This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
gaps ™‘es; (he Cessna presumably took advantage of some of those the Sov° l*'e extent that naval forces can attack over a much wider arc, everv ‘ets may find it extremely difficult to provide sufficient protection ti0n of hfe ^lus’ although naval cruise missiles represent only a frac- On ov , total U S. inventory, they may exert disproportionate effects ‘he fo rU ^OV‘et a'r defense dispositions, and thus may greatly reduce fees available to deal with bomber- or ground-launched weapons.
“Stealth Cessna” Flies; Heads Roll
A West German teenage pilot flew a light airplane from Finland into the Soviet Union in late May, landing in Red Square. The immediate consequence was the dismissal of the Minister of Defense and the chief of Air Defense Forces. There were suggestions that border defenses had been unusually ineffective: the event occurred on Border Guards' Day; about 100 drunken border guards were arrested 'fetect h'T 'ne Same d£,y- The Soviets claimed that they had indeed they hacjt"e "‘"Plane and that interceptors had been dispatched, but that Howe 1 re^ra‘ned from shooting it down on humanitarian grounds.
Po,-'" seems likely that the Cessna penetrated undetected.
°Ppon ICat*le event allowed Mikhail Gorbachev to fire one of his regarded S °n ^°'itburo, and t0 replace him with a younger man is a( , as an ally. However, the situation has its perils. Border security Yurj j* part|y tl'e responsibility of the KGB. As a protege of the late of tha(roP®v> Mr. Gorbachev might be regarded as the representative mance?°ir8anizat‘on' How far’ then’ can he go in criticizing its perfor- aifljne n dle Past> such border protection failures, such as a KAL jet been / ^enetrat'on of Soviet airspace (toward Leningrad) in 1978, have officers h y unment'oned inside the Soviet Union, and only low-ranking couidave suffered. In this case, the entire population of Moscow safetv Sp£ t*le ^adure’ and the Politburo understandably feared for its carryi ^ ' Gorbachev had to say that the airplane might have been
Afghan8 3 terrorist’s” bomb. After all, the Soviet Union is engaged in Stud'Stan’ anC* ^^Shan refugees live in many Western countries. Cruise ents.0^ current naval strategy may draw two lessons. First, a Soviet n‘‘SS‘*e*s considerably smaller than a Cessna. How well would no; n Ulr de^enses do against a Tomahawk? Second, the Soviets would ceptu !Tna'ly expect air attacks from Finland. Their air defenses are con- Possihl k aS a cont*nuous hell around the Soviet Union. However, faiq w |°m^er routes from North America and from NATO Europe are econor,C dc*'ned' That, in turn, permits the Soviets some significant
Canadian Subs, Frigates?
It Published a long-awaited “White Paper on Defense" in June,
ediy S ‘ e * 'rst formal review of overall policy since 1971, and it report- asSoc- arxs a reversal of the long decline in Canadian defense spending Paper'31^ w‘t*1 tde government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The White years ^ ,ec*®es an annual increase of 2% beyond inflation over the next 15 major ^ US add'h°nal special authorizations to cover new procurement of Policy SYstems- The White Paper is government policy, i.e., it is the tive si U Vocated by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his Conserva- PPorters. It must still be translated into actual legislation.
As was rumored, the White Paper advocates the purchase of 10 or 12 nuclear-powered submarines for Arctic patrol. In addition, the Canadian Navy will receive six more frigates, in addition to the six City-class ships already under construction. Presumably, the submarine program will supersede earlier proposals for a third round of six frigates. Should Canada continue with the desired nuclear submarine program, it will be the first country to buy rather than develop such craft. The most likely suppliers are Vickers (with a modified Trafalgar) and France (with a modified Rubis), reportedly with Vickers the favorite.
The Canadian Army will receive new battle tanks, but no additional personnel. However, nearly 30,000 men will be added to the reserves. The long-standing Canadian commitment to transport a brigade—the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) unit—to Norway has been dropped, though Canada will probably still maintain small land forces in West Germany. Currently, they amount to a single armored brigade and two fighter squadrons. The shift away from the European commitment was explained on the ground that it is not realistic in view of actual Canadian resources.
Skeptics may observe that Canada is already heavily committed to other re-equipment programs such as the F/A-18 purchase, and that the Canadian economy may not easily adjust to the cost of the programs required under the White Paper. Reports suggest that the U. S. Government has tried to dissuade Canada from the projected nuclear submarine program because of cost and preference for increased investment in land forces for European combat.
RAN to Buy Swedish Subs
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) announced that it will buy Swedish, rather than West German, submarines to replace its fleet of British- built Oberons. The drawn-out competition has unfortunate implications for the primary German submarine builder, HDW, which had hoped to use the order to finance development of a new generation of submarines. HDW’s situation is further complicated by reports, as yet unconfirmed, that West Germany will have to cancel orders for a new-generation submarine—the Type 211—owing to severe budget shortfalls. India is HDW’s major foreign customer, but several other Third World countries
are showing interest in new submarines.
The RAN winner was the Swedish (Kockums) Type 471; HDW lost with the Type 2000, a diesel- electric submarine offered some years ago to the U. S. Navy. The RAN reportedly described the Type 2000 as somewhat dated in concept, deficient in shock-hardening and silencing, and inadequate in weapon handling. The Australians reportedly decided that, although some of the deficiencies of the German design could be cured, overall it was defective. The Swedish design was described as fundamentally quieter, which suggests much more attention to silencing of the diesel engine. Although details of the report are unlikely to be published widely, the Australian decision will probably affect other navies now considering HDW submarines. It is possible that the Type 2000 represents too great an extrapolation from the small coastal submarines with which the Germans began in the 1950s.
Reportedly, the Australians wanted a submarine capable of patrolling for 40 days at four knots, 3,500 nautical miles from base after a ten-knot transit; battery capacity at patrol speed was specified as 100 hours. The
hr,
“reedi
'■ngs / August 1987
133
Alternatives Crowd Fighter Scene
The French Rafale advanced fighter technology demonstrator has con ducted a series of dummy approaches to the French carrier ClemenciM- Because the Rafale has no tailhook, the Dassault-Breguet pilot di n^. make a touchdown. However, the tests demonstrated the compatibm y the Rafale with the carrier, and emphasized the French commitment adopt a navalized Rafale to replace existing F-8 Crusaders. Rafale Pr0 duction has been delayed, and the French Navy has shown some mte in interim purchases of F/A-18 Hornets. They, in turn, may crow 0 navalized Rafale derivatives. If so. Rafale would not be the first re French naval fighter to have died: The naval version of the Anglo-rre Jaguar never entered service. It was replaced by the Super Eten •
The Rafale is a French alternative to the European Fighter
Type 471 offered 47 days on station and 120 hours on battery, whereas the Type 2000 reportedly offered only 27 days on station (owing to limited fuel capacity) and 84 hours on battery. Comparative battery capacity was also indicated in a comparison of time available at high speed (21 knots): 1.58 (Type 471) versus 1.35 (Type 2000) hours; and inareduced indiscretion rate for the Swedish submarine.
The Type 471 offered six rather than eight (Type 2000) torpedo tubes, but one more torpedo (23 instead of 22 weapons) and, according to the Australians, a better reloading system.
Tilt-rotor RPV May Fly in 1987
Bell-Vertol has plans for a private-venture, tilt-rotor remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) called the Pointer. Its configuration follows that planned for the V-22 Osprey, which the consortium is building, but design gross weight is only 550 pounds, including 75 pounds of payload. It is to be 13 feet long and have a 12-foot wingspan.
RPVs are relatively easy to launch from short ramps, but have encountered some recovery difficulties. For example, the U. S. Navy system installed on board the battleship Iowa (BB-61) employs a vertical net, but several RPVs were lost in early tests, in some cases because air currents around the ship’s superstructure blew them away from the net. Bell- Vertol points out that even a successful net or parachute recovery usually damages an RPV, which needs repairs before it can be reused.
The alternative—a small helicopter drone—is limited in speed and range. Like the V-22, the Pointer should be able to provide a compromise between the need for transit speed (estimated at 160 knots) and the need for vertical landing. Bell-Vertol claims that because the Pointer does not need a ramp for catapult takeoff, its payload need not be shock- hardened.
Work on the Pointer began in 1986, and it is expected to fly for the first time late in 1987.
U. S. Customs to Buy AEW Orions
Lockheed received a letter contract from the U. S. Customs Service in June for an airborne early warning version (AEW) of the P-3 Orion, to be used against drug smugglers. The contract had been expected for some time, but had been delayed in a dispute between the departments of Defense and Justice over provision of what amounted to a new military- capable aircraft. The contract is subject to approval as part of the fiscal year 1987 Supplemental Budget. The $19.7 million contract (the APS- 125 radar will be supplied by the government) should launch the Orion AEW&C program, which Lockheed hopes will appeal to many current P-3 users, such as Australia and Japan. The prototype will be built using a P-3B, one of those turned in by the Royal Australian Air Force as part of its P-3C acquisition; the contract includes an option for three more.
Compared to the proposed international AEW&C version, the Customs P-3 will have fewer radios and fewer intercept positions; it will, however, incorporate special Customs communications.
The first AEW&C Orion is to be delivered late in 1988, and Customs hopes to use it to patrol the entire Caribbean, as far south as Colombia. The new variants will replace Customs P-3As, which have shorter-range surface-search radars.
Lockheed hopes that this order will bring the company back into the AEW field, which it entered more than 35 years ago with special versions of its Constellation (C-121) airliner.
Last S-3 Vikings Deploy
The Navy commissioned Antisubmarine Squadron 35 (VS-35), its newest squadron of carrier-based S-3 Viking antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. The aircraft were taken from storage, and are the last of 187 S-3s to deploy. The program was completed very rapidly (the last
S-3 was delivered in 1978) to realize economies of scale, and substantia^ numbers were stored for future requirements. Now that the last S-3 as deployed, the question of further production arises. This has been uggra vated by the decision to withdraw some S-3s from service tor modi ica tion as electronic surveillance aircraft—as an alternative to the propose E-X program, and as replacements for aging Douglas EKA-3 wna ■ S-3 tooling still exists, and Lockheed has long pressed for the production line to be reopened. The company has also suggested a new multipurpose carrier aircraft, broadly resembling the S-3, but with canard forep anes and a new wing. ,
Certainly the new carriers expected to enter service later in this dec. and in the 1990s will need more ASW aircraft. However, further - production may be rejected in favor of the ASW version ol the e Vertol V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which should be available at a ou^ the same time. The government has plans to buy 1,213 Ospreys. MV-22A for Marine assault troops and another 231 for the Army. SV-22s for ASW; 50 HV-22s for Navy combat search and rescue: and » CV-22As for Air Force special operations. The Department ot Transpor tation is studying the basic Osprey as a potential short-haul airliner, potential role that partly accounts for its initial popularity with Congress.
The V-22A prototype is scheduled to fly in June 1988, and the delivery (to the Marine Corps) is to follow in December 1991. There a been some fear of cost escalation, but it is likely that costs can be e down by increasing the numbers bought. That in turn would make tu production of the S-3 less likely.
Aircraft
(EFA), a British-Italian-German-Spanish project. There have been sug^ gestions that neither France nor the EFA consortium will be ab e follow through with the cost of a full fighter program. French Prin Minister Jacques Chirac has declared his government’s intention to Pr0 duce the Rafale, but France has recently suffered major fiscal problem^ Thus, speculation persists that France ultimately may have to buy a alternative fighter.
McDonnell-Douglas, in turn, has sketched a future Super ^onlfV.,j much-modified F/A-18 derivative with canard surfaces, uprated r engines, and increased composite construction. It has been otlere Britain and Germany, and to Japan as an alternative to a new all-JapJ ■ fighter, designated the FS-X. The Japanese are also considering t <Super Tornado, an advanced version of the multinational Panavia nado. Although Panavia concedes that the Japanese are unlikely to y it, this project might become an alternative to the EFA, available soon and at lower cost. .
In mid-May the British Government announced that defense fun would be cut in favor of civilian research, and there were indications considerable reduction in overall defense resources. West Germany - considering a cut of more than $1 billion in 1988 defense procuremen •
As for the EFA, the date set to decide on whether to go into full-sca development, which was originally to be 1 August, has slipped. ‘ r0 lems reportedly include weight growth, which would raise the price p fighter. Total EFA production might be 800 aircraft, which will en^ service about 1997. Critics have suggested that agreement has been^s | slow (and change will be so difficult in a consortium) that the fighter wi be better than such current aircraft as the F/A-18. No one can say whether such an aircraft could compete with the U. S. Advanced Tactic Fighter (ATF), which would then be entering production, and which wi^ surely incorporate stealth concepts, or with Soviet aircraft designe compete with the ATF. News reports suggest that the major European a forces rule out purchase of the ATF because it will be too expensive.
134
Proceedings / August 1987