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eXp]0a ^Pecial relationship] has been at the root of fCtyeratlVe arrangement, with the Philippines receivi Thca<dv^ntages than its dominant partner.
4rtpetj not'on that survival of a nation depends upon the \n I"1^* anothor fosters dependence and cripples a| dignity.
final n,*a Chronicle—The military bases represent the litiequeP's°de of the Filipinos’ effort to break out of the *^ara an<^ dependency relationship which started with (ThI'Va* Admiral Dewey’s fleet.
. - an
%r“auve arrangement, with the Philippines receiving
Manila Times—Suppose that there were no military bases at all . . . would Filipinos stand a better chance of achieving national unity? The answer . . . is a definite yes.
Philippine Inquirer—We, Filipinos, are being goaded into a state of mind wherein we can very well . . . swallow hook, line and sinker, the unwholesome and lethal aspects of foreign occupation of our national territory, the indignities of racial discrimination, the dangerous delights of the honky-tonk with its drugs and venereal diseases, and the searing promise of a nuclear holocaust.
<n8s / November
1988
89
sustained a long and close, even though intermittent fractious, relationship and that should help bring a ^
Pluses ______________ _____ ^
,, f the
Historical Ties: The “benevolent assimilation’ 0 U. S. colonial period from 1898 until Philippine ^i dence in 1946 left a major imprint on the Philippines 3 legacy of shared political, economic, and social va ^ English is the common language. Many Filipino lea ^ including President Corazon Aquino, have been ecjuCn,eJ in U. S. schools and colleges. A strong bond was '°r -sa while fighting side-by-side in World War II. The resu “special relationship” between the two countries. r°
When then-Commodore George Dewey said, “You may fire when you are ready, Gridley” to Flag Captain C. V. Gridley at Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, he opened the Philippine front of the Spanish- American War. Two months later, the Spanish naval base at Subig (as it was known then) was captured in a joint U. S.-Philippine operation. As a result of the war, the Philippines became a colony of the United States and President Theodore Roosevelt designated Subic Bay and an adjacent 70,000 hectares as a U. S. naval reservation.
In 1903, about 40 miles from Subic, the U. S. Army established a cavalry post known as Fort Stotsenburg. The Army constructed a half-mile dirt runway there in 1917 and, with the arrival of the biplanes of the Army Air Corps’s Third Aero Squadron, inaugurated Clark Field. In 1947, Fort Stotsenburg and Clark Field were combined to establish Clark Air Base.
Ninety years later, Subic Naval Base is a major repair, supply, and training facility for Seventh Fleet operations in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Clark Air Base is home to the 13th Air Force. It serves as a staging point for strategic airlift to the Indian Ocean and has substantial air combat training facilities. Even though U. S. forces remain in the Philippines, much has changed over the past 90 years. The Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, which governs U. S. use of the bases, has been amended more than 40 times. As a result of a major amendment in
1979, the bases are now Philippine bases on which the United States has “facilities.” The 1979 amendment also resulted in the two governments reviewing the agreement every five years. In April 1988, the second of these five- year reviews began in Manila. In 1966, the duration of the MBA was reduced from 99 to 25 years. Therefore, in 1991, either government may give one year’s notice to terminate the agreement. Will the Philippines do so? If it
does, will the two countries sign a new agreement °r treaty? ...
Conventional wisdom says the advantages to the Ph»T pines in allowing for a continued U. S. military presenc outweigh the disadvantages. The closeness and mutua i; of the U. S.-Philippine relationship and Filipino pragma tism, especially with regard to the economic benefits, W1 win out, and the two governments will reach a COI11Pr^ mise on a new bases agreement. Typical of those with z optimistic outlook is former Deputy Assistant Secretary State Evelyn Colbert, who wrote in August 1987:
“The need remains truly mutual. It is this that h3^
boa1
the adjustments on both sides necessary for the survi of the MBA beyond 1991
But several factors in the Philippines may make it e* tremely difficult for the United States to reach an acco modation with the Philippine government:
► Generational change
► A negative view of the historical ties
► Increasing nationalism
► A desire to manifest Philippine independence from
United States
► Greater Asian identification
► A shifting domestic political scene ^
With such an uncertain outlook, what are the pluses
minuses the Philippines sees in deciding whether to re the bases?
-r-------------------------- r ------------------ y goS'
U. S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen vv- . js worth said in 1985 that the U. S.-Philippine relations an “intensely personal relationship, which mo* G foundly links our two nations. The United States e°J special relationship with only a few nations in the and with none do the emotional ties run deeper than the Philippines.”2 tfof
Significantly, this attachment translates into suPP^aniI3 the bases. An August 1986 survey published in the ^ News Herald showed that 82% of the respondents s3 j|jp- bases as useful and necessary for the peace ofthe F to pines, 77% said the bases contributed “appreciab ) ^ the country’s economy, and 75% thought the bases prevent nuclear war. Similarly, a poll published m 1988, by the Asia Research Organization showe 80% of those surveyed favored keeping the bases, had no opinion, while only 8% opposed them- Defense Benefits: The 1952 U. S.-Philippine
90
Proceedings / Noven1
ber‘
s'stin
nthly
nnin
8 of senior Philippine and U. S. officers meets and, along with their staffs, works closely on
^ nSe Treaty declares that in the event of an armed at- ‘‘w m l^e Pacific area on either country, each country vyjo . 3Ct t0 mee' t*le common dangers in accordance f0rlts constitutional processes.” The stationing of U. S. Pled S ln Philippines gives concrete meaning to this naj hy providing a substantial deterrent against exter- Squ reats. The Philippine armed forces have limited re- eff0Ces 'h^t are currently focused on counterinsurgency S**- therefore, the Philippines must rely on the United j^s ^0r its external defense.
gaj ^ddition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) p0rtjolrectly from the U. S. military presence. The AFP l9gj01' °f the base compensation monies for fiscal year per v1 ,ugh fiscal year 1989 will average $95.5 million Poree,ar ‘n Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants and rentllfn ^itary Sales (FMS) credits. This funding cur- ab0i,t oC0mPnses some 20% of the total AFP budget and
^®re il . , i---------- 1—i------------ —-i--------------------------
S>2.5 ’ ne United States has provided an annual average of Vear,T"hion for about 500 Philippine military personnel a f° Participate in the International Military Education c°nsi gaining Program. Finally, a Mutual Defense Board
tUai (if c°mbined training exercises and developing mu- ^hief Lense Plans. General Fidel Ramos, former AFP l>5s c .*aff and the current National Defense Secretary,
ttilit °ns'stently emphasized the value of this strong y'to-military relationship.
Assistance to Local Communities: Commands run a variety of community service programs and undertake numerous projects, which include providing medical and dental care, painting schools, and feeding malnourished children. One special activity was the 1987 visit of the Navy’s hospital ship USNS Mercy (T-AH-19), which treated some 60,000 Filipinos. In the Navy’s Project Handclasp program, companies and individuals donate materials, ranging from school books to mouthwash, which the U. S. sailors and Marines distribute to Filipinos. U. S. military forces also provide disaster assistance, such as evacuating flood victims, fighting fires, and airlifting supplies to areas hit by typhoons.
Economic Benefits: The most immediate impact is the money U. S. forces spend. By providing $96 million in salaries to more than 68,000 Filipino employees, the U. S. military is the second largest employer in the Philippines and has more Filipino employees than the top ten Philippine companies combined. In addition, the U. S. facilities spend more than half a billion dollars per year on the purchase of local goods and services, ranging from soft drinks
<*di
ln8s / November 1988
91
to construction projects. Overall, U. S. military expenditures are estimated to account for 2.5% of the Philippine gross national product (GNP).
Base-related economic benefits also come from the security assistance provided as compensation for U. S. use of the bases (see Figure 1). The 1979 five-year package totaled $500 million, while the 1983 pledge was $900 million. Funds added after the 1986 revolution will bring the total for the 1983 package to more than one billion dollars. The assistance includes the MAP and FMS as well as Economic Support Funds (ESF) that are used to support the national budget and to finance construction of projects for communities, such as schools, roads, and public markets.
Significantly, most security assistance has been grant aid (ESF and MAP), and the amounts compare favorably with those provided other countries receiving base-related security assistance, including Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and Greece (see Figure 2). For fiscal year 1986 through fiscal year 1988, the Philippines was given almost $200 million more in ESF than the other four countries combined (see Figure 3). The Philippines also received more military grants than all the other countries combined, except Turkey. However, in terms of the size of its armed forces, the Philippines was provided about $500 more per soldier and sailor than Turkey.
Furthermore, because the United States bears most of the cost of external defense and provides substantial amounts of security assistance, the Philippine government is able to keep its defense expenditures low. In 1985, among the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines had the lowest per- capita military budget, the lowest military budget as a percentage of GNP, and was fifth out of the six countries in total defense spending. Because of the low defense spending, the Philippines is estimated to save some 2.1% of its GNP, which it can shift to economic development.
The bases also contribute to long-term economic growth by providing a security umbrella under which the Philippines can pursue economic development. Located at the strategic crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, U. S. forces protect air and sea-lanes and maintain a balance to the ever-increasing Soviet military presence in Vietnam. General Ramos pointed out in July 1988 that if a hostile power controlled the choke points between the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the Philippines would experience a disruption in access to energy sources and export markets.
Businesses also consider the bases an asset in assessing whether or not to invest in the Philippines. “Reality demands that the bases must stay,” declared the Manila Jay- cees in 1986. “The imperative is to augment, not reduce, opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship.”3 In addition, there is concern that if the Americans leave the bases, not only will the Philippines forfeit the assistance in the compensation packages but may well lose other U. S. aid. Filipinos also worry about the impact on U. S.-Philippine trade (the United States is still the top trading partner) and the continuing efforts to restructure their foreign debt. They fear that if the Americans are forced to leave the bases, this may jeopardize the entire bilateral relationship.
92
Minuses
Historical Ties: Half the Philippine population is under j ^ears old. Today, most Filipinos know of World War II J°m b°oks and stories told by their fathers and grandfa- cers- No longer are they “blood brothers” with Ameri- ,ans- Therefore, while many Filipinos view the historical es of the colonial period favorably, others argue that ese ties have greatly retarded the ability of the Philip- li'nes t0 be a truly sovereign and independent nation. Po- 1Cal|y, they assert, the United States meddles in docestic Philippine politics. “Economic imperialism” °ntinues with U. S. banks holding most of the Philip- lnes foreign debt of more than $28 billion. Culturally, [1]
bases make a mockery of true independence,” says Maria Diokno, Secretary General of the Anti-Bases Coalition. “In effect we are a country that is not free.”5 Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thinks that “sooner or later the bases will have to go. We will have to cut the umbilical cord at some point.”6 Others, such as Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus, highlight the need to revise the terms of the MBA in order to “regain some of the dignity that history took away from us.”7 Especially onerous is the provision in the 1979 amendment assuring the United States unhampered military operations. This has led many Filipinos, including the Philippine ambassador to the United States, Emmanuel Pelaez, to conclude that “it
‘The bases are ‘a polarized issue’ domestically ‘ral
thef
for
the large U. S. military presence.
ves
would seem clear that the bases, while nominally under the sovereignty of the Philippines, continue to be American bases subject to the control and sovereignty of the United States.”8
Nationalism: Political leaders who believe it is important to create a strong sense of Philippine nationhood often denigrate the U. S. influence and advocate anti-Americanism. There is much talk of “slaying the American father.” Strident nationalism, as it relates to the bases, has begun to move from the radical left to the political mainstream. A nationalistic media produces a steady stream of antibase rhetoric that is eroding public support. Filipinos feel national self-confidence will be gained only by defying the United States. One way to do this is to expel the U. S. military.
Statuses of the Two Countries: Filipinos see the United States as a global power with worldwide security interests that is engaged in superpower politics. The Philippines, on the other hand, is a young country, concentrating on political and economic development and combating a communist insurgency. Furthermore, many Filipinos believe their future lies with Asia. They believe that long-term Philippine security and national interests are going to be influenced more by the power of Japan, China, and Vietnam than by the United States.
As a consequence of these differing views and priorities, Filipinos are now more likely to say that U. S. 11111 tary facilities do not benefit the Philippines and may aC'Uf ally be a detriment to it, including making it a target nuclear attack. They do not regard U. S. use of the ba® as being mutually beneficial. Typical are the comments Foreign Secretary Manglapus in a Washington Post art'c
than a stabilizing force.’ He said they are of ‘no use internal security against the communist rebellion or rig wing military coup attempts and are not required by a external threat against the Philippines.”9 Manglapus gues that “the reality of these bases is that [they are] accommodation to U. S. global strategy.”10 ^
Other States in the Region: The December 1 ASEAN meeting in Manila supported a “Zone of Pea*L Freedom, and Neutrality,” a goal that, according to It* nesia, is not compatible with continued stationing of U . troops in the Philippines. With the exception ot “ gapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, ASEAN leaders have not pressed public support for the bases. Reportedly. 1 ^ have privately told the Philippine government they (0 like to see the bases stay, but private assurances do lid j- help Philippine officials cope with the political fallout
Compensation: The Philippines maintains it rece> paltry sums compared to those given other l*sPe.0ji friends” of the United States, some of which do not bases. The Philippines wants assistance increased bey1 the currently pledged level of $180 million per year. In ^ MBA review, Foreign Secretary Manglapus asked ^ $1.2 billion a year. In addition, the demand was caS(^ “take it or leave it.” Manglapus has said, “It’s up t0
94
Proceedings
NovcniWr
involved with the MBA review than a serious base
tun^ersi°n effort. But they show that the government is o king about a future without the bases and reinforce a £Wlng feeling among Filipinos that they can go it alone, le °ula^ ^mPact °f ^,e Bases: Base opponents portray the inj3r ,y cities of Olongapo and Angeles City as dens of qhmty that would not exist without U. S. servicemen. Uj^?ln8 the bases would remove the sex strips and girl wrestle, they argue. Sexually transmitted diseases b0 ^ disappear, and “souvenir babies” would not be gre,n' The bases are also a highly visible reminder of the cans' *n the standard of living between Ameri-
causi
new
constitution, after 1991 “foreign military bases,
ho,
e*ce,
agre>.^e Congress will have to decide whether a new
cnited States. If they can afford it, they can stay. If they ,ann°t, they should go.”11 While undoubtedly negotiates rhetoric, clearly, the amount of compensation the n,ted States pays is critical to the Philippines. Meanwhile, some Filipinos are beginning to believe the aiPpines can develop the bases in such a way as to r°duce more income for the nation than the Americans °vide. jhg Philippine Senate formed a committee in ae 1988 to study the economic conversion of the bases, the House of Representatives requested that President HnU*n° se* UP a $375 million base conversion fund to in ?nCe a^ternatrve uses of the bases. The proposed ideas ude moving the international airport and several rnili- ry bases from Manila to Clark. Subic would be con- ljee(lto an international ship repair facility, free port, and ^quarters for the Philippine Navy. These preliminary „ 10ns probably reflect more of a congressional desire to
ar>d Filipinos. The result is thefts and scavenging that ^hT confrontations between Filipinos and Americans. eVoj.c *he number of incidents is small, they nevertheless cUsse ahighly emotional reaction among Filipinos. In dis- f6rrla8 such occurrences, one newspaper editorial re- raCj to “killer dogs” and bemoaned that “there are ugly ^rt)St Un<^ertones *° the abuse of defenseless Filipinos by theTICan §uards who by their reprehensible acts betray theeeP'seated contempt they harborfor ‘gooks.’ ”12 For anvV®ra§e Filipino, this issue may have more impact than pother.
Politics: With the ouster of President Ferdi- turL Marcos, the Philippines has returned to a working, sj0nCnt democracy. Increasingly, members of the deci- va, maKng elite either say they are not convinced of the m0r-. bases or oppose them outright. The previously the *eg>slature is becoming a major player. Under .^c PS' 0r facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines ti0n P( Ur|der a treaty” that the Senate must ratify. In addi- ■perrient should be ratified in a nationwide referendum, tiojp 6 ^epate has already acted to implement the constitu- tent wantlnuclear provision that “the Philippines, consis- offrclta the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy 1^88 °ni ^rom nuclear weapons in its territory.” In June 'VfiaPooverwhelmingly passed a bill banning nuclear 0.5 ns In the Philippines, specifically including the °r air aci*d*es- The bill also prohibits nuclear-armed ships and Crra * ^rom entering or transiting Philippine territory compliance with the law. If this bill becomes law, it will directly conflict with the U. S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on U. S. vessels, aircraft, or facilities.
Meanwhile, President Aquino has kept the bases issue at arm’s length. She has said she will honor the MBA until 1991, keeping her options open. She did not actively oppose the inclusion of the bases and antinuclear provisions in the constitution nor did she take public action to try to block passage of the Senate’s antinuclear legislation. Some of her closest advisors advocate dismantling the bases and will lobby her strenuously for termination of the MBA. Two regular advisors told the Far East Economic Review in mid-1988 that Aquino “hopes it might prove possible to end the bases’ agreement.”13
On the other hand, base proponents see some positive signs. During the December 1987 ASEAN meeting, the president acknowledged that the bases contribute to economic stability and growth in Asia and the Pacific. In her July 1988 state of the nation address, she asserted that Philippine nationalism should not rest entirely on whether the country does, or does not, keep the U. S. military facilities (which was interpreted to mean she favors keeping the bases). It is also believed that her low public profile keeps her above the fray on day-to-day base issues, thereby making it easier for her to support their retention when the time is politically right. Nonetheless, her lack of public support for the bases creates uncertainty.
What Next?
In past base negotiations, Philippine rhetoric has been strong and demanding, yet practical considerations, especially economic ones, always prevailed. Now, however, the Filipinos seem increasingly willing to accept what they perceive as short-term problems caused by a U. S. military pullout in order to obtain the long-term objective of complete sovereignty. For example, after passing the antinuclear legislation, several senators, including the chairman of the Senate Economic Affairs Committee, reportedly acknowledged that the bill would hinder the Philippines’ economic recovery because they anticipate cuts in U. S. aid or the departure of the Americans from the bases. Nevertheless, they voted for the bill. For the first time, senior Philippine policymakers appear to consider removal of the bases as a viable option.
Unquestionably, in 1991 the Philippine government will notify the United States of its desire to terminate the MBA in 1992. Even if it wants the bases to stay, the Philippines will give the notice because of the constitutional requirement for a treaty and as a tactic to pressure the Americans for better terms in any follow-on agreement or treaty. Once it gives notice, what next? The worst case is that the United States will have to leave the bases by September 1992. However, the Philippine government could decide that a quick departure is not practical or in its best interests and might propose a phased withdrawal over several years.
Another possibility is a Philippine agreement to some form of continued U. S. access to the bases. One potential plan would have both the Philippine and U. S. military forces operating from the bases. For instance, the Fifth Fighter Wing of the Philippine Air Force, which is currently stationed at Basa Air Base near Clark, might move to Clark. Or some Philippine Navy vessels might shift from Cavite in Manila Bay to Subic. Another option would be U. S. access for logistics purposes. The bases might be civilianized, and the United States would contract for goods and services from either a private firm, possibly a joint U. S.-Philippine venture, or from the Philippine government. Regardless of the type of access, the United States can anticipate that the Philippines will want greater control over U. S. military operations and restrictions on nuclear weapons.
It is difficult to predict what will happen, but the outlook is not encouraging. The U. S. government faces some difficult choices. What, if any, restrictions are acceptable in order to continue operating from the bases? What about the nuclear issue? How much is the United States willing to pay to retain access to the bases?
The Philippine bases must also be viewed in the context of worldwide basing. The Philippines is not the only place where changes are occurring. Under pressure from Spain the United States agreed in early 1988 to remove a U. S. Air Force tactical fighter wing from Torrejon by 1991. In August 1988, the Greek government announced the closure of a U. S. airbase near Athens. Meanwhile, the Philippines will have to decide on its priorities. Is continued U. S. security assistance for the bases worth the “cost” of a perception of reduced sovereignty? Will it recognize the mutual benefit of the bases?
The bottom line seems to be that the U. S. military presence in the Philippines is “going” in the sense that even if access to the bases is retained beyond 1992, the conditions are likely to be less favorable than exist now- Furthermore, it is within the realm of possibilities that the bases will be “gone,” and that could happen as early aS 1992.
'Evelyn Colbert, The United States and the Philippine Bases (Washington, D* The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), p. 19.
2Stephen W. Bosworth. “Philippine-American Friendship Day,” Address P sented at the Philippine Columbian Association, 3 July 1985. ,0
3”Economic Reality Demands the Retention of US Bases,” Philippine Inquirct' September 1986, p. 8. ,atte
4”Philippines Must Stand on Its Own,” Editorial, Manila Chronicle, 21
1988‘ P- 4- r.lobe,
5Tom Ashbrook, "Philippine Passion Revived: What of US Bases?” Boston u 10 March 1988, p. 1.
6Keith B. Richburg, “United States, Philippines to Open Talks on Bases, Washington Post, 5 April 1988, p. 15. ton
7Marc Lemer, “Aquino Aide Seeks Rent Rise for U. S. Bases,” Washinl Times, 29 March 1988, p. 8. rl
"Emmanuel Pelaez, The Military Bases in the Philippines: The Past and the rl (Manila: Philippine Council for Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 27. J(i
yDon Oberdorfer, “Philippines Asks Nuclear Restrictions,” The Washington 9 May 1988, p. 18.
10Ibid. vjote
"Keith B. Richburg, "Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Insists U. S. Must Pay for Bases,” The Washington Post, 17 May 1988, p. 16. 4.
12“Army of Occupation," Editorial, Philippine Inquirer. 30 March 1987’7 ju|y '■’James Clad, “Patience Wears Thin,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
1988, p. 12.
Until recently, Captain Sadler was a Federal Executive Fellow aSSI.^stj. to the Senior Seminar at the State Department’s Foreign Service tute. She is a general unrestricted line officer with a proven subsp®-; , in politico-military planning. Captain Sadler has served as the P° 1' Military Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet Represents Philippines, and as the Philippine action officer in the Plans and P0^ Directorate (J5) of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff j holds a master’s degree in Public Administration from the UniversO a( Washington and was an instructor in the Political Science Depart the Naval Academy. She has written a number of articles for the Institute Proceedings.
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everv c-Hy Filipinos are clones of Americans, copying itig y'bing from furniture to blue jeans. Overall, accord- c0nt° 0ne Philippine editorial, the “special relationship to inhibit the growth of self-reliance and na- dignity.”4
niaj e bases are the most important symbols of the colo- Unij ^ars ar>d the perceived Philippine dependence on the t’hiij .^tates- Filipino critics contend that because the 3CcPP|nes was a colony, the United States forced it to the bases in exchange for independence. “The