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The U.S. Navy’s submarine community has strongly opposed the plan for Litton Pascagoula to build, under license, diesel-electric submarines designed by HDW for export to Egypt. Proliferation of nuisance-type weapons is cited as one reason for this stand— with opponents pointing out that the mere presence of even a few “not very capable” submarines will require four to five times the numbers of antisubmarine warfare forces to combat them. However, there are two problems with this position:
* Proliferation has already occurred; nearly 400 diesel-electric submarines are operational.
^ These are not inconsequential warships; they are sophisticated and capable and in some scenarios better suited than nuclear submarines.
Today, our submarine Navy is entirely nuclear powered. The collapse of the Soviet Union has lessened the requirement for a nuclear-powered submarine force armed with nuclear missiles—but by how much? The attack submarine is vital to naval operations tanging from smaller crises to full-scale War. They are one of our most capable intelligence collectors, and we need them. But how many? And what kind? Littoral warfare is becoming one of the Navy’s primary mission areas. How Well does a large nuclear-powered submarine designed for open-ocean deepwater missions fit into a coastal-water scenario?
Despite prevailing professional opin- ■on, our European allies think that they know as much about submarines as we do. They have capable designers and excellent shipyards and aggressively Pursue export business to protect their naval industrial base—a policy we Would do well to emulate. The Europeans have been living for years with a domestic requirement inadequate to support a submarine industry (a fact of life that we may soon face), but they export; will we?
The Europeans claim that their smaller diesel-electric boats are equal °r better in agility and maneuverability and are much quieter than our large nuclear-powered boats. Despite our efforts in silencing, they lead the way in many 'other signature-reduction techniques in which we are just now commencing active developments. Advances made in diesel-electric technology since World War II include: exhaust gas-powered turbo supercharging, improved batteries, propellers, diesel engines, and air independent propulsion (AIP). Sweden, Germany, France, and Russia are developing AIP systems. These attributes are not given proper credence in comparisons of nuclear- and diesel-electric- powered submarines, and since we have been out of the non-nuke business for some time, we must use their designs for comparison—not ours where we left off.
The Russian Navy continues to build diesel-electric attack submarines. The Rubin design bureau has exhibited innovation and clever design choices in the Project 877 and Project 636 diesel- electric submarines, the first of which was operational in 1980. These boats, which also were built for export, feature double hulls that absorb damage. The reserve buoyancy is 32%—more than two times that of a U.S. nuke. Many provisions have been made to reduce the acoustic signature, but the most interesting are the two Red Octo- ber-style small auxiliary propellers mounted in tunnels near the stern for maneuvering and near-silent running at three knots. The 636 offers many attractive advantages for Russia’s submarine customers, including Libya, Algeria, and Iran.
The final Department of Defense budget, now before the Congress, is in trouble. Carefully crafted rationale for a reasonable budget to achieve defense goals is about to be swept away by DoD mandated cuts needed to achieve deficit elimination goals. Many in the submarine community and elsewhere in the Navy have ignored this reality. This budget anomaly has been in the wind since early this fiscal year, but no service planners appear to have noticed. Now, DoD is preparing to cancel or delay 10 or 12 major programs, including the Navy’s first two new attack submarines (NSSNs) as well as a third Seawolf (SSN-23).
At almost $3 billion for the SSN-23 and approximately $1.75 billion for each NSSN, these programs are extremely vulnerable. However, at the cost ratio of at least four diesel-electric submarines to one nuclear, the United States may be required to have a mixed force of attack submarines. And the preservation of the submarine industrial base may well depend on the export of the only saleable type: the diesel- electric.
Most of our submarine-building allies would agree with U.S. reactionaries: The United States should worry about proliferation and leave the export business to them. But despite opposition, the U.S. Navy should offer its encouragement and full support to the Litton/HDW venture, pursuing both the technology and the export customers.
Admiral Lake, a retired naval aviator, was responsible for the Type 18 Periscope (Reconnaissance) and was involved in numerous submarine electronic warfare projects and other classified underwater projects, including the reconnaissance support facilities at New London and Pearl Harbor.
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Proceedings / June 1995