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When word came that our carrier, the USS Randolph (CVS-15) was to be made ready to join the Reserve Fleet, we were 5,000 miles away in Rio de Janeiro on maneuvers and were not scheduled to return to the United States for almost another month. Only one officer of the 98 on board had ever participated in an inactivation—and the percentage of enlisted men with such experience was even lower.
It was some comfort for us to learn that our ship would not be mummified and entombed to decay away. On the contrary, the “Candoo Randoo” would be inactivated with a view toward reactivation from an “as is” status—in other words, a minimum of effort would then be required to provide a fighting ship that would be capable of satisfactory service with the active fleet.
The ship’s force was made explicitly resp sible for accomplishing the inactivation ship, but certain industrial projects be>° our capability were delegated to the Bo5' Naval Shipyard. These tasks consisted f erally of making the ship watertight 3 weathertight; installing dehumidified11 equipment, a hull cathodic protection syste: and other preservation beyond the capat>>* of the ship’s force, and finally, supporting1 ship’s force when necessary (e.g., crane s< vices). In effect, the ship’s force would df' and preserve the ship while the ship)'3' would fashion the “cocoon” about her ‘1l provide the equipment necessary to keep ^ interior arid.
m tv ter
tom
thp
Shi
and
■Shu
■Shu
h'n,
Tlu
Ma
a tt
As
the
job
res<
The chain of command (Figure 1) ran 11
Any inactivation is a demoralizing experience as the vibrant, almost animate fighting ship rapidly deteriorates into a vacant, cold, lifeless hull. With this deterioration, there is a degradation in the attitudes and motivation of the crew. There are lessons for all in the ways the men of the "Candoo Randoo” met the myriad problems of the inactivation process.
') Commander H. L. Hussmann, U. S. Navy
in tu ^
eer6 norrnal manner from the division offi- resf cto the department head, executive officer, it (L^^anding officer, then beyond the ship to her §,e Commanding Officer, Naval Inactive Maintenance Facility, Philadelphia, -d i' q lhe Commander, Naval Ships System ht J °'''lnand in Washington, D. C. fic2t|1 ^ be ship’s type commander, Commander, syslp Mr Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (Corn-
tab'. ^avAirLant), relinquished control over the in?1 •jf^dolph when she entered the yard at Boston. nC * V[6 Commanding Officer, Inactive Ship I clc ^ aintenance Facility, Philadelphia, assigned ip'3 'nspectors permanently to the ship.
“r ‘1l ^ rePresentatives of the ship’s “owner,”
eP ^ j0^ frequently had to interpret what was a for inactivation, what work should be •an ll Served for reactivation, and how elaborate
the inactivation processes would have to be.
Many such decisions were further complicated by the fact that the Randolph, before inactivation, was scheduled for a six-month overhaul. In the event of reactivation, it would be necessary for the ship to be overhauled for at least an equivalent period in addition to any extra work related to reactivation per se. A “speedy” reactivation period, then, could scarcely be less than nine months. This extended time frame complicated the supply problem of the ship. There was some new equipment on board the Randolph that was urgently needed by the operating fleet. This same equipment would be required on board a reactivated Randolph. There was a constant dilemma to balance the immediate requirements of the Fleet against
all information relevant to the inactiva
tio"'
lems that were arising.
MIC’s relationship in the chain can be s in Figure 1 under the executive officer.
the future requirement to reactivate the Randolph.
In general, the decision to remove a specific piece of equipment was made on a case- by-case basis, with NavShipSysCom or CNO making the final decision. Normally, the removal required a replacement part, a substitute piece of equipment, or a supply requisition for an equivalent item. Many items on board ship were of a semi-perishable nature and a decision had to be made whether to keep the item on board or off-load it for use elsewhere. A “magic” period of three years was selected as the time frame of usefulness to determine if equipment should be retained or removed. Hence, any piece of gear that would become useless in three years was removed. Trade-offs of time-related problems constituted a continuing perplexity.
The money allotted for inactivation was about one-and-a-half million dollars. This was barely sufficient to cover all the industrial work to be done by Boston, and left no room for undiscovered jobs or for unusual assistance required by the ship’s force.
These two problems, insufficient funds and the unpredictable time required to reactivate, constantly caused dilemmas and recpiired sound judgment decisions.
The degree of ship’s preservation also posed a number of problems. Most exposed surfaces were preserved in accordance with normal procedures of chip-and-paint, but some jobs developed that were too extensive, and decisions had to be made as to what preservative measures should be taken. The aviation gasoline tanks, for example, needed extensive chipping and preservation. The job was beyond the capability of the ship’s force and the money allotted was insufficient to cover an industrial work order from the shipyard. The solution was to delay the tank repairs for the reactivation phase. In the interim, the tanks were thoroughly steamed to get rid of explosive vapors, and then sealed. Two months later, the tanks were again tested for gas-free condition. No gas fumes had developed, so a desiccant was introduced to maintain a dry atmosphere and the tank was permanently sealed.
To meet the myriad problems of the inactivation process, the Randolph's CO desig-
Jjj.
nated two officers to form a Management activation Center (MIC). This center h22f establish a uniform, periodic system of P'0. ress reporting; plan for future evoluti°|lS the inactivation; co-ordinate plans and Pr \ ress between the Randolph departments a|; outside agencies; and serve as a repository with the obligation to advise the CO of P1
iet*
direct communications to the various dep1 ment heads. •
Any inactivation is a demoralizing expd‘ ence, as the vibrant, almost animate fig^ ship rapidly deteriorates into a vacant, c° lifeless hull. With this deterioration, there n degradation in the attitudes and motive11, of the crew. Two policy decisions, pro'lllj gated early by the Bureau of Naval Person^ served to minimize these effects. „
actiVa
final
‘"um
PerSo
P°lici
rema
'ion,
toan
hTh
hi
erf on \t
on i! Oiissi PerSc ■Oon ship need C, Prob
OlOQ
tn
last
n
unai
BuPers stated that the Randolph would manned by 70 per cent of her alio"'21! throughout the first three months of the l"
tiff
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w
Is
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itiitf
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infl' |
l»
inf
iff'
oitie port, Norfolk, Virginia, for Boston October. She would spend two months
^side the pier, enter drydock at Boston , December, and be placed out of com- r,„SSl°n on 13 February 1969. All Randolph s°nnel would be away from home for four
Start Date
ComPl*tion Date liHoyMsizlzM “ 8chedm*d
Aaa
■iatancei
final31'011 anc^ t^ien 50 Per cent ^or l^e
l(1In°nth. This policy resulted in a mini- 1,1 of disruption normally attributable to pJ^Hel turnover. The second BuPers reilCy sPecified that department heads would tio a'n 0n board throughout the inactiva- tOa’ TheSe two policies were and are vital orderly inactivation.
I he schedule called for the ship to leave hi
°n l4
sji.nths, but, for three of those months, the ^‘P Would be uninhabitable because of the ^ to close down her habitability systems. Pr krew's berthing constituted an immediate ^ lern- The pier where the ship was to be a °r<‘d for the first two months was at least |a1(1 from the drydock, her home for the Sj. tw° months. At rush-traffic periods, tran- p nilght take up to 45 minutes each way, an )acceptable delay.
Figure 2
TASK SCOPE SHEET
, 3012-L7 8-323-L.
- J - r—
E-6 E-5 ' E-4 NR
Z7<ft
' *• Required & SA^rei Metv white
_2l etku rcgwtVATWE, tass
Ih, 2- ETA Material M/A (If applicable)
i... r~
' “«■> R.,. 953^ 2. SY Start Date . SY Comp Dote i!3B
•r‘c. Specea/Machinery .......................................................................... J' 3|2-' t (accmSS to) _
Milestone Dates
$$ 1$
Two barracks ships (APL) were found and moored close by the ship, thus solving both the berthing problem and the messing requirement for the major part of the crew and officers. Most of the officers were berthed in a Boston hotel under a contract let by the shipyard.
Weekend bus transportation to Norfolk was chartered and a portion of the cost subsidized through non-appropriated funds. Efforts were made to obtain air transportation for married personnel to visit their families. Work hours were lengthened early in the week to permit departure on Friday afternoons. Similar steps were taken to make the four-month “Boston deployment” as gentle a hardship as possible within the limits of the work to be done.
Other preliminary steps were taken during the period between notification of inactivation and arrival at Boston. The Supply Department off-loaded stocks of consumables, aviation repair parts, equipment and provisions, and ordered inactivation supplies and preservatives. Those departments which could spare men began inactivating unused spaces and equipment. While the inactivation would take four months, these preliminaries actually consumed two additional months.
A major task for MIC was to chart and determine how much work had been done and how much remained at any given time. The natural way to measure work is in manhours, the work one man can do in one hour. This yardstack, applicable to all levels of shipboard effort, can measure both effectiveness and efficiency.
Too, MIC had to organize the work so that all the officers and men could understand why they were doing what they were doing and how much more they had to do before they were done.
The management graphs of the USS Kankakee (AO-39) an oiler that had gone through inactivation some time before, were borrowed and studied. The Kankakee crew had broken their over-all labors down into 249 tasks.
Our MIC intended to take each of the departments, group the tasks into about 20 tasks apiece, and follow the clear, comfortable course charted by the Kankakee.
In order to ascertain what the tasks of the ship were, Task Scope (TS) sheets, (Figure 2) were distributed to each department. These sheets listed the estimated work required for each task and the estimated period of the inactivation schedule when the task would be accomplished. The first return of the TS sheets indicated that the Kankakee and the Randolph would have to go their own separate
iu'd-
Figure 3
ways. There were almost 2,000 tasks mitted, approximately ten times the Kanw* total, far too many to be handled rapidly our MIC’s two officers and two sea>llCl Why not a computer? There was an l**1 407 machine on board the Randolph which keP track of supplies. This sophisticated add1'1 machine was able to add and subtract if* mation on cards, sort these cards, and m out the results on a high-speed typevvr'1 What more could we ask?
ilv
INACTIVATION TASK SUMMARY SHEET
TASK | i,* | MAN HOURS R<Q. |
| OCT | NOV |
| JAN | FEB | |||||||||
11 | 18 | 25 | 1 | 8 | 15 |
|
| 10 | 17 | 24 | 31 | 7 | 14 | ||||
K/ee | CC‘ | W/lMt/ | ■Of/ |
| MINI | Hill | mu | Him |
|
|
| Hill | umii | Hill | iiih | Hill | mu |
r,jti Kelt | ocz | Vl/JMtp | VS 3 |
| Hill | mu | Hill | nun | him |
| > | Hill | Hill | lllll | lllll | iiiiii |
|
f3t.rzp.ss ere. | OSJ | /v/DfV | VS/ | HIM | Hill | Hill | Hill | Hill | mu i | 4 | ¥ | mu |
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Rer> 71 ter to'+Ks | CtCV | So | vss |
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| till |
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| 1 |
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Tcf> r | OC3 | 70 | VSJ |
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Pt* if Zo'Ate | rctr | r//o | vss |
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Per IB i or Ate | 007 | /vo | vss |
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| so | vsr |
| Hill |
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| 70 | vss |
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| mi |
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| 0/0 | 2<*C | *53 |
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| Hill | mm |
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s Of>-r Locr£ts | or/ | 3*0 | vss |
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Ikxa er-tz.'d-o | O/Z | $*■?.................. | VfC |
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| in | mu | Hill | Mill | nm |
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(Sort* ff-SZ-U | ms | VZO | vso |
| Him | Hill | IIUI |
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C-'frf- il | ov | /OS | vss |
| III | HI |
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(So/O C-fZStl | o/s | /os | VfO |
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f/Cff /Of +/ | O/O | /o5 | vss |
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The TS sheets as originally published P vided a satisfactory initial work sheet for 1 more sophisticated program. On this she each task was described, the Estimated To** Man-Hours (ETMH) required were decla(e'r and the period when the division ofhc , thought the work would be accompli5!1 . was given, thus providing the basic ir>pllI! that the program would require.
The ship was divided into nine depa; ments: Air, Aviation Intermediate Mal^ tenance, Communications, Operations, N3' , gation, Supply, Weapons, and Engineer11 r
Figure 4
1401-42-9U1
i
PERF PERFORMED REMAINING COMPLETE 123 12343
BKOflt VMMRM
999 on
<m on
•999 Oil 999 on 999 on 999 Oil 999 Oil 999 Oil 999 Oil 999 Oil 999 on
TASK TOTAL «352 0411
130
1500
10.0
33.3
8327
8334
8341
B34a*
8355
8362
8369
8 376
150
150
200
200
200
200
150
150
TASK TOTAL
NC TOTAL 01V TOTAL DEPT TOTAL
1500
4880
4880
59286
33.3
207.4
207.4 3377.9
1300
4680
4680
57633
200
200
200
1653
84.6*
95.98
95.98 97.28
Vi ^mi] >bi •Sht v
s
Sih a tota ’hese
Corisis Cated and t
"'oulc
and i siSne, Cente 38 w« Huire Th an !, nre • Se
this
r4er,
'n
a\vat
'v°rli
aniv
T
Pap,
MIc
fQtn
thg
%
ina,
reci
to?
8ub
SHIP TOTAL 321402
13578
95.78
to
th
'"ti
ABBREVIATIONS
WC - WORK CCUTER DIV - DIVISION DEPT • DEPARTMENT
PEJtr . PERFORMED H/H - HAN MOORS COMP - COMPLETION
IKBELVKHRM - BOMB ELEVATOR HACKINERT ROOM
NOTE! ALL OATES ARE MODIFIED JULIAN OATES TO FACILITATE SUBTRACTION.
FOR EXAMPLE, 8364 . Dac. SI, 1868 83*7 » Jan. 1, 1969
the
is
to
die
ub-
M by # jM-
ep1 n? of
^tments, with the three departments of r„ '^'Histration, Medical, and Dental being >bi ’
l?ht
*nto its internal divisions. Each division
,allV Was subdivided into work centers, for
iu‘:
Was assigned an identification number Cat'S*St*n^ °f three digits. The first digit indi- , t* the department, the second the division,
pro-
thi*
let1,
red'
0
W
nil1*
)31‘
ai11’
avi"
riit?
3m t1 7 -
l*te third the work center. Each task was f'n identified by a 6-digit number that
'tie
•'activation Task Summary Sheet (Fig- 3) which cross-plotted the work to be
fiT and the time frame for its performance.
ls form was of primary benefit to the work r(,flter manager. It provided him a crossly Crence of the work to be done, the period ivv^^inh *l was to accolnpbshed, and an ivamness for the over-all magnitude of the rk-load at any given time during the filiation.
he TS sheet, then, was the basic piece of jPerwork for both the work center and the f. • ft was the cornerstone of all subsequent I . his and reports. Basically, the important t^antities on any TS sheet are the ETMH and J start and finish dates for the task. The Man-Hours per Day (AMHD) was a
I !ehr
■ o
\ ted to reflect the actual totals, and bound " «t ?etyier as a total work summary for some Sefluent carrier undergoing inactivation. I (q ^ information on the TS sheet then had 1 he transcribed to a computer program.
1
$
th,
lned into one because of their relatively ,i 'v°rkload. Each department was broken Q°wn i, F
a t *ly '
the* ^ ^A basic work groups, and each of
th,
C* te^> *n (he hrst 3 digits, its work center, Sj ln the last 3 digits the task number as- Cced within the work center. Each work i,ster made out as many of these TS sheets Were necessary to identify their work reorients.
a his information was then transcribed to n Ir »re doi
Cent«
hernent of the system. At the end of the chvation, all TS sheets were updated, cor-
, Was accomplished by typing the boxed ,.lers and numbers onto a standard IBM f- This card has 80 positions available for recording of information. Each box on the ' sheet represented one of these 80 positions n the IBM card and corresponded to the (j!u,'bers beneath the boxes. For example, *8'ts \ to 10 on the IBM card briefly de- ^fibed the task. Digits 12 to 14 described the '°rk center, while digits 16 to 18 identified
the task number. The dates of starting and completing were changed to Julian code— e.g., 31 December 1968 is 8366; 1 January 1969 is 8367—to permit easier subtraction and were placed in digit spaces 20 to 23 and 25 to 28. The ETMH were placed in the boxes for digits 30 to 34.
To determine the projected work load on any given day, the ETMH were divided by the work days scheduled to find the AMHD required on that task. This figure was placed in the boxes corresponding to IBM digit numbers 36 to 39.
Finally, 19-digit spaces across the bottom of the form represented the applicable Fridays during the inactivation period. For instance, digit number 51 represented the second Friday in November. An “X” in this box indicated that work on that task would take place during the second week in November. Friday had been chosen as the representative date for each week. All work was accomplished on that date and the week started and stopped at 1600 on the same date. Each week was considered to have five eight-hour days for a total of 40 available work hours per man per week.
With this information from the TS Sheet, there was sufficient data to carry out the computer solutions for the total inactivation. The basic computer output was the Inactivation Progress Readout (Figure 4). The computer sorted each card, by work center and task number, and printed it out in tabular form as shown. It then totaled up the ETMH required and the man-hours remaining and
printed the readout of these totals.
This readout was updated as of Friday each week and was republished on Wednesday to reflect the changes that had taken place during the previous week. The method of updating was simple. Two copies of Friday’s readout were distributed to the work centers on Wednesday. The division officer made corrections to the readout if applicable and noted in longhand in the far-right hand column the amount of work that had been accomplished during the current week on each task. On Monday, one copy of the readout was returned to MIC.
The readout was updated by a new IBM card which indicated the task, the date the work was performed (a Friday), and the amount of work performed. The computer hereupon resorted the cards, subtracted the work performed from the ETMH, determined the man-hours remaining, and from this determined the percentage complete for each task. After all tasks were entered, the computer totaled the work efforts to each work center, printed out these totals, and calculated a percentage-complete figure. This process was mechanically extended to provide totals for the division, the department, and the ship. The degree of completion was then readily apparent.
If a correction was needed to revise the original task data, the division officer merely marked through the incorrect figure and placed the proper number alongside the
marked-through number. The MIC vv,°' then pull the original card, punch a ne" 1 with the updated data, insert the neW f in the stack of cards and rerun the prog'3 This readout provided the second eld1'1 of documentation for inactivation. The 1 element consisted of a tabulation of aS? i.e., personnel on board through the inad1' tion. The readout described the work W
H
ress and the historical record of what been done so far.
The remaining function was a required
to determine if the future workload was
can l Perfc into
Worf
Mi
H tl r,-in ■nils
sonable and susceptible to completion by1 end of inactivation. Various approaches this forecasting were attempted. One met*" was to program the computer to sumit^ the AMHD for each week when work scheduled to be accomplished. This Fa11' Workload readout then indicated the a vet3- daily workload for every Friday during 1 remaining inactivation period. A quick c°" parison of this figure with the number1 man-hours available (found by multiply11" the number of personnel on board timeS hours per day) would indicate if the world03! plan was excessive or under-program11^ This was plotted as shown in Figure 5 3,1 provided a tool for managers to rearra,1: their workload.
A different approach to forecasting probability of completion was to compare 1 weekly work rate with the work remain11'-' to determine if sufficient time remained. 4"1’’
hnt
'fill
snn
and
>nsj
HiK
W;
big
spa
c0l
on
the
by
its(
th(
sp
re;
ab
in
Pi
Figure 6
Figure 7
ON-BOARD PERSONNEL CHART
OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | |||||||||||||
| 1 | ■ | IS 1 27 129 | 4 i 131 201 27 | 3 110117114 UT | |||||||||||||
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UGEND: OFFICERS 1 ENLISTED '
vP
c'H0
yfd
of
lefl1(
e*
as?
acti'
p;:
it t- ■ef
f by1 h es
etb°
7ut^
■ed1
•g1,:
CO'1 >er ‘j
>iy*;
lies
.k\o»
1111^
; a"1
^an be determined by dividing the man-hours . rl°rtned in anv week (the weekly work rate) lnt° the
work remaining.
w,
S^kjoad (man-hours) Remaining an-Hours Performed per week of work required.
M
= weeks
Jf
lbis result is greater than the actual time Gaining, the workload is unrealistic and be revised.
Jne additional feature of essential impor- nce was added to the paperwork associated s.lt*1 the Randolph's inactivation. This was a lnple tabulation of all spaces on board ship j ^ their status. The cleaning bill and zone It) ^ection program were compared and an I "t card was punched to identify each space, l^Cate it on board ship, identify the responsi- e Work center, and provide an IBM-digit rPa°e to note the preservation status of the 0|'tpartment involved. Four digit
on
ran'
•e ^ nil# Tii':
spaces
each card were allotted to indicate that ^ sPace had been completed or accepted . ’ the various parties concerned; the division the engineers, the shipyard, and, finally, o inspectors from Philadelphia.
*bese cards indicated the close-out rate of Spaces on board ship. A bi-weekly computer r^adout indicated the status of every space oard ship. When a space was accepted by . p|ladelphia, its card was signed and placed lr* a “completed” file. Monthly, this com- 1 leted file was run through the computer and
the
passed out to the concerned divisions. This card and computer readout system ensured that each of the 2,200 spaces on board ship was assigned some division, was being worked upon, and provided a running tally of preservation of spaces progress. This was an essential element of the over-all program.
The entire program for the ship was summarized by means of four charts which dealt with the four elements that were studied (Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9). First was the historical element, the Inactivation Progress Chart (Figure 6) which was derived from the Inactivation Progress Readout and identified the progress that had been made throughout the ship. Secondly, there was the simple accounting of assets, the On Board-Personnel Chart (Figure 7). Third, there was the prognostic element of the program, an attempt to forecast the workload and predict if each department would finish on time, the Ship Future Workload Chart (Figure 8). Finally, the last program was the tabulation of spaces on board the ship and their state of acceptance by Philadelphia, the Space Closeout Chart (Figure 9). These four charts summarize the inactivation of the carrier Randolph.
One responsibility of the MIC was to coordinate and ease problems between the ship’s departments and the external agencies. There were certain major programs that were continuing problems throughout the inacti-
ate
information necessary to take appropri action. At the command level, the prograI1j provided an accurate index to the progress 0 the ship and made the complex multi-face10 problems of inactivation understandable a°
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1950, Commander Hussmann served in the USS Southerland (DDR-743) in Korea before attending flight training. Then followed successive tours as a patrol pilot with VP-17, as Electronics Warfare pilot with VAW-11 and VAW-13, and, as CO of VRC-40. Between sea duty tours, he was a flight instructor in Kansas, attended the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, and taught engineering at the Naval Academy. He was navigator of the Randolph and Manager of Inactivation during her decommissioning. He is now Military Assistant to the Technical Director at Naval Weapons Laboratory, Dahlgren, Virginia.
vation. There was a requirement to place a tarpaper covering over the flight deck early in the inactivation so as to stop the water leakage in the spaces below. At the same time, there were numerous requirements for work to be accomplished on the flight deck and people and vehicles tended to tear the tarpaper covering. This roofing was carried out over the major portion of the inactivation period. The rips were patched as necessary and the ship learned to live with the problem.
Another running problem was the installation of the dehumidification system. This involved extensive air piping to all sections of the ship and prevented the securing of many spaces that the ship’s force had finished preserving. Because of this work in progress, it was difficult to keep completed spaces clean, and a cyclical clean-up program was necessary to keep the ship in acceptable condition. This involved repetitive work, but it was unavoidable.
Still another major problem involved the removal of the upper 70 feet of the mast. This was necessary because the ship was to be berthed near an airport and her mast would constitute a hazard to air navigation. Because of the height and weight of the mast, the available cranes were insufficient to remove it. Extensive preparations were made to remove all antennas and disconnect the internal wiring within the mast. The initial effort to remove the mast proved to be unsafe and was abandoned. The eventual solution was to cut off a segment of the topmast so that the i'12'1 section was within the capacity of the sh>P yard cranes. This series of evolutions c* tended over the last month of the inactivati0'1 and complicated the work of other depa|1 ments. The tarpaper roof, for example, "‘1 subjected to more ripping as the crane "2 maneuvered for position. Additionally, it 'va impossible to complete inactivation of island though it was complete in all other lf spects. Efforts were made to minimize thesC inconveniences, but delays were unavoidable
The management program proved beneficial at all levels in the inactivati0'1 Each manager, from the commanding ofb0^ to the work center supervisor, had a weekb summary of the activity and effectiveness 0 his particular unit. Shortcomings were quick . apparent and the program provided the
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meaningful. Because most of the computati0'1 work was done by a computer, the bulk of thf paperwork was accomplished by the and this left the operating divisions free 0 the requirement to maintain additional re°' ords. The workload imposed upon the won’ center supervisors rarely required as much °s one hour a week. At the same time, the d>‘ vision officers had to understand accurate^ the magnitude of their own workload an0 constantly revise each task, either upward °r downward, as their initial estimates wer° altered by actual experience. The divisio'1 officers, in effect, were required to manage and were given the necessary tools to analyze their own efforts. That this analysis was cof>' tinually scrutinized is evidenced by the fact that the first estimate of total workload) 439,000 man-hours, was eventually reduced by almost one-third to 323,000 man-hourS' Of greater importance, however, was the data that the program provided for future inactivations. The Randolph’s, inactivatioa generated what was possibly the first accurate tabulation of the work required to decoiT' mission a major combatant vessel. It is sug' gested that any carrier can take the last readout of the Randolph’s inactivation and deter-
Urie the work she must do to place herself f0r commission. The planning potential j subsequent carriers is a major benefit. This Particularly relevant, because few Navy
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There are numerous other refinements that . n be performed to elicit desired informa. n- The program was originally designed by experienced personnel for a computer that incapable of multiplication or division. e final program, almost the same as the a Sinai simple program, was carried out on IBM 1401 computer with greatly refined labilities. These capabilities were not fully nized, however, owing to a shortage of time , b lack of knowledgable personnel. Never- eless, the basic program is suitable for the laHest or largest ship with the most simple culator capabilities.
The Randolph inactivation taught the ship’s a number of things. For example, it is Slrable to move off the ship as early as . °ssible, preferably during the first week of . activation. As long as people are living 1 (he ship, it is difficult to accomplish work their living spaces. It is impossible to close n the habitability systems, the auxiliary ^eam system, the fresh water system, and the . re and flushing main. As much time is spent jn routine cleaning as in inactivation. Psycho- °&ically) the move off the ship makes every- 0tle aware that there is a big new job to Perform and this acclimates their thinking in Be direction of a new requirement to be met.
The move into drydock should be pro- ^rainmed as early as possible, probably at the erid of the first month. This permits the engi- r’eers to drain all of the fluid systems, remove * bilgewater, and prepare and preserve heir portion of the ship.
The benefits of an early drydocking can be Bullified by the lack of a single action on the Part of the shipyard. If, for example, the aBxiliary fire system is not installed prior to hfydocking, the ship’s fire and flushing system B*Ust be retained and used, and it becomes impossible to “dry out” the hull. In the Randolph, lbis installation was expedited by a temporary Canvas hose fire main while the metal pipe hre system was being fabricated. Installation the fire main was essential to the orderly
progress of the inactivation and was a fertile field for co-ordination work between the shipyard and the ship’s force.
Throughout the inactivation, the engineers should be granted extra consideration, for they are usually the most critical department in the ship. Our Engineering Department had 41 per cent of the workload to accomplish, but only 31 per cent of the people on board. The engineers are also affected most by outside functions, such as the movement off ship and the drydocking.
Throughout the inactivation, too, a constant check should be maintained on the employment of ship’s personnel. All the security watches should be closely scrutinized to eliminate excess watches. The watch bill should be centralized for the ship as a whole, with each duty section placed under the control of a single section leader.
A degree of flexibility in personnel assignment should be retained. There is a heavier requirement for the lower rates of enlisted personnel than there is for the more skilled petty officers. Some ratings, such as Aviation Support Equipment Mechanics, have little to do and can be released early in the inactivation period. In some departments, there are officers who normally are occupied with watch duties rather than divisional or personnel activities. When the ship is being inactivated, these officers quickly finish their inactivation tasks and are relatively free of responsibilities. Frequent surveys should be made to determine those whose work is completed, and action should be taken to reassign or transfer them.
The greatest unknown during the inactivation was the work required to preserve the voids and other unused spaces about the ship. These spaces frequently were in very poor state, were difficult or impossible to work in, and required extensive auxiliary equipment to make them safe to work in. It was in these areas that the work estimates varied to the greatest degree. Some of the spaces were so bad that they received only a cursory cleanup and were left for major industrial re-work when the ship was reactivated. Because of the extensive nature of the void work, this constituted one of the major projects for the ship. The Weapons Department attacked the problem by making up a new “Void Division”
Hours Per Man Per Day 4.69 4.27 1.92 0.65
to concentrate on this particular problem.
One result of the Randolph inactivation was a tabulation of the work effort that could be anticipated from the different departments. Over-all, it was found that each man worked an average of 3.31 hours each day on tasks that were directly concerned with the inactivation. For the various departments, the amount of work done toward inactivation varied strikingly. The two extremes concerned the engineers and the Air Department who maintained the highest use of personnel, and the Supply and Administrative Departments who appeared to have accomplished the least per-man-use of personnel toward inactivation. The tabulation below shows the hours of inactivation work, per man, accomplished each eight-hour working day:
Department
Engineering
Air
Supply
Administrative
At first glance, the figures seem quite disappointing, and indicate that the work might have been accomplished at an increased pace. There are, however, certain built-in losses that must be accounted for. As an example, each department was required to furnish mess cooks on the basis of one man for each 20 men. This single requirement in effect reduced the departments average work day per man by 5 per cent, or the equivalent of .4 hour per man per day. Similarly, the requirement for compartment cleaners was in the same ratio and reduced the available work by another .4 hour per man per day. Again, a certain portion of the personnel will be on leave at any given time; if this number reflects the permissible maximum of 10 per cent, the work available is reduced another .8 hour per man. Finally, there is a large requirement for personnel assignments to security duties. At any given time, a minimum of 20 men are re' quired to provide security and other militarn duties. This amounts to a minimum loss 0 about .2 hour per man per day. If these figures are totaled and subtracted from ^ eight hours available, it can be seen that the average sailor on board the Randolph stab5 out with a maximum available inactivatin'1 time of 6.2 hours each day. Add in the in' evitable delays for parts, for safety inspection5 of voids, for tools, for unfavorable weathef conditions (mid-winter in Boston), and the relatively low average becomes more undef' standable and even reasonable. Moreover, * should be emphasized that these figures relate only to work done toward inactivation task8. This factor becomes particularly noticeable111 the Supply and Administrative Department8' where the people are required to carry olit their normal operational functions, and the inactivation workload is merely an overload added to their normal workload. This aC" counts for the low figures for these two de* partments. The other departments also e*' perience this service function, but generally to a lesser degree.
The Reserve Fleet constitutes an important force-in-being. The most recent and mo8t publicized situation wherein its existence proved important was in the reactivation the (JSS New Jersey (BB-62), a battleship that would have been unavailable under any other circumstances. The Randolph herself had been deactivated in June 1947, then recomrnis' sioned in 1953 when carriers were needed to fill out the Fleet. Now, she is again in e*' cess and is being inactivated. As a reserve vessel, she can be readied for active service in a relatively short time, at a maximum cos1 of $25 million. New carriers cost about $400,000,000.
On schedule, the Randolph was placed “Out of Commission, in Reserve” on 13 February 1969. Her crew felt confident that if her services were again required, she would be ready to take her place on the line.
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