“Around the Knothole”
(See F.A. Prisley, pp. 34-38, December 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Eric D. Lanman, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy—I share Commander Prisley’s concern with the way the Navy manages the surface warfare community, and the need to stabilize leadership on our ships. I echo his concern over the way executive officers and commanding officers are assigned and rotated. Unit readiness, cohesion, and morale suffer when a ship experiences rapid turnover in these positions. No sooner do XOs get comfortable in the job and their crews accustomed to their style, than they are replaced. Any new XO naturally will have a different style and different priorities. In all likelihood, the CO will rotate during the XO’s tenure, causing additional leadership changes, and breaking any cohesion that may have developed between the two top leaders on board ship. The ultimate losers in this process are the sailors who are forced to react to constantly changing priorities, because they lack a leadership cadre that has time to get to know them individually—such as COs and their execs who truly see their tours as much more than just ticket punches. The Navy as a whole can't help but suffer in readiness.
If we need to lower selection opportunity rates to correct the problem, then so be it. It will involve tough choices, and may mean that some good people will fail to get the opportunities they might have had in a larger Navy. But it also will mean that the people who do get the opportunity to serve as COs and XOs will be in their billets long enough to help ensure that our Navy continues to be the best in the world—based on its merit.
This being said, I disagree with Commander Prisley’s suggestion that junior officers who fail to perform adequately in all facets of their initial assignments should be given the opportunity to lateral transfer into staff corps or restricted line positions. Methods already exist for these later transfers, and—although the Navy could consider expanding the number of billets available for redesignation—it should do so only for fully qualified top performers. Officers selected should be those who could have continued on—and succeeded—in the line, had they so chosen. The last thing we need is for the staff corps and restricted line to become a haven for those who couldn’t hack it. This would erode the respect currently accorded these communities and would undercut them and their ability to perform their vital functions.
The Navy does not appear to have trouble retaining quality officers in fleet- oriented staff corps positions. The fact that my observations have been contrary to those of the surface warfare community seems to indicate that the issues are too deep to be solved merely by opening up billets already filled by highly qualified and highly motivated individuals.
I empathize with anyone who would rather be in a fleet billet than work at the Pentagon. But the sad fact is that Washington already lacks—and needs—a strange fleet perspective. By assigning to Washington staff duty only those officers who want to be there would further dilute what fleet perspective there is. The cost to the Navy for having all the “true warriors” in the fleet would vastly outweigh any benefits—and would cede the Navy’s future to bureaucrats who now control far too much of it.
“Navy-Marine Corps Team: Equalizing the Partnership”
(See C.E. Mundy, pp.27-30, December 1995 Proceedings)
Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, U.S. Navy (Retired), Chief of Naval Operations 1990-1994—I have read few articles in the Proceedings with greater interest than General Carl Mundy’s. In fact, I have read it several times. Each reading leaves me with the same interpretation: The Marine Corps must receive more of the Department of the Navy’s resources, and we must legitimize a way to do it. For a Chief of Naval Operations who reduced the number of ships and aircraft in the Navy by about half and painfully approved the planning for the departure of more than 200,000 uniformed personnel with the appropriate reduction in resources, this is truly a very difficult argument to swallow. It is even more difficult when I remember that I supported freezing the manpower level for the Marines, even when I knew that it would result in even fewer resources for the Navy. The facts are clear: the Marine share of the Department’s resources has increased during the post-Cold War period: the Navy’s has continued to decrease.
Please do not misunderstand me: I want all Marines and Sailors to have the tools of their trades to be able to do the job and come home. I want all Marines and Sailors to have quality time with their families and friends. I would like the Marines to have all they think is required. This is not an era—and I do not remember any era—when either service felt it had the resources to meet all requirements. We always have needed to present our requirements to civilian superiors, who had to make difficult judgments. Clearly, General Mundy would have the Navy Department procure the V-22 aircraft at a greater rate. The rate-of-buy of that aircraft was considered at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and approved. There may have been naval officers who disagreed with the buy rate, but they did not make the decisions and the highest figures in the Marine Corps’ request were heard. As for the Marine Corps desire to participate in developing requirements for the Department of the Navy, the Marines were offered a seat at the table when the Navy staff was doing its best to prepare requirements, but they refused to participate. Even then, the Navy permitted them to observe the process of determining Navy requirements. The Navy never got a similar seat in Marine planning. One man’s requirement is like another man’s wish. I agree with General Mundy that there should be a better way to determine requirements and the split of resources for major programs. I tried on several occasions to get a board consisting of the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant, the CNO, the Under Secretary, and anyone else considered necessary to wrestle with these difficult requirement decisions before the budget levels had to be finalized. For reasons unknown, this suggestion was never accepted.
General Mundy speaks with pride about new doctrine, . . From the Sea” and “Forward . . . From the Sea.” These are important concepts in the post-Cold War world and give the Navy-Marine Corps team new meaning and strategy. They did not, however, take away a major responsibility of the Navy to ensure the safe passage of our Army and Air Force support by sea. We have controlled the sea lanes for so long that we take their use for granted; but they are secure only because of the U.S. Navy. Even in the post-Cold War world, a strategic deterrent must be maintained—and much of that chore is the responsibility of the Navy. These requirements persist and cannot be ignored by the Navy. They must be considered among the total requirements of the Navy, in addition to Navy support of Marines in the littorals.
I am sorry that I must write this, but I cannot let the idea stand unchallenged that simply shifting money around in the Department of the Navy will satisfy Marine requirements and leave the Navy in good shape. I cannot abide the idea that young Marine captains think that the Navy admirals in the Pentagon are deciding what is allocated to the Marine Corps or that Marine generals are not being heard or listened to. Continuously hearing what happened 50 years ago—that the Navy left the Marines high and dry at Guadalcanal or provided insufficient amtracs at Tarawa—does little to gain my support for today’s Marine Corps requirements. The Navy never intends to ever leave the Marines unprotected again.
The idea that cutting the minimal production of the F/A-18E/F is the way to fund the V-22 is flat wrong. The idea that the need for the F/A-18E/F is only three years old is also wrong. The Navy had to request the F/A-18E/F when the A-12 was cancelled. The Navy has a solid requirement still on the table for a stealthy, night, all-weather bomber. You need both aircraft to keep naval aviation capable in the next century. Will the Navy Department receive the money to make it happen? Only if Navy leadership can convince their civilian superiors that it is required. The Marines clearly need the V-22 to replace the aging C-46. Will they get it faster than the currently planned buy rate? Only if the Marine leadership can convince their civilian superiors that it must happen. These issues always have been dog fights, and the idea they will be any easier tomorrow is poppy-cock.
I started out on an attack transport (AKA); my roommate was the Combat Cargo Officer, Marine Captain Arthur Epley. I spent countless hours in LCPLs as the Boat Group Commander, leading Marines ashore. I am a Marine supporter and always will be one, but those of us in the Department of the Navy have to fight together. We will be a lot smarter if we keep our battles in house, and approach the world with a solid Navy-Marine Corps front.
“Reflections on a Naval Career”
(See L. Di Rita, pp. 8-10, August 1995; D. S. Gernes, A. Vittek, pp. 13-14, September 1995; B. Carleton, P. Swartz, M. White, W. Hannon, W. Porter, pp. 16-21, November 1995 Proceedings)
“Naval Institute Board Clarifies Editorial Procedures”
(See Membership News, p. 4, November 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Frederick Carment, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—I find it both humorous and sad, and an excellent indication of the times in which we live, when people say one thing but mean another. Commander Gernes states: “I realize and support Proceedings’ responsibility to present many sides of issues and opposing points of view,” but then says she is writing to protest the publication of an offering. Proceedings makes it clear that the publication is a forum for the Sea Services. No where do I see a requirement that articles, no matter how valid the viewpoint, must pass the diversity test and not offend someone.
Some of us have spent more time at the “Navy game” than Commander Gernes and have been involved in more than worrying about where to rendezvous to deliver product. “Reflections on a Naval Career” expresses very well fears those of us “from the good old days” (that were often far from “good”) are worried about. Many good naval officers were not offended by Mr. Di Rita’s satire, nor did we find it the basest form of fictional hyperbole. Propaganda indeed! Possibly as a naval officer. Commander Gernes might want to bone up on the purpose of our Navy. She, like many others, seems to have lost track of why we, as a maritime nation, have a Navy. Mr. Di Rita is to be commended for doing what some of our leaders fear to do in this unhappy age of the confused politically correct Navy.
Lieutenant Commander Lori Melling Tanner, U.S. Navy, F/A-18 Hornet Pilot, Weapons Test Squadron, China Lake—I share many of the same concerns as Mr. Di Rita does with regard to peacekeeping and U.N. control. Our real problem, however, lies with the integrity and character of the officer corps. The time I spend on my equal opportunity job assignments reduces the time I can spend on my primary duties. I believe, however, that we as naval officers brought this burden upon ourselves with our long history of less-than-honorable cultural behavior, which was revealed to the world during the Tailhook scandal and subsequent investigation. In Mr. Di Rita’s commentary, then-Lieutenant Commander Keith recalls how he lied under oath about Tailhook, yet does not appear to have any remorse about it. We do not direct any of our corporate anger at those within our own ranks who did wrong; instead, we sacrificed the reputation and effectiveness of the Navy by protecting those within our ranks who committed crimes and lied under oath.
We have the right to be proud of our accomplishments, but they do not earn us the right to be above the laws of this country. I believe that we commissioned officers are suffering from a severe case of self-pity brought about by experiencing the consequences of our own atrocious behavior. Like the alcoholic who blames his drinking problem on his nagging wife, his cruel boss, etc., we find it less painful to blame our problems on external forces beyond our control. It’s Pat Schroeder’s fault; it’s the United Nation’s fault; it’s those minorities; it’s those women. . . . Mr. Di Rita’s commentary accurately reflects this attitude. But the truth is, we have met the enemy and it is us. We have to endure sexual harassment training and other such things, because we have failed to be the professionals the Naval Service requires us to be. We endured an investigative “witch hunt” because many lied under oath without giving it a second thought. We should assume responsibility for our own actions, learn from our mistakes, and press on.
The main character in Mr. Di Rita’s commentary is overwhelmed by circumstances and goes back to dreaming of the good-old days, pulling G’s and doing air combat maneuvering. The truth is, flying is only one small part of what we do. Performing our job as officers means we have to stand up for what we believe in, even if it means we sacrifice our careers. Admiral Stan Arthur lost an opportunity to be Commander in Chief, Pacific, for doing what he thought was right in a female flight student’s sexual harassment case. He put accomplishing his job with integrity above advancing his career. The commentary states: “The lesson was clear to mid-grade officers like Keith: If flag officers could watch Arthur go down with nary a whimper, what could a lieutenant commander with kids and a mortgage hope to achieve by speaking out?” I believe that flag and mid-grade officers alike should have banded together in Admiral Arthur’s defense if they believed he was being unfairly penalized. Meet injustice with righteousness, not with more injustice. Every officer must make the decision that the best interest of this country is more important than his or her career or paycheck. A talented naval officer with integrity will most assuredly be able to find a job on the outside if required to provide for his family. I would rather be married to a man with integrity who is out of a job than a man who sells his integrity to keep a job. There is no middle ground—either you are part of the solution or you become part of the problem by default.
When I think of the “good-old days,” I think of officers with integrity, about whom the phrase was coined “an officer and a gentleman”—a man you could trust with a warship, a nuclear weapon, or your daughter. How can we expect naval leaders to steer a steady course through turbulent waters when they refuse to be held accountable for their own actions or hold those who serve under them accountable? Instead of complaining about those things which are beyond our control, we should focus on rebuilding the character and integrity within our officer corps. Once we have restored our character and integrity, we can change the world!
Master Gunnery Sergeant John W. Crawford, U.S. Marine Corps—Mr. Di Rita’s piece is right on the mark. He seems to be asserting that it is time to stop trying to pander to the politicians and vocal “gimme” groups, and get back to the business of soldiering, which has never been about sensitivities.
Leadership is what is lacking here. It started long ago, but came to the fore with the Tailhook brouhaha. We saw senior flag officers bailing out and leaving their subordinates and shipmates twisting in the wind. This is loyalty? This is leadership? And what kind of example is this? How does someone who has abandoned his shipmates and martial loyalty presume to teach and espouse loyalty and leadership? Rather than stand-downs and other similar events, what is needed is reinforcement of the leadership principles and traits. Also required is an admission that the services take in a small percentage of scum, albeit inadvertently, and that no amount of sensitivity training will change them.
I have asked, on numerous occasions over the past 25 years, why no major military leader has stood up and laid his stars on the line for his beliefs. The usual answer I receive is that by doing so such an officer would lose the opportunity to later ameliorate the ill effects of the initial problem. Or, I’m told that the officer is too valuable to throw himself on his sword. What poppycock! No one is too valuable, particularly flag officers. Those with the position and rank to be heard will never again lead troops into battle, and they are the ones who should throw themselves onto their swords over an issue such as this. We have no Mac Arthur’s in our military, and he did it! Our lesser lights should certainly be willing to do the same.
Mr. Di Rita’s piece poked fun at a naval service that seems much more interested in worrying about its public image than in maintenance of fighting skill. The morale and fighting skills of the Sailors and Marines in our service depend on strong leadership and loyalty. The ability to stick a bayonet into another man’ or woman’s belly does not depend on sensitivity to the feelings of others. It depends on the trust that one’s seniors are foursquare behind them, and to hell with everything else. This willingness to sacrifice time and energy to “sensitivity” training shifts the focus of effort. It is my responsibility, and that of all our senior Marines and Sailors, to instill leadership traits in our young people. Sitting everyone down in the theater or the chapel will not turn around the percentage of dirt-bags who slip into our services. It merely highlights the political nature of the leadership.
Hooray for the Proceedings' willingness to publish Mr. Di Rita’s commentary. I’m not one who usually puts great faith in the “journalistic integrity” of any publication, but the Naval Institute’s staff members have shown that they do have some of the “integrity.” Keep it up.
Dennis K. Wilson—Understanding that one of the Proceedings' objectives is to raise controversial issues within the naval establishment, I take considerable exception to the appearance of this particular commentary in its pages for a number of reasons.
The issues Mr. Di Rita raises are not only political in nature (the relationship of the United States vis-a-vis the United Nations), but also are an appeal, using very clumsy satire, to those who would turn back the clock within the naval establishment by slamming women on board ship, women in combat roles, international cooperation with other countries particularly the United Nations (What if the chief protagonist’s command had been assigned to NATO rather than the United Nations?), and the Navy’s efforts to meet the needs of all its personnel regardless of ethnicity or sex. The article smacks of the fears of the backyard militias who perceive conspiracy everywhere.
Mr. Di Rita uses exaggeration, cynicism, and innuendo to put down women in positions of responsibility, smoking rules, women (with the resulting potential for babies on board ship), attempts at controlling the environment, General Colin Powell, unrest (by whom) in the cities of the United States, Representative Schroeder, and the religious beliefs of those outside the American mainstream. His commentary may appear amusing to some, but it is not well done and represents an attitude that is hard to comprehend considering the Navy of today. One does not have to agree with the issues raised, but it is critical that the American military establishment not step outside its role of subordination to civilian authority.
Mr. Di Rita’s opinions and thoughts as they pertain to Tailhook seem to approve and excuse unethical behavior. That his main character should rise high enough to give serious consideration to flag selection after such actions effectively damns the selection process and the establishment which is struggling with real-world problems. The author’s credibility is lost early in his article.
Suzanne Geissler Bowles, Adjunct Professor of History, William Paterson College—As a historian and a Naval Institute Life member, I support wholeheartedly Mr. Di Rita’s right to write his satirical piece and the Proceedings editorial staff’s decision to publish it. I was appalled to read in the Newark Star-Ledger that the staff might be “punished” for running afoul of the forces of political correctness. Mr. Di Rita’s piece, while a fictional satire, nonetheless raised serious issues that affect the Naval Services. I had thought that Proceedings existed to provide an open forum for the free discussion of those issues without fear of intimidation or retaliation. I hope that continues to be the case and that the editorial staff will continue to resist the attempts at censorship.
Commander John D. Alden, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lawrence Di Rita’s spoof of a politically correct future Navy drew a few smiles, but overall it struck me as overdone and inappropriate for a journal such as the Proceedings. However, I am far more concerned when I read reports that there may have been attempts to exert Navy command influence on the forum for the crime of delivering an unwelcome message. A professional journal does need to maintain high standards of quality in the articles it publishes, and I suggest that sarcastic fiction be rejected from future issues. Even more, I will welcome positive statements from the Board of Control and its august members supporting the rights of authors to express controversial—even politically incorrect—opinions and of the editorial staff to select them for publication.
Commander Jeffery David Render, U.S. Navy—This marks the first time I have had occasion to write Proceedings. I have been a member of the Naval Institute for many years and have always enjoyed the window into the rest of the Navy that Proceedings provides. It was interesting when I was stationed on board USS Midway (CV-41) and kept me in touch when I was stationed at Naval Air Station Memphis.
I wanted to compliment the Naval Institute for publishing “Reflections on a Naval Career.” I found it to be funny, insightful, and thought provoking. I have read other “Reminiscence From the Future” articles, but this was the best.
I am at the far end of the information pipeline serving in Japan. It took a little blurb in Navy Times to let me know a little about the storm that evolved from “Reflections. . . .”
To Larry Di Rita, I say: Good work! I liked it. I have wondered about the future and direction the Navy is taking and will be interested to see the discussion your article provokes.
To Publisher Jim Barber and Editor Fred Rainbow, I say: Ganbatte Kudasai! (Good luck with perseverance overtones.) I was glad that you survived the storm. Keep up the good work.
To the Editorial Board Members, I say: Give it a rest! Some individuals may have been offended by the piece, but they will get over it. From my experience reading Proceedings, I have read many controversial, and to some, perhaps insulting articles. It doesn’t matter whether I (the reader) liked them or not. It is the provocation to thought that is important.
My understanding of the purpose of Proceedings is “. . . a forum for the Sea Services.. . . The opinions and assertions herein are the personal ones of the authors.” Stand behind your purpose! Stand behind your editorial staff. The way the Navy Times article read, it seems as if the professional staff members will have to get permission from the Editorial Board before they can publish anything of a sensitive or controversial nature. If true, is this the message you want to send? It sounds a lot like some of the reactionary things predicted in Mr. Di Rita’s article.
The Proceedings does good work; quit fooling with it.
Captain Arthur M. Smith, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—I read in the Navy Times about the staff’s tribulations that resulted from publication of Mr. Di Rita’s Commentary. Frankly, I am aghast! The stench of censorship is once again polluting the environment of rationality and threatening to obfuscate reality. This is the same insular mindset that damaged the Navy in the aftermath of the Tailhook incident. From my own limited perspective, Proceedings has been the only vehicle consistently available to articulate the truths about the limitations in our medical readiness posture. In fact, there is no other avenue for collegial discourse among professionals about our observations and suggestions short of surreptitious calls to “Hot Lines,” abbreviated letters to the editor in Navy Times, or going through the stifling point paper process via chains of command.
In my view, those who would attempt to squelch the free exchange of ideas among professionals, whether the ideas be right or wrong, threaten to impose long-term harm to the credibility of the naval profession. As Caryl Haskins, the former president of the Carnegie Institute once noted, “A society committed to the search for truth must give protection to, and set a high value upon the independent and original mind, however angular, however socially unpleasant it may be; for it is upon such minds that the search for truth depends.”
Before listing in the U.S. Navy, Arnold Bergier enjoyed a career as a sculptor. His specialty was portraiture, many of prominent people, done from life. After his assignment to "Staff CINCPAC" he was called upon to model and sketch the likenesses of Fit. Adm. Chester W. Nimitz and Adm. William F. Halsey, among others, before his next assignment to the Navy Dept, of History and Records. After many years, some of his works are now being offered in limited editions, together with Certificates of Authenticity. Also pictured is a bronze D-Day memorial plaque.
Editor’s Note: Captain Smith was the Naval Institute’s Proceedings Author of the Year in 1989.
Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Having occasionally been forced to rise to the defense of the forum concept of Proceedings during the past 20 years in retirement, I was delighted to read the clarification of the editorial procedures being followed by the Board of Control, as published on page 4 of the November issue. The main characteristic that sets Proceedings above other military journals—keeps it from being just another “house organ” if you will—is the strict adherence to the forum concept. The Di Rita commentary undoubtedly raised some hackles among the readers and probably among some members of the Board itself, as evidenced by the nature of the responses of the readers. To have the Board, with the Chief of Naval Operations as its President and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy as its Vice President, affirm their support of the forum concept is refreshing and entirely proper. May it always be so.
Editor’s Note: Vice Admiral Miller's comment reflects accurately our position with regard to this issue. Further proof that the integrity of the Proceedings’ open forum is intact can be seen directly in the words published here.
“Joint From Day One”
(See T.J. Haraden. pp. 37-39, July 1995; D.L. Peck, pp.15-16, August 1995; W.K. Sharpe, pp. 23-24, September 1995; J.R. Coelho, pp. 21-23, November 1995, Proceedings)
Colonel Allan R. Millett, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), Mason Professor of Military History, Ohio State University—The American officer corps should be drawn from the academies, the current civilian campus-based officer procurement programs (ROTC), and small officer candidate courses. Officer procurement differs from service to service for good reasons and should remain a service responsibility, drawing from a wide youth base. Arguing that officer procurement should be “joint” seems dubious to me since much of an officer’s first five to seven years of service is spent learning basic skills and deciding whether being an officer is really one’s calling.
Nevertheless, a joint service academy might have some marginal advantages in professional socialization, and it might very well be less expensive than a current academy education, although Lieutenant Haraden needs to consider sunk costs. His article misses the crucial consideration, the advantages of a reformed curriculum and restructured faculty. I have seen the future in Australia, and it works. For ten years the Australian armed forces, which have only 12,000 officers in three services, have maintained the Australian Defence Forces Academy (ADFA), Canberra. Yet Australia did not close its three service-specific academies. After five weeks as a visiting professor at ADFA in the summer of 1995,1 came away with the conviction that the United States should examine the Australian model of academy education as well as other variants in the United Kingdom and in Europe. In my discussions with retired senior Australian generals, ADFA faculty, and the students themselves, I learned that they all regarded ADFA as a success in educational terms, professional socialization for joint and combined service, and relative cost.
The critical elements of the Australian system are these:
- ADFA is a real university, staffed by civilian academic professionals who are members of the University of New South Wales and who meet university and national standards of competence, including certification to teach at the graduate level. The Australians do not bear the substantial cost of sending officers to civilian graduate schools and using their talent on short (and often only) tours as academy instructors—one of the most expensive aspects of the American academy system.
- The academic curriculum at ADFA lasts three years with little military interference on campus, although the cadets certainly do not act or look like civilian undergraduates. There are parades and ceremonies as well as unit activities and lots of sports. Military training comes in the summer and in two midterm breaks.
- Each service still has its own academy, but each academy has the cadets for one year only (the fourth year) and its mission is advanced military training and education in service specialties. Cadets complete the pre-commissioning process at the service academies before going to units or for further specialist training. The most academically promising return to ADFA to complete a fourth year of academic study leading to a Bachelors degree with honors either in arts or science. Engineers return for a fourth year as a matter of course, in line with requirements laid down by the civilian Institute of Engineers, which certifies engineers nation wide. ADFA also runs active and wide-ranging graduate programs at the Masters and Ph.D. levels, which are open to civilians and more senior serving officers—another sound “joint” experience.
- The cadets know to which service they belong, because they are recruited by service and wear service uniforms on campus. All cadet companies are integrated by service. They may not look uniform, but they still look very military. Incidentally, all three services have female cadets, who seem to fit in quite well. All the services provide exemplary male and female officers to ADFA to run the military programs, counsel students, provide role models, and demonstrate their own commitment to academic excellence and joint service. I thought the Australian officers at ADFA were every bit as keen as the officers at our own service academies. I saw another aspect of military education at ADFA that should be part of any reform of our own academy system: the inclusion of officers from other nations, all services. New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand send cadets to Canberra, and other nations may follow. The United States could follow this concept on more than the token basis now in effect and admit all the officer candidates for Canada (assuming the Canadians agree—another matter) and Mexico, which could use both the bilingual educational experience and early exposure to more demanding professional values. Perhaps some Caribbean nations like Haiti and Jamaica could participate. “Joint” may be nice, but “combined” is even better because alliance associations and international peacekeeping missions already have demonstrated that the United States officer corps needs a more global perspective.
No doubt traditionalists will pillory Lieutenant Haraden for thinking the unthinkable, but the American service academies could use a clear-eyed review as we think about building the best armed forces we will need for the future.
“Submarine Design for the Littorals”
(See J. E. Wright, pp. 39-41, December 1995 Proceedings)
Captain J. J. Donnelly, U.S. Navy—I agree with Lieutenant Commander Wright that the Navy needs an affordable new submarine optimized for littoral operations. I also agree that modular ship construction techniques can help hold down construction costs and provide flexibility for multiple hull configurations. Nonetheless, his recommendation that the next generation of U.S. submarines be 600-foot test depth, 20-knot diesel boats that can sit in the mud close to an enemy shore is a giant step backward in submarine design, not an innovation.
The Navy’s design for the New Attack Submarine (NSSN), scheduled to begin construction in fiscal year 1998 and enter the fleet in 2004, will produce a multi-mission stealth warship optimized for littoral operations. Using the best new technology and modular construction techniques, the NSSN will be an affordable and highly capable replacement for the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class, whose lead ship turns 20 this year. Commander Wright’s suggestion that we modernize our submarine force with a less capable platform costing about one quarter that of an improved Los Angeles-class submarine is ill conceived.
The next-generation U.S. submarine must be capable of performing multiple missions supporting joint military operations. It also must be capable of countering any submarine, and of operating independently, far from U.S. shores, for extended periods. Numerous studies, conducted inside and outside the Navy, have concluded that a conventional diesel or air-independent propulsion submarine simply does not satisfy these requirements. The Navy’s NSSN design provides capabilities that will be required in the next century and flexibility to incorporate new technologies as they become available. Many design attributes suggested by Commander Wright—such as an open system architecture in combat systems, “fly-by-wire” ship control, enhanced visual and electromagnetic sensors, and the capability to deploy unmanned and swimmer delivery vehicles are included in the NSSN. Perhaps most important is the improved electromagnetic stealth and Seawolf (SSN-21)-level acoustic silencing that will make it the quietest submarine in the world. Moreover, NSSN will be unparalleled in littoral warfare. She will have a lockout chamber capable of deploying eight fully equipped combat swimmers at a time, a piggyback dry-deck shelter housing a swimmer-delivery vehicle, and the Advanced Swimmer Delivery System, a mini-submarine being developed to transport a fully equipped squad of special operations forces right up to the beach.
Commander Wright identifies several advantages of modular design in submarine construction. However, his concept of a modular submarine using automated welding techniques and computer programs to change modules rapidly as mission requirements shift is impractical. The NSSN will use an innovative new modular construction technique where entire sections of the submarine weighing several hundred tons will be assembled and tested in a shore-based facility before being inserted into the hull cylinders. This design feature will not only simplify the shipbuilding process and reduce cost but also will provide the added flexibility to incorporate mission-specific hull sections during the construction process. Such hull sections could provide additional volume for weapons payload or berthing for special operations personnel, in order to produce a NSSN variant with increased capability in a specific mission area. However, the special configuration would likely remain for the life of the ship. Removing or adding hull sections to an existing submarine, even one with a modular design, is an expensive and time-consuming process.
Despite Commander Wright’s good intentions, the design he suggests would, at best, put U.S. submarines at parity with the diesel submarines being built and exported to Third World nations today. In order for our national military strategy to be successful, the United States must be capable of dominating the undersea battlespace. Today, we are capable of doing that, blue water or littoral, with our Los Angeles and, soon, Seawolf-class submarines. There is currently no assigned mission they are incapable of performing. As the new security environment presages an increased emphasis on the littoral battlespace, the Navy has adjusted its mission focus and is pursuing platform designs optimized for this environment. The New Attack Submarine design is one result of this adjustment and will provide our country with the world’s finest submarines well into the next century.
“Nice To Have, But Not Really Required”
(See K. Kochendarfer, pp.73-74, June 1995; S. P. Clark, p.16, August 1995; C. C. Wohlfeld, p. 18, November 1995 Proceedings)
Commander Terry Kraft, U.S. Navy — While Lieutenant Clark’s letter mentioned some endearing qualities of the single-seat Hornet, I disagree with his views on multi-crew aircraft. It is clear that to me that a two-seat tactical Hornet is crucial to the success of carrier-based strike warfare. I have personally cruised with Hornet squadrons for more than 14 years and in two separate conflicts, and am well aware of its capabilities and limitations. What the F/A-18C offers the strike leader is a versatile platform which can do several different missions capably. It is easily maintained and easy to fly.
There is no doubt that the Hornet does well at the mission for which it was designed: replace the A-7 Corsair II. What it is not is a replacement for the A-6E, or any multi-seat attack or fighter aircraft. Anyone who states that a single-seat Hornet pilot can consistently find complex targets and prosecute a successful weapons delivery, day or night, is mistaken. There is much more to the attack mission than flying somewhere and launching a weapon. Success in strike warfare depends on thorough planning, careful execution, and flawless performance under extreme pressure. I have no doubt that single-seat Hornet aviators believe they can do most anything, but history has shown that it takes two: one to find the target and one to keep the aircraft out of harm’s way and get back to the ship. Any statistical analysis of single versus multi-crew aircraft target acquisition validates this fact. One need look no further than any Navy Strike Warfare Center Fallon detachment or Operation Southern Watch (enforcing no-fly zones in Iraq) mission summary. The question we need to answer as we look at building a two-seat F/A-18, is not if a single-seat aircraft can prosecute difficult high threat targets, but which configuration will do the best job in combat, and survive to fight another day.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for a two-seat Hornet lies in the incredible versatility of the aircraft itself. Being tasked with maintaining proficiency with every type of precision air-to-ground weapon and associated tactics is a full plate. Stack on top of that air-to-air requirements combined with planning and coordination, and it becomes nearly impossible for one person to keep abreast of everything. Already, we’ve seen one air wing Hornet squadron specialize in certain weapon systems while another focuses on a different system. There are simply not enough pilots in a typical Hornet squadron to be proficient in all the things that the aircraft can do. The two- seat Hornet would help solve what is now a fleet-wide manning challenge in deployed Hornet squadrons, while increasing their capabilities across the board.
Should the Navy decide not to build a two-seat F/A-18, it will be making a mistake of epic proportions. Introducing the limitations of a “single-seat only” carrier air wing would be a significant limiting factor to any carrier battle group in terms of personnel available to plan, expertise in the cockpit, and ability to ramp up to more challenging operations.
Finally, one must remember that combat flying is not the same as flying around Lemoore. Lieutenant Clark states that the “Hornet requires very little concentration on basic airmanship” but, as he may learn some day, evading antiaircraft fire, surface-to-air missiles, and enemy fighters is a bit more challenging. Can a heads- down Hornet pilot steering a laser-guided weapon simultaneously avoid an SA-6 which is homing in on his aircraft? In a high-threat environment, task-specific flight crews are not only desired, but required. It is time to make the right choice and not give away the increased, and needed, capability of a two-seat tactical F/A-18 just to save a few dollars.
“To Each According To His Needs”
(See A.G. Webb, pp. 62-64, August 1995; R.A. Robbins, p. 14, October 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel John Manguso, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)—Mr. Webb’s notion that service members are overpaid struck a discordant note with me. I would like to point out that the Fort Sam Houston Commissary is increasing the number of registers that can process the Lone Star Card, which the state of Texas uses for its food stamp program. It should come as a great surprise to members of the armed forces who qualify for food stamps that they are overpaid.
As author Peter G. Tsouras said about soldiering, which in its essence is not unlike sailoring:
Soldiering is not clerking. Soldiering is an emotionally intense profession that demands the deepest moral and physical efforts from its practitioners; it cannot be reduced to the spiritual anonymity of clerking—unless the nation wishes to throw good money after bad to support an army that will collapse when called upon to fight.