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Over Management Leadership
Commander Frederic H. E. Vose, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Nobody asked me, but I am fascinated by the current crop of leadership essays bewailing "over management” in the Navy. It crops up in other bureaucracies too—HEW, EPA, and OSHA to name a few.
I recall one of your anecdotes some years back about two destroyer skippers comparing notes in a bar in Singapore. Our guy talked about his voluminous op-plans. The Limey envied him: his only direction was to “Protect the Queen’s interest.”
Now, that’s the wet navy—a la Paul Jones and going in harm’s way!
A Surface Navy for Today’s Threat”
(See W. H. Bagley, pp. 34-39, September 1978 Proceedings)
Anthony Harrigan—The civilianization °f the defense establishment never erases to amaze me. However, I was astounded to read the note identifying Worth H. Bagley” in the September ■ssue. There was no mention of the fact that he served as an admiral in the hi- S. Navy. The text suggested that he was an academic with a post in business. If a professional naval maga- Zlne downplays rank, why should any- 0r>e be surprised if the country fails to £>ve due respect to those who bear responsibility in their country’s service?
Editor s Note: Worth Bagley and Ar- 1e'gh Burke are two retired admirals who have expressed a preference not to use their military rank on our pages.
Air Force Maritime Missions”
(See H. A. Caldwell, pp. 28-36, October 1978)
lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, U.S. Navy—Mr. Caldwell °ffers some promising ideas for planning in his article. I hope, however, tbat his conclusions are not taken seriously. Namely, we should not undertake policies and practices, notwithstanding doctrine, because the Soviets appear to have similar policies and practices.
In spite of what is perhaps widely believed, Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA) does not often undertake maritime tasks, though they have a mission requirement to do so. The LRA probably performs fewer maritime flights than does the Strategic Air Command, in part, because the LRA is primarily a strategic theater force without significant means to perform intercontinental or ocean operations.
The U. S. armed forces should plan and program their missions, capabilities, and operations because they support U. S. and allied security and international interests, not because the Soviets seem to have similar capabilities or interests. For the most part, Soviet natural security interests are much different from our own. In a naval context, Admiral of the Fleet of the U.S.S.R., Sergei G. Gorshkov, has pointed out this condition numerous times in his writings.
I recommend to Proceedings readers that we take these differences into serious account in our planning and programs. A more complete understanding of Soviet security interests, including their motives and rationale, will make our own plans and programs more appropriate and could actually lead to an easing of international tensions and to realistic and enduring arms limitations agreements. Moreover, we ought to begin to examine the nature and effects of confrontations between parties other than the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the extent to which such confrontations do, or might, involve the interests of the United States. Press reports and other public records over the last decade suggest that there may be greater potential for war between the historic enemies of Russia and China than between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. Nevertheless, I have yet to see an examination of the maritime aspects of such a confrontation in Western naval literature.
Contents:
Over Management Leadership
A Surface Navy for Today’s Threat
Air Force Maritime Missions
In the Navy’s Future:
The Small Fast Surface Ship
We Rode the Covered Wagon
Twilight for the Corps?
The Alcoholic Navy
Preservation of a Tradition
The Fraudulent Enlistment Caper
The Strange Case of Rainbow-5
V/STOL Design for Tactical Aircraft
What V/STOL “Really” Is (A Pilot’s View)
The Marines Through 1999
Extinguish the Smoking Lamp: Permanently
Command Authority and Professionalism
The Changing Nature of Modern Naval Leadership
Leadership and Nuclear Power
Attack Submarine Development— Recent Trends and Projected Needs
Sea-Based “Strategic” Weapons for the 1980s and Beyond
Seakeeping—and the SWATH Design
The Naval Reserve: Separate and Unequal
Needed: One Shipboard Electronic Maintenance Philosophy
Grading the Fitness Report
The Violation of the Liberty
“In the Navy’s Future: the Small Fast Surface Ship”
<See R. E. Adler, pp. 102-111, March 1978; W. S. Hoffman, pp. 81-82, August 1978; and R. K. Ripley, pp. 86-87, October 1978 Proceedings)
“We Rode the Covered Wagon”
(See J. R. Tate, pp. 62-69, October 1978 Proceedings)
Commander Andrew B. Bennett, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—In World War II the principal operating areas were the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In a future outbreak of hostilities, the Indian Ocean will doubtless also be included. The Persian Gulf, NATO’s present principal source of oil, must be protected as well as the 12,000- mile lifeline to Atlantic NATO ports via the Cape of Good Hope route. Eastward to U. S. Pacific ports the line extends over 11,000 miles.
With our Navy’s present strength of 453 ships (less than one-tenth of that at the end of World War II), the patrolling and protection of the additional operating area and sea lanes are tasks apparently beyond our present Navy’s capabilities.
The presently planned shipbuilding programs will not be realized until the mid-1980s. These facts form powerful arguments for ending further delays and to start the integration of a growing force of small fast surface ships. They, transported on fast landing ships, dock (LSDs), can operate with the fleet or scout and patrol independently or in support of Marine Corps landings. Project studies and operational tests indicate that the small fast surface ship’s versatility will prove itself beyond expectation and in due time constitute an indispensable part in our total defense posture.
What is needed is a readjustment in our thinking. Navies have had to adjust themselves to improvements and innovations which at their inception seemed “too far out” or impractical. In 1897, a small yacht equipped with the newly invented Parson steam turbine created a sensation as she sped through the formation of ships during the Spithead Naval Regatta at a then unheard of speed of over 30 knots.
By coincidence, the October Proceedings contains an absorbing article which illustrates the development of a radically new idea in aviation. Entitled “We Rode the Covered Wagon,” it is the story of the USS Langley (CV-l), created from the former collier USS Jupiter (AC-3). It vividly describes the difficulties to be overcome and the innovations to be developed to construct a flight deck over a coal hulk and to design apparatus whereby a land plane could be launched and landed. Perseverance overcame periodical lack of support, doubts, and setbacks, and two years after the landing of the first plane on her flight deck, she joined the Battle Fleet on 17 November 1924.
The tremendous accomplishments of the fast carrier task forces as well as the divisions of light so-called “escort carriers since 1942 to the present day long spelled the end of the proud battleship.
Where a battleship cost $60 million in 1941, a modern nuclear carrier costs $2 billion, or 33 times as much, and it takes years to build such a vast and complicated ship. While carriers are still the backbone of the Navy, we must move with the times.
A local press item, quoting from a recent address by Navy Secretary W. Graham Claytor Jr., reports the sighting in the Baltic of a new Soviet helicopter-equipped amphibious warfare ship capable of carrying three air- cushion personnel landing craft. Each craft can hold a platoon of troops and make rapid landings at speeds in excess of 45 mph.
Secretary Claytor said, “Regardless of how much we improve the quality of our individual ships, no ship can be in more than one place at a time. This statement endorses the need for rethinking of our priorities and concentrating our funds and time to build up an effective force of the versatile “speedees,” the small fast surface ships.
“Twilight for the Corps?”
(See W. S. Lind and J. Record, pp. 38-43, July 1978; F. J. Frank and H. Noyes, p. 23, September 1978; W. V. Kennedy and D. A- Quinlan, pp. 90-91, October 1978; W. O. Standenmaier, G. E. Bell, G. D. Batcheller, and M. R. Janay, pp. 103-107, November 1978 Proceedings)
Colonel James B. Soper, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired), Potomac Research, Inc. —I would like to address one subject in this short response—container- ships. The containership aspect is not new and did not first surface in the Field Logistic System study. It has been an active discussion and study item in the Navy and Marine Corps since at least I960. The problem is that containerships by themselves are not responsive to the early landing requirements in an assault landing because they lack flexibility, i.e., a fighting commander ashore must accept 90% of a container load that is unnecessary at the time in order to receive the 10% that is essential. The Tactical-Logistic Group (TacLog) was devised in the heat of World War U to prevent the unrestricted flow of equipment and supplies into
beachheads that were unable to re- ce*ve, store, maintain, or distribute the material at that time of the operation. The numerous Navy and Marine Corps evaluations of this early use of containers have always validated the point that they could not be used early in an operation but would be very val- nable later in general unloading, follow-on echelons, or resupply. Further, the disposition of the container itself, providing it could be introduced ashore, is a major problem. First, it is in the way, and, second, it presents an excellent target registration point for the enemy.
The containership is oriented to an administrative landing, as the article promotes, for both the Marine Corps and the Army. Actually, the administrative landing is not as simple as many defense analysts imply. A tnarine amphibious force (MAF) equates to approximately 245,116 measurement tons for personnel, equipment, and supplies. Using a colocated air and sea terminal free from enemy interference or firepower, an Maf would require 2,206,051 square feet of open storage, 196,092 square feet of closed storage, a minimum of 1.500 meters of Class I wharfs, and 221,300 square meters of runway and taxiway, assuming the C-5A and C-141 aircraft as well as KC-130S will be used.
There are certain aspects of the article that ring true, e.g., the high cost °f aviation related to the overall Marine Corps budget. However, much °f the rest of its text reads like General Omar Bradley’s comment about the demise of amphibious warfare just before Inchon.
Cuba’s Maritime Outreach”
®ee J- D. Harbron, pp. 40-47, September 1978 Proceedings)
lieutenant Charles N. Dragonette, U.S. ^uval Reserve—Mr. Harbron mentions Use of Cuban ships to support that country’s intervention in Angola. According to the Cubans’ own authorized account of that operation, there were at one time 15 ships at sea in this Slngle operation. Fully one sixth of tbeir merchant fleet was thus withdrawn from commercial service, with
all the economic and logistic dislocations such an action entails. The same Cuban account and later news stories based on statements by a captured Cuban soldier also reveal that at least one of the cargo ships owned and operated by Cuba under Panama’s flag of convenience was used to transport troops to Angola.
Cuba’s known involvement in flag- of-convenience shipping covers eight ships with a total deadweight capacity of more than 100,000 tons. These ships trade worldwide and can, at any time, make clandestine inroads in support of Cuban (or Soviet?) policy. In addition to this direct ownership, Cuba is a partner with six other Caribbean countries in the Naviera Multinacional del Caribe (NAMUCAR). Operating primarily with chartered tonnage, the consortium owns at least one ship which was recently reported arriving at Havana in tow of a Cuban tug for repairs, indicating that the Cuban government might exercise more than one seventh of the control over her. An advertisement for NAMUCAR, which appeared last year in a British shipping magazine, showed a “bombsight view” of the Caribbean with the title "A Target Direct to the Caribbean!”—unwittingly prophetic?
There are ample indications that this maritime outreach will continue to grow outward and in which direction that growth will take. Although the war in Angola has for all practical purposes been over for two years and the Ethiopian intervention was concluded successfully last summer, Cuba has recently taken delivery of an 800- passenger liner and renamed her Africa Cuba, leaving little doubt as to her future employment. At the same time, Cuba has joined with Angola in an effort to build that country’s merchant fleet. A secondhand ship purchased this summer for Angolan flag has been advertised in the Angolan press as a Cuban gift which is being manned jointly by Cuban and Angolan mariners. No mention has been made of the crewing or operational arrangements for three earlier Soviet gifts which were renamed Karl Marx, Lenin, and Engels—hardly household words in Angola not too long ago.
“The Alcoholic Navy”
(See H. G. Redmon, p. 93, September 1978 Proceedings)
Commander Charles W. Soules, U.S. Navy—Some of Commander Red- mon’s recommendations concerning prevention of alcohol abuse in the Navy by reducing the availability of alcohol are too extreme and, if implemented, could be counterproductive. The problem with alcohol abuse in the Navy is not the availability of alcohol; it’s the Navy’s attitude toward alcohol abuse.
Far too many Navy groups consider themselves to have the image of being manned by “hard drinking, two fisted sailors. Thus, the young sailors reporting on board and being assigned to one of these groups feel they must live up to the image of their rate or group. These young men develop,
early in their careers, a drinking pattern which has some of them well on their way to becoming alcoholics by the time they achieve middle grade or above seniority.
To combat this problem the Navy should deemphasize alcohol use at ships’ functions, abolish happy hours, and discourage the telling of “you wouldn’t believe how drunk I was”- type sea stories. The Naval Institute’s The Book of Navy Songs, for example, might be called The Book of Drinking Songs, containing as it does, such representative barroom ballads as “Whiskey Johnny," “All Those in Favor of Having a Drink,” “The Navy Drinking Song,” and “What Are You
Going To Do With a Drunken Sailor?”
Most important, we need to get strict m dealing with all personnel who are too hungover or drunk to perform.
Shortsighted sledge hammer approaches, such as not serving drinks in the clubs at lunch, closing package stores and the like, must be avoided. I observed the effects of implementing just such a program a year or so ago. The alcohol abusers continued to drink outside the gate, at home, or in their cars. The majority of all Navy Personnel was irritated, and attitudes toward the base Alcohol Abuse Control Program suffered. What is needed ls a negative attitude toward alcohol at>use, not the program.
Preservation of a Tradition”
®ee L. R- Lee, pp. 62-75, September 1978 Proceedings)
R°y de Alteriis, Director, Norfolk School
Boatbuilding—Mr. Lee writes with Justifiable pride in the efforts of New Englanders to keep alive the age-old art of boatbuilding. But I would be rerniss if I did not point out that the *argest boatbuilding school in the United States is on the revitalized downtown waterfront of Norfolk.
The school is open to visitors who can watch skilled craftsmen building Sading boats of up to 40 feet in length and work on such handmade nautical 'tetns as sea chests, name plates, and half models for display.
The Norfolk School of Boatbuilding ,s a direct result of cooperative efforts °f city government officials, area busi- ”ess leaders, and the National Trust °r Historic Preservation, all of whom recognized the need for skilled Craftsmen to fulfill the demand for Quality small boat construction. This realization was an outgrowth of Oper- at*on Sail and Norfolk’s “Harborfest” Popularity.
Tuition is $250 per month for each
the three one-year programs offered: niall Boatbuilding and Joinerwork, raditional Boatbuilding, and Yacht Maintenance and Repair. In addition co instruction, the tuition also covers "e cost of materials and a quality set
of hand woodworking tools which becomes the property of the student at the completion of the course.
I predict that the new Norfolk School of Boatbuilding is right in line with the city’s centuries-old tradition as a major international seaport. We have a way to go before we become another Mystic Seaport, but our new boatbuilding school is an excellent beginning.
“Command and Control System
Is Slow and Unreliable”
(See B. Wyrick, p. 143, September 1978
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles Adair, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Wyrick reports that the Defense Department’s World Wide Military Command and Control System doesn t work despite spending $1 billion on it over the last six years. The purpose of this system is to provide the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with the capability to instantly control the tactical operations of any U.S. military unit throughout the world.
But why should the President be controlling tactical military operations in the first place? What is his experience in this area even with the advice of the JCS? The Joint Chiefs are too far removed by both experience and time to be making recommendations to the President as to the use and detailed control of tactical weapons many of which have just been introduced into the combat forces.
A basic fallacy in this method of operations is the failure to recognize the difference between tactics and strategy in military operations. Strategy employs the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or several nations to support adopted policies in order to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions. Tactics relate to the disposing and maneuvering of forces in combat.
The President has the basic responsibility for determining the strategy of the United States and for military operations. For the strategy behind military operations, he is advised by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the Sec
retary of State, various congressional leaders and other government departments and agencies concerned.
Tactics in any area of operations should be the responsibility of those military commanders in the area who have all the facts and know what should be done. There is a considerable difference in the approach to practical problems by those who are thousands of miles from the problem. And as such there should be a basic understanding and confidence among the tactical commanders, the President, and the JCS that necessary and reasonable action will be fully supported .
In the handling of the Mayaguez operation in Southeast Asia by the President and the JCS, there was too much delay in taking action while those in Washington asked questions to get up to date in order to decide what to do. Prompt and firm support of the U. S. military personnel in Southeast Asia would have allowed them to take immediate action to recapture the ship.
Washington s belief in the success of this first tactical operation has led to a similar course of action on at least two additional alerts. Fortunately, the advice of the JCS was not required at either discussion.
Under this new method of directing military operations in which all responsible Washington personnel from the President on down are completely involved in one small tactical operation, what will happen when two, three, or even hundreds of problems arise worldwide at the same time? Will the problems be taken in order, and will they wait while Washington is briefed on each one? What will be the quality of the decisions at that time?
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics on naval, maritime, military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Th
e Fraudulent Enlistment ^aper”
Ho T' C' Grzymala' P- 94, July 1978; C. H. RaT’ ^ September 1978; J. S.
p P- 86. October 1978; J. S. Sawtelle,
' *0, November 1978 Proceedings)
Q
gander R. C. Hansen, U. S. avy Upon reading Commander Horst’s remarks, I was moved
ivould seem logical that once a voluntarily enlists in the Navy, makes written, signed, and sworn tl0tenients t0 effect that end, he does tra ^ave the right to reject his con- ^ as soon as it appears to be detri- taI to his current situation. He
v-uutiu dllUaLlUIl• I H
OrjS ^ave c^e c'S*11 t0 say he bed it
til L,f t0 enlist. but that should noi l- e him to escape military justice should it cast unfavorable light on
v°lu
tat^ charge in his court-martial er than the avoidance of all 'ges.
Th,
^^0r,ginal court-martial charges but djj.p r °n whether the Navy had juris’ lQn to prosecute them. If not the
Oagq
l,aJev'ew the original article to see if I if passed something the first time or rp 0rtltnander Grzymala was really a j /^atnation of Captain Bligh. When !a . finished, the message from the Vo C 6 St'^ rea<J loud and clear; two nien had avoided facing the Hj ^s judicial process for their al- j crimes because of a technicality.
‘‘'an ; and stat
d
recru*ter. Even if there appears to enlSOrtle truth to a claim of fraudulent PStl«ent, the burden of proof should Wlth the enlistee since his action entirely voluntary. Should the thenteer Prove fraudulent enlistment, e°d result should be one addi-
'bar
lere are few naval officers who do Understand the need for an inde- ent judiciary, or who would deny incused any of his rights to a fair tf,t 'mpartial legal process. However, U Cases discussed in Commander k -Vrnala’s article did not depend on
H
LVy> then who? What if the charges % ^een murfier on the high seas? In t|j Sltuation, who would have juris- '°n over the self-proclaimed “civil
ians” in uniform? Fraudulent enlistment is wrong, but it is not a license to violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice! It appears that the military judge may have been correct in the letter of the law, but the end result would hardly qualify as “justice” in the true sense of the word.
If the fraudulent enlistment caper has come about primarily because of rulings related to the case of United States vs. Russo, then those rulings are long overdue for a critical review and possible legislation to restore some common sense to the entire situation.
“The Strange Case of Rainbow-5”
(See C. O. Cook, pp. 66-73, August 1978 Proceedings)
Colonel Rodney A. Blyth, U. S. Army (Retired)—I am representing a minority group of readers of your excellent publication; someone who sees the other side of the story concerning General Douglas MacArthur. We in the Army do not think of this general as an infallible saint. Likewise, many of us aren’t the most ardent supporters of his various tactical and strategic concepts. Neither have we forgotten the results of General MacArthur’s later unfortunate confrontation with President Harry Truman. I heard President Truman express his feelings, in person, regarding his distasteful relationship with General MacArthur. Consequently, I am trying to write you with an unbiased mind.
Captain Cook has probably good reason, in his mind, to describe General MacArthur as “an unpredictable, intractable subordinate. ...” But I wonder if Captain Cook gained this impression from firsthand personal observation of this general, or if it is the result of the long-standing less-than- friendly feelings which existed between General MacArthur and the U. S. Navy.
General MacArthur was undoubtedly a strong-willed individual who also had the label of having the courage of his convictions. I am not attempting to extol the virtues of this general, but I think that it is improper for the Navy to keep taking potshots at this military leader of another service with the apparent goal to castigate him in an unending fashion. Surely, in the U. S. Army, we feel strongly about the actions of Marine Corps General “Howlin’ Mad” Smith—who relieved Major General Ralph C. Smith from command over differences in Marine and Army doctrine—during the invasion of Saipan, but we don’t carry on an interminable campaign to get back at him with articles like Captain Cook’s.
I think that what Captain Cook failed to fully evaluate or thoroughly consider is the fact that General MacArthur reached a special level of leadership, while in the Philippines and in uniform, an achievement realized only previously (maybe) by General George Washington during the Revolutionary Army’s campaigns. Both generals made glaring errors but were patriots of the highest order. I am not advocating untrue eulogies to all of our deceased great military leaders, but I do believe that the Rainbow-5 case shouldn’t be the sole basis for such a “stinging” appreciative expression for all the distinguished service General MacArthur gave. We agree that he, like all naval leaders, was not perfect. Can’t we let it go at that?
“V/STOL Design for Tactical Aircraft”
(See C. A. Lindell, pp. 119-125, September 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John F. Schork, U. S. Navy, Attack Squadron 128—Lieutenant Colonel Lindell certainly puts to rest some of the myths surrounding vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/ STOL) aircraft. However, I strongly disagree with his inclusion of the A-6
Intruder in his discussion of tactical performance capabilities. Not only is he comparing “apples and oranges,” but his performance efficiency figures for the A-6 are simply not accurate.
In listing the performance efficiency index (PEI) of V/STOL and conventional aircraft, the A-6 rates an index of 170. The actual figures for payload and radius were not listed. In fact, using a rather standard ordnance load and flying a conservative mission radius (exact figures cannot be divulged for security reasons), the resultant PEI of the A-6 is 305. This is not the maximum figure attainable, however it is significantly greater than the figures listed for even the AV-16+.
My basic point is that the author is comparing light attack aircraft to all-weather medium attack aircraft. The missions of these aircraft are totally different. Therefore, the designs of the platforms to perform these missions are totally different. The very nature of the A-6’s mission (night, IFR, low-level strikes) requires a much larger avionics-carrying capability. The A-6E TRAM (target recognition attack multisensor) is equipped with an airborne weapon system which is capable of using radar, low-light television, and infrared imagery in conjunction with a ballistics computer and inertial navigation system to attack any target in any weather. The A-6 has extra survivability by having two engines and substantial armor plating— to say nothing of a bom- bardier/navigator to operate the complex weapon system. All of this contributed to the ultimate design of today's Intruder.
Colonel Lindell’s references to V/STOL’s flexibility imply that all of today’s seagoing conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft require 90,000-ton carriers. A-6 and A-7 aircraft regularly fly off the USS Lexington (CVT-16), which has a combat displacement of 40,000 tons. The A-6 is also compatible with the short airfield for tactical support (SATS) system, a land-based catapult and arresting gear currently used by the U. S. Marine Corps. While this is certainly not a vertical takeoff capability, it does increase the combat flexibility of CTOL aircraft in a forward area.
In conclusion, Colonel Lindell paints an exciting picture for the future of V/STOL aircraft and for Marine Corps aviation in particular. The future of the A-6E TRAM in the allweather attack business is equally as bright, and the distinction between the two aircraft’s missions must not be forgotten.
“What V/STOL ‘Really’ Is (A Pilot’s View)”
(See D.C. Corbett, pp. 111-114, June 1978 Proceedings)
Major Robert J. O’Rourke, U. S. Marine Corps—Major Corbett states that the AV-8A has “flown against and defeated missiles of all types in the low altitude environment.” The statement itself cannot be true, and, even if he holds the Soviet SA-9 in low esteem (which should invite argument from many marine aviators), he obviously discounts the excellent low altitude capabilities of the Marine Corps’ own HAWK missile, which can be found in many foreign arsenals.
Major Corbett’s discussion of close air support (CAS) tactics leaves the reader with the impression that the Harrier community has solved the raging debate over suitable CAS tactics on the modern battlefield. Modern CAS tactics are far from the pat mission profile described in his article. Major Corbett has described standard NATO procedures, which are currently taught and practiced throughout the Marine Corps attack community. And these tactics are not without their problems. One of the most severe problems encountered in existing low altitude CAS tactics is radio communications, which Major Corbett assumes will be accomplished through “normal and time-tested lines. ...” Communications may be interrupted by terrain masking or by enemy interference, or both. Also, Major Corbett oversimplifies the task of target acquisition from a low altitude pop-up attack. The talk-in method described in the article is extremely difficult to apply if the attack aircraft is executing a minimum tracking attack, which is required in order to take advantage of low altitude ingress tactics.
While I support the Marine Corps V/STOL program, I find it difficult to support Major Corbett’s contention that the AV-8A meets the threat "with realism and forethought,” that it matches defensive enemy tactics with highly versatile offensive tactics,” and that “it can survive” better than any other aircraft in the Marine Corps fixed-wing community. As Major Corbett stated, the AV-8A is the beginning of a new line of aircraft. It possesses many inadequacies which we hope will be corrected in the AV-8B. There is a clear need for an effective V/STOL capability in the Corps, and many of us non-Harrier pilots join with Major Corbett in trusting that the AV-8 series aircraft will provide it- “The Marines Through 1999”
(See F. Haynes, pp. 24-33, September 1978;
W. C. King and W. B. Collins, p. 28,
November 1978 Proceedings)
Commander W. C. King, U. S. Navy (Retired)—General Haynes has provided what appears to be a valid assessment of the role of the Marine Corps in the next few decades. Unfortunately, one glaring omission considerably diminishes the credibility of his article. General Haynes makes only a fleeting reference to the LHA, stating that “some enhancement of force pro-
lection can be seen in the introduction °f the Tarawa-class LHAs.”
The capabilities of the LHA are well described in the January 1978 Proceedings and need not be repeated here. However, it should be noted that oiany senior Navy and Marine Corps officers have recognized that the LHA provides a quantum improvement to the amphibious forces. With strong Marine Corps endorsement, the Navy has expended a large portion of its shipbuilding resources to acquire this class of general-purpose amphibious assault ship. The LHA's versatility will permit her to be the backbone of other Marine Corps modernization programs 0ver the next three decades.
Extinguish the Smoking Lamp: Permanently”
J. K. Poole, p. 106, September 1978 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral C. L. Waite, M.D., Medical Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired), The Tobacco Institute—Lieutenant Commander Poole’s opinions on smok- lng, health, and performance of duty are generalizations unfounded in the current scientific literature. Therefore, his recommendations are without fnerit.
Commander Poole’s concern over che minimal amounts of carbon monoxide present in the ship’s environment can be likened to the fallacy of labeling common table salt as Poisonous. The amount is important.
Commander Poole’s contention that smoking is addictive is not substandard in the recent publication of the National Institute for Drug Abuse, Monograph # 17 “Research on Smoking Behavior,” December 1977.
In considering his recommendations, the potential cost in Cerms of morale, a 50% drop in recruits, poor job performance, and the expenditure of defense dollars on clinics and quit-smoking education must be weighed carefully against soothing a small minority of smoking abolitionists who are more annoyed chan harmed. After all, the officers and men of our Navy who were victorious in World War II were a smok- ‘ng majority.
“Command Authority and Professionalism”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 26-32, August 1978;
K. M. Smith, pp. 24-27, October 1978;
J. Bussert, pp. 115-119, November 1978
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Gner- lich, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, Navy Recruiting District, Philadelphia—Congratulations to Captain Kelly! I have heard it said more loudly, more profanely, but never more accurately. There is something wrong in our chain of command; it is not just a perception.
Today’s commanding officers are not always well qualified, and are almost never completely trusted. And even if the lack of trust, qualifications, and experience were just staff and junior officers’ perceptions and not fact, the treatment of today’s COs by staffs, seniors, and directives makes the perception fact.
And if, as Captain Kelly states, one in four of our COs admits to feeling harassed, what percentage are hiding their feelings from themselves and from their seniors? And what percentage of their subordinate officers and crew senses the lack of trust and feels their skipper is being picked on? A CO, who is always directed and helped, tends to look for direction and help when it is not needed, and he certainly does not inspire subordinates in the way that he might if he had experience and reasonable control of his own ship’s internal evolutions.
Captain Kelly has a big piece of the solution: take away the need for so much help by having successful COs serve multiple command tours. Why not have a cadre of seagoing sailors instead of star gazers all trying to become CNO by “getting back to D.C.”? Today’s CO’s all too apparent need for help and management by higher authority is frequently due to his actual lack of experience.
Captain Kelly’s ideas of retouring successful COs or lengthening present tours are great. These approaches will pass on experience. In addition, COs who are winners develop confidence, and their commands earn reputations for success. And a reputation will precede a CO to his next job and linger
with the command after he is gone. I propose an additional step: follow the custom of the aviation community and have a policy allowing the qualified executive officer to relieve the superior CO. This will serve several purposes:
► Command continuity and corporate knowledge will be assured. And, an XO will have an even bigger vested interest in the command if he has a chance to be chosen as its next CO.
► Since three department heads equal one XO and one XO equals one CO for each successful CO retoured, the Navy gains another well-qualified XO who also stands a better chance of becoming a superior CO.
► By fleeting up the XO, the command tour length stays the same, but ships get four years of policy while having two COs. Also, the chance of radical policy changes is reduced after a change of command which is good for crew morale and stability.
► The second tour by a successful CO creates a second good XO to follow on with two more years of success.
► By echeloning the levels of command—i.e. a Naval Reserve DD or FF for the first tour, DDG or 963 for the second, and a CG for the third— seniority and experience are matched with proven success. A CO of appropriate seniority and qualification, however, could and should be able to get command at any level without prior command.
“The Changing Nature of Modern Naval Leadership”
(See J. G. Morgan, pp. 76-79, August 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Wesley Al. Sherer, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, USS Billfish (SSN-676)—At least one of the concluding precepts advocated by Lieutenant Morgan is neither exercised, encouraged, nor acceptable in today’s nuclear navy.
Failure is a word and deed which is viewed with grave concern in today’s nuclear fleet. To openly “permit failure to an acceptable extent” courts disaster in the minds of most naval nuclear power specialists. The forces which have brought us to this condition are many; two are public sensitivity and professional conditioning.
It is a matter of continuing record that any mistakes made in the effort to maintain absolute control of radioactive material could be politically disastrous. When one considers the number of naval nuclear warships entering and leaving our ports on a routine basis, the potential for severe public reaction to a naval reactor accident becomes obvious.
In order to prevent “big mistakes,” which would result in public or environmental dangers from nuclear reactors, one must concentrate on the elimination of small mistakes seven days a week. Self-criticism, attention to detail, and responsible responsiveness to even minor problems are essential. This intolerance for even small errors has manifested itself in nearly 23 years of accident-free operation of seagoing naval nuclear reactors. Although this enforced intolerance to failure came into fruition in the nuclear engineering plants on our ships, the same philosophy has spread to all other departments of the modern nuclear warship as nuclear-trained officers permeate the chain of command in those departments. This has led to a raising of standards in nearly every area of the ship. As is always the case, however, you do not get something for nothing. This increase in standards has taken a toll in other areas, such as data overload for junior officers and heavy paperwork.
The resulting pressure of the zero defects pursuit by the nuclear power program has at times proven overwhelming to our officers and enlisted men. The rapidly expanding nuclear fleet and the severe attrition rate of qualified nuclear navy people are a continuing concern.
Admiral E. J. King’s philosophy of command, as reflected in CinCLant Serial 053, is still as sound today as ever. However, the challenge, pressure, and necessity of implementing that philosophy within the constraints of today's zero defect nuclear navy are quite possibly the supreme leadership challenges of recent years.
“Leadership and Nuclear Power”
(See R. E. Chatham, pp. 78-82, July 1978,
C. P. Harris, pp. 21-22, September 1978;
J. W. Asher and P. W. Sparks, pp. 81-84, October 1978; H. C. Lowe and R. Peer, pp- 113-115, November 1978 Proceedings)
Commander A. F. Campbell, V■ Navy, Commanding Officer, FJSS Richard B. Russell (SSN-687)—As a long-time member of the U. S. Naval Institute and as a commanding officer,
I am usually disappointed by the type and quality of articles that find their way into the Leadership Forum. The 1978 Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Prize Essay is no exception. A this represents the best effort at original thought on leadership, it mighc well cause one to look with fear anti dismay at the future of our Navy s leadership capabilities.
British Battleships of World War Two
By Alan Raven and John Roberts
This large and exceptionally well-illustrated volume presents a comprehensive account of the design and construction of the British battleships that served in World War II—from the Queen Elizabeth class to Vanguard. Much of this data is published here for the first time because official documents from the period have only recently become available.
British Battleships of World War Two is therefore unique in making available the full story ot the design and construction of every Royal Navy battleship and battlecruiser class of the period as first built, including details of the various refits and reconstructions that each vessel underwent during its service life. The coverage includes a comprehensive review of developments in weapons, fire control, radar, protection, and propulsion—in short, every aspect of battleship design and function.
The text is complemented with more than three hundred photographs which by themselves would constitute a thorough history of these ships. The photos are backed up by specially drawn sets of plans and elevations. They depict the ships not only as they were built, but also as they were modified during their years of service.
British Battleships of World War Two is the definitive work on its subject.
1976/436 pages/illustrated/index List price: $33.00 Member's price: $26.40
Add $1.00 to each order for postage & handling.
(Please use order form in Books of Interest to the Professional section.)
A Naval Institute Press Book
I do not harbor such fears, however, because of research I did a couple of years ago. Having access to a complete set of Proceedings and bothered by this same basic feeling of concern over
leadership, I went through the past 50 years’ issues looking for articles deal- lng primarily with leadership that 'vere written by acknowledged naval leaders. My conclusion was that our great leaders didn’t write about leadership, they exercised it. It also became Suite clear that most of the leadership articles dealt in generalizations, were Purely someone’s personal axe- gnnding, or were not in touch with •^e real world. Most appear to have been written by those struggling with rheir own personal leadership inadequacies and who tried to compensate for these weaknesses by telling the rest of the Navy how to do it.
Having considerable more experience in dealing with the exact leader- sbip problems Lieutenant Chatham describes, I feel quite confident in stating that he does not understand tbe problem, has reached many efroneous conclusions, and hasn’t even gotten a very good edge on his own axe yet.
The heart of his conclusion revolved around the alleged “second chain of eommand” in nuclear ships, and he lays the entire blame at the door of Admiral H.G. Rickover. There is no ruore a second chain of command in uuclear power than there is in the nu- elear weapons world. A commanding officer must exercise leadership and run his ship in a safe and sane manner, rhus satisfying his squadron, type, and fleet commanders and those responsible for nuclear weapons safety as well as the Division of Naval Reactors. The American public expects and demands uothing less.
Any commanding officer who concerns himself with the “appearance of Safety’’ rather than safety itself or even *n addition to safety, if it adds unreasonable demands on his already bardworking personnel, is a poor leader, I’ll admit. However, such an officer is definitely the exception and n°t the rule in nuclear submarines. The "nuclear way” is not to keep all Problems “in the house” as alleged by Lieutenant Chatham. Nor do com- ruanding officers have tunnel vision that lets them see only the engineer- *ng portion of their ships. Such allega- Pons are completely unfounded, based upon minimal exposure and experience
to the nuclear navy. No commanding officer wants “rudder orders,” and Vice Admiral K. M. Carr told us in his speech of 22 July 1977 that we would not be getting them while he was in command of the Atlantic Submarine Force. This was greeted with positive anticipation by all commanding officers; none of them worried for an instant that they wouldn’t know what to do if not given explicit orders covering every situation.
With one exception the rest of Lieutenant Chatham’s points are not worthy of comment. But as he put it, “finally, there is trust.” I have observed in my years in the nuclear navy that all of the good officers and leading petty officers operate on trust. That trust is granted to every sailor under them until that sailor shows that he is incapable of handling it (a rare occurence). I agree that some few officers have not conducted themselves in that way, but these have been few and far between, and they were not classified as good leaders and placed in positions of higher responsibility.
Working in the nuclear navy is hard, demanding work requiring skilled, dedicated personnel. Herein lies the retention problem. Industry is willing to pay such individuals a more handsome salary for doing an easier job under less demanding conditions (no at sea periods). The retention problem that exists in the nuclear navy is the result of this, not of poor leadership at any level. When Lieutenant Chatham gets a little more firsthand experience this will become plain to him.
Commander Todd Blades, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Chatham has written a very stimulating article about a serious problem. At one point he quotes the observations of a ballistic missile submarine’s weapons officer after his ship had just completed the Naval Reactors Crew Quiz. It served to resurrect a memory from my own personal experiences. I was the plank- owner Talos battery officer in the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) and one of the earliest non-nuclear officers to join the nucleus crew. In fact, I was the first
weapons department member to arrive.
Sometime in the spring of 1961, I was the in-port officer of the deck on the forenoon watch, observing dockside preparations to load the ship s spare main coolant pump. Each of the two nuclear reactors has four of these highly precision pumps in its primary loop, and because of their vital role in the plant, the ship carries one spare. At that time, each of these pumps was priced at about $250,000. Planning for this evolution between the ship’s engineers and the nuclear personnel of the then-Bethlehem Steel Company’s Fore River Shipyard had transpired for days. Things seemed to move ever so slowly during the evolution. The precise and delicate positioning of the pump on its pallet at just the right place on the pier and the slow, precise, and gentle positioning of the dockside crane’s lifting block above the pump were in total contrast to the way the shipyard’s riggers usually went about their business. The pier seemed to be swarming in supervisors. At one time or another, top- level people, including the captain, executive officer, and senior shipyard executives, inspected progress. The time it took to rig straps and slip them onto the hook seemed interminable. Finally, the pump was lifted, raised, and slowly and gently moved over the access hatch on the ship. I’m sure it took much longer before it was resting securely in its stowage below, but by that time I had been relieved of the watch.
Watching the care taken with that pump made me angry. Just a couple of days before, we had had our first Talos test missile delivered. It was a fully operational one except for a dummy warhead. At that time, Talos missiles were also priced at about $250,000 each. Despite an equally thorough and adequate preparation by our ship’s force, we could not get the same careful attention from the shipyard. The missile had, in fact, suffered some stove-in damage while being lifted aboard. The problem was one of emphasis.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover had so thoroughly impressed the Bethlehem Steel Company’s managers with
attention to detail in nuclear construction that they neglected it throughout the rest of the ship. Captain (later Vice Admiral) Eugene P. Wilkinson noticed this as soon as he arrived at the building yard as the prospective commanding officer (PCO) late in 1959. He began noting in his sitreps to the CNO that while almost every piece of equipment comprising what would today be called the combat system in the Long Beach was a new model or major modification, nobody locally seemed to be sure just how it was all to be installed, tested, and made to work together. He wanted to get as many of his weapons and operations officers as possible assigned to the nucleus crew with all haste. (Note that all the key engineering department officers and enlisted men were already there.) Soon after, a lieutenant fresh out of Postgraduate School, with nothing but a cursory knowledge of either Talos or Terrier missile systems, had his orders modified and came to Quincy, Massachusetts. (My original orders had included about six months practical experience in the Galveston [CLG-3] before joining the Long Beach.) The PCO’s misgivings were well founded. The depth of knowledge,
both within the NavSupShip’s Office and within the shipyard itself, was shallow indeed, and the documentation from the bureaus and from locally prepared sources was appallingly fragmentary and incomplete. Of course, the Bethlehem Steel Company cannot be blamed for all of this; the whole Navy, primarily its material establishment, had had a share in it. But Bethlehem was not blameless. Its people were so heavily concentrating on the nuclear aspects, they didn t seem to worry about anything else. For example, even the Way Foreman assigned to the Long Beach complained that his management was not sympathetic to the overall construction problem. Although he had better than a dozen supervisors assigned to the propulsion and primary auxiliary systems, he was never able to get his managers to give him even half that number for the rest of the shjp.
The upshot of all this was that the ship’s nuclear power plant and all its auxiliaries were completed, tested, and ready to go to sea before the rest of the ship. For whatever reasons, justifiable or not, no matter what organizations were responsible, portions of her combat system had not even been installed, much less readied. Nonetheless, the Long Beach was commissioned 9 September 1961. Completion of the combat system installation and test was postponed to a post-delivery availability at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard eight months later. The only fully operational weapon subsystem aboard was the antisubmarine rocket, for all practical purposes a “stand-alone” system. Sad to say, we also deployed to Northern Europe in that condition to advertise to the world its first nuclear- powered surface warship.
I wish I could conclude by saying that this is all history and a thing of the past, but I think crew members of the recently commissioned USS California (commissioned DLGN-36, now CGN-36) can verify that it’s not.
Is the problem stemming from the advent of nuclear power in the Navy and the disproportionate influence of Admiral Rickover? I don’t think so. His standards of engineering excellence are high; they should be, as should be the rest of the Navy’s. His standards of professional excellence are high, as should be the rest of the Navy’s also. But something’s wrong. After all, is it his fault that the Navy is currently over-emphasizing problems with its other power plants? Requiring some 16 weeks of hardcore engineering training for PCOs and new unit commanders (and nowhere near that much, if any, relating to complex combat systems), in addition to drastic reprisals for failing Propulsion Examination Board exams, does seem a little unbalanced.
Whether the problem is a byproduct of Admiral Rickover’s influence or not, what does it matter? One is reminded of the English tune Major General Cornwallis’ troops marched to as they surrendered at Yorktown: “The World Turned Upside Down.” Propulsion systems are just that. Let’s see some more emphasis on armament, the raison d'etre for naval ships in the first place.
“Attack Submarine Development—Recent Trends and Projected Needs”
(See R. M. Chapman, pp. 97-102, August 1978; R. E. Chatham, pp. 87-88, October 1978; L. D. Chirillo, pp. 107-110,
November 1978 Proceedings)
Captain K. G. Schacht, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Some readers may not find this valuable article interesting because it talks so much to the dollar—a dull subject to many of us. I also fear there will be some justified criticism.
For that I am sorry because it is my strong belief that there is a real need t0 openly discuss the Los Angeles (SSN- 688)-dass attack submarine and Trident-class ballistic missile submarine programs.
I wish Mr. Chapman had started with two basic assumptions: (1) the torrent and accepted U. S. goal is a fleet of 90 attack submarines, all SSNs; and (2) the SSN-688 may be too costly.
I shall not comment upon the first assumption. Although I consider it highly controversial, it is far too broad a subject for this feature. Also, some data are classified.
That the costs of procuring and maintaining the 90 SSNs are out of s,ght is well supported in his article. However, his data concern mostly the effect portion of the cause and effect Factors. I would like to review the growth of the SSN program and the SSN-688 costs Mr. Chapman didn’t
mention.
The U. S. submarine navy has probably had more classes of ships rhan any other navy. We started with R-boats—good little boats—limited t0 coastal operations. Then came the S-boats, a larger, more seagoing group which did its share of fighting in World War II. Next, the larger oceangoing fleet submarine, originally designed with a destroyer-type bow Which was to allow her to proceed at night in average seas on the surface and at high speeds, while charging batteries and comprising an advance screen for the fleet. In daylight hours, she was to conduct submerged periscope sweeps. Initial contact of the enemy, vis-a-vis the Battle of Jutland, was considered vital; but this concept was never realized. The hull design, however, was just what we needed in World War II for night surface attacks.
With ideas from the Germans and leftover construction money from the war years, we built moderately streamlined, snorkel-equipped Guppy IIs and Ills, which were actually modified fleet submarines.
Then came the nukes—a whole family of them. The Nautilus (SSN- 571), aptly named, was an innovation. Except for her unlimited power plant endurance, her primary contributions were good press reports.
The Seawolf (SSN-575) was expected to be an innovation in terms of liquid metal (sodium) coolant rather than the more cumbersome, pressurized water system. Alas, she had her defects— although minor in the eyes of her excellent commanding officer—and the Seawolf's power plant was quietly exchanged for the more conventional nuclear type, the same as that installed in the Nautilus.
In the 1959-1960 era, the giant
Triton (SSN-586) and modest Tullibee (SSN-597) were commissioned. It took a long time to get Navy line backing for Triton, for the nuclear power proponents wished to build one nuke with dual reactors which required a giant hull size (7,781 tons submerged displacement). Finally, the surface navy (mostly carrier air) was sold on the nuclear-powered picket submarine concept, and Triton became a requirement. Unfortunately, the required radar antenna could not be designed with sufficient strength to withstand the stresses expected while at moder- ate-to-high submerged speeds. Except for some exciting news media stories (circumnavigating the world while submerged), she proved of little value and was quietly retired.
The Tullibee, with only a 2,607-ton submerged displacement, performed beautifully. Although slower than her contemporaries, she was far less detectable. With only a fraction of normal SSN crew, she was truly an innovation. I never did understand why she was never followed by other ships of her class.
I would like to add to Mr. Chapman's excellent data on the costs of the SSN-688. First, when we speak of ships’ costs, we refer to more than construction costs and life-time maintenance, modifications, and repairs.
Personnel costs are higher in the
of the NAVBMC.
The NAVBMC was created in 1956 in order to streamline the decision
Naval Operations. Moreover, the charter established an executive member (initially the Director of the Guided Missile Division, OP51—of the OPNAV staff—and later OP74 when the division was moved in to OP07) and an executive secretary (initially OP515 later OP744). The executive member with
nuclear power program partially because of the lengthy school training involved. Also a large bonus is given to each officer who agrees to extend his obligated service. And crew numbers required by the 688, because of her size and complexity, are higher than for any attack submarine in history.
Maintenance costs are likely to be more than originally expected for two major reasons. First, being nuclear powered, the safety factor is highly stressed. No other area, including nuclear weapon facilities, receives as much safety attention. Repairs are checked by supervisors, who in turn are checked by managers. These checks can go from a second-class petty officer up through chief petty officer, division officer, engineering officer, XO, and CO. Second, some of the material maintenance costs are due to security requirements, which are extensive and expensive.
Complexity and types of equipment relate to hull size. When money is plentiful—and this has been traditionally the case in the nuclear power community—the availability of space usually results in more systems. Therefore, equipment can be more complex.
The final and most important factor relating to size is one we seldom see examined: vulnerability to enemy antisubmarine warfare. The basic reason for the submarine’s growth in importance as a weapon is because sea water remains a difficult medium to penetrate. And sonar sensors remain the best means for underwater surveillance. Visual, infrared, magnetic- anomaly, and radio and radar intercept sensors are good for only short distance penetrations in the sea. For the foreseeable future it appears that sound waves remain the best pene- trators.
The 688 s size, despite intensive efforts in silencing, will increase her vulnerability in a couple of ways. First, detection by passive sonar has to be greater. Continuously rotating turbines are greater in size; larger propellers must push against larger volumes of water; depth and direction control planes must be larger—all of which require more powerful equipment to
be operated. Most of the concomitant noise is generated from within the hull. Second, when the submarine’s area is being searched by active sonars, be they hull-mounted or sonobuoys, the target size relates closely to the amount of energy that bounces back to the ASW sensor.
Finally, a smaller hull is stronger than a larger hull of the same thickness. This simply means that when a depth charge or nearby torpedo equipped with an influence exploder detonates at a given distance, the smaller hull is more apt to endure.
Other aspects to be considered include: ease of acceleration and deceleration, turning circles, depth-changing, and depth control. The simple task of penetrating shallow waters could also become difficult. And all relate to vulnerability.
It appears to me that the 688-class is in trouble: not just because of the costs to build and maintain, but, more important, because of the costs to retain.
“Sea-Based ‘Strategic’ Weapons for the 1980s and Beyond”
(See N. Polmar and D.A. Paolucci, pp.
98-113, May 1978 Proceeding!)
Commander Paul H. Backus, U, S. Navy (Retired)—The Navy seems to be doing an efficient job of strangling itself by putting up with organizational emphysema. The Navy never could have gone from an idea to a deployed system in four years as it did with Polaris if it had had to tolerate the multi-channeled, multi-headed organizational structure which apparently is extant today within the Navy’s strategic system community.
A key reason for today’s organizational bloat is that no one remaining on active duty seems to understand what was really unique about the Navy’s Polaris management structure. It was not the Office of Special Projects (SP). It was the creation and use of the Navy Ballistic Missile Committee (NAVBMC). The creation of SP in 1955-1956 neatly bypassed the great inertia of the entrenched development and procurement empires of the Bureaus of Ordnance, Ships, and Aeronautics. But SP would have been
harassed into ineffectiveness by many offices in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the bureaus, various commands, not to mention the Office of the Secretary or Defense (OSD) and the Bureau of Budget (now the Office of Manage' ment and Budget), if it had not worked under the protective umbrella making processes within the Navy associated with all policy, program, and planning matters pertaining to the development, acquisition, and initial deployment of the fleet ballistic missile (FBM) weapon system. Its charter brought together into one organizational entity the authorities of the Sec-
f-V-wa Moxrxr cind fhp Chief 0*
the executive secretary as his agent was identified by the charter as the single point of contact within the Navy through which all (inside and outside the Navy) had to go on any matter pertaining to the FBM weapon system.
To conduct the affairs of the FBM weapon system, the staff was free to use the authority of either the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations as might be deemed appropriate by the executive secretary- Of key importance was the fact that from 1956 through 1961 the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO provided the executive member and the staff of the NAVBMC with solid backing. Having this and the dual authority it represented enabled this small staff to conduct FBM affairs in an orderly and decisive fashion.
Various attempts were made, particularly after it became apparent that Polaris would be successful, either to take over control of the staff of the NAVBMC or to penetrate its cover and gain control over a portion of the development and acquisition program- These efforts included debates over
age. The responsibilities for the development, acquisition, and initial deployment of strategic weapon systems should be separated through the DCNO level from those responsible for the operations and readiness of submarines. Isn’t it conceivable that a strategic weapon system could be used by a surface ship? A naval aircraft? The answers, of course, are yes.
The Navy, then, needs to breakup the submarine monopoly of its strategic systems organization. Moreover, it should “get it all together by creating in headquarters an authority for strategic systems which would be the single point of contact for such systems. Moreover, within the hierarchy of the Chief of Naval Material, one office should be given the responsibility for the development and acquisition of strategic weapon systems. His charter should be identical to or very much like the one written for Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., when the Office of Special Projects took its more decisive form in 1956. This office should be lifted out of the choking environment of the many leveled hydra organization of the Chief of Naval Material and made to report directly to the single point of contact in headquarters.
Of course, lines and blocks on an organization chart are made meaningful only by the people whose activity they channel and envelop. Some will contend, however, that Polaris had the pick of the crop; therefore, the quality and commitment of the personnel as-
single versus twin screws for the ini- t'al SSBNs; the method by and rate at 'vhich crews for the propulsion plants °f the initial ships were selected, trained, and assigned to the commissioning details; the test depth approved for the Thresher equivalent class °f SSBNs; the location and capabilities °f the home port(s) and home yard(s) °f the SSBNs; and whether or not Weapon system programs using submarines as a vehicle should be controlled by those responsible for submarine operations and readiness.
Eventually the submariners prevailed in the internal battle over control of the FBM weapon system program. As stated by Captain Paolucci m the 1970 Naval Review, "... after several years, control of the missile platform and the missile itself was consolidated under the leadership of submarine officers.”
It is my contention that it is because of this control by those responsible for submarine warfare that the Navy has put forth over the years such unimaginative and conservative programs for sea-based strategic systems. Consciously or unconsciously, those in charge have traded-off attack versus ballistic missile submarines in force level planning; those responsible for the acquisition of submarine nuclear Propulsion systems have been allowed by the submariners to gain significant ‘f not dominating control over other SSBN characteristics; and, because of the ever-widening influence on Weapon system design of those indoctrinated with the conservative design Practices of nuclear propulsion systems, the design of sea-based strategic systems has become ponderous and almost without risk of failure.
The nation and the Navy urgently feed sea-based strategic systems— but, my God, couldn’t the Navy have been more imaginative and courageous- than to give us what we now know as Trident? Even so, Trident makes more sense than to continue to make the United States a demand target for Soviet warheads by digging trenches, shelters, or more silos as proposed for the MX. Even Minuteman in merchantmen makes more sense than any °f the land-based MX proposals.
Today the Navy must opt for cleavsigned were the key factors accounting for the Navy’s success with it. Certainly, if this is so, you could not prove it by a review of the selection list. Let us assume then that for the last 12 years or so those assigned to strategic systems billets have been as qualified and as committed as those who gave birth to the initially deployed Polaris system. On the basis of this assumption, the architecture of the organizational structures covering the earlier and present efforts of the Navy of sea-based strategic systems must account for a major portion of today’s embarrassing and dangerous disarray within the Navy.
Departures from the school solution will not come easily. The Soviets, however, have been given a huge lead by our own ostrich-like naivete. With commitment, the personal backing of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, and a radical departure from conventional Navy organization, the Navy got Polaris to sea in four years. Isn’t it at least worth trying to emulate some of these methods in order to reduce the Polmar/Paolucci prediction of a decade for Trident II?
“Seakeeping—and the SWATH Design”
(See S. R. Olson, pp. 139-146, March 1978;
H. R. Stiles, p. 25, June 1978 Proceedings)
Charles L. Rouault—Over 20 years ago when the redesign of the long-range height-finding SPS-30 radar was undertaken by the General Electric Company, an in-depth study of the sea conditions on the North Atlantic showed that the design specification by Bureau of Ships for ships’ motions was seriously deficient. We had suspected for some years that the ship motions were much different than specified, and the forcing functions acting upon the radar antenna far more severe.
From many reports by David Taylor Model Basin, U. S. Naval Hydrographic Office, every U. S. shipbuilding yard, the British Navy, and a few others, such as the Norwegian Navy, the Canadian Navy, and the U.S. Coast Guard, we constructed a profile of ship motions which we then used for design. After rechecking the findings with several naval architects and ship constructors, the following summarizes what we found:
► For sheer cussedness the North Atlantic is the worst operating area in the world—peaks can be greater in a number of areas, Lat. 40°S, the Gulf of Alaska, e.g., but for duration, pounding, slamming, wrenching, etc., the North Atlantic is a clear winner of a wretched race.
► U. S. Navy ship design has, for at least 40 years, been dominated by Pacific Ocean conditions; ships become “wet-deck horrors” in the North Atlantic.
► Shock and vibration specifications should emphasize low frequencies and large excursions, not high frequencies and intolerable amplitudes.
^ Wave motions and ship responses are Rayleigh-distributed, nonsinusoidal, and non-derivative. By the latter I mean that the velocity and acceleration cannot be derived from displacement by simple mathematical techniques. As a generality the specified displacement angles, roll, pitch, etc., are reasonably correct, but the true velocities and accelerations are between one and three orders of magnitude greater than sine wave expectation for all motions.
> The “punishment integrals,” the summation of the cumulative effects of all these motions upon material and men are so much larger than expectation that it is hard to believe that such naivete could still exist. In fact, it was necessary to design a radar which would pass the acceptance tests and (buried in the design) an entirely different radar which would perform veil in the real environment.
We made many attempts to obtain the recognition of Bureau of Ships of these effects and to modify the basic specifications for the benefit, not of the contractor, but of the Navy itself, so that future procurements could benefit everyone, but to no avail.
As I study the pictures of the Soviet ships and compare them to corresponding ships in the U. S. Navy, it is clear that their ships are designed for good sea-keeping qualities in the North Atlantic and North Pacific; whereas most of ours seem to have been designed for tropical cruising. Only the new Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) and Spruance (DD-963) classes seem to be really designed for operations in turbulent seas. I could make some guesses about Soviet electronic equipment with relation to ours, but of one thing you can be sure: they’ll be there. The U.S. Navy should recall Nelson's instructions at the onset of the Baltic War to his captains— “Close with the French, and outmanoeuvre the Russians, otherwise you are done.”
“The Naval Reserve: Separate and Unequal”
(See R. W. Lyons, pp. 44-51, July 1978;
C. N. Dragonette, p. 23, September 1978;
A. A. Balunek, pp. 88-89, October 1978 Proceedings)
Captain Barry Prichard, U. S. Naval Reserve —I would like to discuss several points in regards to Category III augmentees for the shore establishment and the need for maintenance and logistic support even in a short, intense war.
Most aviation technical supply mobile billets in the Naval Selected
Reserve are located at support activities. To bring a major unit such as Naval Air Station, North Island, to full wartime manning without a concurrent increase in work load or flight hours would not be cost effective and could not be justified without a looming threat of hostilities. To authorize this condition of manning for the peacetime logistic support establishment would introduce waste and feather-bedding of stupefying proportions.
On the other hand, a survey of supply officers at seven West Coast naval air stations, conducted during my last period of AcDuTra in December 1977, revealed that none of them believed an increased wartime tempo could be sustained in the aviation supply support center, for even 30 to 90 days, without the input of additional technically specialized aviation supply personnel. In most cases, the numbers indicated were actually in excess of authorized Naval Selected Reserve billets for the activity. It was also concluded that civilian hiring would not be a feasible alternative for this type of short, intense war scenario. Thus, the only immediate source of additional personnel is from within the Naval Selected Reserve!
In fact, the anticipated work load increase for a violent, conventional war scenario of perhaps 30 to 90 days has never been scientifically calculated for the supply support center or other departments in a naval air station. The Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Centers should be tasked with generating the necessary statistical data, while this work load projection ought to replace the 605 Study for determining the Selected Reserve billets in the same way that anticipated work load determines civil service manning levels.
Also, continuing Navy inputs of sophisticated, new aircraft and weapon systems demand specialized training that has no close counterpart in the civilian community. Personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve or in a mobilization pool soon lose touch and become out of date. Only participation in a drilling unit of the Selected Reserve can provide the kind of specialized technical training needed to
times as lenient. When we create the COSAL here at SPCC, we place on the ship’s allowance all repair parts with a predicted failure of once in four years, if they are considered militarily essential to performance of the equipment, and to the ship’s mission, and within the maintenance capability of the ship. This is in accordance with OpNav provided criteria (OPNAVINST 4441.12A).
It’s important; in fact, it’s the heart of the matter, to keep in focus the usage data referred to in the article. How do we know what will fail? In a new equipment, it is indeed an engineer’s estimate. That’s all we have. However, in the older equipment (AN/SQS-26CX has been in the fleet since 1967), we do indeed rely on actual fleet experience. A review of parts usage data reported to the Maintenance Support Office Department (MSOD) at Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) here in Mechanicsburg shows 5,165 parts used in shipboard maintenance and repair actions reported under the 3M MDCS (Maintenance and Material Management Maintenance Data Collection System) against the AN/SQS-26CX in the 39- month period, January 1975-March 1978. That’s 132 parts used per month across 48 fleet installations (46 frigates and two nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers), or 2.75 parts per month per installation. That means, if the technicians and storekeepers are doing their job in the 3M reporting world, that 2.75 parts per month are used in maintenance and repair of each AN/SQS-26CX. Of the 3,719 different repair parts on the basic allowance parts list (APL) supporting the AN/SQS-26CX, 15.9% of the parts are currently allowed as onboard repair parts. That’s at least 594 different repair parts (in quantities of one or more) being carried in an average ship which, if 3M reporting is accurate, uses 2.75 repair parts per month to keep the gear up.
It’s important to remember that shipboard allowance lists are as good as the data base used to create them and the best replacement factor (BRF) we apply to each stock number. The BRF is our best estimate of the chance that a repair part will fail in a year.
maintain current proficiency.
A wiser alternative than the proposal advanced by Lieutenant Commander Lyons would be to exercise both regular Navy activities and members of the Naval Selected Reserve on a joint basis at combat tempo svith full battle manning.
Full scale, joint exercises ought to be part of an annual readiness training cycle under which activities such as regular naval air stations would go on 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week operation in all departments with reserve augmentation during a planned alert. The U. S. Air Force may have such a program, but to my knowledge the Naval Selected Reserve has never been involved in this kind of joint training alert except for routine AcDuTra assignments. A program of proficiency testing should also be involved, covering specific mobilization billets.
The Naval Selected Reserve should not, as Lieutenant Commander Lyons suggests, be disestablished. Instead, it should be strengthened in order to provide a truly cost-effective equivalent of full battle manning, but without the objectionable shortcomings of a large standing military force in a democratic society during peacetime.
A responsive, combat-ready Naval Reserve can be attained.
Needed: One Shipboard Electronic Maintenance Philosophy”
(See). Bussert, pp. 105-108, July 1978 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral T. J. Allshouse, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy Commanding Officer, Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC)—Master Chief Bussert is commended for his interest in repaira- bles management problems in Navy electronics today. Indeed, repairables management across the board is a key facet of ever-growing importance in the fleet maintenance and supply strategy of today, and tomorrow.
Chief Bussert stated that “the supply criteria for being on the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) is a predicted failure of one, per system, per year, based on usage data.” The criteria, in fact, are four
We derive it directly from fleet 3M data. Thus, it’s a self-enhancing, or self-defeating, proposition depending on the quality of fleet 3M reporting. If fleet units report all parts usage (not forgetting to include the part that the man from General Electric or Raytheon with the little black bag plugs in during a tech assist) via 3M, the BRF goes up, and on-board repair parts carried go up when the next COSAL is produced. No 3M data, no parts.
I couldn’t agree more with the chief’s view of program managers having problems keeping their repair lines funded. However, we do have initiatives under way to try to keep repair funds from being diverted to other more exotic, but perhaps less readiness-oriented programs. We have also been given DoD approval to budget for cost growth in future budgets for both the repair and the procurement budgets.
As far as holding up fleet requisitions or back-ordering requisitions, it s urgency of need, as indicated on the ship’s requisition, that drives the decision to spot buy, spot repair, or back order. If a repair capability for a given category of material (printed circuit boards are a good example) truly exists on a ship, we’re all for the repair being accomplished afloat, and for the source, maintenance, and recoverability (SM&R) code to be compatible with that capability. SM&R codes are the coding devices through which the maintenance plan for an equipment is communicated to SPCC for COSAL preparation. Only items designated in the maintenance code for installation at the appropriate shipboard level are considered candidates for the COSAL. However, if repair is attempted on a depot level repairable, and fails, we fall further behind the power curve. The carcass is delayed in returning to the depot, and we lose precious repair turn around time. Worse yet, we regularly get back carcasses that are real “basket cases” because the complete repair was truly beyond the capability of the ship. Where users perceive inaccuracies in SM&R coding, the In-Service Engineering Activity (ISEA) would be happy,
I m sure, to receive that information and evaluate it.
“Grading the Fitness Report”
(See F. M. Snyder, pp. 48-61, September 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Joseph M. Mazzafro, U. S. Navy—In raising many germane questions about what qualities should be evaluated, Captain Snyder failed to touch on what I believe to be the more systemic cause of exaggerated grading in officers’ fitness reports: the bureaucratic expectations of the Navy. How many commanding officers consider "average performance” for their officers acceptable? In my nine years of active service at four different commands the term “average performance” has been synonymous with substandard.
Certainly this is a broad generalization from a limited data base, but there are several factors that support such an assertion. First, officers are presumably recruited because they possess a high degree of personality traits specified on the fitness report form. Second, when commissioned, the officer is officially notified that he or she is the repository of special trust and confidence and is admonished to carefully and diligently discharge all assigned duties. Third, once on active duty, a naval officer is given every opportunity to excel in a challenging environment of heavy operating schedules, reduced manning, limited funds, and short-fused tasking. So the last thing the Navy expects from its officers is average performance.
Clearly, a major cause of inflated fitness report grading is the fact that the performance criteria for being a typically effective officer are so rigorous that reporting seniors are unwilling to debase such efforts for the sake of creating a statistical average. This problem is further complicated by the present use of fitness reports for purposes other than performance evaluation—such as motivating career officers and retaining junior officers. The fitness report has become a means for convincing officers that they have a viable future in the Navy. As a result, these reports are required to serve two audiences, one which evaluates an officer's potential worth and another which wants recognition for effort put forth.
Given these complexities, the problem in any consideration of improving the officer evaluation system is how to deflate superior performance into a bell-shaped curve without reducing the overall morale of the officer corps.
I recommend attacking this dilemma simultaneously on two planes.
Initially, stricter documentation must be required for all officers evaluated above “typically effective.” If the documentation is lacking, the fitness report should be returned by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the command for correction or explanation. Right now there is no penalty for submitting a fitness report with top numerical grades which are not fully substantiated in the write-up. Unfortunately, there can be no effective stratification of officers’ performance until these non-evaluative functions are discarded.
Captain Snyder noted some qualities that should be documented in a fitness report, such as comments on potential performance in the next higher pay grade and type of assignment best suited for the officer. I would also add significant contributions to the accomplishment of the command’s mission as an important area for consideration. By substantially increasing the burden of proof in each of these three categories, I believe a more accurate means, for discriminating performance levels among officers might evolve.
In conjunction with stricter documentation, demonstrative meaning must also be given to the term “typically effective officer” by providing higher retention rates for junior officers and meaningful career progressions for senior officers so graded. The Navy must recognize the fact, that despite its high performance expectations, half of its officers are, by statistical definition, below average. Undoubtedly, this must be seen as the mathematical construct that it is. Without such a bureaucratic catharsis which accepts a typically effective officer as a valued member of the organization, exaggerated grading seems to be a blight that will continue no matter how the mechanics of the reporting system are revamped.
Unless the bureaucratic pressures pushing fitness report grades to the left are tempered by enforceable standards for discriminating between levels of performance, reporting seniors will remain reluctant, and rightly so, to apply tougher criteria to the top performing blocks for fear of destroying the morale of their wardrooms.
“The Violation of the ‘Liberty’ ”
(See R. K. Smith, pp. 62-70, June 1978;
S. C. Truver, pp. 91-93, September 1978;
N. Polmar, p. 88, October 1978; Y. Nitzan, pp. 111-113, November 1978 Proceedings)
Virgil L. Brownfield—As a crew member of the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) who was on the bridge as Captain McGonagle’s telephone talker during the Israeli attacks of 8 June 1967, it was with the greatest interest that I read Richard Smith’s “Violation of the Liberty." Of all the material I’ve collected and read through the years, it is the most accurate.
One thing Dr. Smith neglected to mention—maybe it wasn’t in the documents he used—was a small “Piper Cub”-type airplane which circled the ship between the transport- type aircraft’s first and second overflights. The small plane flew close aboard, obviously taking pictures. Several of us waved, as it was not unusual for us to be photographed on any of our deployments.
Commander Paul E. Tobin, U. S. Navy—Dr. Smith’s recent article on the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) incident rekindles many thoughts of what transpired after the attack on the Liberty and how the damaged ship was delivered safely to port. As engineer officer in the USS Davis (DD-937), I boarded the Liberty the morning after the tragic attack and remained with her until she was turned over to shipyard personnel in Malta.
On 8 July 1967, the Davis was steaming in the screen of Carrier Task Force 60, approximately 500 miles from the scene of the attack. Late in the afternoon, the Davis, with Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve embarked and in company with the USS Massey (DD-778), was directed by
Commander Sixth Fleet to proceed to a>d the stricken Liberty. Steaming at over 30 knots throughout the night, the two destroyers arrived at the scene early the next morning. The Liberty was lying dead in the water with blast damage and scorch marks covering most of the topside area. A 10° starboard list complicated transfer of as- S1stance personnel from the Davis, and therefore, the commanding officer those to moor alongside the damaged ship. This maneuver was accomplished tvith no damage and allowed the transfer of personnel, food, and supplies to the Liberty's exhausted crew. After the Davis’ crew rendered assistance for nearly seven hours, Commander Sixth fleet directed the Liberty to proceed to port under her own power, if possible, °r under tow.
The Davis was directed to provide necessary assistance and placed a 20-man team on board the Liberty for the transit. This group was headed by the ComDesRon Twelve chief staff officer and consisted of the Davis’ engineer officer, the damage control assistant, and leading petty officers from the damage control, electrician, interior communication, and boiler- man groups. A signalman and several boatswain’s mates were included because the Liberty's communications facilities were inoperative and extensive high-lining would be required.
The account that follows is a narrative of what transpired during the next five days based on my personal experience. In this discussion, there is no attempt to speculate on the events surrounding the attack. Rather, it is an effort to demonstrate that classroom and shipboard damage control training continue to be an important part of the naval profession.
Damage control is a difficult subject to teach in the classroom, and a great deal of imagination and enthusiasm is required to make practical shipboard damage control training effective. Navy men are required to think about the unthinkable as they study ashore or drill their repair parties on board ship. Firefighting and flooding trainers do much to create the atmosphere of a disaster at sea, but when the moment comes, few men are fully prepared to deal with the realities of a fire out of control, massive flooding, or the possibility of instability and capsizing.
On the morning after the attack, the first order of business was the evacuation of casualties. This was accomplished by sailors from the Davis and helicopters from other Sixth Fleet units. The remainder of the crew suffered from shock and exhaustion and could well have been evacuated with the seriously injured, but fortunately, those uninjured or with minor injuries chose to remain on board to conduct salvage operations. Their intimate knowledge of the interior of this large, unlit, and unconventional ship was extremely valuable in preventing further major damage and reaching port.
The scorched bulkheads, deformed topside structures, and the hundreds of projectile and fragment holes were clear testimony to the severity of repeated strafing attacks. What was less evident was the cause of the ominous
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10° list. The torpedo hit occurred on the starboard side of the number three hold and opened the entire hold to the sea. This hold had been reconfigured to house the research spaces, but there was no watertight integrity between the partitioned spaces in the hold. Aluminum bulkheads and joiner doors provided the required separation. The size of the torpedo hole was not known, but reports of those present when the torpedo hit indicated the flooding had been rapid. The flooding had been so rapid that a decision was made to secure the hatch on the first watertight deck over the hold.
On the morning of 9 July, the crew concluded that the hold was probably flooded solid. Since the progressive listing had long since stabilized, it was assumed that the flooding had stopped. The question remained why the ship was listing if the entire space, which was symmetrical about the centerline, was flooded.
Before the ship could be towed or proceed under her own power, several basic questions had to be answered. What force was pushing the ship over 10° to starboard? If spaces other than the hold were flooded, how was the ship’s structure affected? What amount of residual roll stability remained in the battered hull? How would the ship be affected by a 20- knot beam wind? Was there a danger of capsizing? Finally, if the ship were taken under tow, were the keel and hull girder sufficiently intact to prevent the ship from breaking up under the strain of a bow tow?
The first step was to consult the liquid loading diagrams which all Navy vessels routinely carry. A study of these charts revealed that there were several fuel oil and fresh water tanks as well as voids located below number three hold. All of the ship’s tanks and voids were sounded and the contents examined. The presence of salt water in voids, fuel tanks, and fresh water tanks gave some clues to the extent of the damage and explained the starboard list. The troubling conclusion was that if the damage extended to these spaces below the hold, the torpedo hole was much larger than originally estimated and located closer to the keel.
Using the ship’s inclining experiment report and a new set of draft readings passed from the Davis, the salvage team calculated the residual stability. All those associated with the salvage were relieved when it was determined that a sufficient margin of transverse stability remained to ensure an adequate righting arm if heavy
weather was encountered. Further analysis revealed that the tanks and voids nearest the keel had not been damaged, and that the keel was most likely intact. Therefore, a towing operation was possible, but propulsion by the ship’s engines was preferable because of the damage forward. The next two steps were to determine the damage to the main engineering plant and to adjust the list to the best condition for getting under way. This meant righting the ship. It was clear from the draft readings that the ship was loaded down with flooding and firefighting water, and, therefore, counterflooding was an unacceptable alternative. A transfer from starboard to port of some of the remaining 250,000 gallons of fuel on board was selected. After approximately 40,000 gallons were pumped, the ship returned to an even keel momentarily. Then, with an unexpected and frightening shudder, the vessel commenced listing in the opposite direction. After a gradually diminishing oscillation from a starboard to port list the ship finally stabilized. It was subsequently determined that this unexpected shift to a port list was caused by the large volume of loose water throughout the ship.
As the efforts at righting the ship were taking place, the engineers were carefully examining the main engineering plant to determine the feasibility of raising steam. The Vic-
w
spaces. There was little hope of dewatering the space, but the removal of most of the surface oil seemed possible.
The work of the electricians during the first 24 hours was of fundamental importance. In order to have any hope of reenergizing the ship's electrical systems, all of the major electrical cables which were open or grounded had to be located and repaired. This complex and tedious process was completed rapidly, and the work of the electricians was clearly evident in the form of hundreds of tagged and dead ended cables. Within hours it became possible to commence energizing lighting and ventilation throughout the ship. These measures bolstered morale and speeded damage control efforts.
A survey of the main engineering plant revealed no major machinery damage. It was, therefore, decided to test the feed, steam, and lube oil systems. Steam pressure was raised, and the main engines were tested. In company with the Davis and the fleet tug USS Papago (ATF-160), the ship began a transit of approximately 1,000 miles to Valetta, Malta.
Several basic problems still confronted the crew. What was the extent of the number three hold damage and how would the ship react in heavy weather? Since getting under way, a suction effect was drawing debris out of the torpedo hole in the starboard side. This debris contained material that was highly classified, and there was a possibility that important documents and remains would be lost.
For this reason, the Papago took up a vigil astern of the Liberty and sifted through the large volume of material being washed out of the flooded space.
An attempt to place a net over the opening revealed the large size of the hole, and the jagged steel edges precluded sealing the opening.
The dewatering efforts aimed at removing oil from the surface of the flooded hold were successful enough to allow a visual inspection of the damage below. What remained was a jungle of twisted metal, furniture, and equipment. Crude measurements taken over the side showed the hole to be about 20 feet wide at its largest point and to extend from the waterline
tory ships possessed a reliable and rela- fively simple steam turbine plant with two header-type boilers. Unfortunately, these plants used gravity to assist the operation of the feed and main ube oil systems. Parts of these systems were located high in the superstructure and were vulnerable to strafing attack damage. Hundreds of machine gun bullets and metal fragments Were lodged in the insulation of both systems, and the crew was not able to readily determine what punctures or cracks resulted. Furthermore, the rnorning soundings revealed a large unexplained consumption of feed Water which indicated a massive leak somewhere in the system. Additionally> the loss of key engineering personnel necessitated a crash course for the Davis sailors who were on board to assist the Liberty's remaining engineers.
With the ship righted, it seemed Possible that the water level in the hooded space would now be below the level of the secured hatch above hold three. The dogs were, therefore, carefully loosened to detect leakage, but only hot air was detected. When the hatch was partially opened, the observers were bathed in a wash of oil fumes and steam. The damaged space apparently had not been completely ■solated, and a ruptured low pressure steam line dearly was the source of the mysterious feed water consumption. Unfortunately, the water in the space Was covered with a thick layer of fuel °il so no estimate of the damage below could be made by peering through the hatch. There were thought to have been 22 men in the various spaces in the hold, and their fate was still unknown. Using eductors and portable Pumps, the damage control team commenced to clear the oil from the
to the bilge keel (about 30 feet).
The slow transit to Malta was marked by the gradual restoration of most of the ship’s vital systems, including the main gyro, sound- powered phone circuits, and a main fire and flushing pump. Damage control watches were set, and a steaming routine was established until heavy weather brought the final major challenge of the voyage.
When the ship was approximately 150 miles from Malta, the wind and sea conditions deteriorated to the point that unusual noises were heard in the damaged portion of the ship. The bulkhead on the forward side of the flooded hold was visibly panting as hogging and sagging stresses distorted the ship’s structure. The unusual noises were determined to be the sound of breaking surf and the impact of desks, chairs, and equipment being violently tossed about in the hold.
The integrity of the sustaining bulkheads became highly suspect under these conditions, and there was considerable doubt that the ship would remain seaworthy with another major space flooded. It was an unnerving experience to watch distortions form in the forward bulkhead upon the impact of some object and then begin to slowly leak. The ship was slowed, and those spaces joining the leaking bulkhead were evacuated and stripped of all movable items. This material was thrown overboard to make way for an elaborate shoring effort. Steel clips were welded to the decks and a complex system of metal and wooden shores was constructed. Watches were set at key locations and provisions were made for rapid evacuation of lower spaces in the event of rapid flooding. After a very nervous night, the rough weather subsided and the ship entered Valetta for dry docking and interim repairs that would allow an Atlantic transit.
It was this officer’s observation that the men of the Liberty and Davis knew what was required and carried out their hazardous and unpleasant tasks in a dedicated and professional manner. An ability to contemplate, confront, and overcome catastrophic damage at sea must remain an integral part of our trade.