Early 1966 saw the first defence policy statement, issued by the then 16-month-old Labor government, which was representative of Labor’s own thinking and not simply a carry-over of previous Conservative policies. The statement was in two parts, the first, “The Defence Review,” dealing with broad policy decisions and the second, “Defence Estimates 1966-67,” covering all three armed services in some detail.
As Defence Minister Denis Healey pointed out at an explanatory press conference, the two documents represent the major decisions taken under the long-awaited Defence Review which the Labor government initiated shortly after they won the October 1964 General Election. In this respect, the policies given in the two publications must be a guideline for the deployment, strength, equipment, and Policy of the entire British military effort for a very considerable time to come.
The significance of these new or revised Policies affect the Royal Navy far more than the other two services. In an age when military flexibility and independence of operation must figure increasingly under war conditions of any kind, any major changes in naval Policy for a country such as Britain with widespread overseas commitments must inevitably have political and to some extent economic triplications as well. Indeed, it is the evident failure of the government to appreciate that flexibility and independence of action must today depend largely on the use of seaborne transportation and naval forces and that the retention of a policy relying on static support is, to say the least, highly anachronistic, that has aroused the sharpest criticism of their plans.
A few days before the government published its Defence Review, the Minister of Defence for the Navy, Mr. Christopher Mayhew, resigned. In a statement explaining the reasons for his resignation he criticized the government for failing to do one of two rungs: either to reduce overseas commitments or to increase the forces available to fulfill them if no cuts were possible. He pointed out that present British commitments could not be met if the government insisted on pegging defence expenditure to an annual total of two billion pounds—5.6 billion U. S. dollars—at the 1964 value of the pound.
The government’s response to the charge that it has not reduced commitments has been to point out that the base in Aden would be reduced to the status of an R.A.F. transit field by 1968 and that “drastic reduction” would be made particularly in naval support to NATO in the Mediterranean area. This last point was something of an absurdity since British naval forces in the Mediterranean in mid-1966 were three frigates and four coastal minesweepers. Mr. Healey was unable to say, when questioned, how such a force could be cut “drastically” without removing it entirely. The decision to fold up the Aden base, chiefly used by the R.A.F. and Army, was in direct contravention of solemn guarantees given to Arab leaders within the South Arabian Federation some years earlier that Britain would retain a military presence in Aden to support them as long as they wished after independence. Additionally, Aden’s Regular Army currently has no air, communications, armored, or logistic support of its own and, without British backing, is not a viable force. It is therefore not surprising that Britain has had no request from Federal Arab leaders to quit the base.
But by its closure of the Aden base it must not be assumed that Britain is becoming aware of the need in today’s political climate to place less reliance on static bases and more on a maritime strategy. Instead of Aden, Bahrein in the Persian Gulf and the islands of Gan and the Chagos group are to be developed to support limited air, ground, and naval forces, in the first, and to provide air and communications support in the last two. In addition, there are plans to collaborate with Australia to develop a base in the Darwin area of northern Australia as an alternative to Singapore. Elsewhere, small British Army garrisons are to be withdrawn from colonial territories in Africa and have already been withdrawn from British Guiana. Some reductions are also to be made in ground and air forces in Malta and Cyprus.
In July 1966, as a result of the government’s need to maintain the pound sterling, the Prime Minister ordered a 100-million-pound- cut in overseas defence expenditure. The first, almost immediate reduction, was the withdrawal of about 1,500 R.A.F. personnel and a Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft squadron of Coastal Command from Gibraltar. At least a brigade group of 5,000 troops is to be withdrawn as soon as possible from West Germany and more reductions will follow unless the Bonn government agrees to increase greatly its financial support of the British forces in Germany. Naval spokesmen in the Ministry of Defence were confident that the Navy would escape lightly since “there is not much fat left on it.” But the one Escort Squadron of four destroyers or frigates in the Mediterranean may be withdrawn leaving the British Mediterranean “Fleet” with four coastal minesweepers. In the Far East, Indonesia’s policy of “confrontation” against Malaysia is now officially ended—but in August 1966 there was still no sign of any abatement in attacks on Malaysia by Indonesian forces. This may well prevent the British government from going ahead with cuts planned in that area. When British forces can be reduced in the Far East, the Navy, according to an official spokesman, will return to the level it maintained before the start of “confrontation.” This will mean a reduction in the present strength of two frigates and a mine countermeasures squadron.
This summarizes the changes being planned in the geographical deployment of British forces under the new defence policy. Apart from Aden there is virtually no major reduction in commitments. Therefore, attention must now be turned to the forces available to meet the various major commitments still outstanding, notably in the Far East and in the NATO area. The forces available in the former require more extensive examination since this area is now of primary importance to the Royal Navy.
Currently, in the area from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to Hong Kong, Britain is usually deploying two attack carriers, a commando ship, one of the new LPDs, a DLG, four or five escort squadrons of three to five destroyers and frigates in each, four mine countermeasures squadrons of about six ships each, ten submarines, and support ships of various types. Including some attached Australian and New Zealand ships, the British Far East Fleet numbers between 70 and 80 ships with a further eight to ten ships deployed in the Persian Gulf-Red Sea area.
The Navy as a whole centers on its carriers. In recent years, numerous escorts and support ships have been built whose principal function is to operate with or in support of carriers. In the Far East, in addition to participation in fleet operations, carrier aircraft operating ashore provide tactical and logistic support in forward areas near the Indonesian frontier in parts of Borneo and have been providing shipping surveillance patrols around Malaya—largely because of a lack of suitable R.A.F. aircraft for this role.
But quite apart from their central place in the Far East Fleet, carriers and naval aviation have for 20 years had a similar position in the minds of a complete generation of naval personnel, both officers and enlisted. Naval Power and naval aviation are indivisible, they have been taught. Of the Royal Navy's manpower total of nearly 100,000, something like one-third are employed either within the Fleet Air Arm or in billets closely connected With naval aviation. In recent years, roughly half of those accepted for flying training with the Navy have been allocated fixed-wing air, craft and half have helicopter billets.
All this the government plans to scrap by 1975. Says Part I of the Defence Review: "Experience and study have shown that only one type of operation exists for which carriers and carrier-borne aircraft would be indispensable: that is the landing, or withdrawal, of troops against sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-based air cover." Yet Part II, the "Defence Estimates," states: "The aircraft carrier is the most important element of the Fleet for offensive action against an enemy at sea or ashore and makes a large contribution to the defence of our seaborne forces. It can also play an important part in operations where local air superiority has to be gained and maintained and offensive support of ground forces is required."
If this was not a sufficient answer to the need for carriers, only two months after the government decided in February 1966 not to proceed with a carrier replacement program, the carriers HMS Eagle and Ark Royal flew off more than 1,000 two-hour average sorties in well under a month watching for "pirate" tankers attempting to run oil for Rhodesia into ports in Mozambique. Four R.A.F. Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft were made available but were operationally restricted, as the field in the Malagasy Republic from which they were flying was closed 12 hours in 24.
The decision not to proceed with the Royal Navy’s planned new attack carrier CVA-01, despite Cabinet approval for her construction in July 1963, aroused considerable criticism not only in the Navy, but also among the public as was evident in letters to the press. As a result there was some evidence of alarm in government circles, particularly as the 1966 General Election campaign was underway. In a speech at Plymouth in March, the Prime Minister said: “The question about new carrier orders was not about one but three. With the existing carriers due to end their effective life by the mid-70s, to order three Fleet carriers, the minimum for effective deployment, would cost over a 10- year period, 1,400 million pounds.” But The Defence Review used the same cost total for one new carrier, CVA-01, and two of those already in commission. It stated: “The force of five carriers, which we inherited from the previous Government, will reduce to three in a few years’ time. Even if CVA-01 were built, the force would be limited to three ships through the 1970s. The total cost of such a force would be some 1,400 million pounds over a 10-year period.”
Thus, with the Prime Minister stating that 1,400 million pounds was the cost of three completely new carriers while his Defence Minister in The Defence Review stated that this sum was the cost of one new carrier and two from the existing fleet, it was hardly surprising that many Royal Navy officers did not know what to believe.
The day following publication of the Review, a clear month before the Prime Minister’s speech, the Ministry of Defence announced that the first order would be placed in 1966 for a new class of DLG to be known as the Type 82. Four of these ships are planned and the first will cost 30 million pounds, which is believed to include Research and Development costs of the Australian-designed Ikara ASW missiles and also those of Great Britain’s new surface-to-air Sea Dart missile.
There is some uncertainty over just what the 30 million pounds for each of these ships does in fact cover, but by July 1966, unofficial estimates for the cost of the first ship of the class had risen to as much as 45 million pounds, and the Dutch government, which is sharing Sea Dart radar guidance development costs with Britain, was so alarmed that it began seriously considering the U. S. Tartar missile as an alternative. The cost of CVA-01 was to have been about 70 million pounds. But, when her construction order was turned down by the government some weeks before Publication of The Defence Review, the Navy requested that no order should be placed for the Type 82 DLGs on the grounds that these ships’ primary function was close air and ASW defense of carriers. This request was approved, but as criticism of the government’s naval policy came to the boil with Mr. Mayhew’s resignation, the order for the first Type 82 was reinserted in the 1966-67 naval construction program.
Additionally, in the weeks following the Publication of The Defence Review, there were indications that the government was thinking again about the provision of close air support for ground forces in the Far East in the 1970s. In his speech already quoted, the Prime Minister stressed that he was referring to "Fleet” carriers. Later, when an order for 60 R-1127 VTOL ground support aircraft for the R.A.F. was announced by the Ministry of Defence, some London newsmen hinted from an evidently “inspired” source that the Navy '''as considering the use of this aircraft flying from a new type of small carrier. While it would be most unlikely that the Navy would Be considering an aircraft such as the P.1127 for service in nine years’ time, it is known that a major aircraft corporation has been ordered by the Ministry of Defence to produce design studies for an advanced type of VTOL aircraft which could be operated either from small carriers or from destroyers and frigates supported by some type of aircraft repair ship.
Officially, the problem of air support for naval and ground forces in the Far East after 1975 will be met by the use of U. S.-built F.111A aircraft based mainly at Singapore, with satellite fields available at Gan in the Maidive islands and possibly at Darwin. The Navy will also provide air defence with its Sea Slug, Sea Dart, and Seacat surface-to-air missiles. As further evidence of governmental hasty thinking, these missiles will also be available to provide close air support of ground forces ashore in areas outside the range of land-based aircraft, it has been officially stated. This means an area including virtually the entire African continent and much of Asia. No indication has been given of the number of F. Ills which would actually be operational at any given time nor if it is proposed to deploy some of the 50 to be bought from the United States in West Germany with the British tactical air forces there. An unofficial estimate for the number of F.111s operational given by naval flag officers, based on the operational/maintenance ratio of naval aircraft, is 12 to 38.
The decision to phase out the Royal Navy's carriers by 1975, by which time only the Eagle, Ark Royal, and Hermes will be in commission, will not affect the Fleet Air Arm's helicopter squadrons. Work on a new helicopter support ship to be used mainly for deck landing trials, to be named Engadine after the World War I seaplane tender which fought at Jutland in 1916, is going ahead. Plans to purchase a number of U. S. Sea King helicopters have been approved and they will be built under license in Britain. The cruiser Blake completes her conversion, involving the removal of her 6-inch after gun turret and replacement by a helicopter hangar and platform for four ASW helicopters, in 1967. Work has begun on a similar conversion of her sister ship Lion and the third ship of the class, Tiger, will be converted by 1970-71. Two more "County" class DLGs, each carrying an ASW helicopter, were begun in early 1966 bringing the total number of these ships to be built to eight. In the 1966-67 fiscal year three more Leander-class general purpose frigates, each carrying an ASW helicopter, are to be ordered bringing the total of helicopter-carrying frigates in the Royal Navy to 28.
The attack carrier Ark Royal is to start a 30-month overhaul in late 1966 to enable her to operate U. S. F-4s of which the first was handed over to the Royal Navy in June 1966. It is officially stated that this overhaul will give her an effective operational life until 1975.
The only major change in the equipment of British forces, particularly in the Far East, will therefore be the introduction of F. 111s which will eventually replace the fixed-wing element of the Fleet Air Arm and its carriers. Some R.A.F. medium-range strategic bomber aircraft will also become available for tactical roles when the Royal Navy's four FBM submarines take over responsibility for the maintenance of the British deterrent from 1968 onwards. The reduction in the number of SSBNs from five to four was one of the first moves made by the new Labor government in the fall of 1964.
Thus, on two counts, reductions in commitments, or, alternately, an increase in the strength of the forces available to carry them out, the government has proposed no major changes. Apart from the purchase of F.1.1s and P.1127 VTOL close ground support aircraft to replace the present obsolete Hunter aircraft, eventual replacement of the 30 or 50 Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft by 3 rather smaller number of new aircraft based on the design of the Comet airliner, and the introduction of the Sea Dart and Ikara missiles in the Type 82 DLGs there are no plans for the initiation of completely new concepts. Certainly in the case of the F.111s, it is highly doubtful if they will perform effectively all the functions likely to be imposed on them, as a result of the demise of the carriers, though the R.A.F. undoubtedly has great need for an aircraft such as this. The rest of the 1966-67 naval construction program represents simply a continuation, and certainly not an increase, of previous programs begun, in the case of Leander-class frigates and the fifth SSN, several years ago. On the other hand some new ships projected as long as three years ago have been cut from the program including an icebreaker to replace the 30-year-old former netlayer Protector, used to supply British bases in Antarctica, and two of six planned 500-ton survey ships.
From an economic angle the outcome of the failure either to reduce commitments or strengthen the Services may eventually force upon the Labor government or its successors greatly increased expenditure in the long term. First, further capital costs will arise with the greater-than-ever dependence on shore bases. Though no doubt every effort will be Made to keep expenditures on Gan, Bahrein, and possibly Darwin down to a minimum, from past bitter experience it is abundantly evident that the cost of static bases has an unfortunate tendency to creep ever upwards with singularly little to show for the increases in terms of military viability.
Second, even among naval personnel unaffected by the junking of the new carrier program, there is evidence of a growing sense of frustration and disillusionment. This will almost certainly lead to an increasing number of resignations and failures to “ship over” for further duty—all of which will not only mean a partly wasted outlay on training particularly among those who have graduated from naval technical schools; but also pay rates and “fringe benefits” may well have to be stepped up to slow the flow of manpower wastage. Pay increases are always “across the board” for all three Services which means that they are, in total, very considerable items in the annual defence appropriations.
As an indication of the government’s fears that it may soon be facing a manpower crisis, in May resignations by all naval officers, except on medical grounds, were suspended until the end of 1966 by which time it was hoped the effects of The Defence Review might have been digested and would, on reflection, not seem so disastrous.
From the point of view of British foreign policy, The Defence Review and its positive proposals—or the lack of them—such as the disbanding of the carrier force inevitably must undermine confidence among Britain’s allies in the Cold War or even limited wars. Equally, the sport of “twisting the lion’s tail” may well become even more popular among emerging nations such as Indonesia, who in the past have had great respect for the mobility of seaborne air power.
Within the NATO Alliance, British aircraft and missiles will still play a part in Western Europe’s air defence system. At sea there is likely to be no great reduction in the number of escorts made available to SACLANT for exercise purposes. But the SACLANT Strike Fleet is unlikely ever again to have a British attack carrier unless one happens to be in northern waters in between Far East tours and yard periods.
Any really vast changes in Britain’s NATO commitments are, for the present time, unlikely while a strong and influential body of public opinion in Britain still nurses hopes of eventual British entry into the Common Market. Also the almost complete demise of French participation in NATO has aroused fears among British politicians that Washington might quit Western Europe in disgust if Britain, too, showed signs of cutting her NATO commitments.
Conversely, it is widely held among some London politicians that a demonstrable failure by Britain to meet her Far East commitments might finally bring about much greater U. S. participation in the maintenance of security in the Indian Ocean area. But, in any case, they reckon the time is not far distant when it will be possible to opt out of the defence agreement with Malaysia. Already many Britons maintain that their country should and could safely reduce her commitments outside NATO since both France and West Germany enjoy a high level of prosperity without having to bear the burden of defence commitments overseas. This argument does, of course, conveniently forget that the fruitful overseas markets which these two and other countries enjoy are safeguarded by U. S. and British forces. It is also all too often overlooked that Communism does not subscribe to Western economic principles and is quite prepared to ruin a nation’s economy in order to achieve its political ends—such as denying the West important raw material sources.
No defence policy for a nation such as Britain which is highly susceptible to even relatively minor changes in the international situation can possibly do more than indicate broad outlines based on the best assessment available of likely future trends and dispositions overseas. In 1957, the then Minister of Defence, Mr. Duncan Sandys, introduced proposals of as great significance as those put forward in the present Defence Review. Two years later many of the most important decisions made in 1957 had to be rescinded. This was especially so in the personnel field. Many experienced officers and enlisted left the Services in some cases voluntarily but most under an early retirement scheme with financial incentives to provide more manpower for industry. Two years later all three Services—but the Navy especially—faced an acute shortage of senior enlisted men possessing advanced technical skills. It required some years before the "shipping over" rate among senior chiefs and petty officers reached a satisfactory level. Significantly, during the past two years of uncertainty over the Navy’s future the rate has once more slumped. In part this has been due to the increasing amount of time married men in the Navy now face away from their families.
From the Royal Navy's viewpoint one of the most disturbing side effects of The Defence Review is likely to be that still more personnel will figure that they have no worthwhile future career and will quit at the first opportunity. This will put a still greater burden °II those remaining who will, in turn, face more overseas tours and will thus become even more discontented. The Defence Review gives no clue as to how this vicious circle will ever be broken.
Another notable omission is the lack of any reference at all throughout the Review to the growing power of the Soviets’ submarine fleet particularly and their over-all maritime effort generally. This omission was also to be found in the 1965-66 Defence Estimates and it is a strange one for a nation whose survival depends on the safe arrival of 2.5 million tons of imports every week of the year, about 98 percent of them coming by sea and representing 50 per cent of all food supplies and about 98 Per cent of all raw materials for industry.
Throughout its history the Royal Navy has been struck hard and often by politicians anxious to find funds for more electorally appeal- mg policies than the maintenance of adequate sea power. Each time the Navy has managed survive—though often only just. It is this spirit which is most prevalent in the Navy today and fortunately there are a few straws to be clutched. There is the strong possibility that the present-day attack carriers will be replaced by smaller VTOL carriers. There is also the belief that when the F-4s and the latest buccaneers enter squadron service they will Provide convincing proof to even the most obstinate politicians that seaborne airpower is the most reliable and economic way of prodding close air support.
Already, in the “grand spirit of British compromise,” the Navy has gone a long way toward cutting costs, while maintaining efficiency, to meet the politicians’ plans for tax savings.
Demands for new mine countermeasures ships have been shelved for the moment. So also have suggestions that a nucleus of a new PT boat force should be built in view of the D. S. Navy’s successes with this type of craft in Vietnam.
But the most important concession has been made over new aircraft. Senior British naval officers now believe that in a limited war situation an attack on a ship the size of a carrier would be most unlikely because of the aggressor’s fear that this could escalate the situation into a much larger “hot” war. For this reason, former resistance to VTOL aircraft has been dropped by the Navy. A few years ago the then Defence Minister, Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, was persuaded not to force the P.1154 supersonic VTOL fighter on the Navy as it did not have an operational radius which would allow a carrier to stand sufficiently far out to sea to avoid strikes by enemy tactical missile craft or batteries.
The P.1127 VTOL aircraft, which the Fleet Air Arm is now examining, is a subsonic version of the P.1154. It also has a relatively poor operational radius but now that there is no longer believed to be a serious threat in limited war to carriers the Navy is prepared to take these ships much closer to the battle zone, thus overcoming the P.1127’s range limitations.
In the future no doubt there will be still more compromises, but as Admiral Sir David Luce, former First Sea Lord, made clear by his resignation following that of his chief, Mr. Mayhew, the Royal Navy is conscious that it still has a big part to play in Britain’s defence and the defence of those “who pass upon the seas on their lawful occasions.” The Defence Review is not the last word on Britain’s future role as a world power and an upholder of Western military security. In parts the thinking behind it is muddled and sometimes opaque. But it does not, as some people in Britain and elsewhere feared it might, advocate widespread reductions in British military responsibilities. Nevertheless, a fear must remain that The Defence Review may be used as an excuse for further military reductions particularly in the Far East. The shifting sands of the world political scene will inevitably dictate major changes in the plans contained in the Review. The gravest danger now lies in the damage that may be done before the present policies, such as the abandonment of seaborne air power, are reversed.
Naval Correspondent for London’s The Sunday Telegraph, Mr. Wettern is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings on naval and maritime subjects. He is a Lieutenant (SCC) in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. Among his writing achievements are The Lonely Battle, published by W. H. Allen, Ltd., 1960 and several histories of Vickers-Armstrongs, Ltd., famous British shipbuilding firm.