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The Royal Swedish Navy
By Milan Vego
Since the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, Sweden has managed to stay away from the conflicts and wars that have ravaged much of Europe. A large part of the reason for this has been Sweden’s maintenance of a strong and credible national security system—to which the Royal Swedish Navy makes an important contribution.
The navy (Marinen) is commanded by a vice-admiral, who (in peacetime) is responsible to the supreme commander of the Swedish armed forces, headquartered in Stockholm. The navy—comprised of (1) active fleet, (2) sub-area commands (bases), (3) air arm (helicopters), (4) schools and training centers, and (5) other installations—and coastal artillery units are both responsible to the same vice admiral, whose title is Commander-inChief of the Navy.
The Kustflottan (active fleet) is organized into various divisions of operational forces: torpedo boats, submarines, patrol boats, minelayers, destroyers, auxiliaries, and minesweeping detachments. The Kustflottan is commanded by a rear admiral embarked on the minelayer Visborg. and normally includes about one-third of the Swedish Navy’s surface ships and submarines. Recently, the effort has been made to keep one-half of the available vessels in active service. The rest are kept in reserve status with ammunition and supplies on board. These ships can achieve combat readiness within hours.
Sweden’s active fleet has six subareas of commands, which are divided into smaller patrol areas. Each naval sub-area is normally headed by a commodore or a captain, and they are in effective control of naval bases, ships in reserve, and naval installations within their respective areas of responsibility.
Two helicopter squadrons make up the Kustflottan’s air arm: one is based at Goteborg on the southeastern coast, and the other is inland at Berga.
Principal naval bases are in the ports of Harnosand, Stockholm. Kar- lskrona, and Goteborg. Besides these bases, many underground shelters along the coast are capable of accommodating fast patrol boats (FPBs) and submarines. The largest such underground complex is at Musko, which can repair surface ships as large as destroyers. It is also hardened to withstand the effects of chemical-bacteriological-radiological attacks. Many other shelters along the coast are used to store ammunition, torpedoes, mines, and fuel.
The Kustartillerit (coast artillery) is made up of five regiments in peacetime, with an estimated 20 mobile and 45 static artillery batteries. Other assets include 18 patrol craft, 25 small minelayers, 9 LCMs, and 81 LCUs.
So-called “sleeping” minefields, controlled from shore, guard the entrances of important harbors and exposed areas. Such mined areas are published regularly in notices to mariners, but exact positions of the mines and their type are not revealed. The minefields can be activated when the need arises by the Kustartillerit.
The strength of the Royal Swedish Navy would increase from 15.000 members in peacetime to about 50,000 in wartime. Swedish defense emphasizes rapid mobilization. Reportedly, the Swedish Navy could mobilize most of its fleet, coastal artillery, and reserves within 24 hours. It should be noted that in peacetime the coastal radar early warning stations are almost fully manned, while the coastal artillery units are combat-ready during those months when refresher training for reservists is conducted.
The Royal Swedish Navy is smaller today than it was in the 1960s, but the quality of its ships, weapons, and equipment has not suffered. In 1981, the navy had 57 major combatants (12 submarines, 3 destroyers, 35 fast attack craft, and 7 large patrol craft), 58 minelayers/minesweepers, 30 coastal patrol craft, 144 landing craft, and more than 60 auxiliaries.
Of the once-large number of destroyers on active duty, one Halland- class vessel remains; the last two Vis by-class ASW fast frigates were decommissioned last year.
Twelve submarines are in service: four Draken class (built in the early 1960s and undergoing modernization), five Sjoormen class (built 1967-69), and three Ndcken class (completed in 1979-80). The Nackens have Alba- core-type hull forms, a maximum speed above 20 knots, and eight 21- inch torpedo tubes. This class has a high degree of automation, with a crew of 25. (These submarines reportedly can operate with less than 20 crew members if necessary.)
In 1981, the navy began construction of the first submarine of a new class which may number five. Intended to replace the Drakens\ this class is scheduled to begin entering active service in 1986.
The FPB force consists of 16 Hugin- class missile boats and 18 Spica-class torpedo boats. The six older, 200-ton Spicas are armed with one 57-mm./ L70 Bofors dual-purpose gun and six 21-inch tubes for wire-guided antishipping torpedoes. Their three Sid- deley Proteus gas turbines generate 12,700 shaft horsepower for a top speed of 40 knots. The dozen newer, 230-ton Spica IIs are fitted with more advanced fire control systems and electronic warfare sensors, and have Rolls-Royce gas turbines.
Traditionally, groups of three or four torpedo boats were accompanied by one flotilla leader (usually a destroyer). However, since most of the destroyers and fast frigates have been removed from service, the Spicas must provide their own protection. For this reason, each Spica will be armed with launchers for new RBS-15 antiship missiles by 1985. Two torpedo tubes will be retained on each vessel.
After much delay, the navy finally ordered the first of a new multipurpose FPB—similar to the 230-ton Spica—last June. The 300-ton “YA- 81” class will carry RBS-15 antiship missiles, one 57-mm./L70 dual-purpose and one 40-mm. gun, two 21-inch torpedo tubes, an ASW rocket launcher, and a variable-depth sonar. The propulsion system is a combined diesel and gas turbine arrangement which can produce a top speed of 35 knots.
The 150-ton, 35-knot Hu pins are of Norwegian design and carry one 57- mm./L70 Mk-2 dual-purpose gun and six short-range Penguin Mk-2 surface- to-surface missiles. They will eventually be armed with long-range RB- 15s. The Hugins alternately can carry up to 24 mines or be fitted with depth charge racks. In both cases, however, the missile launchers have to be removed. This class of FPB is intended as a complement for the Spicas and would be employed for scouting, antisea lines of communication, and ASW missions close to Sweden’s coast.
The Hugins could be used from concealed positions behind the offshore islands, emerging briefly to launch missiles at enemy surface ships and then darting back to cover. They also possess limited ASW capability and can be used to guard channel entrances. In peacetime, the Hugins can be used for coastal surveillance and fishery protection.
Minelaying capabilities have decreased over the past decade because of the scrapping of a great number of large surface combatants and submarines. Four large and 45 small minelayers remain. The almost 40- year-old 4,250-ton Alvsnabben, which had served as a training ship, was replaced by the new 3,130-ton and 20- knot minelayer Karlskrona, with a carrying capacity of 105 mines, in 1981. Two other minelayers are the 2,540-ton Alvsborg and Visborg built in 1971 and 1976, respectively. In peacetime, the Alvsborg serves as a submarine tender, the FPBs’ mother ship, or as a torpedo target ship. Small minelayers belong to three different classes: one 200-ton “MUL-ll” and eight 245-ton “MUL-12”-class, built in 1946 and 1957, respectively, and some 36 15-ton minelayers built under a program continuing since 1969. A new class of small minelayers (“MUL-20”) is provided in the budget for 1981-82.
The mine countermeasure capability is one of the Swedish Navy’s most serious problems. It has 12 coastal minesweepers and 18 inshore minesweepers, but no coastal minehunters (MHCs). After many delays, the navy finally ordered two MHCs—310-ton “M-80”-class vessels that will have glass-reinforced plastic sandwich hull form, minehunting sonar, and TV cameras for mine detection. The “M- 80s” are to enter service by 1984.
The naval air arm comprises only helicopters, while strike aircraft and maritime reconnaissance aircraft are provided by the Swedish Air Force. The navy operates about 25 helicopters. including 19 Boeing Vertol BV- 107 (HKP-4B) or Kawasaki Vertol
KV-107 (HKP-4C) models used for ASW, minesweeping, and transport missions. Ten Agusta Bell AB-206A Jet Ranger (HKP-6) helicopters are used for search and rescue duties. Defense plans include an increase in the navy’s helicopter force, and arming it with the new lightweight TP-42 antiship torpedo.
The 1980-85 defense plan calls for naval expenditures of about $2 billion (U. S.). Emphasis will be given to the strengthening and modernization of combat units, while funds for shore establishments will be reduced. The naval education system is to be modernized with more stress on practical training. Fleet and coastal artillery personnel will be more integrated than has previously been the case.
The Swedish Navy has had for many years, and still has, a continuing problem preventing the violation of the country’s territorial waters. This question has become more acute since 1 July 1979 when Sweden’s territorial waters were extended from 4 to 12 nautical miles. At that time, Sweden introduced a requirement of prior notification for warships making passage through its territorial waters. An immediate difficulty arose as to how the new law applied to straits narrower than 12 nautical miles. Sweden resolved it by declaring a passage zone between the Danish island of Bornholm and the Skane’s coast which allowed foreign vessels to pass on the basis of “innocent” passage.
In 1980, Swedish territorial waters were violated on 13 occasions. Warsaw Pact navies were involved in five instances, and NATO ships in four. In that same year, 44 foreign vessels transited through Sweden’s territorial waters without giving advance notification. There have also been several occasions when foreign submarines have crossed into Swedish territorial waters without permission. A notable incident involved one or more sub
The patrol boat Vaktaren (P-160) went into service late in 1979 and carries six Penguin Mk-2 surface-to-surface missile launchers. The Nacken is the lead submarine of a three-vessel class; highly automated, she can operate with less than 20 men. Both types of ships are examples of the emphasis that Sweden’s navy gives to coastal defense.
marines detected east of Uto Island. They were tracked by Swedish Navy surface ships and helicopters from 17 September to 6 October 1980. One submarine (later identified as a Polish “Whiskey”-class) was apparently damaged in an attack by the destroyer Holland and received aid from Polish salvage vessel Piast in international waters.
More recently, a Soviet “Whis- key”-class submarine ran aground last October in a restricted military zone near Sweden’s Karlskrona naval base. Military investigators went on board to question the commanding officer, and the Swedish Government claimed the submarine carried nuclear weapons. After more than a week, the Soviet sub was towed to international waters and released to a waiting flotilla of Soviet warships.
The Swedish concept of total defense calls for all the components of the national defense system to be strong enough to make it unprofitable for any invader to launch an attack against Sweden. Hence, great emphasis has been placed on simplicity and speed in mobilizing available human and material resources for the country’s defense. Sweden’s mobilization system is decentralized and reportedly difficult to sabotage or destroy.
The country’s strategic planning is still primarily based upon the possibility of an invasion from across the sea. Since sailing time is about 12 hours, an invasion launched from the eastern shore of the Baltic against Sweden’s central coastal area can be made during nighttime hours. In the Swedish defense concept, any large- scale amphibious attack must be defeated before enemy transports reach the country's coast.
Swedish naval doctrine envisions three lines of defense against large- scale amphibious attack: submarine and mine offensives close to the enemy shore, combined air and sea attacks against transiting enemy transports and convening forces, and coastal defense.
If an invading amphibious force succeeded in getting close to the Swedish coast, the archipelagoes would be fully exploited to act as a barrier in preventing the enemy from reaching its objectives ashore. Long- range guns, antiship missiles, and coastal torpedo stations would defend naval bases and important harbors. Approaches to harbors would be defended by rapid-firing gun batteries and minefields backed by mobile units armed with light antitank guided missiles. Specially trained anti-amphibious warfare troops (coastal rangers) would be employed to prevent infiltration or break up penetration of the defense line by the invading forces. The army units are intended for counterattacks against the enemy who has already landed, and also for quick shifts in gravity of defenses in the threatened coastal sectors.
Despite great reductions in numerical strength, the Swedish Navy still represents a formidable force on the strength of its high-quality ships, weapons, and equipment, favorable coastal conditions, and excellent personnel.
But the Swedish Navy faces a problem similar to that confronting the U. S. Navy: Would a smaller number of highly capable but high-cost ships be adequate to make up for the lack of numbers?
Sweden faces a combination of potential opponents on the sea who possess a large number of high-quality ships and submarines. It should be noted that naval encounters in narrow seas such as the Baltic would be short but intense, and a high attrition rate must be expected—especially with the employment of FPBs, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters. While the Swedish coast provides the defender great advantages in both defense and offense, a point is reached when the enemy’s superiority in numbers— combined with the willingness to accept large losses—would overwhelm the defender, regardless of high-quality ships or well-trained personnel. The numerical weakness appears to present the most serious problem facing the Royal Swedish Navy in the years ahead.
The navy’s offensive capability has
been weakened since the backbone of strength now rests exclusively with the Spicas. Also the employment of the FPBs suffers because of the lack of flotilla leaders. Presumably, the projected 300-ton FPB, when she enters into service, might fulfill this role, but it appears doubtful.
The navy’s ASW capability has been decreased by the phasing out of destroyers and fast ASW frigates. Thus, the larger burden of ASW work has fallen upon the small force of helicopters. Again, it does not seem that the steps taken so far will eliminate the present weakness in the navy’s ASW capability. Similarly, the numerical strength of the submarine force appears too low for the navy’s needs despite greatly improved capabilities in the newest classes of submarines built or under construction.
The situation is especially serious because of no apparent change in naval policy on the part of the Swedish Government. Sweden cannot afford to have its naval position become further eroded: to do so may well lead to the weakening of its position in the Baltic—with accompanying political consequences.
Milan Vego is a naval and military analyst in Washington. A 1961 graduate of the Yugoslav naval academy, he served on fast patrol boats for most of his naval career. Mr. Vego also wrote the regional summary of East European navies that appears in this issue.
The “Luta” Fleet
By Andrew Li
Western naval observers have continually reported the number of the Chinese “Luta”-class guided missile destroyers as being only seven ships with the following hull numbers: 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, and 111. In fact, the number of “Lutas” is twice seven.
According to some Chinese sources, such as the articles and photographs released by Chinese publications, and the photographs of the
Chinese naval deployment to the South Pacific during the Chinese ICBM test in 1980, the “Luta”-class destroyer fleet actually consists of three series: 105-111; 161-165; and 131 and 132—for a total of 14 ships.
The ships of the 105 series may be deployed with the East Sea Fleet or North Sea Fleet; the 161 series is believed to be deployed with the South Sea Fleet; and the 131 series is reported to be deployed with the East
Sea Fleet. Ships from these series operated together in 1980 in the South Pacific.
The 161-series ships were built at the Guangzhou Shipyard. Other ships were built at the Hongqi (Red Flag) Shipyard at Dalian and the Hudong Shipyard at Shanghai.
The armament of the “Lutas” varies from ship to ship. The main weapons are two trainable triple missile launcher/containers for the “Styx-”