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Is the Super CAG a Super Idea?
Carrier aviation is undergoing a major shift in its upper command structure. The carrier air wing, formerly commanded by a senior commander (CAG), will now be commanded by a captain (Super CAG), assisted by a post-command commander as Deputy CAG. The Wing Commander will concentrate on planning, tactics, and administration, while the Deputy CAG specializes in airborne leadership. This arrangement supposedly provides for a more experienced staff that can better employ the highly sophisticated airborne weapon systems of the modern aircraft carrier than has been the case in the past.
A major Type Commander summarized Super CAG’s responsibilities in a message: “The overriding and everpresent theme must be teamwork . . . just as smooth as that of carrier aviation, the ship and the wing. Now it applies to everyone. ‘Let’s all have at it.’” But when we read the fine print, we find that the same rules do not apply to everyone—not everyone can “have at it.”
The commanders of carrier air wings will be selected only from aviators in the attack and fighter communities. To junior officers in other communities, it seems odd that CAG is not selected on the basis of leadership and tactical ability, both on the ground and in the air. This selection process enforces the perception that talent as a naval officer takes a backseat to talent as an attack or fighter pilot in the earner aviation community. Instead of diversifying our airborne leadership by tapping top fliers from all aviation communities, we are limiting the direction of our future carrier aircraft’s operations to leaders with backgrounds in either dropping bombs or dogfighting.
Are we preparing to fight the next war, or World War II all over again? Major technological advances in weapon systems have permanently altered warfare at sea; we must adjust our approach to combat accordingly.
As the recent clashes with Libya so aptly illustrate, modern airborne sensors and missile weapon systems have be
come the decisive instruments of naval warfare, even against a minor power. To fully integrate and exploit these developments, the Navy should build a
has 16 lieutenant commanders in
more than 1,000 hours ot t >S attack aircraft, and six attac j(,s a manding and executive office simple fact that in wartime t :orjty cannot be airborne to lead I esllpply of strikes anyway. With a go of qualified strike leaders, t 1 be a problem. «.»> is1,01
If “leadership over the oea „ jgt the reason, what is the rea re| « (
a restricted CAG selection po ^ ^rK'" don't know the answer. But ^ale that a price will be paid in 0jUni°r and reduced retention among _ officers in the non-attack an ^ fighter communities. It s . £js. gut aviators aspire only to be be
the realization that they can . abo'e selected for the position dire ^ain their commanding officer m
team of leaders with varied backgrounds. Restricting the backgrounds of CAGs stifles possibilities for unique tactical insight and innovation.
What prompted the Navy hierarchy to institute this policy of segregated career paths for carrier aviators in the first place? There has been a vague concept handed down from above that “leadership over the beach” is the trait used to distinguish the eligible communities from the others. If that is the rationalization, it is weak—the commanding officer of a fighter squadron has no inherently greater expertise in leading strikes over land than do the skippers of the disfranchised squadrons whose primary missions are also conducted over sea. Moreover, the airborne early warning skipper is more experienced in airborne command and control over both land and sea than his F-14 counterpart. The tactical electronic warfare skipper is intimately involved in all phases of strike planning. And while the air antisubmarine skipper is proficient in air-to-ground ordnance delivery, the F-14 squadron skipper isn’t.
Undoubtedly, experienced flight leaders from the attack community are imperative for a successful “feet dry” (land strike) mission. But is there such a lack of able leadership within the attack community that the Deputy CAG must lead the strike? I can’t speak for the rest of the fleet, but my air wing
of command is devastating- .
There is another problem r Super CAG organization: the
CAG will no longer report
to
the
car-
:ctiy
rier’s commanding officer- N thus d*' to the battle group’s admir > jegrad viding shipboard leadership atain 10 ing the power of the carrier connt’ run his ship. Nearly half the ^ ajf on board a carrier belong t0nlb!ing wing—the usual vigorous sc ^ ^ a> between the ship’s company ^ on|y ^
wing for limited resources w^
wing iui iiiniitu ivov-w- ^
exacerbated by having seParfin fosterS “AG pl®n 1 ,ats the c
wing staff, and pushes decisn
exacerbated by navmg manders. The Super CAG P carTier divided leadership, bloats t niak'n'
air
wing oiun, aim ni-llld’
farther up the chain ot com particu Restricting CAG selection ^
lar aviation communities is asegregal1' If there are good reasons lot’ career paths in carrier avia 1 ’ c|eiir
should be spelled out loud a ^ jS all to examine. Today, war -0„ of three dimensional. The exc s fro11 four carrier aviation cornmu ^rii'. CAG selection—airborne eajr ;ii' ing, tactical electronic war a -eS dj submarine, and helic°Pter'T7 raie anv.. versity in our leadership- ne c0'1 retention in the excluded air 0peP^
munities will be damaged- ^ beSt;,n the competition and select 0^ ^ air- brightest fliers, regardless n '
craft they fly, to lead our wings.
of the
carrier
air
Proceei
dings
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