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Solving the Submarine Force People Problem
The submarine force is at a crisis stage in the manning of its ships. Today, approximately 81% of all nuclear-power trained submarine officers—commander and below—are in seagoing billets. The day will soon be at hand when any nuclear submarine officer will achieve both command and higher echelon promotion, not in recognition of personal performance, but because of the attrition of his contemporaries. The day also may be coming when submarines will not go to sea because they lack experience in the leading petty officer “middle management” ranks.
The strategic deterrent submarine force operates to keep a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) at sea to cover strategic targets. Nominally, one month out of three is spent in upkeep; the other two are spent on deterrent patrol. A crew (Blue or Gold) is away from home port approximately in three-months-on, three-months-off cycles. I consider this a 67% “ship- tempo” and a 50% “crew-tempo.” Attack submarines, with only one crew, operate on a 50% ship/50% crew- tempo basis.
The advantages of the SSBN cycle are several. Every three submarines at sea 67% of the time equate to four submarines with a 50% ship-tempo. For three squadrons operating on the FBM cycle, a fourth is effectively created, while sailors are away from home port no more than their SSN contemporaries, sometimes less. The FBM/Poseidon schedule, roughly set years in advance, allows more efficient access to intermediate maintenance activities, long-range ship alteration planning by depot-level teams, and most important to the submarine bluejackets, precise scheduling of their home lives.
The major disadvantages of the Poseidon patrol routine are two. First, it creates a sense of disassociation between a man and his unit. By being shuttled from home to ship by airplanes and buses, without pier-side fanfare, the men of a deploying crew, in the main, feel unattached and without unit identity when not on board. Second, there is the awkwardly justified existence of whole submarine crews, without ships, in off-crew office buildings. The General Accounting Office has some understandable, albeit near-sighted, misgivings about this apparent personnel nonutilization.
These disadvantages can be overcome with good submarine management, but they continue to recur. And they will be with us as long as there are two-crew/one-ship patrols.
Attack submarine fleet readiness could be improved by adoption of SSBN ship/crew tempo policies resulting in improved maintenance capabilities, stable scheduling, and regulated crew home life.
Who wouldn’t want 17% more at-sea units (comparatively 33% more at-sea time) for limited costs? With three squadrons (10 ships each), 30 additional crews are required to achieve the fourth squadron ready for sea. At today’s pay scales, an-average submarine payroll is less than $250,000 per year. For 40 years and 30 crews, the fourth squadron would cost $300 million. Building an additional squadron of SSN hulls (10 X $300 million) would cost $3 billion. Thus, for 40 years at today's wages and prices, a fourth squadron at current ship-tempos could be put to sea for the cost of a single ship.
But, where do we find 30 additional crews? Given the Navy-wide goals of increased readiness and greater home life stability and the current pay scales, we can’t find them. We will have manning problems as long as we
pay a volunteer force conscript*00 wages. Since any program to increase wages to the scales needed in today5 fiscal climate to return the Navy t0 widely perceived attractive, retentive profession is remote, another alterna tive should be considered.
What would be lost if the 679f SSBN ship-tempo was reduced to 5 0 Target coverage would be cut by 25%. But with 30-plus crews ad e ^ to the rotatable community, think 0 the career patterns the submarine tailers could provide.
We’ve all poured our heart out to our boss, spouse, chaplain, <’r kid and asked, “Right?” only tl> be told, “I’m sorry, I wasn’t l«s* tening. ” Nobody listens any more- But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you thm about anything, perhaps y°u ought to contribute to “Nobo‘y asked me, hut ...”
Maybe what you have been sa) ing isn’t worth listening to. But’ if it is, we may print it and Pa> you $50.00. If it isn’t, you’ll fee better for having got it off your chest.
The cost of this proposal is obv ously the reduction in target covera?e This decision does not necessarily ^ mean reduced readiness. SALT cons* erations may not allow the reduction^ to be offset by an increase in warhea per ship, since both warheads and launching devices are accountable-^ But, as a sign of international £°° will, maybe the proposition is con ^ templatable, since 75% of mutual as sured destruction is still MAD. The cost of this change needs further ploration than this analysis, but a turn to the Navy standard of one ship-one crew may solve the submarine people problem.
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Proceedings / December