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Few men are willing to commit themselves publicly to prophecy for, even though we must all live in the future, it remains enshrouded in mystery until it becomes the domain not of the prophet but of the historian.
Prophecy is necessary. All plans are a form of it. But it is, nonetheless, a perilous occupation. The peril is that of being wrong. The degree of peril is proportional to the distance one attempts to peer into the future. General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., in his aptly titled "To the Limit of our Vision—and Back,” opens with a quotation from a prophecy he made in the pages of the Proceedings twenty-six years ago, a prophecy since proved wrong. Despite such hazards, those responsible for the conduct of any organization’s current affairs are equally responsible for preparing that organization for the future. That is, they must prophesy and they do, even if they wish not to. Every new class of ship ordered, every approval given to or withheld from a proposed new officer designator, every change in the nature of deployments, in fact almost everything done today is something in the nature of a prophecy for tomorrow.
What are some of the things the Commandant of the Marine Corps sees in the future of his Service? Ashore, he sees technology correcting "an old imbalance, in which the infantry has done a small share of the killing but a large share of the dying.” Aloft, he sees the development of VSTOL aircraft providing better air support to the forces on the ground. The Harrier, or AV-8A, is the VSTOL aircraft of the moment. Though designed as an attack plane, it has achieved impressive results in simulated air-to-air combat against such opponents as the F-4J, F-86H, and T-38. "Besides its slow speed maneuverability, the AV-8A’s small size and smokeless engine exhaust made it difficult to track, and its relatively low fuel consumption enabled it to double the fighter endurance of its faster opponents.”
Clearly, there is something for the future here, and the Commandant sees the next step as that of a "growth version” of the Harrier, the AV-16A, "a low risk, cost effective design . . . which could be operational within a reasonable time.”
Afloat, the General sees not only the opportunities opened up by the development of surface effect ship technology but also the necessity, as a result of the
Preface 5
vigorous pruning of our amphibious fleet, "to look increasingly to civilian means of sea and air lift.”
The latter thought is one with which the president of The Seafarers International Union would agree. However, because amphibious warfare, like so many other aspects of naval war, is episodic, he probably would prefer the available civilian means to be applied to the never-ending logistic support roles. In any event, in his "A Union Leader Looks at the Merchant Marine,” Paul Hall proposes that the Navy "employ merchant ships and crews to provide part of the Fleet’s logistic support, 25 per cent across-the-board, perhaps.” The Navy tried using commercial tankers in place of Navy-manned oilers, and appears to have committed itself to the use of civilian-manned tankers in the role of oilers under the aegis of the Military Sealift Command. More and more oilers formerly manned with Navy crews are now going to sea with civilian crews under MSC contracts. This is a useful way to stretch the defense dollar, but it has its limitations. No matter how dedicated they may be, a crew of forty men cannot fuel as many ships simultaneously, or fuel as many ships one after another, as can a crew three or four times that size. Nor, of course, both for lack of numbers and because they are under civil, rather than naval, discipline, can they carry out many of the evolutions commonly expected of a ship involved in naval activities. But, when the alternative to a ship with forty civilians is no ship at all, the right choice is clear.
Of course, the main function of a merchant marine is not to support its country’s navy. The main business of merchant ships is to carry trade, and that is a peacetime occupation. When one thinks of merchant ships, one is inclined to think of foreign trade. But, in his "Domestic Shipping and American Maritime Policy,” Wallace T. Sansone tells us that each year the ships in domestic American trade "transport 400 million more tons than all of the vessels engaged in our foreign trade” and they "employ 70,000 more American seamen than those in their sister fleet engaged in our foreign commerce.”
Some of the ships in the domestic trades, none of which are subsidized, compete among themselves for business. These are the vessels that carry cargo between the mainland and Puerto Rico, Alaska, and
Hawaii. Others compete not so much among themselves as against trucks, railroad trains, and pipelines. These are the ships, boats, and barges engaged in coastal, intercoastal, Great Lakes, and inland trades. Mr. Sansone points out that ships and boats use substantially less fuel to move any given amount of freight than do trains, several times less than pipelines, nearly five times less than trucks, and less than one per cent as much as airplanes. They do a lot less polluting, too, than does any other means of domestic transport; and, though the country suffers from "road congestion and freight car shortages,” the water routes are "for the most part underused.”
Captain A. B. How shares General Cushman’s adventurous approach to the future and, like the General, has to confess to the difficulties of prophesying. He shares, too, Mr. Sansone’s view of the economy and, therefore, of the bright future that awaits domestic shipping. But he points to a problem with manpower at sea not touched by those former mariners, Sansone and Hall. Unlike Mr. Hall, who is concerned that there be enough jobs for American seamen to fill, Captain How observes that though today "merchant vessels are both willing and able to go to the assistance of their fellows in distress, they may soon be so highly automated that there will not be enough people on board both to navigate their ship and lend assistance on the scene.” Hence, "a new class of high-endurance cutter will be needed to replace the now very old Campbell class.”
It is worth observing that the Coast Guard’s strength in such large cutters is now less than half what it was five years ago, and still declining.
Captain How anticipates that the portion of his Service’s work that will "see the most expansion . . . in the future is that of law enforcement. The large number of foreign fishing vessels now in Alaskan waters, along the Aleutian chain, and the East and West coasts, where our own lobstermen and draggers work, means that there will be no letup in American fishermen’s gear conflicts with foreign vessels as well as between themselves. . . .”
This view certainly is supported by Richard H. Philips in his "The Present and Future of the West Coast Fishing Industries.” Mr. Philips writes that the Coast Guard "does a remarkable job of patrolling the West Coast in the areas where foreign fleets
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operate. Those areas stretch from San Francisco to Kodiak, and on to Adak and include all of the eastern Bering Sea. It is a huge expanse of ocean, most of the year the weather is miserable, and the Coast Guard’s surveillance ships and airplanes are spread very, very thinly.”
Mr. Philips admires the fishermen he describes and the boats they use, but for others his admiration is not unbounded. He has nothing but scorn for those in the federal government who foisted on the fishing industry a couple of large European-style stern trawlers. As for others, he reports, "Until fishermen have some assurance that legislation passed in their behalf will be used, they will continue to have little confidence in the candor of the political and bureaucratic leadership.”
Perhaps the most interesting of the West Coast’s fishing vessels are the big, elegant tuna seiners, most of which work out of San Diego. These vessels, many of which are well over 200 feet in length,
"fish off the coast of Central America and northern South America as well as off the equatorial coast of Africa. Some boats are even considering going as far as Australia.” They certainly signal to all who see them the health of their part of the American fisheries.
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes agrees with Mr. Sansone on the fact that there is freight congestion ashore and, as an example, points to the big shipments of American wheat to the Soviet Union, which began in 1972 and are not yet completed. In his Seapower Commentary, "The Maritime World in 1973,” he observes that the way the grain trade was handled led to "one of the worst freight car shortages in U. S. railroad history and a gigantic ship tie-up . . . not unlike that ... at Vung Tau at the beginning of major U. S. participation in the Vietnamese War. Some ships were delayed as much as 45 days. . . .” Admiral Hayes says that one solution to the problem probably will be through "increased movement by barges down the Mississippi River system.”
Another result of the big grain deal is that "the myth of the highly touted merchant marine of the Soviet Union is being dispelled as it becomes more evident that the Russians do not yet know how to operate commercial ships efficiently according to the standards of other maritime countries. Third nation
ships—British, Norwegian, Japanese, Greek, and Liberian, the last named under the ownership of both Americans and Greeks—are moving over three quarters of the wheat.”
Additionally, the Admiral points to the most significant "recent increase in the size of the Greek-flag fleet. In two years it has gone from seventh place to fifth in size. In 1972 it passed the U. S. fleet and this year that of the Soviet Union. The surprisingly small increase in the size of the latter fleet in 1973 indicates that the phenomenal growth of the Soviet merchant marine is now leveling off.”
"Merchant ships,” John Hayes reminds us, "are largely international in character, and haul any cargo anywhere. Those flying flags of convenience are completely international and their owners are men without any national points of view,” an opinion with which Paul Hall agrees. The latter quotes the president of one of the large, ship-owning multinational oil companies: "I’ve never been faced with the situation where I’d say to myself, I’m only going to be a good citizen of one country, because if I do that I am no longer being a multinational oil company.”
The Admiral also says that "the competence of the crews is declining and the number of collisions, explosions, and sinkings increases. The crowded waterways become more dangerous than ever, and the likelihood of pollution rises.”
Is there a remedy for "this essentially civil area of maritime disorder”? Yes, there is, says Admiral Hayes, and it lies "in the experience and reputation of the U. S. Coast Guard.” That Service is "highly experienced in the international arena and is well regarded by those with whom it comes in contact.” It has "the know-how and the organization to bring order to the world ocean in all the categories where corrective action is urgently needed: in pollution control, crew competence, vessel inspection, and traffic control.” One good place to start, the Admiral suggests, is in the Persian Gulf: "The Sheik of Bahrein may be induced ... to permit the United States to keep the naval facility there as a Coast Guard base, thereby offering to this dangerous, easily polluted sea area the benefits of pollution control, law enforcement, and safety at sea.”
An interesting combination of the grain trade
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with the oil shortage is reported by Commander J. B. Finkelstein in his annual chronology, "Naval and Maritime Events.” The entry for 11 January tells us "Soviet maritime officials said that one of the first U. S. ships bringing American grain to the Soviet Union would sail back with the first Russian oil to be imported by the United States since the end of World War II.” In another entry, that for 24 April, we find that "The British merchant ship Spraynes rescued 70 crewmen who abandoned the USS Force (MSO-445) when she caught fire and sank on 23 April....” The photograph of the Force's survivors, which heads the first half of Commander Finkelstein’s chronology, is certainly fuzzy enough, but it shows almost all of them to be in rafts and floats. The boat in the photo almost certainly is a fiberglass, 26-foot motor whaleboat. As Roger C. Taylor says in his "Some Thoughts on Ships’ Boats in the Navy,” such whaleboats "might better be called lifeboats, for that is their primary function, and they more closely resemble the traditional ship’s lifeboat than the much finer lined rowing and sailing craft used in the days of sail as boats from which to harpoon and lance leviathans. Be that as it may, the 26-foot motor whaleboat is a favorite among ships’ boats, and well she might be. Well-behaved, seaworthy, and easy to handle, she can be put to a great variety of uses.” Mr. Taylor’s informed commentary on the Navy’s boats concludes with a proposal that the Navy adopt for shipboard use a 17-foot dinghy designed long ago by the famous designer, Uffa Fox. To be sure, many of our ships which might carry such a boat have severe problems of topside weight. But, when the Navy wants to do something it never finds such problems insoluble and, as Mr. Taylor says, "this would be an admirable design for a ship’s boat for training and recreation in today’s Navy.” As to the value of such training, the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, could attest. During World War II he saved his life, and the lives of others, by being able to sail a small boat a long distance.
General Cushman saw the Harrier as an important airplane in his Service’s future. So does Captain Stephen T. De La Mater in his "Naval Aircraft in the Next Decade.” Most of the aircraft that Captain De La Mater sees the Navy using a decade hence are
already on hand. Of these, the Harrier, he says, "may not be the ultimate in VSTOL but it is here today, it is flying operationally, and it is doing much better than many professionals would have dared to predict three or four years ago. The sea control ship’s VSTOL has almost got to be the same type the Marines will use, which probably means some advanced version of Harrier unless the Navy can come up with a fighter for the CV that will get on and off the sea control ship and has VSTOL and close air support capabilities acceptable to the Marines.” The advanced version of the Harrier, as we saw, is the airplane General Cushman favors. But Captain De La Mater pins his hope on "North American’s augmented wing XFV-12A, which will duct hot gases through wing flap vents to achieve vertical lift.” This is an advantage in that it obviates the "cruise-plus-lift engine concept with its inherent penalty of having to carry extra engines that mostly ride.” As of now, unfortunately, "no such airplane has ever been flown.”
The reason the XFV-12A, or the Harrier, or some dark horse is even a matter of interest to the Navy is twofold: first, it must have an airplane with fighter qualities that can use the small deck of the forthcoming sea control ship; and second, the F-14 Tomcat, while a superb aircraft, is very expensive and something cheaper will be necessary to fill out the air groups of the full-size carriers.
In the meantime naval aviation has come through with a new project that is less glamorous than a fighter but probably of more profound importance, the S-3 antisubmarine airplane. This jet-propelled aircraft has put the aircraft carrier back into the antisubmarine role and, therefore, back into the struggle for control of the sea. Probably even more than the F-14, the S-3 will be the source of the carrier’s importance for years to come. As Captain De La Mater writes, with the new airplanes "the position of attack carriers became stronger. Though they are now called CVs they are, of course, the same ships that served so well as CVAs. They have survived severe analytical attack on their credibility because, with the S-3, F-i4, and other highly capable aircraft embarked they have become a weapon system that can operate in high threat areas of any sort.”
If the submarine is the main Soviet naval instrument we must be prepared to fight, it is one
8
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1974
which, in our hands, the Soviets cannot afford to neglect. Indeed, Norman Polmar informs us in "The Soviet 'Aircraft Carrier,’” the helicopter-carrying Moskva and Leningrad both "were intended to counter the U. S. Polaris submarines.” But "the area search capabilities of a single Moskva-class ship were limited. It would be necessary for many such ships to be available to have a major impact against U. S. submarines carrying the Polaris A-3 missile.” This is no surprise to anyone, of course. It is interesting, though, that the next Soviet step, the 35,000-ton Kiev class will be able to operate not only a substantial number of helicopters but also a squadron or two of VSTOL aircraft. The Soviet Union has shown more interest in VSTOL in the recent past than have we, and several types of STOL or VSTOL fighter are reported by Mr. Polmar to be under consideration for service aboard the Kiev and any sisters she may have. Such aircraft, he observes, "will provide a potent offensive and defensive capability where there is neither a major Allied air base nor an aircraft carrier,” and the Kiev herself "will permit the Soviets to employ more naval air power farther away from their shores.”
Considering the limited practical range of fighters, fighter-bombers, and attack planes when they are committed to such roles as combat air patrol and close air support, "farther away from their shores” doesn’t have to be very far at all. In fact, the significance of several Kiev-class ships in the not-too-distant Norwegian Sea could be enormous, mainly because they would be able to keep that part of the ocean clear of Allied ships until one or more properly supported American carriers could get there. Of course, it would be harder for the American task force to stay than it would be for the Russians to retire to their base and re-emerge after the Americans had gone. If the Soviets were successful in an airborne thrust supported by amphibious landings upon Norway, the Americans would have great difficulty in staying.
In that respect, Major General J. L. Moulton observes, "Despite the publicity that has been given to Soviet advances in the Mediterranean, the northern flank presents the greater potential threat.
To open the Black Sea and Baltic exits may have been an historic Russian ambition, but neither gives direct access to the Atlantic and the vital sea
communications of Western Europe. Murmansk has better access to that, but the route passes through the North Cape-Svalbard narrows and the straits on either side of Iceland. Opening or easing the passage of these by securing flanking territory for forward air bases, anchorages, and underwater surveillance installations would be a major strategic as well as a major political gain for Russia.”
General Moulton notes that "The main phase of the Russian Exercise Okean of 1970 was the deployment in the Norwegian Sea from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets of ten missile destroyers and cruisers, the helicopter carrier Moskva, and an estimated 30 submarines, supported by 400 bomber and reconnaissance sorties. . . . Russian marines in some 24 landing ships of the Northern Fleet simulated an invasion of hostile territory by landing near Pechenga on the Russian coast.”
It is true enough that the Soviet Navy does not have many amphibious ships that can steam long distances, but Bardufoss, not by any means the nearest Norwegian airfield to the Soviet border, "is some 260 nautical miles (480 km.) from Petsamo, less than an hour’s flying in an An-12, and. . . . The sea voyage from Murmansk to Troms0 is about 400 nautical miles, about 30 hours for a 15-knot ship . . .” Thus, the distances from the Soviet Union are relatively small and the need for a transoceanic invasion capability is correspondingly slight. General Moulton also points out that, if necessary, the first elements of an invasion force "could be disguised by sailing in the Soviet fishing fleet which frequents the area, or might follow the German example of 1940 and use fast warships to seize key coastal points.” The numerous modest-sized Russian merchant ships might also be employed. Going alongside the quays and discharging their troops (who need not be specially trained marines) right into the heart of town, such ships could play a decisive role in an invasion comparable in its speed to the "slick and efficient, if brutal” invasion of Czechoslovakia six years ago. Once the seaports and their associated airfields were taken, there would be nothing more in Norway for an invader to seek.
The foregoing illuminates the fact that the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact are possessed of "the capability of carrying through a sudden coup which would leave the West with the
choice of conventional counter-attack, nuclear escalation, or submission.” When one keeps in mind the principle set forth by Commander Roy L.
Beavers, Jr., in "Salt I,” that strategic nuclear forces exist only for the purpose of deterring the other side from initiating their use,” it becomes obvious that a power or coalition that can use either "conventional” or nuclear weapons has a considerable range of options, whereas one that relies solely or mainly on nuclear weapons has pathetically few. To be sure, even though the latter might possess "a qualitatively inferior missile force [he] can be confident that he will bobble to inflict intolerable destruction upon the other side’s society ...” But he will be able to that only at the cost of the destruction of his own society.
It remains to be said that, though Commander Beavers won the Naval Institute’s prize essay contest this year and his prize-winning work was published *n last month’s Proceedings, that fact is not connected with his appearance in the Naval Review issue. Nonetheless, the two essays, read in succession (this one was written before the one published last nronth), show Commander Beavers to be steady in his views, contrary though they may be to views highly regarded elsewhere.
In presenting these essays in Naval Review, the Naval Institute does not pretend to do more than offer tools to other men, with the aim of helping ihem add to their knowledge of professionally 'mportant and interesting things and perhaps helping them sharpen their own thinking on these subjects. Those who disagree with what is written here, in Part or in whole, explicitly or implicitly, are invited t0 take issue with our writers. Our pages are open t0 them.
Cv. TV,
Frank Uhlig, Jr. Editor
3 March 1974