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To the Naiyman at sea, it often seems that two-thirds of the Navy—the Navy Department and the Shore Establishmetit—exists merely to make life miserable for his one-third, the Fleet. Certainly, most people in the Fleet are concerned that their relatively middle-aged Naiy will become even more paunchy and raunchy unless a lot of the shoreside-generated paperwork and disruptive inspections comes to a screeching halt.
;
The U. S. Navy is in bad shape. The daily n1 reports keep track of the dwindling number of Fleet units, and politicians vie with each other to11 crease military cuts. The fact that the bulk of the N is of World War II vintage, combined with incre2-l,f; commitments that spread it all too thinly around 1 world, means that maintenance of the material c° dition and weapons/electronic suites is a consrJ battle against rust and obsolescence. Our "new” gu'1 missile ships are approaching 15 years of age and sh° ing it. Worse yet, the latest construction units are by design economies, cost over-runs, construction lays, and controversy as to their combat effective^ These new construction difficulties can be corrected the future with more money, better contracting, tes* before series production, and improved quality con11
all of which are beyond the scope of this essay-
existing fleet with which we do our assigned task5, the basis of the formidable problem approached n
The age of many of our ships may be old and 1° ; past the designed useful years of service, but our paratively middle-aged 197-year-old Navy is evidcl^ becoming old, paunchy, and raunchy. Any °f.
ization, civilian or military, tends with time to 3<
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mulate excessive echelons of command and spc
increasingly more time and effort in self-administr*tl^J than is practical. This wheel-spinning, inevitably. |J the expense of the designed purpose of the otfji ization, in the Navy’s case, first class, combat-^ j naval ships. j
The Department of the Navy consists of three f ^ the Navy Department in Washington, D. C., the + Establishment, and the Fleet. Two-thirds of our ^ the Navy Department and Shore Establishment, ^ close appraisal since, if less funds and manpowef expended ashore, there should be more money and ^ for the operating forces—which, supposedly, >s a Navy is all about. yj
In August, the Senate Armed Forces Cornu1
stated that 140,000 servicemen, or manpower su$cl i
to form nine Army divisions, were in high-level 11
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quarters jobs. Does the Navy need 15 naval districts to accomplish its tasks? Fewer commands in the continental United States (ConUS) could be achieved by combining the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Washington Naval Districts; joining the Sixth and Eighth; leaving the Ninth intact; and uniting the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth districts. Thus the ten ConUS administrative areas in Figure 1 could become the four illustrated in Figure 2, and without an unmanageable "span of control.” Three of our four non-ConUS districts could be administered more simply as normal shore bases not in a district, such as Panama’s Cristobal and Balboa, rather than as a Fifteenth Naval District. The Tenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Naval Districts each consist of two bases. The result would be that the present 15 naval districts could be decreased to five. These consolidations should not hurt our shore-based effectiveness, and as a matter of policy ease, it would seem that, instead of the present fragmentation, it would be more efficient for one district to administer the Gulf of Mexico or the Northeast coast. Of the ten ConUS naval districts, seven are now split among
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counties of states, rather than along the more logical state lines. The four proposed stateside naval districts would be the Northeast, South, Midwest, and West Coast.
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Meanwhile, back at sea, discussions in the Fleet undoubtedly include consideration of whether a shrinking, 300-ship Navy actually requires the same amount of shore support and flag-rank structure that was necessary for a 600-ship Navy some years ago- Certainly, some soul-searching might be in order on noting that there may soon exist an unusual ratio of one admiral per ship.
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Although exact figures on foreign naval officers are unavailable, the ratio of officer-to-enlisted figures cited in Jane’s Fighting Ships should serve as a basis for comparison. The U. S. Navy is now 11.3% officer, which is lower than the top-heavy Asiatic navies, which have from 13% to 18%. European navies average 10% and- surprisingly, the South American navies have an average of only 7%. House Armed Services Subcommittee figures on officer-to-enlisted ratios revealed that ' c U. S. Marine Corps with 1:9 ratio was lowest of U-
Figure 2
Services, and the U. S. Air Force, with a 1:5 ratio was 'he highest. Thus, the U. S. Navy with a 1:9 and the U,s. Army with 1:6 evidence a median officer-to- cnlisted ratio.
Another symptom of over-administration is the fact 'hat the Operational Reports publication NWIP 10-1 (D) lists 80 required reports from ships. Still another Sample is the type commander (TyCom) 5000 series instruction, which enumerates 266 reports to be possibly submitted by cruiser-destroyer type ships. Table 1 reveals the breakdown by topic, and a correlation of command attention to the subject by the number of forms alloted, is apparent. Still being added are new sports, such as the Ecology Spot Report in July Z-114. Tenders are still expending fruitless effort filling out 'heir Manhour Utilization cards. If one had the time '° spare, it would be fascinating at first and frightening lJ'cr, to itemize all of the letters, messages, and forms 'hat would now be required of John Paul Jones subsequent to his famous battle with HMS Serapis, or that S'ephen Decatur would have to complete as a result °f his daring strike on the captured USS Philadelphia.
When glancing over the titles of various Navy forms, it becomes apparent that many concern themselves with similar subject matter. For example, some general areas in the Ordnance reports are loss or theft of materials, unsatisfactory or malfunctioning gear, firing or expenditure, maintenance or alteration, and movement. Why must so many subgroups or systems require their own unique form? Many general information blocks should be universal among various reports, and some coordinated work would enable one form to replace two or more of the present format. For example, it should be possible to combine into one the NavWeps 8510/3 Report of Unsatisfactory or Defective Torpedoes or Equipment, and the NavOrd 8500/1 Report of Unsatisfactory or Defective Mines, Depth Charges, or Equipment. Possibly other unsatisfactory reports, such as Special Weapons NavWeps 8110/14, as well as EOD Unsatisfactory form NavOrd 8027/1, could be included in this. To carry the reduction of redundant forms even further, we could cross the sacred departmental lines and have Operations or Supply forms included in the condensation. The "weapons
22
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973
unsat” forms previously referred to could be used for unsat medical or electronics hardware, which is now reported in the Unsatisfactory Material—Condition Report 4790.47. Op Nav Notice 5214 describes the current monitoring of the cost in dollars and man-hours of recurring reports.
The question of actual use of the voluminous amounts of forms cranked out by a ship is another point. Some interesting responses were obtained from inquiries as to who actually needed the data or who reacted to recommendations painstakingly documented on forms such as the Electronics Performance and Operational Report NavShips 3878. After days of calling various echelons of the Washington naval bureaucracy, the inquirer was unable to locate anyone who actually used the sonar equipment data, or knew of any one else who did. Later, however, more addees were placed on the distribution list so that the invaluable, unvalued data would be used. Forms, we must learn, somehow, are not an end unto themselves. They must serve a function and be reacted upon. In the interest of basic efficiency, the first goal must be to reduce the amount of paperwork to be submitted, and next we must deal with the matter of using fewer, universal forms to cover general topics, instead of employing the hundreds of special purpose forms as now.
The remainder of this discussion concerns itself with the imbalance of administrative functions over material readiness as is evident in the extensive Navy inspection program. Ships now spend so much time preparing for the multiple visiting teams that the normal ship’s maintenance and training is slighted. The command loses from one working day to one week during the inspection, which loss is compounded by the frenzied preparation effort expended and the time later devoted to the inevitable correction of discrepancies. It is ironic that the inspections by which the Navy intends to provide material assistance to the Fleet, can themselves inadvertently result in a lessening of the ship’s material readiness and total disruption of the command’s attempt at routine and planned scheduling of its needs. It might be said that the crews are too busy bailing water to repair the leak.
This is not a new problem, and CNO attention has been brought to it in such ways as Z-67 in December of 1970, "Naval Command Inspection Program.” But a subsequent CNO letter "Visits by Formal Evaluation Groups” on June 1972 indicates the problem was continuing one-and-one-half years later. There is still much duplication on inspection instructions and other areas at OpNav, Fleet, and TyCom levels. Moreover, the quality inspections can vary from Type Commander and Flotilla or Squadron teams.
The detailed reports of the Board of Inspection a® size c Survey (InSurv) give evidence of the disturbing maten in ty,( condition, including mission degrading items, of ma" of our ships. What can be done, then, in spite of tW things, to bring the material condition of the Fleet to our traditionally high Navy standards? Money, primary need for the ship overhauls and alterations, dependent upon the military budget allotted by & civilian legislators. Reducing the size of the shore tablishment would not, of itself, materially help ships, and paper work is difficult to decrease, as SecNav program SCRAP (Selective Curtailment of ports and Paperwork) unfortunately demonstrate about ten years ago. This leaves only Inspections ff the hopefully fertile area to attempt to cut down ship interference and as a side benefit, to decrease son1' associated paperwork.
To modify inspections to a significant degree nece? tates a modification of the ship’s cycle schedule, b this discussion, the vehicle for proposed changes to ships inspections and cycle, a guided missile destroy (DDG) is used. Figure 3 shows a typical, mock1* 12-quarter cycle, with the two deployments consist!1? of an 11-month Stateside time period and a six-moi? overseas period. As a general thumb-rule, it would s#1" to require three ships to keep one on deployment, a 3:1 ratio of total force available to overseas preset Reductions in the number of active ships aggravate scheduling dilemma, i.e., heavier overseas commitmeC are being met by a 450-ship Navy than was acco1? plished by a 650-ship Navy five years ago. The propo$£ cycle changes in Figure 4 would have the dual bend of decreasing the predeployment inspections and taining a 2:1 deployment ratio. This means that $ same overseas presence could be maintained with t® ships instead of three.
At first glance, it would appear that the decreas*1?
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Table 1
Summary of reports to be submitted.
Report
Series
Subject Group
1000 | Military personnel |
2000 | Communications |
3000 | Operational and Readiness |
4000 | Logistics |
5000 | General Administration and |
| Management |
6000 | Medicine and Dentistry |
7000 | Financial Management |
8000 | Ordnance Material |
9000 | Ship Design and Material |
10000 | General Maintenance |
23
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U. S. Navy—Middle Age Spread 23
:ion size of our Navy should cause a proportionate rise matefl in the money allotted for, and the material attention of m3r paid to, the remaining active units, and that therefore of tf>c the manning level should be higher. This is not the case, because of the combined financial factors of a smaller military budget and the inflation of the dollar, as well as the increased operational tempo resulting from the smaller number of ships. Although details are classified, an average regular overhaul (ROH) for a hDG is about $3 million and should be considerably more. Figure 4 shows a 12-month ConUS and a 12- month deployment timetable, with a major ROH every 16 quarters (or four years) instead of every 12 quarters 3s is presently the case on DDGs. The main stumbling Mock in this proposal would be people-oriented rather chan material-related, because of the undesirable morale Actors associated with a 12-month deployment. This schedule is predicated on the heavy overseas commitments of 1972, but if world tensions were notably ^creased as a result of SALT agreements and Presidential summit trips, the rotation cycle could shift to shorter cruises and longer Stateside time.
The largest number of inspections in the ship’s cycle 's included in the predeployment inspection (PDI) svhich consists of approximately 15 area evaluations, and the proposed schedule has a PDI every eight quarters instead of every six quarters as at present. A comprehensive summary of the inspections to which a DDG ls now subject is listed in Table 2. The commanding °fficer’s words, "Welcome aboard,” and the inspection team leader’s opening statement, "We are here to help you,” take on a hollow ring when reiterated weekly. Table 2 is a list of the inspection cycles at present, and Table 3 depicts the recommended changes, each °f which will be discussed. Generally, the proposed trend is a consolidation of inspections or a stretching °ut of the time between visits, without a noticeable drop in the ship’s readiness or condition. Other inspec- l’on groups which may come on board are: Combat Systems Support which is broken into Ship Qualifica- don Trials (SQT) of 11 days and Weapon System Acceptance Trials (WSAT) of 5 days; NavMat Special Assistance Team (NSAT); Auxiliary Boiler Inspection kv Tycom; Distillate Assistance/Advisory Team (DAT) and various Ship Assistance Teams (SAT); SQS-26 Sonar Valuation and Assistance (SEA); Torpedo Readiness Assistance Team (TRAT); SUPRAD secure area inspec- tlQn by TyCom; Meteorological/Oceanographic Inspec- t|Qn; and Annual Dental Inspection by Force Dental. This by-no-means-complete list should show the point and explain why COs carry around copies of the bicNavAb (Dictionary of Naval Abbreviations).
The boiler inspectors conduct an annual inspection °n each of the four boilers on a quarterly basis—or,
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in other words, require disassembly of a boiler by ships company four times a year. Because, in the past, some ships’ boilers could go longer than a year and be in good shape while others needed inspection on a shorter basis, the annual inspection is still necessary. If, however, the boiler inspectors checked two boilers on a visit, this would mean that the fireroom evolution would be conducted only twice a year, thus cutting the ship’s work disruption in half.
The 3-M inspection is presently conducted annually by TyCom, and the turnover in personnel combined with the planned maintenance subsystem (PMS) coverage revision necessitate this thorough administrative and equipment check verification. The Squadron Quarterly 3-M Inspection could be stretched to a semi-annual basis without materially reducing the ship’s 3-M status. Since the TyCom annual PMS inspection now takes the place of a squadron quarterly inspection, the ship would have a two-day 3-M inspection twice instead of four times per year. The ship can request a TyCom 3-M Assist Visit anytime. The 3-M inspections could be more uniform and less confusing if only one format were printed. There are three different check-off sheets in existence: the Fleet Commander, Type Commander, and Force Inspection Procedures. This is another area of redundant paperwork which catches the confused Fleet in the middle. Finally, by continuing to have the annual 3-M inspection count in the ship’s "E” competition grade, the emphasis is biased to the grade assigned rather than the proper performance of PMS, which should be the true measure of the evaluation.
24 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1973
Present inspections of a DDG.
Table 2
Frequency | Inspection Conducted By |
Annual | Force Medical |
Bi-annual Annual | Ron Medical ISIC1 |
Annual | ISIC1 |
Annual | TyCom |
Tender avail Annual Annual Annual Quarterly Annual Bi-annual Quarterly | Tender Ron/TyCom NRFC2 TyCom Ron TyCom ISIC1 Squadron |
Tri-annual Annual Annual 18 Months | Insurv Board TyCom/NWTG3 TyCom/NWTG3 FCDNA4 |
Prefire | TyCom/NSMSES5 |
Semi-annual | Tycom |
Predeploy Annual | NOSSOs/TyCom TyCom |
Table 3
Present and proposed inspection periodicity and cycle
Type Inspection | No. Now (5-year Cycle) | No./yr. | Proposed {4-year Cycle) | No./f |
Boiler | 12 | 4 | 8 | 2 |
3-M | 12 | 4 | 8 | 2 |
Predeployment | 2 | .66 | 2 | .5 |
Pre-overhaul | 1 | .33 | 1 | .25 |
Command | Bi-annual | .5 | 0 | 0 |
Medical | 5 | 1.66 | 4 | 1 |
Other Annuals | 3 | 1 | 3 | .66 |
to the present two in a three-year cycle, fewer woul^ be conducted per year.
The pre-overhaul period is another extensive inspO' tion time consisting primarily of three boiler tyf* inspections and InSurv, with ordnance, electronic, and machinery inspections and trials along with the'pO" ROH availability also. By stretching the ship’s cyde between major overhauls, there would be fewer pi*- overhaul inspections annually. Thus, more money cou^ be spent on the extensive alterations and material job[1][2] [3] [4] [5] [6] that need to be accomplished. By federal law, an inSuh material inspection must be held every 12 quarters, but some DDGs presently have 16 quarters between ROH5 because of operations, so this time difference is not really an insurmountable problem.
Command inspections are to be held not more than two years apart. It is in four parts as follows: command procedures; maintenance and material (boiler, ordnanO review, electronics and 3-M inspections); administration (predeployment inspection and registered public3' tions); and supply (disbursing review and medical >n' spection). The overlap of the PDI and Command it1' spection is striking, with the PDI being the motf extensive of the two, except in the supply area. Log1' cally, any ship would deploy at least once in a two-yOr period, which could negate the necessity of the large Command Inspection. The numerous special purpo* inspections should be scheduled as part of the week long Command inspection to avoid repetitious insp^' tions of the same areas; however, many times, the^ is not this coordination. Again, the losers are the ship- force and scheduled work.
Medical. A bi-annual medical inspection is conducted by the squadron or divisional Officer using the TyCom Inspection Procedure Manual an Annual Medical Evaluation is conducted by tl>c Force Medical Officer—using another TyCom instruction. Dropping the bi-annual inspection is not likeb to degrade the ship’s Medical Department since thefc
U. S. Navy—Middle Age Spread 25
would still be annual evaluations being conducted. Once again, there would be only one check-off sheet with which to comply.
Scheduling of other annual special purpose inspections listed in Table 2, and not previously discussed, could possibly be stretched out, from every 12 months, to every 18 months. This would decrease these various annual inspection requirements from three to two over a three-year period. The extensive variety of assist-visits available to the ships suggest that no degradation need happen in ship areas that have the frequency of inspection stretched. The broad spectrum of assist-visits allows commands to get help when they feel it is needed. Assist-visits do not disrupt the ship’s routine, scheduled maintenance, or training. The areas of assistance cover the topics of 3-M, communications, ASW, personnel/administration, medical, food management, laundry, SQS-26 sonar, career counsellor, dental, nuclear, distillate fuel, supercharged steam, MOTU, technical assistance, NavSec, damage control, missile systems, LAMPS, and security. As if the ships were not "assisted” to death now, three new assist teams were proposed °f actually implemented between July and September °f 1972. They are Evaporator Assist Teams, 1,200 psi Steam Propulsion Mobile Training Teams (MTT), and new NavMat Test and Assist Teams. Obviously, these will more than close any potential gaps due to the lengthening of outside inspection requirements. Naturally, zone inspections, Division Officer space checks, and PMS conscientiously done should help the ship keep herself up through internal routines. Table 3 illustrates the present and proposed periodicity of the six diseased inspections, and the other annuals such as Annual Supply and Registered Publications.
let us now assume that we have reduced the large shore establishment and paperwork activity, drastically decreased the interruptions of ship’s work by multilevel inspection parties, and stretched out the ship’s cycle. Would this really mean that the Navy has combat-ready ships able to meet all commitments under any level of combat? Hardly. The average ship would have more effective scheduling of maintenance and less paperwork; but, sadly, many of our ships are not equipped to fight in the present day jet plane and anti-ship missile combat environment.
After all of the furor over the contracting of the dE-io52 class, which still continues to come off the production lines basically unaltered, the next-genera- don ship logically should have none of the single-hit complaints or lack of armament. The 963 class should he a DD"G” rather than a DD. It should be built with °ne of the three "T” (Tartar, Terrier, or Talos) anti-air missiles, and an antisurface ship missile defense. It may
come with a short-range Basic Point Defense Missile System, which is being fitted on selected DE-1052S now. Because of a shortage of funds, many needed items are "to be added later,” but we have digressed from our basic subject, the existing Fleet. We are still talking money, but with the proposed cycle, the Navy should be able to spend much more on the ROH and make it a comprehensive CNO overhaul the first time, if required.
A large share of the Navy’s budget has always been spent on ordnance and electronics, and this ought to cover the permanent addition of any launchers or sensors deemed necessary for combat. The amount spent on those "poor relations”—hull and engineering- should be increased because, without a reliable platform and propulsion, the money spent elsewhere is useless.
Second only to our men, ships are the most important element of our Navy, and there can be no excuse for a ship to come out of a shipyard or complete an overhaul with less than first-class material condition, and all systems in Charlie One, or fully operational, status.
In summation, then, less paperwork, fewer disruptive inspections, and a leaner Shore Establishment can all contribute to the revitalization that is so urgently required by many of our Fleet units. Our Navy, hopefully, can recover its trim look and lose its costly, debilitating fat. It is better for the Navy to police itself than have the Senate or the House do it for us.
As the 200th anniversary of our nation and our Navy approaches, it is appropriate that we rededicate ourselves to the things which made them great. Among these are men of dedication and action, unencumbered by anti-military politicians or bureaucracy; seeing their job and accomplishing it with alacrity. Today, the training, readiness and material condition of the Fleet are more important than they were in 1775, because now, not only the survival of our nation is at stake—the entire Free World looks to us for naval leadership and the protection of the seas against the modern, growing Communist naval forces.
Chief Bussert enlisted in the Navy in June 1954 following graduation from high school in Pasadena, California, and has served in seven destroyer- type ships on both coasts during his 12 years of sea duty. He was an instructor at the Fleet ASW School in San Diego, California, from 1964 to 1967. After graduation from the SQS-26CX Factory School in Syracuse, New York, in 1968, he made a WcsPac cruise in the USS Decatur (DDG-31) until joining the USS Hepburn (DE-1055) as part of her pre-commissioning crew. After serving in the Hepburn for two years, during which time he was promoted to Master Chief, he commenced his present shore duty tour at ComCruDesPac in July 1971.
Purpose Of Inspection
Medical Readiness Evaluation Medical Inspection (RPS) Registered Pubs Inspection Communications Admin Inspection (ORI) Operational Readiness Inspection Technical Assistance Visit Supply Inspection Disbursing Review 3-M Inspection 3-M Inspection Boiler Inspection Command Inspection (QSSI) Quarterly Surprise Security Insurv Board
Nuclear Technical Proficiency K0009024
Technical Standardization Inspection Missile System Readiness Test
(DSOT) Daily System Operability Predeployment Review Ordnance Support Element Review
present
Medid1
* ISIC =: Immediate Superior in Chain of Command
[2]NRFC = Navy Regional Finance Center
[3]NWTG = Nuclear Weapon Training Group
1FCDNA = Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency
[5]NSMSES = Naval Ship Missile System Engineering Station
[6]NOSSO = Naval Ordnance Systems Support Office
Predeployment inspection (PDI). This is the largest group of inspections, consisting of from 15 to 20 possible individual segments in the 150 day period between 180 and 30 days before deployment, since none are to be held during the 30 day POM (Prepare for Overseas Movement) period. Our guided missile destroyer would have the following: boiler inspection, ordnance review, electronic warfare inspection, LAMPS predeployment review, 3-M inspection, underwater hull, FORACS, ULM-4 test, electronics inspection, Naval tactical Data System NTDS review, NTPI, naval gunfire qualification, helicopter fueling qualification, ROPEval, operational readiness inspection, damage control team inspection, crypto certification, and degaussing. By having two deployments in a four-year cycle, compared