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°day’s Naval Reservists can no longer be ^sidered “weekend warriors” training °r Wartime backup roles. They participate 0lUinely in fleet operations, such as Naval °ntrol of Shipping in the Persian Gulf,
^ deserve official status as part-time etnbers of the Total Force.
We cannot continue doing business with the Naval Reserve the way we have since World War II. Today’s operational and fiscal realities require a change in the way the Navy takes advantage of the reserve assets that continue to accumulate.
The Naval Reserve has two roles—one potential, one kinetic. Its potential role is the traditional one: to be ready to mobilize and augment the active force in time of war or national emergency. Its kinetic role is relatively new, cer-
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cedings / February 1988
“Calling up the reserves” has positive and nega’ implications. A callup of any kind sends a message the government is sufficiently concerned about matters
When the Navy sends active-duty-for-training volunteers to actual or potential combat areas, they enter a twilight zone of questions about length of duty, pay and benefits, etc. It also wreaks havoc with Total Force planning and policy execution.
tainly on such a large and growing scale: to contribute meaningfully—and in several areas, vitally—to the peacetime operation of the active force. Over the years, the Naval Reserve’s kinetic role has replaced its potential role in primary importance. Therefore, it should receive primary attention in policy planning and execution.
The Naval Reserve, particularly the Selected Reserve, has always represented the difference between the personnel and equipment the Navy can afford to maintain during peacetime and that needed for wartime operations. But the Naval Reserve today represents the difference between what the Navy can afford during peacetime and what it needs during peacetime, as well as for mobilization.
In its kinetic role, the peacetime reserve provides “mutual support” to the active force on a day-to-day basis. Ostensibly, mutual support is a by-product of reserve training, and it is true that reservists receive valuable training while providing support. However, the Navy has come to expect its reserve component to deliver services in many everyday mission areas, and not just to stand ready to provide assets upon mobilization. As a result, Naval Reserve personnel routinely participate in fleet operations. Nevertheless, the coincidence of service to the fleet as a fortunate by-product of training is a myth no longer worth perpetuating. The reality of the Navy’s routine use of the Naval Reserve to carry out its peacetime mission dictates that Navy policy acknowledge that fact—and incorporate it into planning and operations.
It is appropriate for the Navy to rely on its reservists for operational support. However, only in rare exceptions is this reliance total, in which the Navy finds itself unable to perform a peacetime mission without support from inactive-duty reservists. There must be a balance, to encourage reserve participation in the Navy’s operations without creating total dependence on the inactive reserve in any mission area that could develop before mobilization.
The increasingly kinetic nature of the Naval Reserve is the result of a drive during the past several years to bring the Reserve into the Navy mainstream. This has been driven in turn by a combination of high (and expensive) operating tempos—derived from broad-based international responsibilities—and of fiscal constraints, under pressure of nonmilitary priorities.
Congress has perceived an opportunity to reduce overall defense costs by investing more in reserve and less in active components. Congressional pressure on the military services to emphasize reserve forces has also been encouraged by such other interests as the National Guard. Finally, the services have recognized that economies can be achieved by assigning nontraditional missions to reserve components.
The Navy has, in fact, saved money by giving several
missions to the Naval Reserve. For instance, if severa' active ships were transferred to the Naval Reserve, reservists would benefit from improved training, and thefe would be lower operating and personnel-related costs. The remaining active force would then have to do one or more of the following: reduce commitments, increase frequent or length of deployments for the remaining active-duty ships, or lengthen their operating cycles. These actions atf secondary costs that the active force assumes by transfer ring missions to the Naval Reserve. .
The Navy must be ready to tap the Reserve’s kinetic energy—because there is a substantial investment of re' sources and effort in the Naval Reserve—resources thal could measurably enhance the Navy’s ability to carry °ul its peacetime as well as wartime missions.
The imposition of the Naval Reserve’s potential role aS its primary reason for being severely restricts the manning of reserve units. At present, reserve billets or units muS be justified by mobilization need—the traditional aP' proach. But the system cannot provide reserve support f°r the active Navy’s peacetime missions on a nonmobil>za' tion basis. In such cases, the Navy either does without the reserve contribution or attains it through a real or contrived mobilization need—then uses it for the origin11 operational purpose. Having to follow this process han1' strings the Navy unnecessarily, and is not a good way t0 do business.
Limiting the Naval Reserve to its potential role hinder proper development of its kinetic role and denies the Nav> legitimate peacetime support. The Navy should seriousl)' consider establishing and maintaining, on a case-by-case basis, reserve billets and units specifically to support the Navy’s peacetime operations.
Accessing Naval Reserve assets is not always easy^ particularly on short notice. Occasionally, critical n111, sions have been accomplished with volunteer reserve sup port. Such volunteer response is praiseworthy, but canU0 be relied upon during periods of low-level conflict. T*1 voluntary aspect of active duty for training (AcDuTra presents little impediment when reserve support is sche1 uled well in advance, for example, in routine mariti11 patrols or construction battalion activity. But prcble'11
occur when assets are accessed on short notice. „
live
that to
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Proceedings / February
A 'he
>nto hazardous duty? What death or injury benefits they and their families rate? How often and for how ng can AcDuTra orders be extended? Can such exten
der
A
*Stlng law does provide for a means to achieve Con- tarv f rec°gn>tion of the increased portion of the mili- "cnt °rCe structure assigned to the Naval Reserve compo- amh^’. Congress has provided the president with the
^tivate its reserve forces. This is acceptable only when e government intends to put its own citizens, its allies, jjnd its adversaries on notice. Historically, that message as been a useful political tool. But today, with the Military’s assigning much of its capabilities to the reserve C°mPonents, simply accessing that capability by means of ,callup could send the wrong signal or send the correct Slgnal prematurely, threatening the objective.
AcDuTra, whether “annual” or “special,” has two ?aJ°r drawbacks. In most instances it is voluntary, there- re not a valid basis for total force policy planning or *ecution. It also presents difficulties in terms of the status trainees, especially in actual or potential combat zones. aPptng reserve assets for short-fuzed operations usually eans inviting reservists with the appropriate skills to re- -p,rt f°r a specified—or unspecified—time for AcDuTra.
. e record of acceptance to these invitations has been datory, even encouraging. But, as more situations arise firing reserve support, it becomes increasingly precari- s to depend on enough of the right people being willing d able to volunteer, to leave the real world of family and 'essional commitments.
'he second drawback is the question of whether it is t^Priate to assign reservists strictly on “training” duty '*eet operations, where they are actually performing an'ributory service, especially in the face of a potential or
, ual hostilities. Can or should “trainees” ever be ordered do loi
"ns be made involuntarily, or can they be accomplished dj Un'arily without the members’ signatures, in the event at the members are not readily available to sign the ^°Per forms? The status of trainees and their benefits to°uld be at least partially addressed by an Army proposal Iarnend the law to provide for members and their fami- jnS ln 'he event of death or injuries incurred during train- § Periods, particularly under hostile conditions or in special situations.
°ncept worth pursuing is operational active duty, or ^“btuory active duty (ConAcDu), as opposed to Acne r|fa facing reservists on active duty to perform stre.e<f services for the Navy is legitimate and should be Usa'^'forward. ConAcDu could be involuntary in un- aca situations. As a practical matter, the service would eve°nimoda'e 'be personal schedules of reservists when- de/ i)c!Ssible, as is the case today with AcDuTra, but the owning factor would be the needs of the Navy to carry serv*tS I^1'ssi°n- ConAcDu would satisfy the Selected Ream ls's requirements for two weeks of active duty annuel ■ necessary could occur for a period or periods
eeding the minimum two weeks, txi:
Sele°nty hJSC 673b) to order as many as 200,000 as QAted Reservists to involuntary active duty for as many f0rce days per Selected Reservist to augment the active e for any operational mission, without emergency
mobilization. However, this authority has never been used.
The authority of Section 673b is not intended to be a preliminary step toward mobilization, but unfortunately, military planners insist upon treating it that way. This authority will have to be used for operational needs frequently enough to make such exercises routine. A simple way to accomplish this would be to select units whose periods of active duty have already been scheduled and whose AcDuTra is of a “mutual support” nature—then recall those units to active duty under Section 673b for the same period. This process would desensitize observers who still think every callup is a danger signal, and would help remove the cloak of “training” from operational reserve contributions.
If callups are delayed until the situation requires all 200,000 reservists, the president likely would be petitioned to provide reservists for all the services. The Navy’s share would be too small to meet its needs.
If reservists are to be employed to a greater extent in a contributory role, there will also have to be careful public education on the subject. Otherwise it is questionable whether ordering reservists to tours of active duty other than their traditional two-week AcDuTra would be acceptable. Individual reservists, their families, or their employers might balk. The policy could even have a negative effect on reserve retention. In addition, it would be impractical for the Navy to implement a ConAcDu program without securing acceptance of the concept from several sources: civilian and military leadership, the news media, and the public.
The Naval Reserve should be officially designated the part-time component of the total force. Whatever specific language this designation takes, such an action would give inactive reservists the status of part-time members, rather than trainees. To a great extent, this would merely formalize what is already common practice. However, by no longer having the official focus on training for mobilization, the Navy could much better exercise the Naval Reserve’s kinetic role. At the same time, day-to-day reserve training would continue. Mobilization readiness would, in fact, be enhanced, because being an active participant in the total force before mobilization is the best possible preparation for mobilization.
By prefacing the amount of money appropriated for the Navy Reserve Pay account with direction that the money be used for training reservists, the existing statute emphasizes the “ready in waiting” aspect of reserve forces. Legislative action would be necessary to amend this and any other pertinent language. Congressional approval would be needed to complete official recognition of the part-time status of the reserves. But first, the Navy establishment will have to take a hard look at its reserve component and agree to dispel fond myths.
Commander Feeny is a Naval Reserve officer on active duty in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Having enlisted in the Naval Reserve in 1965, he has been on active duty in the Pentagon since 1982, working for the most part in the office of the Director of Naval Reserve.
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