This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Commander William J. Lahneman, U.S. Navy
More success in drug busts—here, 43 tons of hashish and 13 tons of marijuana are taken off the Intrepid Venture in San Francisco Bay—just means that maritime interdiction forces must refine intelligence gathering and develop more effective random-search methods, to counter ever- changing smuggling techniques.
Maritime drug interdiction on the West Coast of the United States has been just one area of the multifaceted problem of stemming the influx of drugs. It is the Coast Guard’s responsibility and constitutes a formidable challenge. For example, the Coast Guard’s Pacific Area Intelligence Division (PacArea Intell) estimates that only 20 ships carry marijuana from the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam) to the West Coast each year, while statistics indicate that approximately 5,000 vessels are under way in the Pacific Ocean each day.1 Even if this number underestimates the actual number of drug-carrying vessels by a factor of five, raising the number of annual shipments to 100, drug interdiction forces would still be looking for a needle in a haystack.
The Coast Guard’s increased emphasis on obtaining intelligence data on the movement of drug-laden vessels has steadily increased the percentages of drugs intercepted. However, the nature of the maritime drug threat shifts as smugglers change their methods (because of Coast Guard successes against marijuana smuggling, and smugglers’ increased traffic in cocaine).
Coast Guard interdiction units on the West Coast employ some innovative steps to curb drug smuggling. In addition, several new recommendations have been suggested, which will enhance both the scope and effectiveness of random search-and-surveillance techniques for a modest cost.
Coast Guard Drug Interdiction on the West Coast
Cocaine smuggling has become the most important component of maritime drug smuggling on the West
Coast; most of the Coast Guard’s experience in maritime drug interdiction had been with marijuana and hashish shipments from the Golden Triangle. Coast Guard drug interdiction forces rely heavily on intelligence collection to discover the identities and sailing plans of ships.
An extensive intelligence-gathering network supports drug interdiction efforts. Members of Coast Guard PacArea Intell synthesize huge amounts of incoming intelligence data into a coherent pattern for use in the Coast Guard’s efforts. Pacific Area Coast Guard districts provide data, and PacArea Intell uses and contributes to a computerized nationwide drug interdiction intelligence data base network that the Customs Service maintains for the Treasury Enforcement Communications System and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. PacArea Intell staff members make extensive use of link charts” in their analyses of drug-smuggling operations; these charts provide visual means for piecing together details of a large operation from individual pieces of information, much as the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle link together. PacArea Intell provides the results of its analyses directly to the appropriate Coast Guard units and to various computer networks for other law enforcement organizations to use.
When the Department of Defense (DoD) was designated as lead agency for “the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, Joint Task Force Five (JTF-5) was formed in February 1989 to coordinate DoD maritime and aerial surveillance efforts on the West Coast.3 JTF-5 will ultimately consist of almost 200 personnel drawn from all of the armed services, plus liaison agents from the Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency. JTF-5’s intelligence data and that of other DoD organizations charged with gathering drug-related information—JTF-4 on the East Coast, JTF-6 for the southern border of the United States, and Southern Command for South American surveillance efforts—are fed into the Customs Service’s data base. In addition, JTF-5’s collocation with PacArea Intell. on Coast Guard Island in Alameda, California, provides rapid transmission of important data directly between staffs.
JTF-5 provides a mechanism for focusing the govern-
Cocaine Opium
merit’s considerable West Coast surveillance assets on drug interdiction. It adjusts the operating areas and flight Plans of platforms from different services and agencies to Prevent unintended overlap. However, JTF-5’s capacity to refine its surveillance effort depends on its ability to obtain Permanent control of a number of suitable platforms. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (JTF-5’s immediate superior) is responsible for providing this type of support. Thus far, allocations have been small—four Navy ships, two alert P-3 patrol aircraft, and intermittent E-3 Sentry AW ACS support. However, such dedicated assets represent a significant increase over past levels. Funding for JTF-5 also has been limited, consisting of $18 million in fiscal year 1989.4
The increasing frequency of cocaine smuggling on the West Coast has posed a dilemma for drug interdiction forces. In cases where cocaine is smuggled into the counfry in the truck-size containers of large merchant ships, the Physical impossibility of randomly searching any but a miniscule percentage of these containers increases the importance of possessing intelligence information. Alternatively, when smugglers use many small, privately owned vessels to smuggle small amounts of cocaine into a variety of U.S. ports, the Coast Guard must augment intelligence-collection efforts with an effective random-search program. Drug smugglers are responsive to countermeasures and will accordingly use the method of smuggling that works best. Maritime drug interdiction forces must therefore develop random search methods that pose a credible deterrent to these new methods in addition to refining intelligence-gathering techniques.
A brief look at the operations of Coast Guard Group Monterey illustrates the inherent difficulties maritime drug interdiction forces face and demonstrates the type of low- cost, innovative measures they can employ to combat the problem. Coast Guard Group Monterey is responsible for maritime law enforcement, search and rescue (SAR), and general maritime safety along a 200-niile stretch of the California coast from just north of Point Conception in the south to approximately 20 miles north of Santa Cruz at the northern end of Monterey Bay. Drug interdiction falls under the law enforcement category, which also includes enforcement of fisheries regulations against both foreign and domestic offenders and the apprehension of illegal aliens.
Group Monterey operates three 82-foot patrol boats (WPBs), which perform most of the drug interdiction work, and four smaller boats, which assist in this role.
A glance at the Coast Guard’s “Quick Look’’ Vessel Identification Guide will help determine whether a Ashing vessel is acting suspiciously. The Coast Guard should join the other services in using drug-snifAng dogs (facing page, the Department of Defense Dog Center). By signiAcantly increasing the probability of detecting hidden caches of illegal drugs, this would also serve as a deterrent.
Until a few years ago, SAR was Group Monterey’s predominant mission. Recent guidance from Coast Guard District Eleven, Group Monterey’s immediate superior, has raised the required amount of underway time devoted to law enforcement so that this mission now predominates over SAR, fisheries protection, and illegal alien apprehension. Now at least one of Group Monterey’s boats is performing law enforcement duties at any given time. In addition, it receives approximately 50 hours of airborne surveillance services per month from either Coast Guard District Eleven or JTF-5.
The limited availability of assets for performing all of their mission areas makes it difficult for Group Monterey |° conduct an effective random-search program. However, ■i employs a number of techniques to enhance the effectiveness of its maritime drug interdiction effort, including:
- Coast Guard personnel surveil coastal waters from Prominent points of land, such as the Point Sur Lighthouse. Small teams at these locations watch for suspicious activity over large coastal and ocean expanses. They free ^TBs for other uses farther from shore or along other Parts of the coast.
- Group Monterey has temporarily increased its personnel hy using Coast Guardsmen from cutters that are undergoing overhaul in shipyards.
- The Customs Service has recently activated an antidrug hotline that provides a convenient method for citizens to report drug-related information. Group Monterey should Profit directly from this service.
^ Group Monterey strives to present a positive image of the Coast Guard—that of a helpful friend rather than that °f a policeman. When a Coast Guard vessel visits a port, diction. Its “Quick Look” Vessel Identification Guide provides afloat units with an excellent synopsis of the different types of commercial fishing boats operating off the California coast.5 The guide includes descriptions and drawings of these vessels and lists the kinds of fish they normally catch, following their seasonal patterns. This guide has been distributed to the Coast Guard and all appropriate DoD units, including naval airborne and surface units, whose crews are less familiar with the information than the Coast Guard.
PacArea Intell also has produced A Narcotics Investigation Course for the California Department of Justice.6 This course describes the Coast Guard’s maritime drug interdiction effort and provides law enforcement personnel from other agencies with smuggler profiles, a list of vessel characteristics that indicate a potential drug runner, and instructions about the best ways to assist the Coast Guard in drug interdiction.
Enhancing Drug Interdiction Efforts
Despite the Coast Guard’s aggressive initiatives, maritime drug smuggling remains a viable undertaking. The following recommendations are proposed to further improve Coast Guard maritime drug interdiction efforts:
(he crew emphasizes their other missions—SAR and safety concerns—rather than their drug interdiction role. This approach encourages people to inform the Coast Guard if they see suspicious activity or hear about an upturning drug-smuggling operation. To further encourage this practice, Group Monterey follows up on all leads.
On another level, PacArea Intell has produced a number °f documents that directly improve maritime drug inter-
Military Working Dogs: The U.S. armed forces have employed dogs in a variety of roles since World War II. Dogs in the Vietnam War were originally used as sentries; this stimulated experimentation into using military dogs for detecting drugs and explosives.
The Department of Defense Dog Center at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, procures all military working dogs. The Air Force trains all of the dogs and their handlers.
A Profile of The Modern Drug Smuggler
All drug smugglers are motivated by the promise of great and fast financial gain. They are businessmen, after all. Even the lowest member of the smuggling organization stands to gain big rewards. In one case, a fisherman in a northern California coastal town made two smuggling runs a year. Each run consisted of a rendezvous with a mother ship about 175 miles from shore. He would then return to his town, and two men from another segment of the drug ring would offload the cargo of marijuana into a truck. The captain earned $50,000 for each run; his crew members earned $20,000 each.
A well-planned drug-smuggling operation with good security has an excellent chance of success, unless law-enforcement agencies receive prior intelligence information. The smuggling operations are usually sophisticated, while law-enforcement assets are limited and have a low level of effectiveness.
A drug smuggler’s methods depend largely on which drug the smuggler is attempting to land. Until recently, marijuana and hashish constituted the primary contraband. Within the last few years, however, cocaine smuggling by land, sea, and air has taken over. In addition to a wider range of drugs, the drug cartels now stockpile their products at the source, which enables them to ship year-round on a random basis without regard for the growing season.
The marijuana and hashish smuggled into the West Coast originate in the “Golden Triangle,” which is composed of parts of Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. These drug-smuggling operations take one of two forms. In one method, a large amount of marijuana or hashish is loaded aboard a moderate-sized merchant ship, which travels across the Pacific Ocean toward the United States along one of the busy, great-circle trading routes. When the ship is within 1,000 miles of the West Coast, she leaves the trade routes and heads for a little-traveled area 150 to 900 miles offshore. Once there, the mother ship unloads her illegal cargo in small lots to a number of U.S. fishing boats and pleasure craft that take their contraband into different U.S. ports. The use of many smugglers in small boats reduces risks both to each smuggler and to the other members of the smuggling hierarchy.
The second method uses a smaller vessel, such as an oceangoing fishing boat, to make the entire run from Southeast Asia to a U.S. port. Marijuana and hashish are hidden on board these vessels in imaginative and effective ways. In one such case involving the motor vessel Querube II, marijuana was hidden in a welded-shut compartment disguised as a fuel tank by the addition of a small tank in one of the hidden compartment’s corners. The “fuel tank” contained fuel and could be sounded in the traditional way. In another case, smugglers added an entire false bottom filled with marijuana to the engine room of a fishing boat. Smugglers using this method often spend a long time at various ports along their route to complicate surveillance efforts. While in port, they often repaint their vessels using different color schemes and change their vessels’ names to further confound law-enforcement efforts. They may also build false deck structures to mask their vessels’ true silhouettes.
Drug smugglers use a wide array of electronic devices to detect possible surveillance and interdiction efforts. To complement radios of various ranges and types, including satellite- capable ones, they use scramblers—encryption devices that prevent eavesdropping by anyone without the proper equipment and decoding material. Search radars and radio frequency scanners help smugglers detect approaching law-enforcement aircraft or ships. They also scan radio frequencies and gather their own intelligence information by monitoring law- enforcement communications channels, which are rarely scrambled. Law-enforcement officials are taking steps to reduce their vulnerability in this area.
Drug smugglers have even
Approximately 2,000 military working dogs are presently employed successfully throughout DoD, as well as by a number of federal agencies, and the Military Working Dog School maintains the capability to rapidly expand its output of trained dogs in a contingency situation.
If the Coast Guard used drug “sniffer” dogs to randomly search vessels, it would greatly increase the probability of detecting cleverly hidden caches of illegal drugs, such as the “six-pack of cocaine.” Moreover, the dogs’ ability to detect residual odors at previously used locations would help the Coast Guard identify potential drugrunning vessels. The knowledge that the Coast Guard was employing drug-sniffing dogs during searches would, in addition, act as a deterrent.
The funding necessary to expand the military working dog program would be efficiently spent: the organization for training the additional dogs already exists and is prepared to expand rapidly. The Navy’s use of drug-sniffing dogs on board ship has already proven the dogs’ value in a maritime environment. Although they have exhibited some weaknesses in this role, notably a degradation in their effectiveness after prolonged exposure to the noises
case of detection, including criteria for aborting the operation. One captured document (depicted here) listed an area that the marijuana-laden small craft returning from the mother ship were to avoid because of a known Coast Guard and Navy presence. Such detailed plans enable smugglers to conduct major operations under virtual radio silence, removing one factor law enforcement forces tradi
Published operations orders for a 'Uajor operation. Closely resembling military operations orders, ihese documents described the unticipated chronology of events and included listings of primary and alternate radio frequencies, c°de names for main action offiCers and vessels, and diagrams depicting the manner in which contraband will be transferred from the mother ship. The plans listed contingency measures in
According to code sheets captured from a smuggling organization, the Eagle B> later stopped by the USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC-722) had the word to stay clear of the indicated “heat area” because U.S. Coast Guard and Navy ships and aircraft were operating there.
tionally could exploit.
Much more valuable per kilogram than marijuana or hashish, cocaine is smuggled in smaller lots, enabling smugglers to conceal amounts of substantial value in small compartments and devices. For example, one of the most popular forms of maritime cocaine smuggling is to hide a cocaine shipment in one of the hundreds of boxes in one of the truck-size containers on a large containerized merchant ship. Since each containerized ship holds hundreds of containers, the Customs agents ashore or Coast Guardsmen at sea have only a remote chance of discovering the cocaine unless they possess prior information of the shipment, including which container it is in. Moreover, the containers usually originate in different locations, and often sit in storage at various ports while awaiting further transportation, greatly complicating attempts to establish the identities of the smugglers involved.
Even a small boat provides a multitude of locations for hiding cocaine. For example, a kilogram of cocaine, worth between $10,000 and $20,000, can be concealed in a specially made six-pack of Coca Cola in one of the cabinets in the galley of a 35-foot sailboat. Without intelligence information highlighting that boat as a likely smuggling platform, the Coast Guard would be hard pressed to detect the hidden contraband in a routine search.
—W. J. Lahneman
and forced-air ventilation systems of large ships. The lack °f these phenomena on small boats, however, would actu- aUy improve the dogs’ performance over the Navy’s experience. On the other hand, the increased pitching and rolling of small craft in rough weather would decrease the ‘logs’ effectiveness. However, Coast Guard drug interdiction teams can overcome this problem by searching small vessels after they have entered the shelter of harbors or after they have moored or anchored.
More Focused Use of the Coast Guard Reserve for Drug Interdiction: The Coast Guard Reserve historically
has trained to support the service’s wartime mission. Accordingly, their training has stressed preparation for such missions as port security, Maritime Defense Zone (Mar- Dez) operations, and anti-sabotage measures. The Coast Guard recently released a study, the “Strategic Planning and Reserve Capability Study” (SPARCS), that addressed the future choices of the Coast Guard Reserve.
The panel recommended that Coast Guard planners “investigate ways in which Coast Guard reservists can contribute, to a greater degree, to the accomplishment of current Coast Guard objectives while maintaining mobilization readiness.”7 It commented on the need for a strategic planning process to implement this new policy and to carry the Coast Guard into the next century.
The SPARCS study represents a significant departure from the previous use of the Coast Guard Reserve. In addition to shifting training emphasis to helping the active- duty Coast Guard perform its peacetime mission, the study provides a unifying force for standardizing Coast Guard Reserve training, which each district currently performs differently.
The training approach of Coast Guard Group Monterey’s reserve unit illustrates the assistance that reservists can provide to active-duty forces. In Monterey, reservists spend a minimum of 65% of their monthly reserve weekends directly augmenting Group Monterey’s WPBs and small craft. Currently, however, their two-week active- duty period is spent in training for their wartime mission of MarDez operations. Reservists qualify on the same watch stations and maintain the same requalification schedules as active-duty Coast Guardsmen. Many of the reservists work as law-enforcement officers in various local, state, and federal organizations, and they bring substantial knowledge of law-enforcement procedures with them to their reserve duties. The reserves’ port security rating, a specialty that does not exist in the active-duty Coast Guard, attracts many of these people to reserve duty. However, reservists’ limited drilling time, and the current use of the two-week active-duty period for training for their wartime mission, make maintaining qualifications difficult.
The SPARCS initiatives indicate that reserve training will become increasingly focused toward support of active-duty forces. Whether or not this effort will actually produce a significant increase in Coast Guardsmen available for drug interdiction remains to be seen, however, since SPARCS’s long list of mission areas would seem to preclude a significant increase in Coast Guard drug interdiction capability.
The Coast Guard Reserve contains approximately 12,700 personnel, about one-third the size of the active- duty Coast Guard. If devoted exclusively to law-enforcement duties, the reserves could significantly add to the Coast Guard’s drug-busting punch. This impact would be even greater if the reserves expanded to the 24,500 personnel level the SPARCS study suggests. In addition, many reserve units possess their own small craft that could be used to augment the active Coast Guard fleet for drug interdiction. While such exclusive emphasis on one area of the reserve’s mission at the expense of all others is a radical departure from the past, only strong measures will win the President’s war on drugs. The present low probability of war between the United States and another major power increases the feasibility of this recommendation.
The Coast Guard Auxiliary: The Coast Guard Auxiliary presents another vehicle for improving maritime drug interdiction. The Auxiliary is a volunteer organization composed primarily of members of the boat-owning public. It assists the Coast Guard primarily by performing courtesy boat inspections and administering safe boating classes to
the public. In addition, Auxiliary members conduct “safety patrols” under the close supervision of the local Coast Guard. During a patrol, the Coast Guard Auxiliary vessel, which must be a radio-equipped vessel at least 17 feet long with a crew of at least four, checks in with the Coast Guard hourly by radio. The Coast Guard uses these vessels to investigate problems; for example, it will send Auxiliary vessels to the scene of a distress call to ascertain the situation and, if necessary, order the vessel to pick up people in distress or take a boat under tow. The Auxiliary also uses private aircraft and radio-equipped automobiles to conduct airborne maritime surveillance and patrol the coast.
Although the Auxiliary is prohibited by law from participating in law-enforcement operations, the Coast Guard , has indirectly used it to help in drug interdiction. Since Auxiliary vessels are pleasure craft, they can blend inconspicuously with other maritime traffic, despite the fact that they fly the Coast Guard Auxiliary pennant when on patrol. On one occasion, the Coast Guard directed an Auxiliary vessel on patrol to sail to the vicinity of a boat suspected of smuggling drugs and report any suspicious activities. The Auxiliary vessel was able to perform this function undetected, while a Coast Guard ship would have immediately alerted the suspected smugglers.
Present legislation provides for the indirect involvement of the Auxiliary in law-enforcement operations. The Coast Guard is permitted to “commandeer” Auxiliary vessels to augment its forces. In commandeering a boat, the Coast Guard places a Coast Guard crew on board, while the boat’s owner remains with the boat to provide technical assistance. The Coast Guard then uses the commandeered craft as it would any other Coast Guard vessel. The owner does not participate in any law-enforcement operations, and the Coast Guard assumes responsibility for any damage to the vessel while in a commandeered status.
The Coast Guard Auxiliary has the potential to be a significant force in drug interdiction without becoming involved in law-enforcement operations or having its vessels commandeered. The fact that these citizens possess boats, airplanes, and automobiles equipped with radios makes them an excellent group to enhance the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction surveillance effort. Even in the absence of such platforms, the Auxiliary could staff the lighthouses and many other prominent coastal locations that Coast Guard personnel currently man infrequently-
Coast Guard Auxiliary operations in the Monterey area show that the Auxiliary’s usefulness falls far short of its potential. The flotilla has 27 members and four boats. Yet patrols are rarely conducted because of the difficulty in arranging the required four-man crew. In fact, the flotilla has only conducted two or three patrols per year for the last few years. Auxiliary members are reluctant to commit the seven or eight hours of their free time necessary to conduct a patrol.
These comments are not intended to serve as an indictment of Monterey’s flotilla as much as they are meant to highlight the fact that the Auxiliary’s enormous potential for aiding maritime drug interdiction will remain untapped if sufficient volunteers cannot be found to undertake a
significant number of patrols. If properly managed, the President’s declaration of war on drugs can serve as a rallying cry for soliciting more volunteers for a reinvigorated and highly focused Coast Guard Auxiliary.
Failure of a campaign to enlist the aid of the citizenry in combating what the President has described as a leading Rational security problem is indicative of a perception gap between American policymakers and the people. The use °f extraordinary efforts and substantial federal funding to combat the drug problem would be ill-advised if the American people were not behind such an effort.
Enhanced Drug Interdiction Training for Navy and Air Force Units: The Navy and Air Force operate a large number of ships and aircraft off the West Coast, covering a Vast surveillance area. Unfortunately, the crews are usu- al,y poorly trained to detect suspected drug-running vest's- The “Quick Look” Fishing Vessel Identification Euide and the smuggler profiles in the Narcotics Investi- Sation Course, California Department of Justice contain excellent information. However, drug interdiction traditionally has been a low priority among these units. The Coast Guard can improve its effectiveness, however, by Providing training in smuggler profiles and patterns of operations to certain specialized segments of their crews e-§-> signalmen and boatswain’s mates in surface ships).
Summary
Although most drug seizures are cued by intelligence ,ata> the increasing use of smaller vessels to smuggle relatiVely small amounts of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish demand an improvement in random search techniques. ”hile the smuggler’s cleverness and the limitations of the drug interdiction forces tend to paint a dreary picture, the situation is not hopeless. The goal is to make it increasingly difficult for the smuggler to operate.
The drug problem cannot be solved solely by interdiction at America’s borders regardless of the effectiveness of the drug interdiction agencies. The U.S. transportation system is extensive, making the different ways to smuggle drugs so varied that interdiction efforts will have to include interdicting illegal drugs at their source. Even then, the drug problem will continue unless a large portion of the American people decide it must stop and personally contribute to drug control efforts.
'Lt (jg) K. Conroy, USCG, staff officer, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area Intelligence Division, interview by author, 18 August 1989, Alameda, CA, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
2Lt. R.G. Brunke, USCG, Narcotics Investigation Course, California Department of Justice (Alameda, CA: U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, 1989), p. 3.
Joint Task Force Five (JTF-5) Mission and Overview Public Affairs Presentation, August 1989.
“Ibid.
5Lt. B. De Jong, USCG, Lt. C. Olin, USCG, and MST1 D. Carmody, USCG, "Quick Look” Fishing Vessel Identification Guide (Alameda, CA, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, 1989).
6Brunke.
1Strategic Planning and Reserve Capability Study (SPARCS), by RAdm. B. S. Sparks, USCGR, Chairman (Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, 1989), B-3.
Commander Lahneman is currently a student in the International Organizations and Negotiations curriculum of the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer who has served in the USS Truxtun (CGN-35), Samuel Eliot Morison (FFG-13), Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), and, most recently, as executive officer in the USS Texas (CGN-39).
_____________________ They Don’t Call ’Em Belly-Robbers for Nothin’_____
As a junior division officer on an aircraft carrier, I began each day signing an assortment of chits. One morning an off-duty cook handed me a request for items for the galley. Several blank spaces in the “quantity to be issued” column aroused my suspicion. To be sure nothing would be added later I placed an “X” on each blank line before signing the chit. He stopped me with, “Oh no, Sir, you don’t have to sign on every line.”
H.C. Miner
______________________________ Training or Refl’ra?__________________
On the third day of refresher training (RefTra) at Guantanamo Bay, we had just failed another battle problem because of poor interior communications. The captain came storming out onto the bridge wing of the medium-endurance Coast Guard cutter. Stomping his feet in fury, he shouted up to the weapons officer at the flying bridge gun control platform:
“How can you continually foul up this drill!"
“Sir,” came the placating reply, “The phone talker is a new man . . . he’s got the dialogue right in front of him, but he’s not familiar with the terminology ... but I’m sure he’ll get the hang of it soon. He’s getting better already, and he’s getting great training.”
The captain’s eyes bulged and he shook with rage.
“Training! This is RefTra, dammit! The score’s too important! This is no time for training!” The entire bridge became dead quiet. The trace of a smile began to play at the corners of the captain’s mouth. He shook his head and stalked back into the pilothouse, chuckling.
Lt. Daniel A. Laliberte, USCG