Viewed from a long-term perspective, counterdrug operations—such as the recent counterdrug deployment of the Thomas S. Gates (CG-51)—are good for the country, the Navy, and the ship.
Surface warfare officers will tell you counterdrug operations "ain't where the action is." Given the publicity about and activity in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleet theaters, it is understandable sea warriors would rather deploy to those regions. But having deployed to all those areas, and having conducted a productive and fun counterdrug deployment on board the Thomas S. Gates, I can tell you the perception of counterdrug deployments as uneventful or irrelevant is both incorrect and myopic.
National and Navy Advantages
A counterdrug deployment provides definitive national gains. Successful drug hunting will, at some level, impede the movement of this destructive influence into our country. And because of the location of the most frequent sources of drugs, a counterdrug deployment facilitates engagement with our oft-overlooked South American neighbors. These young democracies are nations we need as friends.
Brazil, a nation of 175 million people, is a growing giant. Its new president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a professed admirer of Fidel Castro, already is an aggressive player on the world scene. In addition to his expanding list of visits with world leaders, he is seeking permanent membership for Brazil on the U.N. security Council.1 Brazil also is courting at least four other countries to join the Mercosur regime and challenge the United States in the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) initiative.2 These developments, though not damaging, could be indicative of a developing adversarial relationship, which we must avoid.
Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner is fighting economic battles and negotiating enormous foreign debts. In his first weeks in office he reorganized the military leadership and the federal police and forced the resignation of the controversial head of the Supreme Court. Venezuela is at an economic and governmental crossroads, with unrest and 7dismal economic performance. It is the only South American nation aside from Colombia for which the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for 2003.3 Peru also has experienced a recent cycle of unrest and is struggling to bolster its economy. Recent Shining Path activity has brought that Marxist guerrilla organization renewed publicity.
Deployment to this region also aids in the global war on terrorism. Numerous periodicals have reported on suspected al Qaeda activity in the tricountry area (the corner of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina).4 U.S. presence and involvement is an active deterrent. Also notable is that both the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency have been reporting on the threat of narcoterrorism—specifically, narcotics from South America and Afghanistan.5 Terrorist groups profit from the trafficking of these drugs, and when that trafficking is hampered, so are their activities.
The Navy gains substantially from counterdrug operations deployments, too. In hindsight, much of what we did on counterdrug ops supported "Sea Power 21" and emerging initiatives. Foremost was surge readiness. We amazed even ourselves with the level of professionalism and combat readiness we achieved in only three months. One could make a formidable argument for sending more Atlantic and Pacific Fleet assets to Southern Command for short periods (8-12 weeks) to both increase the interdictory impact on the drug trade and sharpen our sailors' skills. We also conducted both joint and multinational operations. Our operations with the U.S. Army and Coast Guard and the Peruvian Navy provided unconventional and superb training venues. In addition, our presence in the Southern Command area of responsibility promoted the ideas behind sea basing and combat reach.
Advantages for the Ship
A counterdrug deployment is anomalous by Navy standards. With few exceptions, ships spend the entire interdeployment training cycle preparing for deployment as part of a carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group. By contrast, a counterdrug deployment generally consists of independent operations and integration with U.S. Coast Guard detachments. On board the Thomas S. Gates, we decided we would eke every last bit of tactical and training potential out of the deployment. In the end, the deployment stimulated tactical thought, provided unparalleled in-house training, allowed us to engage other nations and other militaries in unconventional arenas, and included a significant quality of life element.
The tactical aspect of counterdrug operations was extremely valuable. We were able to execute and validate several tactics and training practices regarding visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS), surface track of interest identification, nighttime identification, and helicopter operations. Each of our CIC watchstanders became infinitely more familiar with the details of these core surface competencies. Emissions control and counterdetection were real-life issues-it is much easier for a small drug runner to see an Aegis cruiser than for the cruiser to see him. With a bit of intelligence and historical analysis we were able to recommend to our shore-based superiors where to position the ship to best intercept contraband based on destination likelihood. With that positioning we netted a major bust and contributed significantly to the ship's receipt of the Coast Guard Special Operations Ribbon. We gained such operational proficiency and triggered so much good thinking we were able to submit a concept of operations for a Counterdrug Operations Surface Action Group to Joint Interagency Task Force-East and a Helicopter Warning Shots/Disabling Fire point paper to Naval Forces Southern Command headquarters.
Perhaps our greatest achievement, however, was our regime of self-training. Our training organization planned and implemented a steady-strain, cross-sectional plan that provided uncompromised readiness in three months. We developed training scenarios that would benefit our skills inside and outside the lifelines, consistently stress the training teams, and, most important, train the watchslanders who would be on the ship for the next deployment. Table 1 illustrates our training week.
By the time we chopped over to the UNITAS phase of our deployment, our warfighting and shipboard survival skills were outstanding. In addition, the ship experienced great success on one of her postavailability immediate-superior-in-command evaluations, a result, at least in some fashion, of our deployment training standards.
Like all good sea warriors, we relished the opportunity to train, particularly with other assets and organizations. We participated in a major special operations exercise and operated with forces from other services. We aggressively sought and received permission to conduct naval surface fire support (NSFS) on a range in Saunas, Peru. The Peruvian Navy was so excited by our interest that, with only a few days notice, it arranged for several ships and a submarine to be involved in a two-day group sail with us. This provided critical multiship interaction, which folded nicely into our preparations for UNITAS, an annual multinational exercise promoting security and common operations in the Americas. In addition, we honed valuable skills in helicopter and ship interaction, search tactics, boat operations, and submarine hunting. Our two-day group sail with the Peruvian Navy was unusual for a counterdrug deployment, but provided a way to accomplish multiple missions. We stayed in theater, ready to respond to counterdrug tasking, while still engaging with another country and enhancing our own shiphandling, warfare, and fire support skills.
The most significant organization with which we operated was the U.S. Coast Guard. We spent three months with three detachments, each embarked for one month. We learned how to work with them, and they learned Navy skills. We frequently trained with them on VBSS and security techniques, skills that only will become more important for our Navy, as will operations with the Coast Guard.
A final benefit of this deployment for the ship was the autonomy and the liberty in Southern Command. The operations schedule allowed for an equitable and varied distribution of port visits. The command staffs were very effective at placing assets to maximize both operational readiness and liberty port distribution.
Transformation
Although I knew little of transformation at the time, this deployment lent itself well to this culture. Our fundamental goal on board the Thomas S. Gates was to enable the ship, in an atypical environment, to train to the most demanding standards and to maintain readiness for a six-month deployment that consisted of two very unlike halves-counterdrug operations and UNITAS. We did this through safe and authorized enhancements of current equipment, training scenarios that challenged warfighting doctrine, the use of Coast Guard personnel to train our sailors, and persistent requests up our chain of command to deviate from traditional counterdrug operations practices to more effectively accommodate mission accomplishment and warfare readiness.
Our crewmembers unknowingly developed a culture of transformation during this deployment. Our boatswain's mates created two highly effective protective skirts for both rigid-hull inflatable boats to allow for more flexible operations. Our firecontrolmen and operations specialists safely enhanced combat information center equipment to most effectively meet watchstanders demands and improve the dissemination of information. Our training teams integrated their objectives and the elements of their events and thereby taught the watchstanders to think, when and where appropriate, beyond stovepipes. And our use of Coast Guard assets and the unusual interaction with other navies and commands expanded the realm in which we were used to operating and training.
The Future
The Navy of the future will fight in the littorals, hence the push for the littoral combat ship. In these waters, ships will conduct VBSS, operate in emissions control, search for threatening surface contacts, fight submarines, provide support for troops ashore, and accomplish myriad other missions. We conducted all of these on our counterdrug operations deployment. Recently, in Poland, President George W. Bush announced a proliferation security initiative to interdict or prevent deliveries of weapons of mass destruction. This initiative likely will include both diplomatic and at-sea intervention. We unknowingly trained to that capability while doing counterdrug operations. From a training and readiness perspective, the deployment was both useful and relevant.
As the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom Navy focuses on the most efficient means to maintain surge readiness and prepare itself for the threats of the future, it ought to look at expanding counterdrug cruises. These deployments could be effective as 8-12 week periods (post-final evaluation period) to sharpen the saw. The Navy might even want to look at formalizing skills to be certified during a counterdrug operations event. From my experience, the cruise contributed to my ship being a ready and persistent asset that could provide credible combat power.
1 Tom Rachinan, "Brazil seeks Larger UN security Couneil," Associated Press, 24 june 2003.
2 Mercosur is a growing customs union and common trading market that currently includes the southern South America nations of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Kim Houscgo "Brazil President seeks Continent Trade Bloc," The Seattle Times (Associated Press), 29 june 2003.
3 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning, 19 February 2003.
4 Reuters, "Bin Laden Reportedly Spent Time in Bra/il in '95," The Washington Post, 18 March 2003, p. A24.
5 Steven Casteel, Assistant DEA Administrator for Intelligence, testimony before the Senate judiciary, 30 May 2003.
Lieutenant Commander Daly is an action officer on the OPNAV staff. In 2002, he was the operations officer on board the Thomas S. Gates (CG-51) during her counterdrug operations and UNITAS deployment.