical position, physical conformation, and extent of territory—will be called naval strategic position.
If naval strategic position is defined this way, then more can be said of its criteria. By itself, no place is a naval strategic position. We must ensure that the fleet can operate from there. Ergo, a naval strategic position must have all those installations that are needed for the maintenance, supply, and repair of a modern fleet. The base must furthermore be protected against land and air attack. It must be connected with the homeland, its ultimate source of power, by efficient lines of communications that cannot be broken. If the base is situated overseas, the intermediate sea area must be safely under one's own control. Whether such overseas outposts, in cases where a land transport link or mastery of the sea area in between is lacking, can be supported exclusively by air lift and still remain operational is open to doubt. The long-term success of such a venture would surely require complete air domination in the area linking the home country and the base.
Today, ever-increasing operational radii and systems of seaborne supply can make naval operations possible across ever-increasing distances. That permits a network of naval strategic positions that is more widely spread than formerly. Should the time come in which a fleet would consist, not primarily of surface ships, but of submarines and long-range aircraft—a development some people envision—the geographical prerequisites of a strategic naval position might change and positions not suitable today might become usable. But by no means do naval strategic positions become superfluous. A fleet without a well-equipped base within reach is condemned to emaciation in today's highly technological age, even more than before.
The closer to its own position a fleet operates, the stronger the factor position becomes in the formula "fleet times position equals seapower;" and conversely, the farther away it operates, the weaker the position element will be. Long distances between ship and base diminish the strength of the fleet. In the immediate coastal area even a small fleet factor makes for a sizeable product. Weapons located ashore and land-based aircraft in particular, strengthen the factor fleet. At the same time, land-based aircraft tend to widen the coastal zone within which even weak naval forces can dominate the sea. The periphery of a naval strategic position will be avoided by the enemy's shipping; it is therefore not necessary for one's own fleet to be permanently at sea. The constant possibility of its appearance will suffice to divert the adversary's shipping. The position thus develops a kind of field of force.
The foregoing remarks concerning the naval strategic position are shaped by the experiences of a continental power, like Germany, throughout two world wars. The Soviet Union is a country just as much shaped by continental traditions, possessing long coast lines and some fine ports, but lacking, as did Germany, naval strategic positions adjacent to the oceans. In fact, the similarity of the two countries with regard to their naval strategic situation is quite striking. The particular insistence on the importance of the naval strategic position which characterizes this analysis has this similarity in mind, and, we believe, is thereby justified. We will revert to the peculiarities of the Soviet Union's strategic situation in the last chapter.
A word on Mahan's other "elements," first, those of "character" and "number" of peoples, is in order. Mahan gained his professional experience in sailing ships. His historical writings deal with fleets of sailing vessels. If he lists the national character of a nation as a separate element of seapower, that is because he believes that a nation that has been seafaring for a long time brings along particular qualities for naval warfare. He argues that such nations dispose of large populations with experience at sea, and, as their economic fate depends on the sea, they have, in general, a natural advantage over non-seafaring nations. This element, no question about it, has lost its significance today. The two world powers of our time are not particularly oriented towards the sea by their traditions. What counts today is the technological level of a nation. This does not depend on maritime traditions. As for numbers of people, obviously numbers confer an advantage, and the two main powers are well supplied with people.
Of utmost importance is, no doubt, the technical quality of ships, of their propulsion systems, their weapons, the ability of their crews to keep such modern installations in readiness and to maximize their value in combat: all that, together with numbers of units, makes for the value of a fleet. However, all these technical elements are already contained in the concept of "fleet."
One other element has not changed in its significance since Mahan's times: "character of the government." It may easily be the most important element of all, but, properly speaking, it is not an element of seapower as heretofore defined; rather it is an element of naval strategy in a more general sense. The quality of the government decides whether a nation chooses to acquire seapower or not; the worthiness or unworthiness of the leading figure of the nation, the nation's historical experience, its intellectual maturity, its preparedness to assume sacrifices and hardship, its moral endurance—all those are mirrored in this term, character of the government. And, indeed, in this respect the character of a nation does play a role. By instinct, peoples with a long-standing maritime tradition may have an edge over peoples with a continental military tradition. At least that was so in the past, but we cannot rely on this for the future. It remains true, at any rate, that the high-level decisions to construct a navy and to create naval strategic positions are intellectual achievements of a very high rank. They can be taken—even without prior traditions of war at sea—by rational means, both by eminent statesmen like Themistocles, and by collegiate bodies, like the Roman leaders in the First Punic War.
We can thus summarize: seapower consists—and there is no undue simplification in this—of only two elements: fleet and naval strategic position. The product of the two elements, and thereby the rank and efficiency of seapower, hinges on the quality of each of them.
Raider Warfare
A country at war which, either because of insufficient naval forces or lack of a naval strategic position, is unable or unwilling to contest the adversary's mastery of the sea, is not for that reason condemned to inactivity. It could choose a strategy of raider warfare. This means, the country can, like a partisan within enemy-occupied territory, harm the enemy's mastery of the sea and limit itself to direct attacks on the object of naval war, the cargo vessel. This paradox will be explained in a moment.
Historically speaking, this strategy of naval war developed from piracy. Loot, the capture of valuable prizes, was then the aim, rather than winning a full-fledged naval war. Not until later did raider warfare become a perfectly acceptable variety of naval war. Today, the primary goal is to cause scarcity of tonnage, and sometimes, in addition, to destroy specific shipments of vital importance for warfare. When raider warfare succeeds in creating scarcity on a large scale, and over long periods, it takes on strategic significance. For if shipping space becomes so desperately scarce that sea traffic sinks below the level of important economic and military needs, then mastery of the sea has not accomplished its protective mission. It has become an empty shell. Even in this extreme case, however, mastery of the sea has not become an absurdity. Raider warfare, even when highly successful, can never open the sea lanes for one's own traffic. The raider nation still remains isolated from overseas. Thus understood, raider warfare is a weaker form of naval warfare.
The Pacific War provides an example. Despite the successful raider war conducted by the American submarines, the Japanese, not the Americans, still held the mastery of the East Asian seas in 1944. True, that Japanese mastery had become an empty shell, but so far as transport ships steamed those seas, they were Japanese, not American, ships. That situation prevailed until the Japanese fleet itself was defeated.
If there were war between the Soviet Union and NATO, the Soviet Union would have no need to cross the Atlantic Ocean, whereas it would be vital for NATO to be able to do that. Hence, the Soviet Union would be at an advantage to start with, in this respect. But simultaneously that country would be cut off from all overseas Communist countries, which would have to align their politics with the power which possessed control of the sea.
Mahan did not advocate raider warfare. For him, it implied a dissipation of forces. It was his thesis that raider warfare has always finally been exterminated by seapower. Both world wars confirm this thesis. Bur it is an open question whether Mahan's thesis is thus irrefutably proven or whether it could have been invalidated—for the first time—by a different German strategy. The two submarine campaigns of the Germans at least proved one thing: that with the arrival of the submarine, raider warfare attained completely new dimensions. It is quite conceivable that a country at war could maintain mastery of the sea in certain areas, and simultaneously wage raider war in others. Indeed, that describes the American effort in the Pacific in World War II. The distinctive feature of raider warfare is that it always takes place within a sea area under the enemy's control. A further point should be made. The submarine has now become so powerful an instrument of naval warfare, as to have entered into competition for mastery of the sea. The nuclear-powered submarine in particular is a weapon that is just as much a danger to warships—surface and sub-surface—as against cargo ships.
The use of submarines is therefore not exclusively linked with raider war. If the development of submarines is to be classified correctly in our system, then a distinction must be made between the missions involved. If a country at war uses its submarine fleet systematically for the destruction of the enemy's naval forces, the submarine becomes, not a commerce raider, but a fighting ship. For submarines on such missions, transport ships are unimportant except as good opportunities for supplementary action. Conversely, submarines with a raider warfare mission concentrate on transport ships. For them, hostile fighting ships are targets of opportunity. Despite their success as raiders, the American submarines in World War II might be said to be an example of the first philosophy; the Germans provide an example of the second.
Strategic Offensive at Sea
The essence of naval theory as we have formulated it becomes even clearer if we integrate the concepts of strategic offensive and defensive into our model. As in a land war, tactical, operational, and strategic offensive and defensive activities must be distinguished at sea. It is obvious that a tactical maneuver of an individual ship or a formation—be it offensive or defensive—does not tell us much about the general character of the naval strategy of a country. Even an offensive operation at sea is not necessarily part of a strategic offensive. On land, offensive operations can likewise occur within the framework of a defensive strategy (and vice versa). In asking whether naval operations, or activities generally, belong to an offensive or defensive strategy, we must first look to the objective. If the activities are geared towards the conquest of mastery of the sea, then the strategy is offensive: If they are differently oriented, or if the existing mastery of the sea is to be maintained, then the strategy is defensive.
If these definitions, which are derived from the concept of mastery of the sea, are accepted, then some conclusions of importance can be drawn.
As already described, seapower consists of "fleet" and "position." Offensive naval strategy is the attempt to reduce one of these two assets of the enemy to zero, be it by destruction of his fleet, or by elimination of his position.
An offensive Strategy can express itself in the improvement, i.e., in the geographical advancing, of a naval strategic position that is at present unsatisfactory. By creating a starting position for one's fleet from which it can fight for mastery of the sea, one throws one's hat into the ring where mastery of the sea is at stake. One challenges the enemy.
Advancing of position can very well take place in peacetime by means of diplomacy, supported by economic or military aid. In this case, politics are the instrument of the naval strategic offensive. If a nation is forced to conduct a naval war, and it lacks strategic position, it must first obtain it by military means. This is not a problem for the navy alone, but for overall strategy. Within this framework, it is perfectly possible for the army to promote the strategic naval offensive. The second act of establishing seapower—creating an adequate fleet and installing it in the newly gained position—is the task of the navy. From then on seapower exists. If the positions of the parries along the disputed sea area are equivalent—Mahan's favorite situation—the control of the sea becomes a matter for dispute. Both sides aim at the destruction of the respective enemy's fleet, both are on the offensive. The battle at sea—the fighting-brings the decision.
There is still another method to carry out a strategic offensive. It can be achieved without a battle at sea simply by depriving the enemy's fleet of its position. A land campaign leading to the occupation of the enemy's position can have the same consequences as the elimination of the enemy's fleet. If, for example, Field Marshal Rommel had reached the Suez Canal in 1942, British sea power in the Eastern Mediterranean would have ceased to exist, and the naval forces of the Axis would have exercised control of that sea. In effect, the Field Marshal would have won a naval victory simultaneously with his victory on land.
A country which does not wish to change the existing state of sea supremacy is strategically on the defensive. Two motives are possible. Either one is satisfied with the existing state of affairs, if his position needs no improvement, and he stays where he is and exercises control of the sea, protecting his position against enemy attack and his ships against the enemy's raider warfare; or, he renounces sea supremacy because he lacks a fleet or he does not have an adequate position. If one does not dispute the enemy's mastery of the sea, and accepts it passively, one is strategically on the defensive. Actions of raider warfare, even if tactically offensive, are then the mere expression of a defensive naval strategy. With these remarks, somewhat simplified, but sufficient for our present purpose, we can close our discussion of the theory of the strategic offensive and defensive. The analysis can be summarized in the following outline:
(a) Strategic naval offensive = the will to acquire the mastery of the sea, characterized by:
- Advancing one's own position (if one's own fleet exists);
- Advancing one's fleet into existing or newly conquered positions;
- Attack on the enemy's fleet if respective positions are equivalent;
- Elimination of the enemy's position.
(b) Strategic naval defensive = maintenance of sea supremacy characterized by:
- Remaining in satisfactory position;
- Defending seapower against offensive activities of the enemy, as in (a) above, and against the enemy's raider warfare.
(c) Strategic naval defensive = renunciation of control of the sea characterized by:
- Absence of an adequate fleet;
- Remaining in an inadequate position;
- Confining oneself to raider warfare;
- Defending one's own coasts.
Carriers of "Strategic" Atomic Weapons at Sea
Before we set out to examine the validity of naval theory in the nuclear age, one more subject needs discussion. As they were unknown to the pre-atomic period, they could not appear in former theories: the carriers of "strategic" atomic weapons at sea. Today, they play an essential part within the navies of the atomic powers. Without doubt, they are eminently significant for overall military strategy, and no one contests their importance. But what is their role in naval theory? Do they change it? Do they upset it completely? Because of their priority position, one is frequently told that "strategic" atomic submarines are the battleships of our times.
If one starts with Mahan's premise that the objective of naval war is control of the sea—and this is indeed the guiding principle of our analysis—then obviously strategic atomic weapon carriers at sea do not have a place within naval theory. For the mission of this arm is basically different from that of naval forces in war. Naval war deals with mastery of the sea, with sea traffic, with goods and men transported in ships. Carriers of strategic atomic weapons can contribute nothing to the control of the sea. Their targets are neither cargo vessels nor naval formations of the enemy. Their targets lie ashore. It is in fact irrelevant for the accomplishment of their mission whether the weapons are fired from aircraft or launching pads ashore, or from platforms at sea. The transfer of the launching site to the sea has technical reasons, and increases survivability.
"Strategic" weapons at sea can certainly be used in the course of atomic war for the benefit of naval warfare, e.g., by eliminating hostile naval bases. But that is not a characteristic mission; weapons situated ashore could do the job just as well. Whether land, air, or shipborne weapon systems are chosen, is a question of firing range or economic choice within the framework of the available potential.
That a ship with long-range "strategic" weapons has a mission which is different from that of other warships, can easily be gathered from the scope of authority of the commanding officer. In contrast to a commander engaged in naval warfare whose foremost task is to use his weapons in combat, the commander of a carrier of atomic weapons at sea commands only the platform; the ballistic missiles stored in his ship are not even suited for fighting targets at sea. He has no influence whatsoever on the choice of target and the time of firing. In fact, these decisions are not even within the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, but are made by the central decision-making body for atomic strategy. Carriers of atomic weapons at sea are thus, properly speaking, part of the "strategic" atomic forces of a nation. The navy acts merely as a trustee. The line is then clearly drawn: naval warfare is not involved. "Strategic" submarines have nothing to do with the battleships of former times.
The trusteeship of the navy implies building and manning such ships, and then deploying them operationally. The navy must also protect those submarines against enemy attack, and has to fight the enemy's carriers of atomic weapons at sea. All these are indeed genuine naval tasks that are by no means outside the sphere of naval theory. Protection of one's own, destruction of hostile users of the sea—these are and remain under the heading of control of the sea.
Seapower in the Nuclear Age
After carriers of "strategic" atomic weapons at sea have thus been placed properly in perspective, it is now our task to examine the role of sea power under the changed circumstances of the atomic age. It is not the invention of atomic weapons as such that confronts naval theory with new problems. "Tactical" atomic weapons could influence naval warfare in certain ways, but the basic situation for sea power remains more or less unaffected. The true problem originates from the atomic balance. It forces the two superpowers to avoid, if at all possible, an all-out war in their global contest for world leadership. Is it conceivable then, that naval war, with its objective of protecting one's own shipping and preventing the movement of the enemy's, could still occur?
Even if a world war between the superpowers has become less likely than before, war is still a possibility. All armament in East and West, both atomic and conventional, on land, in the air, and at sea, is oriented towards such a possibility. All these military components must be allowed for, because "strategic" atomic deterrence is credible and preserves peace only if the conventional components of military forces also attain a certain balance on both sides.
Hardly anyone contests this logic as far as conventional land and air forces are concerned. They must exist in sufficient strength to repulse an attack if atomic deterrence fails. Only the continued existence of the effect of sea power arouses doubts. This is probably owing to the fact that the effect of seapower presupposes duration. The problem of seapower in the atomic age thus boils down to the question: Do present-day circumstances permit a war of such duration that seapower can take effect?
No doubt if ever atomic strikes are exchanged, the "strategic" atomic phase, properly speaking, could only be short. During this phase sea power could not play any major role. But what precedes the "strategic" atomic phase? Could there not be a phase, perhaps even a long one, fought only with conventional arms or "tactical" atomic weapons? And is there really a compulsory development towards the "strategic" atomic strike? Could it not be that atomic destructive power, because of the continuing growth of the atomic potential on both sides, finally becomes self-frustrating by its very terrifying force? If indeed the atomic risk becomes a theoretical ultima ratio, if neither side dares to proceed towards atomic holocaust, a long-drawn out war is perfectly conceivable. Such a war would continue until compromise solutions were accepted, solutions that would still be vastly preferable to atomic self-annihilation. The function of the atomic balance would then be as a moderating element of war. Such a war would probably take a considerable time, and sea power would play its traditional part.
If in fact war—under the pressure of the omnipresent atomic threat—is reduced from a hurricane of destruction aiming at unconditional surrender to a form in which the existence of the enemy is not at stake, then both sides should make an effort, even during war, to avoid everything that could set the atomic spiral into motion. In a land war it appears difficult to stick to this condition. There is no clear line between "strategic" and "tactical" weapons. For this reason, some experts think that a war could be completely limited to the sea.
However one may evaluate such self-limitation in war, as long as nobody can predict with certainty what forms "strategic" atomic armament will take in the future, and as long as it remains uncertain whether a world war can still come about, and what character it would take, the possibility of long-term war must be taken into account.
If a war breaks out in one form or the other, then control of the sea would assume an even greater importance than before, because the economic interdependence of all countries in the world, and particularly those in the West, and their dependence on the sea, is greater than ever before. The deterrent effect of superior seapower—and at the same time its political weight in peace—resides in these very uncertainties and possibilities. In this respect, superior Soviet seapower would have a much greater effect on the West than superior Western seapower has had, or would have, on the Soviet Union, though, as the latter's overseas interests increase, the difference tends to narrow.
This deterrent effect is in reality quite considerable. It can compensate for possible inferiority of land forces, and, so far as the West is concerned, is further increased by its ability to quell Eastern speculations as to a post-atomic phase of war. To this day, the Soviet Union advances the military doctrine that the true decision of war comes in the post-atomic phase. We do not know exactly whether the Soviet Union still believes in this doctrine; but as long as we do not know precisely, we must envisage what seapower can mean in the post-atomic phase, its horrors notwithstanding. It is certainly true that he who manages first to rise from the chaos of atomic destruction will have an advantage in the continuation of war. A premium in this phase will thus be placed on restitution. Everything depends on the speedy reconstruction of organized life, of the economy, and of the military organization. If, in fact nearly all resources in one's own country are destroyed, then, more than ever, the potential of the overseas world, so far left undamaged, will make all the difference. As all ships that were at sea during the atomic strike, or in overseas ports, have remained unaffected, shipping can gradually be reorganized. But the resources of overseas countries can be utilized only by those who control the ocean. The other side is excluded from this reservoir of vital resources. For the restitution phase, control of the oceans can thus become a decisive factor.
From a purely military point of view, mastery of the sea in the post-atomic phase also brings advantages. One can assume that the navies on both sides have survived because many of their ships were at sea. For the moment, they represent possibly the only military instrument ready for use. The more naval and air bases that are destroyed on either side, the higher the value of superior naval forces. American carrier-based aviation assumes the highest importance in a situation of this kind. As soon as land-based air power is eliminated, the carrier-based potential obtains a monopoly position in the air space above the sea. In the absence of a threat from Soviet land-based aircraft, the carriers' approach to the peripheral seas will be facilitated. Despite the continuing submarine danger, the American naval aircraft might get a chance to sink Soviet surface forces and the logistic support afloat. Even a nuclear monopoly above parts of the territories of the Eastern bloc by carrier-based aircraft might become a possibility. From these few considerations it becomes clear to what extent control of the sea determines the post-atomic phase.
We can summarize as follows: Even under the auspices of the atomic balance, a long war in which seapower can be fully brought to bear is by no means excluded. The margin for the exercise of seapower has become narrower by comparison to former times, but its relative weight within this margin has increased. Superior Western—or Eastern—seapower could be decisive in a restitution phase, partly for reconstruction with the help of the resources of the undamaged part of the world, partly as a military factor.
Superior sea power thus becomes an important, even indispensable factor of deterrence for the West. Just as the West cannot tolerate the destruction of the atomic balance by unilateral Soviet atomic armament, it cannot allow Western superiority at sea to be endangered by Eastern naval armament. The Western lead must be maintained quantitatively and qualitatively. Without the atomic balance, and without Western superiority at sea, deterrence itself would not work. And without credible deterrence, the West would have to give in piece by piece. Peace and freedom of the West in the atomic age depend in a decisive manner on the superiority of its seapower.
Maritime Power in the Situation of Non-War
As long as deterrence works, war is not used as an instrument for the solution of political conflicts between the world powers. Nevertheless, the worldwide power contest goes on permanently. Again and again, situations will arise in which formerly war would have been expected, but in which today, under the circumstances of the atomic balance, attempts are made to maintain peace. Formally speaking, such situations are situations of peace. De facto, however, they are situations of enormous tension, or even situations in which, rather than open combat, a camouflaged war is conducted. These situations are inadequately described by the term peace. Despite the considerable variation of the concept, they shall here be referred to as situations of non-war.
For this situation of non-war, certain forms of military conflict have developed on land that hitherto were unknown: limited war, as in Korea or Vietnam; vicarious warfare; so-called wars of national liberation; and subversive war. At sea, such forms have not as yet developed. There is no such thing as camouflaged warfare at sea. The explanation is simple: Submarines aside, fighting ships can almost always be identified by their flag, type, place of combat, and other types of information. Their home governments cannot disclaim responsibility for their actions. Submarines, of course, can attack and remain unidentified. But, should identification later take place, that could mean extreme political consequences. In any event, except for a few occasions during the Spanish Civil War, submarine attacks in peacetime, or by non-belligerents in a war, have never been observed.
Be that as it may, seapower remains an instrument of power politics. The objective of seapower—shipping—has decisive economic, and even more so, military and political significance in situations of crisis. The temptation to use seapower in situations of non-war is therefore considerable. The counter-argument is that merchant ships are protected in peace by international law against military attacks.
Any attack on another country's merchant ships presupposes a state of war. The application of force against civilian ships in peacetime on the high seas is piracy. Under international law, there is thus no room for the exercise of sea power in situations of non-war. It follows, then, that mastery of the sea presupposes the condition of war.
Use of the naval instrument in peace times reeks of breach of the law, and this is one reason why those who use maritime power in peacetime try to protect themselves by UN resolutions. It is indeed a political decision whether or not, and to what extent, to disregard international law in peacetime.
Nevertheless, a number of examples can be cited from recent times of the use of maritime power in situations of non-war. The most striking example is the Cuban crisis. With the Cuban blockade, or more strictly, "quarantine," President J. F. Kennedy disregarded the principles of the law of the seas. Weighing necessity and inherent risks, his decision was of a strictly political nature. Aspects of the international law of the seas played only a minor role. The success of the act rested in the fact that the Soviets were unable to escort their ships. The U. S. naval forces were left undisturbed. Had the Soviets foreseen President Kennedy's reaction, and had they dispatched destroyer escorts into the Caribbean in time, the President would certainly have chosen a different answer to the installation of rockets in Cuba.
In another case, we have witnessed how President L. B. Johnson shied away from exploiting the exclusive American presence in the Gulf of Tonkin in a naval blockade of North Vietnam's deep-water ports. He did not even care to order a mining blockade of the harbor areas, especially of the Red River estuary, as suggested by the U. S. Navy, though some rivers too small for seagoing ships were mined, and there was a great deal of bombing and shelling from the sea. In the case of Haiphong, he kept to the international law of the seas. This too was naturally a political decision, probably aimed at avoiding difficulties with the Soviet Union. History will judge whether it was a wise one, or whether it was a serious, perhaps the crucial, mistake of the whole Vietnam war.
Another example for the use of seapower in non-war was the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba by Egypt in 1967. Egypt's military means of enforcement behind the blockade were weak. In spite of their weakness the naval forces engaged were adequate because the Egyptians were the only power to be militarily present.
A final example is the U.N. blockade—if that word can be used for so porous a barrier—of the Mozambique Channel in connection with the embargo of oil to Rhodesia. Here also we find the situation, characteristic of a non-war blockade, of the blockading force (in this case, consisting of British ships and aircraft) being the only one present. Practical experience thus confirms our hypothesis that seapower will also be employed in non-war. Even though the empirical data from these few examples are scarce, the characteristics for a theory of the use of maritime resources in non-war—analogous to the theory of naval warfare—could very well be deduced therefrom.
In non-war under conditions of the nuclear balance, when one of the world powers decides to use force against seagoing traffic, it will do so only to such a degree as will not lead to escalation with the risk of war. At least, one avoids attacking warships of the opponent. Civil transport ships of the opposing side, or even international seagoing traffic in general, can thus be seized only when one is alone at sea with an unarmed merchant ship. As soon as a warship of the opponent appears on the scene and escorts the merchant ship, the merchant ship will cease to obey the orders of the attacking warship. The use of force is then possible only if one is prepared to accept the risks incurred by firing the first shot. Persisting in the action with force leads to an exchange of shots with the escort, and thereby to escalation. Escorting, it is true, does not completely preclude the use of force. However, the use of force against an escort leads dangerously beyond the domain of non-war in which one wishes to remain.
It follows from this consideration that in non-war there is no control of the sea. Fighting ships of the opponent cannot be eliminated as happens in wartime with the aim of hindering seagoing traffic. The appearance of opposing escort vessels paralyzes the application of force in non-war. Only where the enemy cannot, or temporarily cannot, appear is there a situation similar to control of the sea where shipping can be attacked. That means attack is possible only in the situation of exclusive presence. The theoretical application of this principle to the war in Vietnam is apparent.
When both parties are present, and as long as either one avoids a military clash, the relative strengths of naval forces do not play the same role as in war, for there is no fighting. Any fighting ship capable of reacting to a first shot in a way that sets in motion the spiral of escalation, is enough to prevent an attack. What counts is the fact that presence has to do with something other than fighting.
The Theory of Maritime Presence
It is the concept of presence, as it results from our analysis, that could lead us to a parallel to the theory of naval strategy. The role which mastery of the sea plays in war could be given to presence in non-war. Both have a similar mission: protection of one's own, and attack on the enemy's shipping. Mastery of the sea and maritime presence are both effective only if there is duration. A short sojourn, or even occasional fleet visits, do not constitute presence. One can, it is true, send in an ad hoc escort in acute situations, as, conceivably, the Russians might have in the Cuban missile Crisis. But that isno presence likely to create a new situation.
Here, however, the analogy ends. If both sides are present, their presence neutralizes each other. There is no military remedy to this situation, as there is no fighting in non-war. Shipping on both sides goes on. Either side can get its civil and military transports to their respective destinations. A situation can arise in which one side, in spite of highly superior naval forces, must look on helplessly while the opponent uses the sea for the support of military activities that are directed against his cause. Not even amphibious operations of the opposing side can be prevented no matter how superior the naval forces are with which one is present.
Because the ocean is so large, one cannot be everywhere all the time with an adequate number of escorts to prevent an enemy attack. This is particularly true of seagoing traffic in distant sea areas. One could ask, does presence require a naval strategic position nearby? Theoretically this is not the case. In peacetime anyone can stay anywhere in international waters as long as he likes, provided he has afloat support. In practice, however, presence makes bases nearby necessary, or at least desirable, if it is to be maintained over a long period of time far removed from the home country. The endurance of warships at sea has limits. Harbor visits permit the preservation of the ship and the recreation of the crew. Even if the harbors visited have no repair facilities, such calls lengthen the period of deployment of individual ships in the area of presence. Just as a field of force of mastery takes shape around a naval strategic position in war, something like a field of force of "presence" can take shape around a maritime position. Anchorage harbors—any harbor that permits a ship to shift from sea routine to harbor routine—allow presence without making it necessary to stay at sea continuously.
These bases do not have to meet the requirements that must be demanded for naval strategic positions. Anchorage harbors in which support of a peacetime level can be obtained will suffice. The lines of communication to the home country are always open in non-war. No supremacy on the sea between an area of presence and a naval strategic position is needed. Despite these easier conditions, the distance between an area of presence and the nearest naval strategic position is by no means insignificant. The necessity for regular replacement of the ships determines, according to the number of vessels available, the distance at which presence can be maintained over a long period of time.
One can then summarize: Anchorage harbors in convenient proximity to the area of presence are an important factor for presence. The degree of presence is measured by the number of ships and the number, location, and quality of anchorage harbors. Both ships and harbors are prerequisites for durable presence.
Here our consideration again runs parallel to the theory of naval strategy. As Beet and naval strategic position are integral elements of seapower, so naval forces and anchorage harbors are prerequisites for presence. This statement is not precise, however. Presence is a state of affairs, seapower an instrument of force. The two concepts are not commensurate. If a correct relationship is to be obtained, then "presence" must be put at the same level as "control of the sea." It is necessary to introduce a parallel term which would describe the prerequisites of presence. For this we introduce the term "maritime power," admittedly a somewhat arbitrary choice. The term takes its cue from the concept of "maritime measures" which is now frequently used for the deployment of naval forces in situations of non-war. Linguistically, it is appropriate to the extent that "maritime power" is weaker than the word seapower.
If one accepts this term, then it seems advisable to apply the word "maritime" wherever concepts of maritime presence are set parallel to concepts referring to control of the sea. This would mean that one would call anchorage harbors "maritime positions," in parallel with "naval strategic positions." (Likewise, "maritime forces" would correspond to "Beet.") From this, the following definition of maritime power can be deduced: whatever seapower is in respect to war, maritime power would be in respect to non-war. Just as seapower is the product of fleet and naval strategic position, maritime power is the product of maritime forces and maritime position.
Naturally, there are very close connections between control of the sea and maritime presence on the one hand, and seapower and maritime power on the other. As long as a state of non-war exists, it is unimportant whether maritime presence is based on seapower or on maritime power. In either case, one can do no more than be present. But the situation of non-war can at any time change into a situation of war. At this moment, the weakness of maritime power is revealed. As soon as it is confronted under wartime conditions with seapower, as soon as military force is applied, the product of Beet times naval strategic position regains its full weight. Maritime power, which is based either on inferior maritime forces present or on positions with only maritime characteristics (or perhaps both), will be eliminated by seapower. The presence is extinguished, control of the sea comes into its own.
Maritime power can convert itself into seapower. Fleet and maritime forces are not absolute values. They are interdependent. If the maritime forces are increased to equal or surpass the Beet of the opponent, and if the maritime position is converted into a true naval strategic position, then seapower is created which, in case non-war is transformed into war, can embark on the contest of supremacy. Maritime power can thus become the avant-garde of seapower.
Finally, since naval strategy—as the term has been used so far—does not suit the conditions of non-war, one might consider distinguishing the strategy of presence from naval strategy by the term "maritime strategy." A naval strategy is only genuine when it is directed towards the final objective—the control of the sea—and is therefore meant for war. Maritime strategy should however be considered as part of naval strategy, as a lesser order of naval strategy.
Maritime Offensive and Defensive
In the field of naval strategic offensive and defensive, the analogy between seapower and maritime power may also be pursued. A naval strategic offensive aims at winning control of the sea. When no naval strategic position but only a maritime position is created, when no fleet but only maritime forces appear at that position, then there is no question of a naval strategic offensive. According co our definition, the appearance of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean does not, as yet, constitute a naval strategic offensive. As long as the U. S. Sixth Fleet is able to maintain mastery of the sea in the Mediterranean the anchorage harbors which are open to the Soviets do not constitute naval strategic positions. Their connections with the resources of the home country in the Black Sea must pass through the Dardanelles, and in war, those will be blocked by the Turks and by the Western control of the sea in the Mediterranean. Consequently, the anchorage harbors are merely maritime positions. The Soviet squadron does not represent seapower, but only maritime power. Nevertheless, from the Western point of view, the long-term dispatch of this squadron is an offensive action. For, in the very moment the Sixth Fleet loses mastery, the harbors will change their character and become naval strategic positions. Ifthis is to be included in the theoretical framework, one should speak of "maritime offensive" and distinguish it from naval strategic offensive. Maritime offensive—again, in analogy—would then mean the creation or the advancement of maritime position, and the long-term dispatch there of naval forces capable of constituting presence.
A naval strategic offensive or defensive can take place on two levels, on the political in peace, and the military in war. Since in non-war the use of military force is excluded, only the political-diplomatic level is conceivable for the maritime offensive. The same is true of the maritime defensive. If one wants to prevent the taking of a maritime position, or being pushed out of one's own position, one can resort only to methods compatible with non-war.
According to these definitions, the lively civilian activities of the Soviets on the oceans do not represent a maritime offensive as is often asserted. These activities bear no relation to the power ratio at sea. Neither the fishing and whaling fleets nor the electronic observation and oceanographic research ships represent maritime power. On the contrary, the more the Soviets appear on the oceans of the world in this manner or with their growing merchant fleet, the more they expose themselves to possible maritime measures of the West, and the more they become vulnerable wherever the West is alone present. The oceanic activities of the Soviets in the non-military field may be an indication of their growing understanding of the ocean. From the viewpoint of naval strategy or maritime strategy they carry no weight by themselves.
The Political Consequences of Maritime Power
Finally, the political consequences must also be part of our analysis. The political influence of seapower is due to the fact that seapower is already acknowledged in peacetime as latent mastery of the sea. When a state must include in its political calculation the face that sea power in the form of lone presence could even be brought to bear in non-war, then the political influence of seapower is increased still more. However, if the opposing side enters the scene with maritime power, and displays its own presence, it neutralizes nor only the lone presence of the seapower, but also a good deal of its political effectiveness. In this it hardly matters whether the new maritime presence has any prospect of durability in war. In the age of the nuclear balance the possibility of war cannot be calculated as simply as in the past. This is the reason why exclusive presence in peacetime, even when it is not backed by seapower, has political weight.
The peoples of the Third World in particular do not count on long-term developments. They think of today, and of what they can see. They are perhaps unable to distinguish true seapower from maritime power. Thus, demonstratively displayed presence, coupled with propaganda and expansionist policies, is often honored politically to a higher degree than its real worth justifies.
This situation makes the employment of maritime power in the global power struggle between East and West a tool of the politics of non-war, of course preferably for the one who is in a weaker position with regard to global seapower. For the Soviet Union, its maritime offensive is one part of its imperialist expansionist policy, a part that is particularly effective in its psychological-demonstrative aspects.
The theoretical analysis has herewith come to an end. The model for a theory of maritime power in non-war offered here, consciously modeled after the theory of seapower in war, may seem in one respect or another artificial. Nevertheless, it can be useful if we are to reach a clearer understanding and evaluation of new forms and new uses of military power at sea in the age of the atomic balance.
Conclusion
With the aid of these concepts, we can now describe the power relationship at sea between East and West as follows:
Mastery of the sea in respect of ocean areas. The Soviet Union borders on the navigable seas at four points separated one from another. Two of these areas, the Baltic and Black seas, are situated adjacent to internal waters the access to which is under NATO control, the two others, the Barents and Japan seas, are peripheral seas separated from the ocean by narrows (in the radar age, even the sea between Scotland and Iceland is a narrows) that could not be passed by Soviet surface ships without incurring substantial risks. If evaluated under the aspect of seapower on the oceans, all four positions have either a small, or a "zero" factor value respectively.
As long as Western aircraft carriers are unhurt, Soviet surface fleets based on the four separated positions will be unable to unite under wartime conditions. Confronted by Western shipborne aviation, and as long as they lack similar aviation of their own, they have no chance beyond the peripheral seas. The factor value of the Soviet surface fleet on the ocean is, therefore, also zero. Soviet sea power does not exist there.
Hence, on the oceans, the Soviets must embark on submarine warfare. Though not ideal, the Northern and Far Eastern positions are usable by submarines, since they are able to pass the narrows that limit the peripheral seas, albeit at some risk. The position value is small for submarines, but not at all zero; the submarines can be deployed from them into the oceans.
As long as the majority of their submarines are still conventional in nature, the Soviets will use them mainly for raider warfare against Western shipping. Attack missions for some nuclear submarines against Western fighting ships have not yet changed this overall picture.
For this reason, the Soviets embark on raider warfare with submarines. Although some risks are incurred, the narrows that limit the peripheral seas can be passed by submarines.
Soviet naval strategy for the ocean areas must therefore be analyzed as defensive. The West, on the other hand, defends its present superiority against the Soviet submarine. As far as the ocean areas go, the West is equally defensive. There is no contest for supremacy.
Mastery of the sea in respect of internal and peripheral seas. By contrast, the Soviet positions are strong in sea areas that are immediately adjacent. Compared to local NATO naval forces, Soviet naval potential is also strong in these areas. Here, in fact, the product of position times fleet is seapower, enabling the Soviet Union to exercise mastery of the sea. But this mastery is geographically limited, and is furthermore contingent on the absence of the West; it ceases to exist when and if the West shows up with concentrated naval forces, ready to impose its control.
In these sea areas, the naval strategy of the Soviet Union is offensive. It aims at enlarging its area of control by advancing its position. Especially by amphibious means, it menaces the NATO territories that flank the exits of internal seas and the Norwegian coasts.
Here the West adopts a defensive strategy, preferably by maintaining control over the Baltic approaches, the Dardanelles, and the Japanese straits. Should it shy away from a major counteraction in the European part of the Arctic Ocean, it would be reduced to being present there merely with submarines. That would indicate that control of that part of the sea is left at least temporarily to the Soviet Union.
If the Soviets choose to embark on a naval strategic offensive aiming at mastery of the ocean areas, they would have two possibilities:
Firstly: Creation of seapower on the oceans by advancing naval strategic positions by land and sea and construction of a fleet equivalent to that of the Americans. Until late in 1971, there were no indications that the Soviets harbored such intentions. Much depends on the accuracy of recent newspaper reports that they might, in fact, be building an aircraft carrier in one of the Black Sea shipyards. Advancing their position toward the Atlantic would mean occupation of Western Europe and of Northwest Africa. On the Pacific, there are hardly any possibilities for advancing.
Secondly: Instead of building a surface fleet, the Soviets could construct an attack fleet of submarines. Assuming that they succeeded in building atomic submarines with speeds exceeding those of Western fighting ships, a fleet consisting of such units—with a mission to attack Western surface forces in a systematic and concentrated manner—could become a naval instrument of a high "fleet" factor value. As already noted, the positions on the Arctic Ocean and in the Far East would be practicable for such a strategy. The Soviets could thus acquire sea power on the oceans, and could adopt a strategy of naval offensive there without having to advance their positions. They could contest Western sea supremacy.
In order to protect the West's mastery of the sea against an offensive of this order, two ways would be open: (a) weakening the Soviet position factor by barring, as far as feasible, the passages between the peripheral seas and the ocean to Soviet submarines, and (b) protecting valuable naval units—like atomic strategic submarines and aircraft carriers—by escorting them with submarines. For either alternative a large number of modern subkillers would be required.
The maritime strategy of the Soviets. As it aims at areas where the Soviet Union has not been present before, this is, as a matter of principle, of an offensive nature. Soviet naval forces used for maritime presence grow. Continuously, new maritime positions are acquired.
The most spectacular maritime offensive takes place in the Mediterranean. Here, the lone presence of the West has already been neutralized by counter-presence. Apart from the psychological-demonstrative effect which has been achieved already, the real danger for the West lies in the possibility that the maritime position of the Soviet Union could be converted, in case of war, into a naval strategic position from which the Soviets could contest the supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Soviet naval and air forces based on such a position, combined with atomic submarines, could become a substantial threat to the aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet.
The maritime presence of the Soviets in the Indian Ocean has been prepared by a long-standing policy of obtaining maritime bases, especially in the northern part of that ocean. In this area the West is on the defensive; it has lost nearly all its positions. Because maritime positions are lacking, it would even have difficulties in putting up a permanent counter-presence. If the Soviet Union succeeds in converting its maritime position in the Mediterranean into a naval strategic position, the area around the Arabian Peninsula could grow, together with the Mediterranean, into an enormous overall position via the Suez Canal. However, to constitute sea power in this zone the Soviets do not have, for the time being, the factor "adequate fleet." If a global war were to be fought now, Western seapower could eliminate Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, which would be engulfed by Western control of the sea in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
In the Atlantic and the Pacific the chances of a Soviet maritime offensive are small. In the North Atlantic, not even an incipient maritime position is in evidence. A temporary sojourn of Soviet naval forces does not constitute maritime presence in the area. In the remaining parts of the Atlantic and in the Pacific, it would be of relevance within atomic and maritime strategy if the Soviets could gain a foothold in peacetime; but it would be irrelevant under the aspect of naval strategy, as long as the West exercised control of the sea in the area. Maritime positions could not be converted into naval strategic positions.
Inthis way it is the coincidence of seapower with maritime power that conveys true value. Despite the significance of maritime strategy, in the last analysis, what counts is seapower. The political weight of naval armament depends eventually on it, and so does its deterrent effect.
This is what President Kennedy meant when he said:
"Control of the sea means security. Control of the seas can mean peace. Control of the seas can mean victory…Our very survival may hinge on it."