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ition
Optimistic Western analysts don’t think that the Soviets can keep enough of their “Yankee”- class “warfighting” submarines on line. But with “Yankees,” you don’t need many. Three of them, operating athwart the major carrier transit routes and other sea lines of communications, could launch up to 12 attacks within hours of the inception of a conflict.
• c t recog111
address the traumatic implications or any 1 of such a Soviet SSBN mission, namely:L neal^ The U. S. intelligence community has
this possible Soviet mission for 25 years.
► The U. S. Navy has been planning, F1 ^nSj, materiel, and operating for 25 years with no eration of a potentially serious but underin ny
It will take a persuasive argument to aC' j jjjjM tional or naval recognition of a Soviet tact1 ^ mission. The short-lived Soviet SS-NX-13 rn|Sfully 95 gram, dormant since 1973, was accePtetacti^ such a threat. Is it not possible that lateI' j rO
The prime mission of the U. S. fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is deterrence, discouraging initiation of nuclear war. The wartime mission is retaliation. Any launch of our submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), regardless of how effectively they performed, would therefore denote the failure of the prime mission. A spectrum of evidence suggests that the prime mission of the Soviet “Yankee”-class SSBNs is warfighting—primarily the interdiction of U. S. retaliatory strike capability and secondarily, enhancement of the probability of winning a postnuclear exchange conflict. The submarines are not intended for the purpose of strategic strike, retaliation, or withholding, even though we generally view them as assigned to those roles.
Commander Richard T. Ackley discussed Soviet SSBN operations in the June 1978 Proceedings.1 He cited three possible major missions: y Striking against land-based targets ► Combating the enemy fleet
^ Withholding for intra-war fighting or war termination bargaining.
The second mission has not influenced U. S. (or NATO) strategic and naval planning. Ackley did not
v_n a. uuv.ai. jlo u uui 1
tiship ballistic missiles have been deve^ ^ e(.
' “ >d
supersede the SS-NX-13 (which apparently h‘
r . 1 to P!
fective strategic range capability) and
enhanced system capability and versatility-
• d tb ^
The Soviet Naval Missions: The continue . evaluation of the Soviet SLBM force as stra ^ rives primarily from the Western concept 0 _
pose of submarine-launched ballistic m1 ^, prolonged Cold War, the purported l9^S
and Sputnik formed our thinking in the * c0ll& and early 1960s. Improved intelligence aj_ejierisNe tion and later events prompted no corn” f0[c<-’|S reevaluation of this thinking; the Soviet still viewed only as a strategic problem- >s
Almost every serious analyst of the S°vie _ jsjavf faced with a disturbing dichotomy. The \^r
had no delineated strategic mission from sL®^S
II until at least the late 1960s, but it di a 0{sHt and the plainly stated highest priority tus "* t f pressing nuclear strikes against the motherly re3 world's oceans. This mission was the navy s0t,vi°u5 son for being, and, except for the SLBMs, joC|<ed'|(1
focus of all its developmental effort. In ^^pjyis
s<e
*For footnotes, please turn to page 71.
U. S. view, however, nuclear-armed J c0(\C^'
strategic missiles. Therefore, America115fl)|c that the Soviet Navy must have a stra|£W Some U. S. analysts have accepted this vie
64
cussed later _
► Comparatively short missile ranges ^u£jng
ive
th*1
► Given that any nuclear weapon iaui»-“ ^s0n r. the "chain has been pulled,” there is salv0 1 launch only a single weapon; a sho g eCte&- ( three, four, or more missiles could be ..
Given primitive submarine navigat'0 ^ cgp (£l . and marginally effective targeting sensors, .jgS shou cular error probable) of 7 to 10 nautica
be possible at the 300-700-nautical-nm ^ SS*
ranges given for the older Soviet ss- jniss‘ SLBMs; the later “Yankee”-class sS‘ ese piis*1 should do even better at such ranges- te^.^
are all single stage and liquid propel e > greatetr vehicles estimated to be one megaton be yield. With liquid propulsion, thrust nated by valving at any time during nautl .£[
allowing minimum ranges of 1 t\\e ..
miles. The minimum range limit, r ^^jyab1 ^ viewpoint, would assure the safety an ^oft raff of the submarine firing the missiles- jficah1^' t missile accuracy should be impr°ve .S1^ equip1*1*.^}. With the exception of some anci rg[atively s°a|1i aircraft carriers are massive and re pticlU
. • „ less-tna“ *
Operating at sea, they are in a 1
ily, while others remain adamantly opposed.
The missions of the Soviet Navy since World War II have been well documented. Into the 1950s, Stalin, his successors, and the Soviet leadership had the almost paranoiac conviction that U. S.-supported NATO fully intended to subdue and dominate the Soviet Union. The U. S. fast carrier strike forces were a primary threat. In the 1960s, the U. S. SSBNs became the focus of concern and exacerbated Soviet fears. In 1965, even as the SS-N-6 missile/“Yankee”- class submarine program must have been gaining momentum, Soviet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov made an unusually straightforward statement:
“. . . our navy, which is called upon to protect our homeland reliably against naval attacks by the aggressor, is playing an ever greater role in strengthening our country’s defensive might. In the past few decades its development—the profound qualitative changes in its armaments and its equipment with new ships—has been subordinated to this goal.” [Emphasis added.]2 A knowledgeable Soviet writer suggested very pointedly in 1973 that Soviet SLBMs were not dedicated solely to strategic targets:
“Equipping submarines with nuclear power plants and arming them with nuclear munitions and ballistic missiles of long range and underwater launch has changed them into the main strike force of a modern navy and capable of carrying out a wide circle of offensive missions of an operational and strategic nature.” [Emphasis added.]3 Soviet writers have repeatedly designated some of the intended targets for Soviet SLBMs: y “. . . targets on both land and sea . . .”
► "... surface targets located at distances of thousands of kilometers ...” [Emphasis added.]
► “. . . major land bases, ships at formation, and those which are laid up, and industrial centers ...” [Emphasis added.]4
On Soviet Navy Day in 1972, Admiral Gorshkov said:
"... Nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles and long-range torpedoes, and backed by missile-carrying planes and ships, are capable of destroying an enemy in any region of the world's oceans.” [Emphasis added.]5
On this same date, another admiral was more specific: .
“Submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying ships at a distance of hundreds of kilometers and of delivering blows from beneath the water at strategic enemy targets at greater distances.” [Emphasis added.]6
This constant iteration of “seagoing” targets for
to be ^
ballistic missiles has persisted far too long govie1 missed as having been engendered by anr*'
optimism over the future role of the SS- f ship ballistic missile. The Soviet SLBM/SSB born of, and nurtured on, Soviet naval Xe'caP^1'? sive requirements. The strategic offens $ 0u[
of the present fleet is merely a seren *P* js still growth of that effort, and Admiral Goes ctjonst0 trying to sell it. However, some valid o )^j, tactical employment of SLBMs have been & jjfficul1,
► Targeting accurately from a submarine
a moving target compounds the difficulty■ ^ cap3”
► The launching submarine has no rea ^ ^\\is^c
bility for locating tactical targets at sea missile ranges. . ^sic c°fl”
In evaluating these objections, severa siderations apply: . is c0(1
► The second objection, target l°catl°j^_i3, ‘l'5 tradicted by data published on the SS
tic*1 tb{
v ___ r___ --j ___
miles or less) are possible, significantly accuracy problem. t ev*sl
► Shorter ranges allow less time f°r tar
action. ensate 1
► An increase in weapon yield may C°jnaCCufaCieSt relative missile guidance and targeting ^ j0ytlieIf
► The impelling requirement for tactica ^
of SLBMs would be to prevent the {aU>1‘^ccarrier 1 strike aircraft or missiles, not to sin submarine (which might be desirable)- eans
66
Proceei
,di»Ss
launch 1
ance
at peak overpressures as low as 2-3 PSI.
decl^ 65 Cnt C° surv*ve a nuclear attack. The flight cupjej ^ t0 ^ feet above the surface, is usually oc- Ncesj op a Jarying number of aircraft, often in the 0cre'ueling and/or rearming. The relatively no protection.
'nterdict ^ e^ects a nuclear burst which would nUclear-aCarr*er operations and prevent the launch of 'n Pound rne^ ^°f ot^er^ uircraft are blast (measured "dthjtj ^Cr Scluare inch or PSI), which would occur ^ret>all_r (j0nCS or minutes, depending upon range; Ce0timeterlated heat (measured in calories per square ^Mp)j both°f Ca^crn2^> and electromagnetic pulse !n the c/y°CCUrr*nS almost instantly.
In<licatf.c \ects °f Nuclear Weapons, Samuel Glasstone > A ”a'he following:
0t>ly, 0Verpressure (the primary, but not the Cause faj ?la^*n8 blast component) of 5-6 PSI will aricillarv ^ SeVere damage to ship superstructure and "'ill ptob^U*f)rnent> while overpressures of 3-4 PSI ^ Milit ^.Cause moderate damage.
^c°Uomic^| a*rcra^ W41 probably suffer strike (not pSj anJ° rePait) damage at peak overpressures of ^uinten ° su®c*ent damage to require extensive
► Given a one-megaton burst, black rubber such as aircraft tires and fuel hoses will ignite at radiant heat intensities of 20 calories per square centimeter.
► Eight to ten calories per square centimeter (or less) of radiated heat will cause severe burns to exposed personnel, particularly those in dark clothing.
► EMP effects will vary with the nature of the weapon but could disable ship and aircraft electrical and electronics systems (and ignite some weapons) at considerable distances.7
Table 1 summarizes the ranges at which these various effects (with the exception of EMP) would be expected to occur given a one-megaton burst at optimum altitude, or about 2 nautical miles high. Figure 1 shows the varying radii at which disabling damage could reasonably be expected from such a burst. The damage effects would vary with the aspect angle of the burst from the carrier and with differing weather conditions. While a carrier might survive a nuclear attack, given the targeting problems, the stated objective—interdiction of nuclear attack against the motherland — probably would be achieved.
COURTESY OF TETRA TECH, INC.
Soviet Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles
S'atus
Ope,
IOC*
Range
^Pulsion
Paging
!?arhead/
Gu'dance
Launch mode platfr,,
SS-N-4 | SS-N-5 | SS-N-6 MOD-1 | SS-NX-13 | SS-N-8 | SS-N-6 MOD-2 | SS-N-6 MOD-3 |
1960 | 1963 | 1968 | 1969 | 1973 | 1976 | 1976 |
300 | 700 | 1300 | 400 | 4200 | 1600 | 1600 |
Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid |
1-Stage | 1-Stage | 1-Stage | 2-Stage | 2-Stage | 1-Stage | 1-Stage |
1 RV/ | 1 RV/ | 1 RV/ | 1 RV/ Inertial | 1 RV/ | 1 RV/ | 3 MRV/ |
Inertial | Inertial | Inertial | and radar homing | Stellar-Inertial | Inertial | Inertial |
Surface | Submerge | Submerge | Submerge | Submerge | Submerge | Submerge |
GOLF 1, HOTEL 1 | GOLF II, HOTEL II | YANKEE | YANKEE ? | HOTEL III, DELTA l/ll | YANKEE | YANKEE |
Operational | Operational | Obsolete (1976 ?) | Cancelled | Operational | Operational | Operational |
°nal OapabJIity — year in which the submarine end missile system entered the operational inventory ot forces.
The possible effects of subsurface nuclear burst on
the ■ on
lint
the
requirements; the number he has ^eP jjj.
line is adequate for tactical employment tbe ic _ _ • mire affecting
ments. If a maintenance problem were a
utilization, a much greater variation m
emp
adequate for deployment when, where, a
,oft
of
With the majority of the “Yankees
rifle
the
*w*‘*w*’w7 1 - ft l ”
The nuclear-powered “Yankee” class j^ft/scf^ power, high-speed, relatively noisy ^ua^or a s^' propulsion system—not really required °^ete[reflc marine on a typical slow-moving, covert, faStef patrol mission. The “Yankee,” about ^ie the than our comparable SSBNs (at more than ^ shaft horsepower), is probably fast lT!rtack *>*
some of our earlier nuclear-powered „yan
• if the
marines (SSNs) and our aircraft carriers. .
strike row
th|S
sir
submarines may also be addressed. For instance, a nuclear weapon burst at a depth of 1,000 feet would create an intense shock wave traveling at about the speed of sound through water. The lateral distance at which a one-megaton burst could overstress and collapse a deeply submerged submarine hull is unknown. A rough estimate would be 3-5 nautical miles, with the aspect angle of the burst from the ship varying this distance. The shock (water- hammer) effect could be critically severe for an extended distance, damaging delicate inertial instruments and components on both missiles and the submarine. If so, the launch suppression requirement would have been met. A grid pattern salvo of missiles could enlarge the interdictory damage radius and area.
The SS-N-6, Mod 2 has a single reentry vehicle, while the Mod 3 has two or three. Because the Mod 3’s maximum range is given as equal to that of the Mod 2, its warheads must be smaller than those of the Mod 2 and could be optimized for deployment in a submerged burst footprint more suited for submarine interdiction.
“Yankee” Class Employment and Propulsion: Commander Ackley, K. J. Moore, and others have commented on SSBN patrol areas and on the low “Yankee” utilization rate of about four to five SSBNs on patrol out of a total of more than 30; this amounts to only about 12-15% on patrol.8 The patrol areas and
Table 1*
Slant Range, | Expected Peak | Expected Radiant | |
Burst to Target | Overpressure | Heat Equivalent | |
|
| at Target, | at Target, |
Statute | Nautical | Pounds Per | Calories Per Square |
Miles | Miles | Square Inch | Centimeter |
|
| (PSI) | (CAL/CM2) |
3 | 2.6 | 9.0 | 100 |
4 | 3.5 | 5.5 | 48-50 |
5 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 30-35 |
6 | 5.2 | 3.2 | 20 |
7 | 6.1 | 2.5 | 12-15 |
8 | 7.0 | 2.0 | 10 |
9 | 7.8 | 1.6 | 5 |
10 | 8.7 | 1.4 | 2 |
Table 1.* | The expected blast and heat effects on a target at | ||
varying ranges from a nuclear burst with | a one megaton yield. |
Peak overpressures of 2-3 pounds per square inch will damage aircraft, while heat radiation equivalent to 20 calories per square centimeter will cause black rubber objects to burst into flame.
•Taken from the Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer included in Glasstone: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Third Edition.
"V nkee” aS ^
employment rate are adequate for the *a , marjnts
antiship tactical weapon system, for the and
operate athwart the major carrier transit ^an(cees
other sea lines of communication. Three ^jssik
on patrol in the Atlantic, allowing for 0nCj, up
salvos for each target ship or force, coul facoa'
to 12 attacks within hours of the inception
flict. Before more task groups or convoys coUld
formed and dispatched, additional Yan ee j, 5ays
be surge-deployed. Commander C. C. *~lO„£orShk0v
that, because of maintenance problems, »9 |i
• ■ rhe lme-
can’t possibly keep his submarines on u
Gorshkov can produce 65 modern subm* 1
about 15 years, he can also keep enough on
to meet
ient
- n fesetve
rates would be expected. The “Yankees ^ jf are required.
local waters (and remembering the PosSnaj - versatility of the SS-N-6), the Soviet hierarc ^ ^ch option of rapidly tailoring responsive aCtl°” ng ifltet' varying requirements in any period rlS* tjnie f°r national tension. The submarine crews hayrelaXat'ofl training, drills, routine maintenance an cfews). (with no requirement for “blue and g° ^ jjng 0 Facilities exist for major repairs and UP^ jnd‘' equipment. During any escalation of tens ^ pih vidual submarine weapon loads may be ^g^er the
aboard to fit anticipated requirements, w .atjofl 0
threat is Chinese, NATO, U. S., or a com 1 j,edt° these. These “Yankees” may be quickly l8P^ 0[(Jets- relatively safe littoral waters to await turt ^ ^ y,jgb'
kee” is dedicated purely to a strategic str ^ 5 added power, which is very noisy and req ^ jS, nificantly greater amounts of scarce nuclear^. prime example of misapplied technology- frafl^’ to a tactical warfighting role, on the 0 would call for high speed and probably t e sacrifice of more silent operation.
. The
The SS-N-6 (Mods)/SS-NX-13 Shell Game-
:ee”/ss-N-6
Were the:
1969.
system became operational about
Nx.
The Joint 13 in 1978- ‘Th
then ^ Vessels carrying the missiles, which would enerne ^re<J coward the general area in which the ^X-n S*llps were steaming. Sources say the SS-
^ t vie J1 v tl
low rrussHe warhead can change direction to fol-
hear
target at coordinates different (Moore es-
C'm;
hiiles) ffUp t0 50 kilometers, or about 35 nautical Point W/f0 t*le initial (uncorrected) ballistic impact
^NX-13
the Soy' never became operational, but it highlights rhe test l Intent t0 use SLBMs tactically. Inasmuch as a'^nc^1 was conducted in 1973, a reasonable devgjo °wance would indicate system concept and sornettme during the 1960s. The
toallow—cne ss-NX-13 and SS-N-6 developed jointly "'ere the6 ^an^ee” a dual tactical/strategic role? Or ‘rig tacticaj0 m*ss^es complementary, allowing differ- (he tatgetp aPPbcation dependent upon the nature of
Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the SS-
missil 6 ,SS'Nx'13 is a tactical ballistic antiship in Y Mr may have been intended for deployment since C^aSS ss®^s. U has not been tested
HoWeve0vember 1973 and is not operational, the n, f’ t^le advanced technology displayed by An 7,iap0n is significant ...” 10 f>r°vides UStrat‘on °f the SS-NX-13 flight trajectory ^llotvin m^0rmation on the missile, including the
^ A ^
^ An a^£ t0 600 nautical miles
ttiiles °^ee Maximum altitude) of 150 nautical
t JW°eSta§es
target n?S°r ^ur*defined) which “locks on” to the
h Terrri^ar ap08ee
Lensor-detecr stage maneuvers to allow impact at the 'dal haii- ected target coordinates, offset from the in> subilc Tpact point
A ne launch capability.11 *'shed ;nr account probably best sums up the pub- "ThO^ation on the SS-NX-13: miSsiiee ^°Vlet Union is perfecting a new naval 40() e .t^at c°uld hit U. S. warships from over . r-,5s away even if they maneuvered to escape
missil l 6 Soviets recently resumed testing [the PlanesJ experts believe that Russian
sp0t0r satellites probably would be used to help speecl211601^ sbips. Information on target location, sUrfara°d course would be beamed down to Soviet
Thear^et ships if they try to evade.”12 °CcUts alect°ry data indicate that “sensor lock-on”
cects” "ar udssile apogee, and that the sensor “de
i^ Che taro*,- ________ l■ cc____________ * ates
cical^^atever t^ie c7pe sensor> at the 100-600- hhle ranges given, the approximate target lo-
Figure 1
Taken from the “Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer" included in Glasstone, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Third Edition.
Figure 2. Possible salvo targeting of four missiles with one megaton reentry vehicles with 7-nautical-mile damage radius to interdict a carrier at sea. AB = BC = 12 nautical miles. XY = YZ = 26 nautical miles. Area = 676 square nautical miles. With a circular error probable (CEP) of 3 5 nautical miles, the weapons would be expected to hit within the smaller circles 50% of the time, and within the larger circles about 90% of the time.
the
cal
ndered
d-
ternal reconaissance sensor systems. ► More importantly, additional
target-**
.radiate'
discontinued. At about the same time, tW° oPetr models of the SS-N-6 were tested and beca tegic tional. These SS-N-6 (Mods) had improve ^jlity range, plus a possible minimum range also
cation as well as the pertinent characteristics of the sensor target would have had to have been provided to the launching “Yankee”-class ship from an external or remote reconaissance sensor sometime prior to launch. There is no indication that the “Yankee” may autonomously locate any surface or subsurface
targets at such distances. Briefly, a remote sensor or combination of sensors and a means of communicating the location of targets detected by these sensors to the submerged “Yankee” were apparently required for the SS-NX-13. There is no obvious reason that such a system could not be applied in the targeting of other tactical SLBMs.
The cited reports say that the SS-NX-13 test launches resumed and were completed in November 1973 and that the SS-NX-13 demonstrated “advanced technology.” They acknowledge that the SS-NX-13 was a tactical antiship SLBM, probably intended to be carried by the “Yankee” class. They offer no rationale for the abrupt discontinuation of the program, other than the obvious SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) liability. The launchers would count, but the missile had no effective strategic range.
The 1977 JCS report states the following:
“In October 1972, flight testing began on a modified version of the SS-N-6. This system, the MOD 2, reached an IOC [initial operating capability] in 1973- The most significant modification was in the propulsion system, resulting in a 300 nm [nautical mile] increase in range to 1600 nm.
. . . The SS-N-6 MOD 3 represents a further development in Soviet missile technology. This 1,600 nm weapon carries MRVs and may have reached IOC in 1975. . .”13
The more pertinent technical characteristics of the SS-NX-13, SS-N-6 (Mods) and the “Yankee” class, and the indicated timing of some of the more significant events may be summarized as follows:
► Although the interim strategic arms limitation agreement, signed in May 1972, rem ctl, “Yankee”-class launch tubes accountable, t ^ge antiship SS-NX-13 SLBM, with little strateg^^ capability, remained under test through
1973. 6> M°a
► But the single reentry vehicle SS- Ibce**1
2—upgraded to a 1,600-nautical-mile range ^ 0„
testing in October 1972 and became operat* ^ the “Yankee” in 1973; the two-to-three reentr j£ cle SS-N-6, Mod 3 was tested sometime be o* reported operational on the “Yankee” in D any
► The SS-NX-13 could be roughly targete ^ ^get- target within range with “Yankee” on-boa
ing and fire control computers. woula
► The “Yankee,” to launch the SS-NX-1^
have had to receive rough target coot * ^ ejc-
while (probably) submerged, from one or
signal characteristics required for the SS-NX at)d sor” would have had to be detected, eva ua ^ passed to the launching “Yankee”-class su
► The liquid-propelled SS-N-6 (all Mods) c0 of a minimum range capability comparable t
the SS-NX-13. j using
► The SS-N-6 (Mods) could also be targets
the “Yankee”-class on-board fire control an^^.i3. ing computer intended for use with the art We do not suggest that the SS-N-6 ( ^ jS also equipped with a target-detecting “sensor. ^.13 important to differentiate between t^'^ance target-detecting “sensor” and the reconais * coursers” which would provide target locati > and speed data to the launching submarine reer< In summary, the interim strategic ar ]aundierS was signed, limiting the number of SLB tecfrnol' allowed. Later, the SS-NX-13, an ‘ advance^^ ^ ogy” weapon lacking effective strategic^ - imPr°ve
comparable to that of the SS-NX-13- j tactica
capable of assuming the SS-NX- 13’s intenf senso^ °\ role? Did some combination of enhance surveillance system capability andlo cO*11'
“Yankee” on-board targeting and fire'CO ^Jlity puter augment “Yankee” SS-N-6 tactic® sufficiently to allow it to replace the n £SlJch* SS-NX-13? The train of events is suSSestlve jate 19^ breakthrough, probably occurring between and 1974, given the timing of other
One clear impression emerges fr ^ jn tl> studies of Soviet doctrinal approach to sva
1973).
"®S A«ack," Izvestiya, 28 April 1970.
"mjrronuc^ear weapons: the Soviet concept is not a JaCqUejr lrnage of the U. S. or Western concept.
Davis summarizes the difference: the ^Cording t0 the military/political literature of equj ^let Union concepts such as stability, parity, areence> military balance, and even deterrence w^pq60t0 ^0v'et strategic thought . . . [N]uclear doctrinS n0t a^tef t^*e essence Soviet strategic Winn- [1][2] [3] emphasizes war-waging and war-
GivennfhC°nCeptS’ ‘ • -”[4][5]
cept 0f ^ ls’ *t follows that a “ mirror image” con- iovieK' weaponry also requires extreme opme f[6]' Their approach to weapon system devel- fulfill; > aS- k£en pragmatic; assets are dedicated to bin^j ° tmssion requirements according to priority. and sj-, t>een considered less than technological has haj 6 *abor limitations, but the Soviet Navy SSBmsanj° for a share of the military ruble.
Substanr' . ^BMs, tremendously expensive, are also a W’a drawdown on limited technological and Soviet jq6r P°°b. Admiral Gorshkov stated that the reqUireavaf developments were subordinated to the <Wel0Dnt t0 defend the homeland. Among these C°ncept ntS Was an exPens‘ve antiship tactical SLBM Only f^e very expensive “Yankee” program.
en this requirement had been fulfilled did artlnie Roie of Sovjet ssgfjj .. pp 34.42
Homeland,” Pravda, 24 July 1965.
AAF S lJ' ASW Weapons and Their Delivery Systems (Moscow: ,1^ ^bmari^’ ^rasnaya zvezda, 29 July 1967; V. Goltsev, “The Nu-
3o July j^_^Ceanic ^uar<^ tl,e Soviets,” Zarya vos-
i 'f'°n (tya h 6 *te^ ^ Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, Third ^• J. Moore *n^t0n’ k-C.: U. S. Government Printing Office).
^ar‘ne Sys ’ ^an*gan, and R. D. Helsel, “Developments in Sub- 2S*. m"1![7][8] [9] [10] [11],5.6:76'" in Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign faeger Puki *C^ae^ ^ccGwire and John McDonnell, editors (New York: the development of the larger SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 missiles and the “Delta”-class submarines occur, in concert with Gorshkov’s intensified campaign for an increased naval share of the strategic strike tasking with the Strategic Rocket Force. The rapid development of a large and versatile fleet of SSBNs capable of a significant variety of operational and strategic assignments provided him significant leverage for such a campaign. The compelling—overriding—Soviet naval mission at the time, however, was the limiting of nuclear strikes against the motherland. The “Yankee” fleet was developed in support of this mission.
Lieutenant Commander Clawson served—as an enlisted combat air crewman and in other capacities—in aviation squadrons and aircraft carriers from 1944 to 1946 and 1950 to 1959- In 1959, as an aviation ordnanceman first class, he was commissioned as a limited duty officer. Subsequent duty included the USS Wasp (CVS-18), Naval Air Station Oceana, the staff of Commander Fleet Air Quonset Point, and staff of Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. From 1968 to 1971, he was an analyst at the U. S. Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center and head of the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Division. Since 197 1
retirement, he has been an analyst with the Systems Division of
Tetra Tech, Inc. He lives in Rockville, Maryland.
““SALT and the Balance of Superpower Strategic Forces," NATO’s Fifteen Nations, February-March, 1978, p. 58.
The Right Man for the Job
[6] just received a letter from my fiance, a lieutenant serving on board an aircraft carrier. As I proudly read aloud about his activities as movie officer, safety officer, claims officer, and recreation officer, my father, who was once in the Navy, smiled and said, “It sounds as though he’s also the junior officer.”
Monique Livingston
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
[7]'Proceedings, July 1978, pp. 21-22.
‘"General George S. Brown, USAF, United States Military Posture for FY 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 16.
“Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Make New SALT Bid," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 February 1976, p. 14. Reprinted in Aviation Week & Space Technology on SALT (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979),
p. 128.
“Fred S. Hoffman (Associated Press), "Russ perfecting new naval missile,” San Francisco Examiner, 14 November 1973, p. 19.
“Brown, United States Military Posture for FY 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 37-38.