Capstone Essay Contest
Submarines have been used extensively throughout history in conducting anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). It is not likely that these two missions will ever go away. But what about the future of submarines in less conventional areas? Reduced defense funding and plans to decommission submarines, including the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, make it important to determine whether any existing missions justify the prolonged life of these submarines. Such a mission does exist: low intensity conflict (LIC).
Submarines already perform operations that can be classified as LIC, but these boats are few and generally are considered “specialty” submarines and not part of the U.S. submarine force. To continue to be looked upon as the most important asset in the U.S. military arsenal, the submarine force must devote a greater percent of submarines to low-intensity conflict. The temporary end of the Soviet submarine threat enables the United States to focus more on regional crises as opposed to global warfare. We must “cope more effectively with that swirling pot of poison made up of drug cartels, terrorists, religious fanatics, violent ethnic forces, powerful insurgencies, decaying dictatorships, and crazy rulers that crowd the lower end of the threat curve and collect under the label of LIC.”1 The present situations in Bosnia and Taiwan illustrate this fact. These situations are becoming more and more common and need to be dealt with in a manner that does pose a significant risk to American lives. One possible means to that end is to see if the roles normally played by surface ships or fighter pilots could be successfully accomplished by submarines, thereby reducing the exposure of U.S. personnel.
Submarines already have proved their worth in strike warfare. The launching of Tomahawk missiles on enemy targets from submerged submarines allows us to conduct precision strikes against an enemy from an unseen position. “A single improved Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine carries enough Tomahawk missiles on board to debilitate a nation’s military infrastructure, to take down most of its vital command-and-control facilities, and to knock out a significant share of its power-generating capacity.”2 In a local conflict such as Operation Desert Storm, a quick strike could leave the enemy defenseless against a coordinated land attack. A similar attack from a surface ship would not be equivalent, since most enemy countries can detect a group of surface ships near its coast. A recent study by the Naval Research Advisory Committee revealed that the greatest weakness in the Navy’s littoral warfare strategy is the lack of defense against anti-ship cruise missiles.3 Surprise would no longer be an issue, and as a result key targets might be moved, thereby invalidating the intelligence provided to the surface group.
An air strike faces the same detection problem as the surface-launched missile. "Without conducting a deep strike using precision-guided munitions to disable enemy command-and-control sites, take down critical power-generation systems, and to destroy key surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, we will lose aviators who will have to go in and do this difficult job themselves.”4 The pilots flying the mission often must fly through complex air defenses in enemy territory on the way to their target. This extreme risk to U.S. pilots could be avoided altogether by the use of submarines.
At times when collateral damage losses need to be zero or immediate battle damage assessment must be performed after a strike, an alternative method to firing cruise missiles must be found. A second way in which submarines play an important role in LIC is the delivery of special forces personnel undetected to enemy coastlines. Submarines can put forces ashore directly under the enemy’s nose without any air support or other cover. With the improving designs of SEAL delivery vehicles that mate with submarines, this capability can only get better. “Once ashore, theses forces can perform critical tasks in support of amphibious assaults or ground campaigns, including gunfire spotting, forward air control target designation for air strikes, and tactical intelligence.”5 In this capacity, a submarine maintains the major benefit that it possesses in Tomahawk delivery: stealth. It is difficult for an enemy to defend against a SEAL amphibious assault if they do not know that it is coming. Recent exercises have shown that several submarines working together can deliver up to 75 special warfare personnel ashore.6 This represents a sizable fighting force that, when delivered unseen to an enemy’s coast, could almost end a low intensity conflict itself.
Launching Tomahawk missiles and delivering special warfare operatives are two ways in which the submarine force has played an important role in dealing with low intensity conflict. New weapons and tactics must continually be developed to increase a submarine’s role in this capacity. Examples of capabilities that the Navy currently is researching include controlling an unmanned submarine-launched flight vehicle that could provide real-time data to the National Command Authorities without risking a pilot’s life. This would extend the submarine’s role in the area of surveillance. Another advancement that being studied is the adaptation of the Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) for launch through a submarine’s vertical launch system.7 This would allow attack submarines to deploy carrying nonnuclear ballistic strike missiles that travel roughly six times as fast as subsonic missiles such as the Tomahawk. This would increase the rapid strike capability of the submarine and make it an even more potent force in low-intensity conflicts.
Obviously, every submarine cannot be dedicated to unconventional warfare. But employing only a few boats to conduct special operations while allowing Tomahawk launch from many also is unacceptable. Low-intensity conflict has become too important for the submarine force to assign only a small portion of its arsenal to such taskings. The solution—especially in the wake of defense cutbacks—is to convert more Los Angeles-class submarines to dedicated special operations platforms. A “battle group” of three of these submarines could conduct a small campaign entirely on its own.
“Low-intensity conflicts are the wave of the future,” claimed a former assistant secretary of defense for special operations.8 Submarines are arguably the best U.S. asset for fighting in these conflicts. Their present and improving capabilities make submarines important players; they become too valuable to decommission. If it is decided that the conventional roles of submarines do not support such a large number, then the unused Los Angeles-class boats should be dedicated to low-intensity conflict. Doing that would not merely justify keeping submarines that would otherwise be scrapped; instead, the United States would be using its best platforms to engage in low-intensity conflict.
1 John L. Byron. "A New Target for the Submarine Force,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1990, p. 38.
2 Kevin Peppe, “Submarines in the Littorals," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings July 1993. p. 48.
3 Joseph N. Giaquinto. “The Quick Strike Submarine." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1995, p. 42.
4 Kevin Peppe, "Submarines in the Littorals,” U S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1993, p. 46.
5 Roger F. Bacon, “Submarine Warfare It’s A-Changing," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1992, p. 53.
6 Ibid.
7 Giaquinto. p. 43.
8 Douglas Waller, "Secret Warriors," Newsweek, 17 June 1991, p. 29.
Ensign Pritchett will be pursuing a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering at the University of Texas before entering the submarine force.