The Military Mind
Lieutenant Commander Robert G. Partlow, U. S. Navy—There is an increasing difficulty in attracting potential career personnel, particularly officers, and there is an increasing reluctance by society to spend its resources on defense.
Let us look first at the ability to attract career officers: the military man today is the most stereotyped individual in our society. Even his thought process is pre-judged, viz., “the military mind” is a standard term in current popular rhetoric. Unfortunately, few, if any aspects of the stereotyped images are considered desirable by the young of today. We are going to have a difficult task in attracting those we need to the Service.
In examining the second problem, we must come to the realization that our society is increasingly viewing every dollar spent on defense as a dollar lost to social and environmental improvement programs. The legitimacy of this view and its conclusions, while certainly questionable, is secondary to the fact that it is becoming a prevalent view. The layer of smog hanging over our cities is visible daily; the occurrence of riots is equally visible on the evening news. How visible is the Service? In the context of cost over-runs and alleged wasted billions on unnecessary weapons systems, we are indeed visible. When our civilian contemporary weighs the issues, as presented to him, is there any wonder that he becomes reluctant to allocate more resources to defense? Portions of both problems stem from an image gap.
The following are some proposals for solutions to the two problems. It must be pointed out that the proposals are not an alteration to the concepts of dedication, self-discipline, and personal sacrifice that have long been the hallmark of the military and naval man. We ought to display these attributes better, and eliminate some unessential aspects of our image, hopefully finding that they are as attractive to today’s young as they were to those before.
Breaking out of the Shell—At an isolated duty station, there is a clear necessity for base facilities such as exchanges, commissaries, and dependent medical care. On all bases, it is necessary to provide facilities for those enlisted men and women who reside on the base. With these exceptions, however, a phased elimination of such facilities with compensating pay increases would be a significant step towards integrating Service people with the civilian population. In areas where there is inadequate housing, government-owned housing should be spread throughout the community. Where possible, Servicemen should be encouraged to own homes through financial backing plans, such as many large private corporations use to assist their career personnel who are periodically required to relocate. The secondary effects that such action would have upon the personal freedom of Service life would aid greatly in our ability to attract the young.
Consideration should be given to the use of civilian facilities in lieu of government facilities whenever possible. In our postgraduate education program, for example, every career officer on a college campus has an almost unlimited opportunity to help fill the vacuum of factual information that exists about the Service.
Involvement—The Service must remain non-political, but there remains, however, a vast arena of problems that the citizenry of the country are becoming increasingly involved in, in a nonpolitical manner. The key word of intelligent young people today is involvement. But, how many active duty naval officers have spoken out, or actively participated in the solution of our main social and economic problems?
With the many years of experience in the manpower management and training fields, military and naval men should be able to speak out with authority on problems relating to training of the poor. In the same manner, knowledge in the logistics area should yield some expertise in urban transit problems.
Many of today’s young people entering the professions and industry are making the availability to participate in social projects a prerequisite to their decision to accept a position. How many potential career people will never consider the Navy because of an apparent lack of such opportunity?
How much more believable would a naval officer be when he rose to defend the need of a future weapons system, if he were also known as an outspoken champion of civil rights or environmental improvement?
We have long recognized that promotion of high shipboard morale and a high re-enlistment rate are desirable traits. Why not recognize that promotion of public understanding and respect of our profession is equally desirable. If, indeed, there is a long peace, might we not find it desirable to develop a diversified, constructive, peaceful capability? This could be accomplished by an open policy of lending our officers and highly-trained senior enlisted men and women to other federal agencies or even local governments.
A better understanding of the Service will not alone bring in the young. We do have characteristics which unnecessarily reduce the attractiveness of a Service career. What is needed foremost is a thorough reappraisal of what the essential characteristics of a military or naval organization are, and an elimination of those present facets that, even though enthroned in tradition, are unnecessarily restrictive. The directive by the Chief of Naval Operations on beards, moustaches, and hair length is an excellent example of what can be done. It is understandable that the concept of a uniformed service implies a certain degree of uniformity, but if we take the position that we do not need or want the long-haired, vocal youth, then we miss entirely one of their clearest messages: “judge me for what I do, not for how I dress or the color of my skin.” If we can show that we are capable of flexibility and tolerance, then we will find that the long-haired youth might be willing to give us a try and that he will not require exotic dress to prove his individuality. If we provide only a “take it or leave it” alternative, the choice too often will be “leave it.”
We also need to examine exactly what is meant by career. The present Service concept has been successful in the past, but we should not be too confident that it will be in the future. In fact, when one considers that of almost 600 students at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business in 1969, there were 30 ex-nuclear submarine officers, and that, in this author’s class, the U. S. Naval Academy was second only to Stanford as an undergraduate source of students, we must question our present career concept. We should learn what business is learning—that graduates are less interested in becoming enmeshed as a cog in a gigantic machine. Advancement, financial rewards, and security are still important considerations, but they are secondary to a desire for challenge, interest, and mobility. This writer feels the naval Service is second to none as a challenging and interesting career. However, we need increased mobility.
Our lack of vertical mobility is pointed out by the Gates Commission, on the all-volunteer force comment, that promotion selectivity in the armed services is not “. . . too critical until about the 20-years-of-service point.” This situation has been long noted and debated in the Service. My point is simply that it is not compatible with the career desires of many of today’s graduates. Greater amounts of deep selection and its reverse constitute only a portion of this recommendation; the remainder consists of a de-emphasis of the rigidity with which we fill billets. If a man is deemed competent by a responsible senior to fill a billet, it should be inconsequential that he holds a certain rank or so many years of service.
To increase the ability to move across designator lines is simply to acknowledge that a man’s interests can change as he matures and gains experience. To thwart a man’s desire to change to a designator in which there is a need for him, because there is a greater need in his current designator, is an invitation for him to leave the Service.
Although there is a reluctance by many recent graduates to enter large corporations, many do, knowing that they can gain valuable experience and then leave the organization, only to re-enter at a later date if they so desire. Adding to the ability to do this is the concept of interchangeable retirement credits that the man carries with him from organization to organization. The price to a naval officer for such in-and- out mobility would be an increased responsibility on his part to plan his career. There would be no guarantees. It would give us a greater capability, however, to recover the officer who “just wants to see what it is like on the outside,” and to retain the young officer at the four- to five-year mark, who has not yet made up his mind, but feels that he can not afford to wait to make his final decision and so he leaves. For staff corps officers, where there is a greater similarity between in-service and out-of-service functions, this type of mobility could be a very acceptable one for the Navy.
The nature of the subject has required the use of subjective analysis and extensive generalities. There are dangers in such methods. Two aspects of our society do seem evident: those institutions that have met youth with inflexibility have been either passed by or forced to change; and, there is an increasing lack of understanding of the military and naval establishment by general society. Both of these conditions require some imaginative action.
“A Wetter, Better NROTC”
(See J. W. Corey, Jr., pp. 64-67, June 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Alexander Monroe, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—A retreat from the university, no matter how cleverly it is disguised, would prove ultimately injurious to the Armed Services.
Criticism of the ROTC depends on the acceptance of two premises: (1) that in allowing the units to operate on campus, the college authorities somehow provide a “haven for war;” (2) the critics maintain that ROTC courses lack academic merit. Each set of arguments has been uncritically accepted and could, with relative ease, be demonstrated to be sophistry, unworthy of the presumed intellect of those individuals who advance it.
Government exists for the protection of its citizens, and, in offering its students the opportunity to serve, the college serves this indispensible function. Furthermore, there were, in my college days, academic hoaxes substantially greater than ROTC courses. I was looking through the catalog of my undergraduate school recently, and was amused to see that they still exist.
It was my experience at the University of Virginia that each of the NROTC instructors came directly from stations in which they had served as division officers and department heads. Here they had developed a fair knowledge of young men and how to motivate them. I observed that each instructor had a personal interest in the success or failure of his students in a broad range of campus activities. This alone, it seems to me, is an important virtue in a college atmosphere where we have been plagued by false images, standards, and beliefs.
The important goal now to be pursued is melding of the element of strong, personal commitment to the development of young men, which is exhibited by the vast majority of NROTC instructors, with tangible evidence of academic accomplishment on their part. Within the Navy and the Naval Reserve, there are many officers who hold academic degrees higher than the B.A. or B.S. These may be M.S., M.A., M.B.A., J.D., or even Ph.D. A constructive step might be to assign to NROTC units, only those officers who hold the degrees set forth. A secondary, more profound, change would be the creation of a special designator for men with the desire and demonstrated capacity to serve as teachers. A man could, for example, serve in teaching posts during the regular academic year, and then have operational assignments during the summer terms. At some stated time, he could rotate to a normal sea tour.
These steps represent nothing less than a striking changeover from normal practices, particularly insofar as they envision the creation of a special group with special characteristics. Using the natural resource that is at hand, however, would have the distinct advantage of demolishing the canard that NROTC instructors are incompetent, and their material spurious.
“Retention: The High Cost of Leaving”
(See J. R. Fredland, pp. 44-47, January; pp. 106-109, June; p. 109, July; pp. 106-108, August; and pp. 93-94, September 1970; and pp. 86-87, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Charles N. Straney, U. S. Navy—Professor Fredland’s second recommended reform (a basic annual leave period of 45 days), although commendable, is the hard way to achieve a result. Present statutes would permit nearly immediate action, at the Service secretary level, to provide essentially the recommended result by establishing the policy that Navy men (in effect, all Servicemen) be charged for leave taken on workdays only, exempting Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays.
The following quote reveals the ease with which this career motivation problem could be resolved by the three Service secretaries (by agreement). From Title 37—United States Code (Amended), Chapter I, Article 33 “Pay and allowance for accumulated leave—Enlisted Personnel; Warrant Officers and Commissioned Officers:”
Determination of Leave
(e) Determination of the number of calendar days leave to which a member or former member is entitled, including the number of calendar of absence from duty or vacation to be counted or charged against such leave, shall be made in accordance with regulation shall provide equal treatment of respective secretaries, which regulation shall provide equal treatment of officers and enlisted men and shall establish to the fullest extent practicable uniform policies for the several branches of the Armed Forces.
“Image of Command”
(See S. H. Edwards, pp. 36-39, February; pp. 102-104, July; and p. 98, September 1970; and p. 88, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander John J. Gelke, U. S. Navy—Study after study has reinforced the importance of personal attention in the supervision of men, and shown that “eyeball” contact is a key factor in promoting good crew morale. The point is that it is difficult for the supervisor to pursue these efforts when he is made fast to his desk by the “paper anchor.”
“Vice Admiral Chuichi Hara: Unforgettable Foe”
(See D. Bartlett, pp. 51-55, October 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Rear Admiral C. R. Adams, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The article is well-written and most interesting—a human interest story that was a pleasure to read. Although the technical articles in the PROCEEDINGS are well-chosen, I believe the magazine can be improved by interlacing the contents with more articles like Commander Bartlett’s.
“The Near West”
(See H. W. Bergbauer, Jr., pp. 47-51, June 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Dr. F. K. DeVos—It is interesting to note that all states bordering on the North Sea and Arctic Ocean are either members of NATO or signatories and ratifiers of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Although most of these countries adhere to both, the Soviet Union is not a member of NATO, while Belgium, Germany, and Norway are either not parties to, or have not ratified the 1958 Convention.
On the other hand, the North Atlantic Assembly, held at Brussels in October 1969, adopted inter alia the following resolution on the need for an Ocean Space Treaty:
The Assembly noting that ocean space beyond territorial waters is not subject at present to any international agreement, noting that the technologically advanced nations have already begun the exploration for both military and economic reasons of the resources of ocean space without any system of international control, concerned that such undersea operations without adequate controls could be harmful, recommends that the North Atlantic Council endorse through the member nations the urgent introduction of an ocean space treaty, a suggested draft of which is appended hereto, to institute a system of international control. In doing so, provision must be made for: (a) definition of the continental shelf; (b) the setting up of a license granting authority; (c) the creation of an international sea guard to ensure the observance of the principles of the Treaty; (d) the setting up of an adjudicating body to decide disputes.
As explained in a comment by Commander R. O. Plancher, Belgian Naval Reserve, in the January 1970 PROCEEDINGS, the application of the equidistance principle and the sector principle can lead to different delimitations. Since, with the exception of Norway whose Spitsbergen islands make her an Arctic coastal state, all countries bordering on the Arctic Sea have signed and ratified the Geneva Convention of 1958, it is felt that readers of the PROCEEDINGS will be interested in the kind of approximate delimitation that would result if the Convention’s equidistance principle and the resulting median lines were applied in the area around the North Pole. Two observations, however, must be made.
First, those who would claim that because of its great depth—between 820 and 16,400 feet—the Arctic Ocean is not underlain by a continental shelf are referred to Article 1, subsection (a) of the Geneva Convention which reads, “. . . to a depth of 200 meters (656 feet) or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; . . .” Technological progress being what it is, who would deny that exploitation will be possible at much greater depth than 656 feet?
Secondly, the currently accepted delimitation between the Soviet Union and the United States (Alaska) is shown on present maps as being based more on the sector than on the equidistance principle, and it is therefore a moot point whether these two countries ought to consider the possibility of revising this traditional boundary under the terms of the Geneva Convention to which they both have adhered.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the present U.S.S.R.-U. S. delimitation is mainly sectoral and coincides with the International Date Line—at least in the Arctic Zone. On the other hand, the median line would give the United States a larger share of the Chukchi Sea, between Wrangell Island and Alaska, while attributing an area about six times as large to the Soviet Union in the more northerly areas. Between Canada and the United States, the sector principle would attribute considerably more area to the United States than the median line, while Norway (Spitsbergen) would similarly benefit from the sector principle, vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and Denmark (Greenland). This latter consideration may well have been at the root of Norway’s hesitation to adhere to the Convention of 1958. Unless my cartographic estimate is off the mark, it would also appear as if the equidistance principle should put Denmark in possession of the North Pole.
[Figure 1: map of boundaries in the Arctic]
Reverting now to more southerly latitudes, Georges Bank would seem to become somewhat of a problem between the United States and Canada, since the former are currently raising certain objections against the application of the equidistance principle in that area. It is not readily apparent how this is to be supported, since both of the countries have signed and also ratified the Geneva Convention.
The NATO Resolution of October 1969 has underlined the urgency of putting our ocean spaces in some sort of civilized condition of law and order and, if even Canada and the United States find it hard to agree on such matters, one would conclude that this is indeed an area for improved world understanding on a multilateral basis.
The Leadership Lab Concept—A New Approach
Lieutenant Robert J. Brudno, U. S. Naval Reserve—For many years, the leadership training at naval officer training institutions comprised lectures on customs and courtesies, Uniform Code of Military Justice, benefits, and an occasional training film. It has been generally accepted that true leadership development could only come with summer cruises and, ultimately, experience in the Fleet. How often have we heard “I learned it the hard way, so will they?” But how much damage is done while one junior officer fumbles through conflicts, trial, and error, perhaps making irreversible mistakes in the process? Must we also require the unfortunate sailor to endure such a lack of leadership while this division officer learns his trade?
Without even the limited benefit of practical experience gained by summer cruise, the Naval Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduate, for example, must immediately take on awesome responsibility. The challenge is clear: How can we develop leadership as a personal quality, rather than a mere position, in a short four months?
I believe that teaching the abstract qualities of leadership produces marginal results, for an officer’s leadership is inexorably related to his own style and personality. Leadership, then, must be developed, not taught.
A new approach which promises a breakthrough in the training of officers (not just ensigns) is the Leadership Laboratory Method. Following extensive study at OCS, coupled with the assistance of the National Training Laboratory (NTL), I have proposed this program as a possible addition to or replacement of traditional elements of the curriculum.
One session requires that each officer candidate produce a list of the qualities of good leadership. Groups are formed to establish a unified presentation of the consensus. Because no leader is appointed, natural leaders emerge as interpersonal conflicts arise. The interaction of individuals in this exercise, as one motivates and persuades others is valuable data for the staff officer observer. A lengthy feedback period follows. Officer candidates are encouraged to rate themselves against such a list, and more importantly, to express their reaction to their classmates’ behavior as exhibited during this exercise. Criticism becomes advice as each participant becomes more aware of his style and unique methods of motivating others. Later labs would use similar artificial conflict exercises as well as officer/enlisted role-playing. In both, personal techniques based on the participant’s true concepts of leadership are surfaced, challenged, as well as applauded.
It must be pointed out, however, that the primary objective is the creation of continuous feedback of individual behavior. Yard patrol craft (YP), tactical trainer, buttercup, firefighting, close order drill, and other scheduled events thus become more than just professional training. After a rigorous exercise of destroyer tactics, for example, one officer candidate might inform the student OOD that his visible nervousness gave others a feeling of insecurity. This is not so much a judgment as an honest statement of one’s reaction to another’s leadership behavior. This is much more effective than using a one-hour leadership “lecture” to state that self-confidence is an important and contagious quality of the mythical good leader. The trust gained by continuous, constructive feedback will use all experiences to develop individual leadership strength. OCS then becomes a total leadership training environment, which capitalizes on the daily display of qualities so dryly presented from the podium.
Although advances in technology have increased emphasis at most officer training schools on professional skills, leadership remains the Navy’s greatest concern. Changes in such training areas as navigation, tactics, or engineering have been far easier, however, than in leadership development. We must examine our programs to create means of exercising qualities. We hope to discover better ways to prepare college graduates with the most varied backgrounds for immediate leadership roles. Perhaps a step away from the lecture method is one approach.
“The Feasibility of the Franklin Piloting Technique”
(See E. B. Brown, pp. 144-148, October 1969; p. 92, February; pp. 99-100, March; and pp. 98-99, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Master Chief Quartermaster Byron E. Franklin, U. S. Navy—There is a need for clarifying why the use of horizontal sextant angles is not a feasible solution to the piloting problem outlined by Mr. Brown. My comments are addressed solely to the feasibility of using sextant angles.
One of the primary difficulties in the use of horizontal sextant angles is identification of the objects observed. Even during daylight, the use of a check bearing or check angle is prudent. Because of the limited field of view while observing with the sextant, positive identification of objects used for angle measurements is somewhat more difficult than identification of objects used for bearing observations. During darkness, identification may be so difficult that the sextant cannot be used. This night-time limitation on the use of the sextant alone is possibly sufficient reason for stating that sextant angles are not the more suitable alternative to the piloting problem.
There are other difficulties associated with the use of the sextant in a piloting situation. Fixing by sextant angles and three-arm protractor is somewhat slower than by bearing observations and drafting machine even by navigators proficient with both methods. The delay between fixes obtained by sextant angles may not be acceptable or may be too long for safe navigation in some instances.
Selection of objects providing good angles of cut of bearing lines is less critical than selection of objects to provide strong sextant angle fixes. Those navigators not skilled in selecting objects for strong sextant angle fixes may be misled by the point fix always provided by the three-arm protractor. If the only objects which can be identified produce a swinger or revolver, even a navigator having high proficiency in the use of the sextant cannot obtain a fix until such time that the ship has proceeded to a position at which the revolver is no longer applicable. And, the ship may proceed to that position without a fixing capability in the interim.
Navy ships are designed so that the pelorus stands are in ideal position for bearings and communications with the plotting station. This is not true with the sextant observer. The superstructure may introduce severe limitations and force a special communications set-up from a level above or below the plotting station, and may even cause a shift of the point of observation in order to obtain each of the needed two angles.
The fact that the sextant provides the experienced navigator with the most accurate and safest means when used during daylight while making a transit at slow speeds is not contested. The foregoing assumes the availability of well-situated objects which can be observed to obtain strong fixes. In some situations, such as transits of narrow passages when identifiable charted objects are quite distant, even very small observational or unknown compass errors can produce unacceptable error in the cross-bearing plot. In such situations, the use of the sextant for observing danger angles and fixing can be the only feasible means which is available for safe navigation.
There is a frequent requirement, however, for making observations, recording data, and plotting fixes on the chart at two-minute intervals while making a transit at five to ten knots. This frequent fixing interval may have to be sustained over a period of 30 minutes to one hour, night or day. With rapid personnel turnover, and the continuous requirement for training replacements, recognition has to be given to the fact that the use of the sextant by inexperienced observers, while fixing at frequent intervals, introduces the problem of possible damage to the sextant which later may be required for celestial navigation.
“Saga of Drydock One”
(See T. B. Buell, pp. 60-67, July; and p. 85, December 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
John R. Lyman—Lieutenant Commander Buell’s article calls the docking of the ship of the line Delaware at Gosport, Virginia, in June 1833 “. . . the first in the Western Hemisphere . . . .”
For a long time, it has been thought that this event was indeed the first use of a drydock in North America. A few years ago, however, Joseph Goldenberg, then a graduate student in history at the University of North Carolina, discovered a record of a drydock that was built in Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1678, pursuant to a monopoly offered in 1668 by the Massachusetts General Court.
Dr. Goldenberg, who is now a history professor at Virginia State College in Petersburg, Virginia published his findings in the January 1970 American Neptune magazine under the title “A Forgotten Dry Dock in Colonial Charlestown.”
The colonial records show that eight investors built the Charlestown drydock, which was located about halfway between the present Charles River Bridge and the Navy Yard. Professor Goldenberg found that the drydock later was enlarged and used as a slip for loading and unloading vessels. In this form, it was shown on maps of Charlestown as late as 1818.
“Manpower and the Merchant Marine”
(See J. Locetta, pp. 26-30, July; and pp. 56-57, December 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Rear Admiral E. A. Rodgers, U. S. Merchant Service, Superintendent, Maine Maritime Academy—Much has been said about the need to rebuild our aging and steadily declining merchant marine with new ships, but very little has been said about the need to keep apace with officers to man these new ships.
Technical advances, together with union-controlled pension plans, have greatly reduced the number of officers who advance via the “hawsepipe” route. The state maritime academies and the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy at King’s Point have grown in size and quality of program to meet this challenge. Our graduates serve with distinction as officers in the merchant marine, Navy, Coast Guard, in management positions throughout the maritime industry, and in many other fields. A Maine Maritime Academy graduate of 1952 is presently the governor of Maine. (About 10% of the Maine graduates have integrated into the regular Navy.)
Now, as we enter the long-awaited era of a new merchant shipbuilding program, the future of the state academies is being jeopardized by a proposed cutback in federal support as indicated in a Maritime Administration report of February 1970 to the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The problem has been aggravated by the introduction of a union school for engineers. This school pays the student $200 a month through a two-year program (one year in school and one year at sea). The funds for this school are extracted from the ship operators through collective bargaining, while these same operators are finding it difficult to compete in the world market and are applying for government subsidies. The graduates of this union school are not eligible for a commission in the Navy.
The union is also in a position to control who gets the job on board ship, and through group shipping rules, gives preferential treatment to their school graduates. The state academies cannot compete against these odds.
There is an urgent need for an awakening of appropriate naval and maritime officials to the value of the state academies to our seapower team and to the future leadership of our maritime industry.
“Sea Lords”
(See R. L. Schreadley, pp. 22-31, August 1970; and p. 83, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Clay W. Stuckey, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—I was very happy to see a photograph of the PCF-27 on page 29, taken while I was her officer-in-charge.
For those who are acquainted with “Swift” boats, and may have wondered what became of the main cabin windows on the PCF-27, they were blown out by the concussion of a B-40 rocket hit on 31 July 1969 and were replaced with plywood. This was a rather common feature of the “Swifts” in those days when windows were being blown out faster than the supply system could provide glass replacements.
I consider myself a “plank owner” in Seafloat, having helped to escort her up the Bo De and into the Cua Lon rivers in June 1969. Throughout my tour in Vietnam, I served with many fine “Swifties,” some of which are no longer with us. Thank you for helping to make public their contributions to their country.
“What Shall We Wear?”
(See R. H. Schulze, pp. 116-117, December 1969; and p. 95, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander William F. Fahey, U. S. Navy—The subject of wearing of the uniform is not only one of the most-talked-about wardroom topics, but also one of the least-written-about. The reason for this is unclear, but it may be that the unending series of Bureau of Naval Personnel studies about uniform improvement has produced few tangible improvements, and the typical junior officer (upon whom all aspects of the uniform—cost, appearance, utility, and comfort—make the greatest impact) feels that he would be advocating an already lost cause if he were to recommend changes in the uniform or uniform standards. Hopefully, Commander Schulze’s remarks will encourage more dialogue on the subject.
The uniform changes proposed by Commander Schulze appear to be too radical to receive much serious consideration. The naval uniform is too steeped in tradition to countenance such proposals—and rightly so. The basic naval uniform is the envy of all the other Services; attractive and distinctive, “It’s got class.” But there are still several justifiable complaints about the wearing of the uniform that can, and should be remedied with only minor changes to the U. S. Navy Uniform Regulations:
A non-uniform uniform? That may sound ridiculous until one observes a group of naval officers on a fleet landing in April or May at a large naval installation. Aviation greens with combination hats, greens with overseas hats, service dress khaki, service dress blue, tropical khaki long; all are intermingled. Then there are variations within variations: service dress khaki blouses with pleats in the back; shiny lightweight service dress blues, and service dress blues in a heavy wide-wale material that looks like corduroy; two different types of cap devices; black shoes, brown shoes, cordovan shoes, half-Wellington boots, shoes with buckles, and shoes with laces.
If there are 12 officers there may be 12 different colors of socks; no two shades of service dress khaki are the same either. There are narrow ties and wide ties. They are made of silk, cotton, wool, dacron, and nylon. In addition, there are plastic and cloth cap covers. The result is kaleidoscopic instead of uniform.
It is obvious that the U. S. Navy Uniform Regulations is too imprecise in its uniform specifications and options, permitting an excessively wide range of interpretation in almost every item of uniform manufacture and wear. I suggest that uniform regulations be less permissive in their requirements and specifications. The Regulations should specify a single color, shoe style, shirt style, and the like, for each uniform.
Another major step in making the uniform uniform should be taken by cognizant commanders. They should insist on a single uniform within a single geographic area.
Another most important step should also be taken immediately. Commanding officers at all levels should insist that articles of uniform conform strictly with uniform regulations. Beyond the variations presently permitted by the Regulations there are a multitude of non-regulation variations permitted (or even encouraged) by some commands—engraved (with everything from cartoons to foul language) belt buckles, ornately embroidered cloth belts, monogrammed shirts and ties, baseball caps of all hues of the rainbow, and an infinite variety of “working jackets.” A command should not try to improve morale (or gain popularity) by encouraging aberations in the wearing of the uniform; rather, it can and should improve morale by taking pride in how well the men (officers included) in the command wear the regulation uniform.
Within the framework of making the uniform uniform by decreasing the opportunity for variety, any changes to the Uniform Regulations should also take into consideration the following complaints, comments, and recommendations which I have collected from junior officers in the past few years:
The tropical khaki long uniform, with gabardine trousers, is a comfortable, good-looking uniform, yet many commanders prohibit the wearing of this uniform off base except when proceeding directly to and from work. Other commanders prohibit its use off base at any time. Finally, tropical khaki long is prohibited at all times while traveling. This bit of pettifoggery is irritating, inconvenient, and, in the eyes of the junior officer, irrational, since all the other Services consider the short-sleeved shirt a perfectly presentable liberty and travel uniform. Why not authorize the wearing of ribbons on the tropical khaki shirt, and accept the tropical khaki long as a liberty and travel uniform? Certainly, to the civilian community, the sight of a naval officer, cool and sharp in a tropical shirt is infinitely preferable to the sight of a profusely sweating, disheveled, and uncomfortable officer in a coat and tie as he stops in the bank, post office, or airline terminal.
In this age of plastics, resins, synthetics, and miracle fibers, we should be able to find an adequate substitute for the expensive and archaic gold lace which, more often than not, is a tarnished blemish rather than a functional adornment on a naval officer’s uniform.
Tropical white shirts are, in the main, made of extremely thin and flimsy material which does not hold starch or a press for more than an hour in hot weather. A notable exception to this is the high quality of the tropical white shirts worn by midshipmen at the Naval Academy. These shirts are capable of holding starch, and looking fresh and unwrinkled all day. When a product such as this is so obviously superior, it should be made the required standard for Navy-wide use.
Hopefully, these comments will encourage further discussion from junior officers of the Fleet who, after all, will be wearing the uniform much longer than I will.
“Naval Air Training: A Change Is Needed”
(See D. R. Wright, pp. 115-117, February; and p. 84, November 1970; and p. 83, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Ensign Richard G. Kirkland, U. S. Navy—To improve morale, the selection for jet training has to be altered. It is not a situation that can wait for extended studies or costly structural changes.
The major complaint with the present system is that the selection is purely dependent on the “luck of the draw,” effected by such factors as the weather and number of jet seats open at the Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi. An example of this selection system is available almost any week. In one week, the selection will be very selective, requiring flight grades from Training Squadron (VT) 1 well into the 3.15 to 3.20 range. The next week, however, the need for jet trainees increases, and the number of men finishing VT-1 with high flight grades, remains nearly constant. The result is that, in some cases, men are sent to NAS Meridian with grades below 3.00.
The morale factor enters the picture when the men in the first week with flight grades of 3.04 to 3.10 are sent to non-jet training squadrons, knowing that there will be many men sent to VT-7 and 9 at NAS Meridian with qualifications that are well below those achieved by men a week earlier.
The solution seems to lie in the establishment of a minimum selection grade, based on the present selection factors of primary flight grades and classroom work, and allowing only those men who reach this grade level to select jet training. This minimum grade could easily be established so as to send to NAS Meridian only those who have a specified probability of success. This would decrease the dropout rate by reducing the number of men who are transferred to NAS Meridian who have grades that indicate a higher satisfactory failure rate in jet training.
In weeks when more men qualify for jet training than NAS Meridian can start in training, the excess could be held until the first instructor opening. This idea of a “pool” has been used at NAS Pensacola, Florida for the excess of student waiting for openings at VT-1.
The second step in the selection of jet pilots would come at a specific time in the basic prop training cycle; this would be much the same as the selection of multi-engine versus helicopter training. At this point, the student who desires jet training, but did not adapt to the flight environment at VT-1, could have the additional time to adjust to flying and attempt to achieve a grade suitable for transfer to jet training. Again, this grade would be determined to provide a specific probability of successful jet training.
The advantage is immediate. The major cause of low morale is removed, and even though the student may spend a few more weeks in transition to jet aircraft, the switch would be made early and not disrupt a career pattern in the future. In addition, the student who desires jet training would have the assurance that his performance, in one of two different places could result in his choice of aircraft type.
“Terror”
(See H. R. Simpson, pp. 64-69, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas A. Brooks, U. S. Navy—Mr. Simpson’s excellent article left me with a question as to exactly what he meant by “counter terror.” If, by this term, he is limiting his objections to the indiscriminate use of terror against groups of people (e.g., French commandos bombing Algerian restaurants), I fully concur that such counter terror is merely revengeful, and probably counterproductive to the goals of the government. If, however, he intends to include all use of terror by the government in his observation that counter terror is undesirable, I cannot agree.
Selective terror, cloaked in a semblance of legality, can be as productive for the government as for the guerrilla.
In Vietnam, the Viet Cong (VC) have long practiced selective terror (assassination) by either covertly distributing “Wanted” notices of criminal conviction by a “VC people’s court” prior to an assassination, or by pinning death warrants to the bodies of murdered government collaborators. This has established the presence of a VC “shadow government” in the eyes of the populace, while at the same time eliminating undesirable and hostile elements. It has simultaneously, of course, demonstrated to the populace that the government cannot protect them, and thus, very often has caused the populace to try to sit on the fence rather than support the government. This sort of terror is primarily a psychological and political weapon, and has proven quite successful throughout the history of politically-inspired guerrilla warfare.
Why, if effective for one side, it cannot be effective for the other if the application is equally subtle? In Vietnam, where large areas of the countryside are still under VC control, the elimination of the VC government or infrastructure must be one of the primary goals of a pacification program. Once government forces have entered the area, this can be accomplished by arrests, trials, and executions, if the VC cadre are still in the area. Thus, the elimination becomes the legal operation described by Frank Scotton of the U. S. Information Agency in the Simpson article. I question whether Mr. Scotton necessarily intended his comments to be limited to the type of operation which takes place after some semblance of government control has already been established in the area. How much more effective psychologically, politically, and even militarily it would have been for the government to have commenced quasi-legal elimination operations (call them terror, counter-terror, or assassination) before full government presence had been established in the area.
By sending teams into VC-controlled areas to eliminate identified VC, several goals are achieved, particularly if some sort of document is left behind to cloak the action in an effort to give it a semblance of legality.
The type of elimination operation need not be limited to assassination. Kidnapping can often be more profitable to the government in the long run, since the cadre, under intensive interrogation, might reveal names of other VC within the government. The psychological effect, however, of his visible assassination on the populace is foregone.
While it is agreed that random terror against groups of people is counterproductive, it is maintained that the weapon of selective terror against identified guerrillas can be a most valuable and effective weapon for a government. No matter how distasteful such activity might be to the American mind, a discussion of the use of terror as a weapon should not completely dismiss the value of terror used by government forces.