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In mid-May 1975, the U. S.-flag merchant ship Mayaguez was illegally seized on the high seas in the Gulf of Siam and taken toward a group of islands claimed by the new Revolutionary Government of Cambodia. Like the traditional ”Hey Rube!” distress call of circus folk, the ”Mayday ” of the Mayaguez summoned ships, aircraft, sailors, and Marines to the rescue. And every bluejacket and leatherneck, who came, saw the affair through different eyes. For example, there were:
(1) The Patrol Squadron Skipper (4) The Battalion Operations Officer
(2) The Destroyer Escort’s Skipper (5) The Guided Missile Destroyer’s Skipper
(3) The Company Commander
The Patrol Squadron Skipper
Patrol Squadron Four’s (VP-4) first indication that an American ship had been fired upon and seized by Cambodian units came in the form of a phone call from Task Force 72 at approximately 1300Z (2100 H at Cubi, 2000 G on scene; all times referred to from this point will be on-scene times) on Monday, 12 May. The initial information was sketchy. Nevertheless, I immediately placed the squadron on full alert and we started to prepare crew briefings and to organize a flight schedule to cover the next 24 hours.
VP-4, consisting of 360 people and ten P-3B/D aircraft, deployed to NAS Cubi Point on 23 April 1975, and, on 9 May, I relieved the commanding officer of VP-19 as Commander Philippine Air Patrol Group (CTG 72.3).
As Task Group Commander, I received my orders from Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces Seventh Fleet (CTF 72). Rear Admiral W. D. Toole, Jr., was CTF 72 during the Mayaguez affair and his operations officer was Commander Hersh Plowman.
Our area of surveillance responsibility included the international waters of the western Philippine Sea, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, and the Indian Ocean. While our primary base for operations was Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines, we used Diego Garcia as a secondary operational base and the Royal Thai Naval Air Station at Utapao, Thailand, as a logistics base and refueling stop. Due to the extensive area of responsibility assigned to CTG 72.3, VP-4 normally was augmented by three aircraft from VP-17 and one aircraft from VP-46. Personnel from these outfits also were to play important roles in the Mayaguez operation.
Before describing the VP flying phase of the Mayaguez recovery operation, it is important to understand what we were faced with on the ground. At Cubi, early in the operation, I placed my executive officer, Commander Brant Powell, in charge of the Cubi operational control center (OPCON). The Cubi OPCON had the responsibilities of digesting the numerous incoming directives and translating them into flight crew briefings. In addition, the OPCON personnel debriefed flight crews, communicated with airborne aircraft, and, most important, drafted reports for submission to higher authority. During the four days of the Mayaguez affair, Commander Powell and his assistants drafted and sent over 100 flash or immediate precedence messages. Concurrently, they received, read, and digested several hundred messages.
In addition to the intense message traffic activity associated with the Mayaguez seizure, the OPCON officers’ jobs were considerably complicated by the surveillance requirements attendant to the fleet of small Vietnamese surface craft escaping the Communist takeover of South Vietnam. A myriad of vessels was still scattered throughout the South China Sea during the period 12 to 16 May. In fact, Task Group 72.3 expended more flight hours related to the evacuation of Vietnam—Operation "Frequent Wind”—than on Mayaguez surveillance flights.
Finally, for the entire first day of the affair the only intelligence relative to the fate of the Mayaguez was obtained by P-3 aircraft and reported to the OPCON at Cubi Point. Consequently a great deal of attention was focused on the CTG 72.3 OPCON. We received numerous telephone calls from all levels of command up through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). More often than not the caller was of flag rank and desired immediate information. As a result, Commander Powell and I spent many hours on the telephone answering questions.
Our initial flight preparations involved having the ready alert crew on the line for a night illumination mission. I also called Lieutenant Commander Le Doux, the officer-in-charge of our detachment at Utapao, and briefed him on the situation. I asked him how soon he could launch an aircraft for night radar and visual surveillance. Knowing he had no ready alert crews or ready alert aircraft and few spare parts, I expected an answer of about four to six hours. I was happily surprised by his response: "Forty minutes after you say go!” Since it takes 20 minutes just to
Commander J. A. Messegee, U. S. Navy
pump a full load of jet fuel into a bird which contains only a normal ramp load, and since he did not have a crew on alert, I honestly didn’t believe his optimistic forecast. At about 2030, Commander Plowman gave us the g°- At 2055, the first aircraft was airborne from Utapao, and, at 2115, our ready alert crew was airborne from Cubi Point. The bird from Utapao was on station near Poulo Wai Island at 2128, approximately 90 minutes after our first notification that an incident had occurred in that area.
Poulo Wai is about 60 miles from the mainland of Cambodia and therefore well within the range of fighter aircraft launched from mainland airfields. Our intelligence indicated Cambodia’s only tactical aircraft were T-28 Trojans, which the P-3 can easily outperform. At the time, however, we did not know if the Vietnamese were involved in the caper and, if they were, whether they had fighter aircraft in the area. Since we did not have friendly air cover for the early missions, the only advice we could give our plane commanders was "play heads up.”
In addition to no air cover, we also were concerned about the antiaircraft (AA) armament on the Cambodian gunboats, inasmuch as we had lost a P-J to this type of boat during the Vietnam War. Although our best intelligence indicated the boats’ heaviest weapons were 20 millimeters, one publication indicated they had 40 millimeters. This discrepancy caused me to set a 6,000-fo°c minimum altitude restriction on out aircraft when in the vicinity of a possible gunboat and to require a one-mile mini' mum offset. We were to learn that these restrictions did not hamper our ability to visually monitor gunboat movements, except during periods of 1°^ cloudiness. At these minimums, however, we could not discern specific details, such as the lettering on the bo^ and stern of the Mayaguez.
Our first two aircraft arrived on station after dark and discovered several vessels, large and small, within 60 mileS of Poulo Wai Island. Systematically each contact was illuminated by parachute
flares and examined visually.
We assumed the Mayaguez would be under way toward the Cambodian port
Kompong Som. Two ships in the area jaaet the Mayaguez’ general description ut several others were similar. The ’T'ost likely candidate was located seven j^fles off Paulo Wai. She was fully *ghted and apparently dead in the water (E>IW), but we weren’t able to positively ‘Aentify her.
As the first two aircraft continued to lscover numerous vessels and report their descriptions, courses, and speeds, it ecame apparent that we would have to °htain positive identifying data—i.e., read the name off the ship. Therefore, V> e directed our third aircraft, which was er|route to the area, to make one pass at 300 feet a]tituc]e ancf i;000 yards offset r°m the large vessel DIW off Paulo Wai. t '"’as imperative to obtain visual confirmation of the ship’s name.
Shortly after sunrise on the 13th of May, a VP-17 P-3 made one high-speed pass down the port side of the 500-foot containership laying-to off Paulo Wai. Numerous photos were obtained of the ship and two gunboats tied up alongside. The P-3 crew read the name Mayaguez both on the stern and the bow of the container-laden merchant vessel. While executing the close-in pass, the P-3 crew observed small arms fire from the Mayaguez and AA fire from the twin guns on the gunboats. At the same time a crewmember, located near the tail of the aircraft, reported to the pilot that he heard a bullet hit in his area. Consequently, the pilot retired a few miles from the area and inspected his aircraft for low-speed controllability and visually checked it for damage. The plane had been hit by a single .50-caliber projectile
Dead in the water off Poulo Wai Island, the containership, upper photograph, looked very much like the Mayaguez. A P-3 made a high-speed pass down the vessel’s port side and, before the development of the film for the lower photograph, it was immediately obvious that the search was over. The Mayaguez—two gunboats tied up alongside—had been located.
which caused superficial damage to the vertical stabilizer. The pilot decided it was not significant and elected to remain on station for his scheduled surveillance period.
With the Mayaguez located and DIW, the vp mission momentarily focused on keeping tabs on all Cambodian naval units in the area and, secondarily, to
96 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976
periodically check on the Mayaguez and monitor her condition. Shortly after the P-3’s close-in pass, the Mayaguez got under way and headed straight for Kom- pong Som on the mainland. At her course and speed we estimated that she would be in port within six hours! We received no authorization, however, to expend ordnance or take any action to stop her from proceeding into the harbor. From our vantage point it appeared as if we were headed for another Pueblo-type incident.
To our astonishment, as the Mayaguez passed north of Koh Tang, a small island halfway between Paulo Wai and the mainland, she slowed and made a turn into a cove on the north end of the island. And, then, she anchored about one mile from the island. Near this same time, at approximately 1500, U. S. Air Force tactical air units, F-ms, F-4s, and A-7S, arrived over the Mayaguez. Our worries of hostile interceptors engaging the P-3 aircraft were now much allayed.
With the Mayaguez anchored, our primary mission again shifted to locating and keeping tabs on all Cambodian naval units. The on-scene P-3 resumed a systematic search of the area within 60 miles of the Mayaguez and plotted the positions of several Cambodian gunboats as well as numerous fishing-type vessels.
In the late afternoon of 13 May, during a routine visual check of the con- tainership, the P-3 crew observed a gunboat and a trawler-type vessel tie up to the ship. Many personnel were transferred from the Mayaguez'to the trawler and were seated on its deck with their heads on their knees. Inasmuch as they appeared to be "Caucasian,” we assumed they were the crew members of the Mayaguez. Moreover, even though it was impossible to count heads, the pilot’s post-mission estimate of 30 to 40 personnel transferred corresponded well with the known size of the crew—40. The trawler, accompanied by the gunboat, departed the Mayaguez and went into the beach area on Koh Tang.
Throughout the affair our aircraft reported AA fire whenever they were in the vicinity of a gunboat! Gun positions on Koh Tang also opened fire whenever a plane came within sight of them. Since the maximum altitude of the tracers was about 3,500 feet, we assumed their largest weapons were about .50-caliber.
During the night of 13 May and darkness hours of the morning of 14 May, on-scene P-3 aircraft attempted to keep track of all small boat movements by radar. Additionally, the area around the Mayaguez was kept lighted as much as feasible with parachute flares in an attempt to keep this region under visual surveillance. Each time our crew would ignite a new flare it would elicit a Cambodian response consisting of a barrage of poorly directed AA fire. During these night hours, small craft made several trips between the island and the Mayaguez. The illumination from the flares, however, did not provide us enough visibility to determine how many people were going aboard or exiting from the ship.
Shortly after dawn on Wednesday, 14 May, a vessel similar to the trawler which we believed had transferred the crew into Koh Tang harbor the previous evening got under way from the island and headed for Kompong Som. Visual surveillance identified Caucasians huddled on the trawler’s bow. It appeared our worst fears—that the crew would be transferred to prisons on mainland Cambodia before they could be rescued—were coming to fruition as the little craft plodded northeast toward the harbor. In spite of an impressive firepower demonstration put on by the Air Force Tac birds, which included F-m bombing runs, an AC-130 pass, the sinking of three patrol boats by F-4 and A-7 fire, and A-7S firing to within ten yards of the boat’s bow, the trawler continued on course and disappeared into the haze as it entered Kompong Som harbor. At the Cubi OPCON we assumed the crew of the Mayaguez was now in mainland Cambodia.
For the remainder of the day of 14 May, we kept close surveillance on all small craft within about 60 miles of Koh Tang. Near midday we received orders to prevent any gunboats from approaching either Koh Tang or the Mayaguez. Our crews coordinated with the Air Force tactical aircraft and vectored several aircraft into positions for kills on the Cambodian gunboat fleet.
During the time our attention was riveted on the small boat transporting the Caucasians to Kompong Som, a ship of Swedish registry, the SS Hirado, was fired upon by a Cambodian gunboat about 50 nautical miles southwest of Koh Tang. By the time this information reached us, many hours had elapsed. Subsequent to the attack, one of our P-3 crews, routinely identifying all surface craft in the area, had flown over the Hirado. They photographed her and recorded her position, course, and speed. When we received the news of the attack on the Hirado and, concurrently, instructions to investigate the situation, the plane commander, who had observed her "operating normally” several hours after the alleged attack, was debriefing in the Cubi OPCON. Our immediate "mission accomplished” message must have caused some confusion, because we subsequently received a "relocate” requirement for the Hirado. I now had a dilemma: the Hirado likely would be very near the Bangkok harbor by the time I could get an aircraft to intercept her track. How was I to search the port of Bangkok? Fortunately, Lieutenant Commander Le Doux in Utapao was carefully following the message traffic and was several steps ahead of me. He quickly sent me a message indicating as a reference a telephone call between him and port officials in Bangkok. It essentially said "ref. a indicates SS Hirado in port Bangkok; master reports conditions normal.”
During the night hours of 14 May, several gunboats were detected closing the Mayaguez. With the P-3s providing radar information and flare illumination, the Air Force Tac birds prevented any boats from reaching the ship or the island.
Our crews, as well as we in the OPCON, were cheered considerably during the night of 14 May when the first surface units of the U. S. Seventh Fleet entered the Gulf of Siam. Throughout the night, the on-station P-3s could talk on short-range radio to ComDesRon 23 embarked in the USS Harold E. Holt■ Close behind the Holt was the guided- missile destroyer USS Henry B. Wilsoth followed by the attack carrier USS Coral Sea. While supporting Air Force tactical aircraft the on-scene P-3 passed the surface picture data to ComDesRon 23-
Shortly after dawn on 15 May a coordinated attack to secure Koh Tang and the Mayaguez commenced. Concurrently, air strikes began on the mainland
"Mayday” for the Mayaguez 97
harbor facilities and airport which could be utilized to oppose our landings. U. S. •Air Force helos, with the Marine assault troops embarked, took heavy fire as they approached the beach in pairs. During these operations our P-3 crew orbited nearby and watched helplessly.
About two hours after the assault began, the P-3 picked up a small target exiting Kompong Som harbor. The pilot reported the contact to Com- DesRon 23 and to us in the OPCON. The on-scene commander ordered the P-3 to immediately close and visually identify the craft.
I never expected the report that followed: "Thirty Caucasian persons on board waving white flags.” Within a few minutes the Wilson reported that all 40 crewmembers were on board the trawler and in good condition.
Now that we had both the ship and the crew back under our control, the Marines were ordered to withdraw from
Koh Tang. But, due to the intense fire, even though they were closely supported by the Wilson and tactical aircraft, it took the remainder of the day to extract the troops from the island.
For the next two days we kept P-3S in the Gulf of Siam and monitored the sea traffic while remaining well clear of all Cambodian territory. No Cambodian gunboat activity was noted. On 18 May, Task Group 72.3 reverted to its normal patrol pattern.
The
Destroyer Escort’s Skipper
Commander Robert A. Peterson, U. S. Navy
The USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1074) was operating in the South China Sea, southwest of Subic Bay, late in the afternoon on 12 May 1975 when word was first received of the Mayaguez seizure. Soon after, we were directed to proceed at best speed to the vicinity of the Mayaguez. Fortunately, Captain D. P. Roane, ComDesRon 23, and his staff material officer, Lieutenant Bob Lemke, Were embarked in the Harold E. Holt because their participation in the Mayaguez rescue operation was to be at least partially responsible for its success.
As we closed the Mayaguez, the volume of message traffic rapidly increased and soon our communications capabilities were being taxed to the limit. We were receiving a constant flow of mesSages on the location of the Mayaguez, ^here she had been fired upon and boarded, locating data on the crew, and cbe status of gunboat activity in the area. From the information provided by p-3 aircraft, we knew the Mayaguez was anchored near an island named Koh 'Tang, approximately 25 miles southwest °fi Sihanoukville, Cambodia. Further aircraft reports revealed that personnel who appeared to be Caucasian had been taken Rom the ship by boat. Information as to tbe boat’s destination was sketchy. Some reports indicated that the crew had been raken ashore on Koh Tang. Others had :be crew proceeding to the mainland.
While the on-scene reports came in '■'•’e established a direct voice circuit to rhe CNO switchboard. We also were receiving messages detailing—as much as possible, based on the information available at the time—our mission. Depending upon existing on-scene conditions, the Harold E. Holt was to either have a landing party board the Mayaguez and disable her propulsion capability or embark a nucleus crew and take her under tow. Regardless of the eventual option that would be carried out, it was emphasized that we were to utilize only our own resources in formulating a plan of action.
We were able to identify the Mayaguez’ characteristics from available intelligence publications to assist with the formulation of our plans. Meanwhile, we continued to receive information on the captured ship’s location from aircraft flyovers. (Later we were to determine from her engineering bell- book that the Mayaguez had been captured and ordered by Cambodian personnel to anchor, and the following day, 13 May, ordered to get under way to yet another anchorage.) Satisfied that the reported location of the Mayaguez was valid, we finalized plans on how to approach and board the vessel.
Our initial plan was to embark a boarding party, using our ship’s boats. Aircraft patrolling the area reported several hostile gunboats in the vicinity of the Mayaguez so we expected to have to fight our way in. Our biggest concerns were: (1) how much resistance would we encounter from on board the Mayaguez', and (2) how much hostile fire we would receive from Koh Tang. We would later find that the Alayaguez was out of small arms range from Koh Tang, although the Cambodians had weapons that could have caused us some problems had they used them.
With underway watch condition III set and weapon systems ready, the Harold E. Holt arrived on the scene during the late hours of 14 May. We then were informed that a detachment of Marines, some Military Sealift Command (MSC) civilian personnel to man and steam the Mayaguez, Navy personnel, and an Air Force EOD team to dispose of any booby traps on board, were to be flown out to us early on 15 May from Thailand. We also were informed that after embarking these additional personnel, we were to seize the Mayaguez. Additionally, intelligence information received on the evening of 14 May indicated that the Mayaguez' engineering plant might be in operation. If this was the case, it was probable that some of the crew was on board; and if she got under way, we were to blockade and prevent her from reaching the mainland of Cambodia.
At first light on 15 May, three Air Force "jolly greens” arrived and offloaded 59 Marines, a six-man MSC nucleus crew, and EOD personnel. As soon as we had our passengers, we stationed general quarters and started in for the Mayaguez which lay at anchor about 15 miles to the east.
My executive officer, Lieutenant Commander John Todd, and our small arms fire team leader, Coast Guard Officer Lieutenant (junior grade) Jim Richardson, worked swiftly with the embarked Marines in formulating plans for and stationing the contingent of
His ship tied up alongside the Mayaguez, top photograph, the skipper of the Harold E. Holt conferred with one of the Military Sealift Command’s civilian personnel who had volunteered for the rescue mission. Then, supported by fire from the Henry B. Wilson, right, from whose deck many of these photographs were taken, the Harold E. Holt got under way with the Mayaguez in tow.
du
lar
Marines about our topside areas for fire team support as we approached our °bjective.
When we learned the previous even- lng that we would receive the Marine support for the operation, we decided to take the Harold E. Holt alongside the ^■ayaguez rather than use small boats. Therefore, all fire-team personnel could
devoted to topside positions on board ln support of installed weapon systems—one five-inch gun forward and °ur basic point defense missile system
aft.
Since we assumed that there would be Cambodians on board the Mayaguez, flans were made to have Air Force aircraft air-drop riot control agent (tear §as) on the Mayaguez ten minutes before boarding operations were to commence, followed five minutes later by aircraft strafing runs. These two elements, together with other unknowns, such as what type and the extent of resistance we would encounter from Personnel that might be on board, were aH critical areas of concern for all hands 0r> board the Harold E. Holt.
One additional element also was critical—that of maneuvering alongside. Admittedly, that is what I had been Practicing as a profession for years, and I Relieved I had achieved a fairly high level proficiency and confidence. However, Uormally when mooring alongside an- °rher ship or pier, line handlers are available to receive your mooring lines as foey are passed over. Also, when moor- lfig alongside another ship, she will not dually be swinging free at anchor or a Duoy, but rather will be moored in such a fashion as to preclude a mooring in motion. As the many facets of this en- tlre operation passed through my mind rmg the next few hours, this particu- problem seemed to stay at the front.
I would have to maneuver the Harold E. Holt into a position where the Marines could board while alongside and do it the first time. Obviously, we were also concerned about the match-up of the freeboard of both ships. Fortunately, the 01 deck level of the Harold E. Holt did align fairly even with that of the main deck on the Mayaguez. There would certainly be some additional problems involved if I didn’t get alongside on the first approach and had to make a second attempt; but I didn’t want to think about it. We planned to have some of the first Marines that boarded the Mayaguez handle our lines.
So, with gas masks and a Marine boarding team at the ready, the Harold E. Holt started her approach on the Mayaguez. The Mayaguez was lying at anchor nearly parallel to and approximately 3,000 yards off the northeast shoreline of Koh Tang. Her decks were piled high with containerized cargo fore and aft of her midship superstructure. The wind was blowing across her decks from port to starboard at about 10 knots. I decided to make the approach on the Mayaguez with my portside to. Although, with the existing wind conditions this meant we would probably receive residual tear gas, it would put the Mayaguez between the Harold E. Holt and hostile positions on the island. More important, this would afford the easiest approach for a single-screw ship.
I informed Commodore Roane that I expected to be alongside in approximately ten or 15 minutes and he called for the tear gas drop. In a matter of moments, A-7S made what later proved to be a perfect drop of riot control agent bomblets from stern to stem over the Mayaguez. Five minutes later, with adrenalin pumping, heart pounding, and sweat rolling down my face under an
Mk-5 gas mask, I called for the strafing run. At this time I estimated my range at 200 yards astern of the Mayaguez. A few moments after I requested the strafing run, I could see that I had been too late with the request and a run now would probably hit us as well as the Mayaguez. I called for an immediate cancellation of the run.
With the doors to the pilot house closed, the level of heat and humidity inside defied description. Trying to get voice commands to the helm and even see the helm through a gas mask while maneuvering alongside was an interesting and challenging new experience for this shiphandler. With a lot of the Lord’s help, I was able to ease alongside without damage to either ship and placed my bridge nearly adjacent to that of the Mayaguez'.
Naturally, throughout the approach all eyes searched the Mayaguez for any sign of activity. As soon as we were alongside, Lieutenant Commander Todd sounded "Marines over the side” and 59 Marines began a boarding evolution unheard of in modern Navy times. Simultaneously, Harold E. Holt sailors moved from below decks to pass mooring lines to the Marines embarking in the Mayaguez. A well-organized Marine contingent under the direction of Major R. E. Porter searched out every space of the Mayaguez and within an hour reported her secure. The Harold E. Holt passed a set of colors to the Marines. As Major Porter raised the Stars and Stripes on the Mayaguez, I ordered attention to port.
The Harold E. Holt's, deck force sailors now set out hurriedly preparing the Mayaguez for towing. Her engineering plant was discovered to be in a completely cold state. Harold E. Holt machinists, boiler technicians, and electri-
100
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976
dans assisted the MSC engineer with preparations for plant light-off but not with much success. Without power in the Mayaguez it was impossible to walk out anchor chain for towing, so a towing bridle was fabricated using one of her headlines.
Although the cross-deck wind had removed the heaviest concentration of tear gas and masks were no longer required by most topside personnel, personnel in below deck areas, without any benefit of ventilation, still required masks.
Finally, with our towing hawser made fast, we were ready to get under way. Since we were without a scope of anchor chain to provide the desired catenary in the towline, our speed buildup had to be gradual so as not to put excess strain on the towing hawser. To control this operation I stationed my exec on the fantail where the action of the towline could best be observed, with orders that once we were clear of the Mayaguez' side he was to direct orders to main engine control. I retained control of the rudder at the pilothouse.
The division of labor proved successful. After our deck seaman stationed on the Mayaguez forecastle cut the anchor chain with a portable oxyacetylene emergency cutting outfit, the Harold E. Holt was under way with the Mayaguez in tow. Without the use of a scope of anchor chain in the towline, our speed was restricted to four or five knots. Except for the few anxious moments when we first got under way and the Harold E. Holt presented herself to the enemy on Koh Tang from behind the cover of the Mayaguez and her high deck load, this speed restriction was not a problem.
Not long after we were under way with the Mayaguez in tow, we learned that the Henry B. Wilson had retrieved the captured Mayaguez crew. She returned to our vicinity and sent the Master, Charles Miller, and his crew back to their vessel on a small boat. Soon after he was back on board, Captain Miller called me by bridge-to-bridge radio, offered me his thanks and a round of beer for my crew, and said he would soon have steam up and be ready to proceed on his own power. Later in the afternoon, the Mayaguez reported she was able to proceed under her own power and our deck seaman cut the towing bridle on the Mayaguez forecastle. We retrieved our towing hawser and accompanied the Mayaguez until she was approximately 12 miles from any land.
As we were about to send a small boat to the Mayaguez to retrieve our engineers, deck seamen, and the Marine security detachment, we received word that we were to return immediately ro the vicinity of Koh Tang to assist the Henry B. Wilson with the extraction of Marines from the island.
We returned and took station near the island as directed by the airborne evacuation coordinator. Our mission then became one of trying to assist the airborne spotters in the location of Marines on the island and of providing a landing platform for the helicopters pulling them out. By late evening, when the operation ended, we had received about 35 Marines from helicopter extraction efforts.
The Harold E. Holt then departed Koh Tang and proceeded to pick up the Marines and ship’s company personnel left on board the Mayaguez.
The Company Commander
Captain Walter J. Wood, U. S. Marine Corps
had been loaded onto an Air Force C-i'*1 and we began the four-hour flight to Utapao, Thailand. In flight, Major Potter, Captain Feltner, and I formulated a list of questions concerning the Mttf aguez, such as what was her cargo, were photos available, etc.
We landed at 0505, on the l4th of May, and were met by Air Force buses and taken to a nearby mess hall. But before my troops ate, an Air Force colo-
My men and I, First Battalion of the Fourth Marine Regiment stationed in the Philippines, first learned of the Cambodian seizure of an American vessel on 12 May. Information concerning the ship’s capture was rather sparse and it wasn’t until the next morning that things began to pick up. At approximately 0800, a battalion briefing was held where the company commanders and section heads were instructed to prepare their men for immediate embarkation.
By 1100, my troops were ready to move out. Finally, at 1930, my battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Hester, ordered me to organize two platoons and a headquarters element, total force size to be 120 men, and be prepared to move out by 2300. He didn’t tell me where we would be going, only that we would be leaving. By 2200, I had 120 Marines standing by in full battle gear, chow drawn, weapon and communication equipment checked, and rosters prepared.
At 2230, I was called to an operational brief to which I brought my two platoon commanders, 2nd Lieutenants E. R. Whitesides and Joe Flores, who would join me on the mission. At this brief, we were instructed as to the nature of our mission and the tentative plan for the recapture of the SS Mayaguez. Additionally, I was informed that a headquarters element was being attached to my unit, comprised of Major R. E. Porter, the battalion XO, and Captain J. P. Feltner, the assistant operations officer. Finally, we were instructed that we’d be briefed in detail concerning the operation at Utapao, Thailand.
Following a last-minute inspection of the troops and their gear, we departed for Cubi Point airstrip by 2330. During the three hours since we’d been alerted, our battalion S-4 (logistics officer, Captain Bill Harley) worked feverishly and delivered some 5,000 pounds of ammunition to the airstrip; the ammo was a mixed bag—everything from 5.56 f°r our M-16S to satchel charges and gaS grenades. At the airstrip we picked up six MSC and six Navy personnel who volunteered for the mission of getting the Mayaguez under way once we had seized her.
By 0110, our gear and ammunition
"Mayday” for the Mayaguez 101
nel informed me that 0610 had been established as a possible launch time for us. Back to the airstrip. Major Porter, Captain Feltner, and I were called into a briefing, and we saw pictures of the Mayaguez. Additionally, we were instructed and questioned as to the feasibility of a helo assault directly onto the deck of the Mayaguez and were given needed information on the logistical and communications aspects of the opera- Oon. During the course of the brief, we had attached to our unit two Air Force explosive ordnance types and an Army translator.
Since the Mayaguez was a fully-loaded containership, a direct helo assault on her was possible—two landing points were available, one forward and one aft. As to her captors, we were informed that approximately 30 Cambodians were °n board the vessel armed with auto- tnatic and antitank weapons. This information had been gleaned from photos that were taken by P-3S which were constantly on station above the vessel ar>d Koh Tang. We also received a position report on the vessel—she was anchored approximately 1,100 meters off the north shore of Koh Tang—and infrared photos showed her plant to be cold.” The vessel could not move on her own power for some three hours due to boiler light-off time and the like. The one question that constantly troubled us was the location of the crew. Since the crew still could be on board, fire discipline in the actual assault of the Al^y- aguez was stressed.
As the brief progressed, we were informed that the launch had been postponed until 0910, and then again Until 1230, and in our discussions we decided we could not effectively launch to the Mayaguez after 1415. The plant °n the Mayaguez was cold and therefore no artificial light could or would be Available to us. We felt that we needed at least three hours in order to seize and thoroughly search the vessel, and naturally we wanted the aid of any and all dlumination. The helicopter flight 'vhich would have to cover some 270 miles from Utapao to the Mayaguez ''v°uld take approximately two hours, keeping in mind that evening nautical rrvilight would occur at approximately *915, it was understandable why we had to launch by 1415.
For our mission we were assigned six Air Force CH-53S of the Jolly Green Giant variety. These 53s had been constructed as search and rescue helos for operations in hostile environments and were equipped with three 7.62-mm. miniguns capable of firing in one of two modes— either at 1,000 or 2,000 rounds per minute. Additionally, these helos were constructed with some 4,000 pounds of armor plate, which limited their troopcarrying capability. A normal Marine Corps CH-53 can carry 35-45 combat- loaded Marines, but due to their equipment and armor plate, these helos would be able to transport only 20-27 Marines. The one distinct advantage these helos held was that they had an aerial refueling capability, without which the mission could not have been initiated. At the conclusion of the brief, we were instructed to reboard buses and stand by at a nearby gymnasium.
At the gym, Major Porter, Captain Feltner, and I drew up the actual assault plan for the Mayaguez. The last actual ship boarding conducted by Marines had taken place in 1826, so none of us had any experience in drawing up shipboarding procedures. Our final plan could be categorized as being very much akin to a raid; the principal exception was that we did not intend to withdraw from the objective area—the SS Mayaguez. But, as in a raid, our plan called for assault elements, search elements, a keen dependence on fire control, surprise, firepower, and violence of action.
Having been on board vessels similar to the Mayaguez, we recognized that we had to seize as quickly as possible four critical areas—the bridge, engine room, and main deck fore and aft. Once these areas were seized the ship could then be cautiously and thoroughly searched. Once our plan was formulated we organized our unit into two echelons, the first consisting of four assault teams. The second echelon would contain one helo with reinforcements to be used as needed and the sixth bird would contain the six MSC personnel who would be landed once the ship was secured.
Our planned scenerio was as follows: (1) The first helo would land on the forward portion of the vessel and its team, under my command, would clear the tops of the containers and assault across the containers and seize the bridge.
(2) The second team, under the direction of Captain Feltner, would land, proceed into the secured bridge, and enter and clear the superstructure. (3) The third team would land forward, proceed down to the deck, and clear it fore to aft. (4) The fourth team’s mission was to land and move into the bridge and proceed directly into the area of the engine room.
We proceeded to brief our element and squad leaders, rehearsed as best we could, and finally held a detailed brief for our entire unit as to the overall scheme of the operation. The troops were told that the assault, in our best estimate, would undoubtedly be successful, but the price of success would be dear. As I might have expected when asked if they had any questions, only one Marine spoke up: "Sir, when do we eat?” It was obvious my Marines were ready to fight and die if need be, but not on empty stomachs.
At approximately 1215, my men, now with full stomachs, were bused back to the airfield where we staged aboard predesignated aircraft and once again assumed the all-too-familiar "stand-by status.” During this period a pilot brief was conducted as to the plan and sequencing of the assault and various support roles for the helos’ miniguns were discussed and plans formulated. The launch order was never received and at 1415 we dismounted our helicopters and made our way back to the gymnasium. After the evening meal, briefs of the mission were once again held and the need for fire discipline and target identification was stressed to all hands.
At 2200, Major Porter was called to another brief at base operations. During this brief the operation plan as executed was formulated and somewhat finalized. Rather than merely an assault against the Mayaguez, the operation took form as a joint seizure of the Mayaguez and nearby Koh Tang, where the ship’s crew was believed to be held. In order to provide the assault unit—2nd Battalion, 9th Marines—with sufficient helo assets for the operation, our assets were cut from six to three helicopters, necessitating a major reduction in our assault force. Additionally, it had been decided that rather than risking a direct helo assault onto the Mayaguez, my troops would be flown to the Harold E. Holt
ayaguez
The original plan had called for the Marines to recapture the Mayaguez by direct helicopter assault, but, at the eleventh hour, it was decided to board from the deck of the Harold E. Holt. Following a gas strike by two Air Force A-7s, the Marine boarding began and, instead of the 30 armed Cambodians expected to resist them, the Marines found only cold foodstuffs.
could only set down one set of its
and would board the MayagUez from ^er- Liftoff for the operation was set for 0400 on 15 May.
Necessarily, my unit’s actual assault plan was modified to accomplish the Same goals, securing the vital areas of t*le ship, but in a different manner and lt;h fewer personnel.
Reveille sounded at 0230, and within a few minutes of 0400 our 53s were taxiing for takeoff.
. At 0602, my helo hovered over the ^credibly small helo pad on the Harold , ■ Holt. Due to the size of the pad, the
heels, necessitating our departure rough the starboard doorway of the This embarkation-debarkation evolu- t'°n rook 15-20 minutes, and, by 0630, e Harold E. Holt began moving toward rhe Mayaguez.
At approximately 0710-0715, as fanned, with the Harold E. Holt astern rhe Mayaguez, two Air Force A-7S
delivered an accurate gas strike on the Mayaguez. The entire vessel was clouded in gas; the word was passed to don gas masks and prepare for boarding. Hundreds of searching eyes peered at the Mayaguez, but there was no sign of enemy activity. While the destroyer escort was still some distance from the Mayaguez, one of my men, Corporal C. R. Coker, jumped to the deck of the Mayaguez, and I followed.
Lines were thrown from the Harold E. Holt to the Mayaguez, and Corporal Coker and I rushed to secure them. As we moved forward, I turned to check the positions of my other Marines but, much to my surprise, I discovered that no one else had boarded, for as we had jumped, the two ships had drifted apart, and indeed the two ships were now some 25 feet apart. Motivated partially out of loneliness, Corporal Coker and I worked feverishly at the lines and the two ships were made fast. My Marines
After the totally deserted ship was searched, the author helped raise the national colors. Thereafter, some Marines returned to the escort, pictured on opposite page and above, while the detachment remaining on the Mayaguez got the opportunity to rest and think about what might have happened.
then boarded. Teams moved to their predesignated areas, and the vessel was thoroughly searched.
Led by Corporal Coker, a squad of Marines made their way to the bridge where they found foodstuffs that the Cambodians had left behind in their hasty flight. Contrary to many reports, however, the food was not warm. With the aid of flashlights, Sergeant W. J. Owens’ squad moved down several
104 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976
gas-filled decks and conducted a thorough search of the engine room. Simultaneously, the remainder of the force began a fore-to-aft search of the main deck and cargo containers. Containers, opened by Cambodians, were searched, as was the remainder of the superstructure. Except for some superficial gear, the Mayaguez was basically undamaged.
As the operation progressed, it became obvious that the vessel had been abandoned by her captors.
Finally, at 0825, with the Marines on Koh Tang still heavily committed, the Colors were raised over the Mayaguez.
At approximately 0935, I received word from Major Porter that some of my Marines might be needed ashore, so
I transferred to the Harold E. Holt with one platoon to wait for a helicopter that would never come. Within 36 hours all of my Marines would be transferred to the guided-missile destroyer Hemy B- Wilson for our return to Subic Bay where an unexpected welcoming committee greeted us.
Major J. B. Hendricks, U. S. Marine Corps
The Battalion Operations Officer
By 12 May, Phnom Phenh and Saigon were evacuated of all U. S. citizens. Vientiane was perking but quiet. Marine units at Okinawa bases had stood down from their various readiness conditions and naval and Marine forces in the South China Sea were on the way to, or already in, the Philippines and Okinawa. The Second Battalion of the Ninth Marine Regiment (2/9) was beginning the long complicated task of reordering of training and bringing its more administrative-type training up to the standard of combat training already completed. The officers and men of 2/9, either in the field or buried beneath staff paperwork or support tasks, took little notice of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service news broadcasts. So we missed the first report of the seizure of the Sea-Land Service, Incorporated, con- tainership, the SS Mayaguez.
At 1400 on the 13th, I received a call from the 9th Marines operations officer, Major David Quinlan, and was requested to report to his office. When I reported he informed me and the operations officer of 3/9 that we were to prepare to "go somewhere to do something.” 2/9 was the first on the step, and 3/9 was to be second. After a quick conference with the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. Austin, and the battalion’s executive officer, Major Lawrence R. Moran, Larry and I were off to prepare for the battalion’s deployment. At this time all battalion units were in field training areas throughout central Okinawa. Company commanders were briefed on the alert and had their rear echelons prepare for movement. Scarcely a month old, 2/9 was already an old hand at alerts. We had been alerted several times for both the Phnom Phenh and Saigon evacuation operations.
At 2030 that night, Lieutenant Colonel Austin received notice that the battalion was to move immediately to Kadena Air Base and be prepared for airlift by dawn. Lieutenant Colonel Austin gave the order and, by 0145 the morning of the 14th, all units had returned from the field, stored their personal effects, saddled up for a long trip (and a long stay if necessary), and were departing our home camp for the trip to Kadena. By 0400, the battalion and attachments were at Kadena, and U. S. Air Force C-i4i Starlifters and C-5A Galaxies were arriving. The battalion was reinforced by a heavy mortar battery, engineer, communications, and other attachments, and became Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/9-
At 0615, the first aircraft departed Kadena. By late Wednesday afternoon the BLT was encamped at Utapao Air Base in Thailand.
Lieutenant Colonel Austin received his mission from the Marine Task Force Commander (termed Ground Security Force by the Air Force) who was already at Utapao. Our mission was "to seize, occupy and defend, for a period of about 48 hours, the island of Koh Tang in order to: (1) Conduct a search for crew members of the Mayaguez, some or all of whom were thought to be on the island. (2) Deny the use of the island as a base of fire from which to interfere with the re-taking of the Mayaguez."
That afternoon Lieutenant Colonel Austin, accompanied by me and other battalion officers, took off in a borrowed twin-engine, U. S. Army aircraft for a reconnaissance flight over Koh Tang.
The island is about four to five miles long, heavily foliated except for a sma cleared strip through the northern part of the island, with a cove and a beach on both the east and west sides of the island. The Mayaguez sat DIW about one mile northeast of the island.
A reinforced company from BLT 1/ had arrived from the Philippines an was to form the boarding party to actu ally seize the ship. This force was also under the command of the Marine Tas
Force Commander. .
By 2130, the plan for the assault o the island was completed and orders were issued to BLT units. Company was to make the initial assault, an Company E was to follow them in the second wave. A command and fire sup port group would accompany the fifSt wave. Briefings informed us that there were 20-30 Khmer Rouge irregulars on the island, possibly reinforced by whatever naval support personnel that were there associated with the gunboats sighted in the area. Koh Tang was over 200 miles away which meant that the second wave could not arrive until at least four and one-half hours after the first wave had been inserted. As the boarding of the Mayaguez was to take place simultaneously with the assault on the island, available Air Force helicopters had to be allocated between the two forces. Three CH-53 heavy helicopter5 were to transfer the boarding company to the Harold E. Holt for alongsi e boarding. The remaining eight were 10 make the assault, six in the eastern zone and two into the western zone. Pfe assault airstrikes were prohibited and use of riot control agent was ruled out be cause both operations could threaten the
"Mayday” for the Mayaguez 105
safety of the Mayaguez crew members.
At 0356, the morning of 15 May, the order to conduct the assault was revived. It was a long, cold flight over the Gulf of Siam. Officers and men sat on the floor of the helicopters and Air Force gunners rested at their miniguns.
At 0607, the assault commenced. As che helicopters carrying our command group hove into view of the island, we could see a column of dark smoke rising ^om the eastern zone. At first we were er>couraged because we thought the ban against pre-assault air strikes had been lifted. We soon learned, however, that the assault force had made its down payment on the recovery of the crew of the Mayaguez—11 Marines, two Navy corpsmen, and the Air Force copilot 0st their lives in that downed aircraft.
Another aircraft also was down in that zone, but we later learned that the Crew and the Marine platoon aboard 'Vere holed up in the nearby rocks and trees and ably defending themselves. The survivors of the first aircraft were swim- rrung away from the intense small arms and automatic weapons fire that was raking the beach landing zone. As they stvam, they towed their wounded, and °r>e of the battalion’s forward air controllers, Lieutenant Terry Tonkin, using a survival radio from his vantage point ln the water, directed and adjusted air strikes against the beach.
"Fhe remaining aircraft were requested t° place their troops in the western 2°rie. Sporadic fire was being taken by e aircraft landing there, but entry was ^till possible. Two aircraft inserted their °ads as the volume of fire in the western 2one picked up. Another deposited Part of its load after repeated aborted aPproaches, and the two other helos c°uld not even get in because of the n°w rapidly increasing intensity of small arrUs and mortar fire into the zone.
Aboard the helicopter carrying the c°mmand group, Lieutenant Colonel Ustin directed that we find another *0ne near the western zone, but out of e contended area. An attempt was rt'ade to insert one aircraft full of troops and then the command and fire support group. The troop carrier was forced to fhdraw, but the command group made m. All forces going ashore for the ^Xt five-and-a-half hours were now on the ground.
The forces on the island were fragmented into three groups. One other small party was swimming out to sea. The first two aircraft into the eastern zone were down and destroyed. Another CH-53 had crashed into the sea after offloading its troops on the western side (with the loss of one crew member). Two aircraft had been shot up so badly that they limped back toward the mainland with their troops still aboard and made emergency landings far from Utapao. Three more returned to Thailand or assumed search and rescue duties after discharging all or part of their troops.
The first order of business on the ground was to reorganize. After a quick appraisal of the situation, Lieutenant Colonel Austin decided to get supporting air strikes going and then establish a linkup of the forces on the western side of the island which were then some 1,200 meters of rugged rock and jungle apart. The battalion air liaison officer, Captain Barry Cassidy, commenced coordinating the air strikes of the Air Force A-7S and the AC-130 gunship. The lack of gridded maps, however, hampered all fire coordination efforts.
The fate of the platoon on the western side was not clear, as the only communications it had was a survival radio. It soon became apparent that the 60-plus Marines in the originally designated western zone could not break through the intense opposition between them and the command and fire support group to the south. The senior officer in the zone, Company G’s executive officer, Lieutenant James D. Kieth, had consolidated his force in the area and was controlling air strikes from his area of the beach. His force had already had one man killed and several wounded. The Marines there were engaging the Khmer Rouge defenders at grenade range and the exchange of small arms fire was intense.
The command and fire support group then commenced to move north to effect a linkup with the force holding the western zone. Using a hastily formed fire team as point (the command and fire support group had been intended to land with the strongest force and rely upon it for protection), the southern group moved north along the rocky and densely foliated shore. Clerks, radiomen, and mortarmen demonstrated their infantry proficiency as they fired and maneuvered to drive the enemy from his prepared positions along the shoreline over the entire distance of the 1,200 meters. The main tactic of the southern group was to advance aggressively to deny the defenders the knowledge that it consisted of only 27 Marines and Navy medical personnel. Captured Khmer Rouge weapons were assimilated into the attacking force and its firepower was greatly increased as it moved along in the attack.
When the two forces were in sight of one another, Lieutenant I. I. McMena- min’s 81-mm. mortars went into action. Quickly spotting targets, the mortarmen commenced to pound hostile positions along the coast and into the jungle. An alert observer spotted movement through the leaves of a tree each time a mortar, which was pounding Lieutenant Kieth’s positions, fired. A quick fire mission silenced the position and a methodical pounding of the enemy defensive positions began, along with an advance by a now beefed-up point force. Our mortar rounds were impacting scant yards in front of Lieutenant Kieth’s Marines. This searching fire was later discovered to have raked the main enemy position, knocking out a 90-mm. recoilless rifle position which would have wreaked havoc on any assault. While the BLT’s mortars were pounding Khmer Rouge positions, the second wave of approximately 100 Marines of Companies G and E arrived in the western zone. With the impact of the final rounds from our mortars, the now reinforced troops in the perimeter assaulted through the Khmer Rouge, driving them from their positions. At 1230, the drive immediately linked up with the command group which was engaging the rear of the Khmer Rouge defenses.
A defense perimeter was immediately established to hold the western zone. Command post and machine gun and mortar firing positions were established; reports were made to the rear; logistical requests were dispatched; and a field aid station was established. Air support was brought in even closer as our troops dug in. An Air Force forward air controller arrived to direct the air strikes. The landing force was then set to either hold
As the fierce fighting raged between the Marines and the Khmer Rouge on the heavily foliated, northernmost peninsula of Koh Tang, the assault troops could see the pall of black smoke that marked two downed U. S. helicopters. An Air Force controller whose OV-IO Bronco is barely visible, right, directed air strikes by A-ls. In the bottom photograph, two CH-53s bore through a hail of small arms and automatic weapons fire to help evacuate the Marines.
Its
dons
own or to continue assigned opera-
The second wave had brought in the lr>forrnation that the crew of the May- aguez had been returned. We also knew torn earlier contact with the Henry B.
'Ison that the ship had been recovered. Instructions were requested. The air- °rne command and control center, °wever, was not certain if the assets '-Verc available to meet Lieutenant Colonel Austin’s stated needs to extract the er>tire force, or any of it. As the afternoon wore on, the Khmer Rouge began 0 probe and snipe at our perimeter espite the rain of bombs and cannon ^re. We could hear what we assumed to e heavy caliber automatic weapons en- §aging the fixed-wing aircraft as they Pulled out of their runs. The forward air c°ntroller alternately rolled in on sus- Pucted positions and danced his strange ahet of loops, rolls, and climbs seeking °Ut their weapons’ positions. Everyone ^nhin the perimeter walked around ^Uh his shoulders scrunched up aSainst the near spent pieces of searingly jj0t metal fragments that whisked and uttered throughout the entire area. As lr> the morning’s grenade and mortar engagements, no one had to be refunded to keep on his helmet and flak
Jacket.
As the day grew shorter, sniper fire grew heavier, and we could hear the engagement on the other side of the island as air strikes were intensified as a prelude to extracting the platoon there. Later a C-130 flew over and two pallets on parachutes came popping out. As we watched our resupply drift far away into the hands of the Khmer Rouge there was some understandable grumbling. As it turned out, the resupply went exactly where it was supposed to. It was a 15,000 pound "daisy-cutter” bomb designed to clear landing zones in dense jungle. After we picked ourselves up we were just as happy that the package was delivered next door, so to speak.
As the sun sank into the Gulf of Siam, a small armed craft from one of the destroyers rounded the northern tip of the island. After a brief moment of apprehension on our part, he identified himself and set to work patrolling our northern flank along the beach. The Harold E. Holt came in and stood off the western beach. We were dug in for the night and, except for water, were in good condition to hold our position.
There was just enough light to see westward when a lone CH-53 turned and came boring in toward the beach. When asked whether he was to resupply or extract he replied that he was to extract and other aircraft were on the way. As he settled into the shallow water at the edge of the beach he was greeted by an almost unbelievable hail of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the ridge to our south and east. Tracers streamed into the perimeter and bounced around like flaming popcorn. The pilot set his aircraft down and took his share of the fire without flinching. The battalion surgeon, Lieutenant John Wilkins, herded his wounded on board, accompanied by the force reserve. As he lifted off, the next aircraft, whose reception by the Khmer Rouge was just as warm, moved into the zone. Again the troops on the perimeter zeroed in on the source of the fire and suppressed most of it. The minigunmen on the helos poured streams of fire over the heads of the Marines and into the ridgeline. The command and fire support group and
108 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976
all support personnel departed on the second helicopter. As I was in the command group, the last thing I saw of the island was the half circle of the perimeter blazing away at the larger half circle of fire surrounding it. The two company commanders, Captain James H. Davis of Company G and Captain Mykle E. Stahl of Company E, were collapsing their respective halves of the perimeter and readying the next aircraft load in the pocket thus formed. Debriefing these two officers and others of their companies later, I found that the extraction had gone almost exactly as planned. Enemy pressure remained strong right up until the last helicopter pulled out. Captain Davis and his gunnery sergeant had remained at the last to check the beach and were joined in their task by the crew chief of the last helo. At approximately 2030, this last helo was recovered by the Coral Sea.
In the accounting of personnel that
followed, we found that Marines ha been delivered to the Harold E. Ho t, some were on the Henry B. Wilson, an the bulk of the force was on the Cora Sea. Three Marines were missing— remain so today, more than a year later.
The entire Marine phase of the opera tion lasted some 56 hours, but the las 14 were the longest. It had been a ver) long Thursday. The Marines, Navymen, and Airmen who fought there can e justly proud of their performances.
Commander J. Michael Rodgers, U. S. Navy
The Guided-Missile Destroyer’s Skipper
this
eventuality, the executive and weap°nS officers had organized a close-in defend team armed with our four 7.62-m11^. M-60 machine guns and a good supply 0 hand grenades. Positions were chose*1 which provided some protection to 1 ^ gunners while ensuring 360° coverag
On Monday, 12 May 1975, the USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) steamed south in the South China Sea from Kaohsiung, Republic of China, bound for Subic Bay, Republic of the Phil- lipines. That evening the ship received her first reports of what would become known as the Mayaguez incident.
Soon the radio-teletypes in the ship’s message center were printing out more information concerning the seizure by gunboats of the Khmer Rouge navy. Orders were going out to ComDesRon 23, embarked in the USS Harold E. Holt, other forces, and maritime patrol aircraft to proceed to the scene. We were at sea and heading the right way; we were hoping for such orders.
Early Tuesday, 13 May 1975, they came. We were to proceed to the vicinity of Koh Tang at best speed, report to ComDesRon 23, and support the recovery of the Mayaguez and her crew as well as provide what assistance we could to the U. S. Marine Corps operations in the area. This mission, coupled with our rules of engagement, were the only "rudder orders” we received during the entire operation.
At approximately noon on 13 May, we fueled to 100% of capacity from the USS Ashtabula (AO-51), off Subic Bay, and turned southwest toward the Gulf of Siam and Koh Tang, approximately 1,200 nautical miles distant. The chief engineer punched his fuel consumption tables and determined that if we proceeded on all four boilers at 31 knots we could arrive with approximately 25-30% fuel remaining. If we steamed any faster we would arrive with a dangerously low amount of fuel, or possibly not arrive at all. So 31 knots was our "best speed” and that is what we used for the next 40 hours. This speed had the additional advantage of getting us to Koh Tang close to first light on the 15th when the recovery action was scheduled to commence.
As the ship closed Koh Tang, several meetings were held with the department heads, the "chief of the boat” (BTCM Hazelett), and other key personnel as we made plans for the upcoming operations. The Henry B. Wilson was being made an information addressee on the increasing number of messages concerning preparations, tactics, and deployment of forces for the recovery of the Mayaguez. Intelligence reports were filling in some of the gaps concerning this little-known area of the world. Our best source of information describing the near real-time events in the vicinity of the Mayaguez was the excellent reporting by the U. S. Navy P-3 Orions of VP-4 which were maintaining constant aerial surveillance of the area. We knew where the Mayaguez was anchored and had a good appreciation for the disposition and nature of the hostile forces in the area.
It appeared to us that the Harold E. Holt with her embarked Marines would approach the anchored Mayaguez from the northwest. We decided to make our approach from the southeast of the island in order to force the enemy to look in two directions and split any heavy weapons capability they might possess,
rather than permitting them to conCC? trate on the recovery operation. All e partments reported they were ready 1 all respects for whatever activity might encounter the following m°rn ing. All weapons and sensors were oper ating properly. ;
As early as Operation "Eagle Pull the evacuation of U. S. nationals froIlfl Cambodia—it had become apparent tha we sorely needed a complement of aut0 matic weapons positions. There lS fairly wide area around a destroy which is inside the minimum depress^11 angle of the main gun battery and t minimum firing range of the miss' system. Hostile small craft, lighr ^ armed, can operate within this area an "outgun” a large warship. Theoretica ) you should not permit the enemy to g this close. In reality, it is often difficU to separate friend from foe—ofterl you’re only sure when the shooting (theirs) starts. This situation was den1 onstrated during "Eagle Pull” when 11 Cambodian gunboat with uncertain intentions came out to look us over 0,1 our station just south of Komp°n£ Som. During "Frequent Wind” we 'ver<j. constantly surrounded by hundreds small craft, including gunboats, an occasionally were the target of host* fire from shore and sea. Foreseeing
"Mayday" for the Mayaguez 109
and interlocking fields of fire. This team ivas regularly called away and drilled, ornrnand and control was maintained r°m the bridge via the ship’s general announcing system. On several occa- si°ns the mere mustering of this team Jas sufficient to encourage gunboats of °ubtful intent to quit our area. Dur- lng the Mayaguez recovery operation the team would fire its weapons.
That night, 14-15 May, as we sped north through a series of small islands to ' e west of the southwestern tip of °uth Vietnam, we picked up a few Suspicious contacts on our search radars which did not conform to the pattern of activity demonstrated by the hundreds small craft under way in this area, incidentally, we received a "heads-up” pert from Commander U. S. Seventh eet that there had been reports of Possibly hostile gunboat activity along our track. Our various night observation evices and low-light-level television Were especially useful for obtaining pos- ltlVe identification of the myriad of contacts in our vicinity. Most were indigenous fishing boats and the night passed without incident.
The dawn of 15 May broke quickly, 'v'thout a prolonged period of first- 'gut, which is characteristic in this por- tl°n of the world. Koh Tang was ap- Pr°ximately 20 miles distant to the north-northwest. We could see the Movement of small points of light on .e radar scope which indicated the aircraft were marshaling for their strikes and to carry in the Marines. The ar°ld E. Holt was a larger "blip” which aPpeared to be closing the contact we esrimated to be the Mayaguez. The feather was warm with a few white c °uds floating in a bright blue sky. The sea was nearly calm with only a slight nj°P on it caused by six to eight knots wind blowing from the northwest, ne current was moving to the east arross the northern tip of the island at a out one-half knot.
AH hands shifted from condition of teadiness III to general quarters and banned battle stations. We reported in to the airborne command post coordi- ^ating operations in the area and to 0mDesRon 23. Forty minutes later, at sj °0, we arrived at Koh Tang and ,°wed to 5 knots as we examined the tuation. Koh Tang is a low, heavily
forested island with one commanding hill in the northern half of the island. It is somewhat triangular shaped, with the longest tip pointing south. All activity was concentrated on the northern and northwestern portions of the island.
The Harold E. Holt was alongside the Mayaguez and her Marines were securing the ship. Plumes of oily black smoke were rising from two U. S. Air Force CH-5J helicopters which had been shot down in a cove which ran along the northern end of the island. U. S. Air Force attack and fighter aircraft were strafing and bombing enemy positions in support of the Marines. The USS Coral Sea (CVA-43), which was racing toward the scene of action, sent us a combat air patrol to support our operations. The rattle of automatic weapons and machine guns came crackling over the water. As we closed the northeastern tip of the island to 1,000 yards, one of the lookouts shouted down to the bridge that he saw people in the water. Soon we had located three groups of men in the sea. The ship’s gig, under the command of Lieutenant (junior grade) Fred H. Naeve, was quickly launched and, armed with machine gunners to suppress hostile fire from shore, raced to pick up two of the groups while the Henry B. Wilson was conned into position to rescue the third group. In all, 13 men were pulled from the currents which were sweeping them away from land. Several were kept afloat by ship’s force personnel who unhesitatingly leaped into the sea from the forecastle. They were U. S. Air Force and Marine Corps survivors from one of the helicopters which had been shot down. The ship’s chief hospital corpsman treated their burns and wounds in the ship’s engineering berthing area which had been converted into a hospital. The gig crisscrossed the area until we were sure there were no more personnel in the water.
Just as we were passing the Mayaguez close aboard to starboard, a patrol aircraft reported what appeared to be an enemy gunboat heading toward Koh Tang from the mainland, approximately 20 nautical miles to the east. Com- DesRon 23 ordered us to intercept it and prevent it from approaching the scene of action. We moved toward the distant contact, zigzagging left and
right, enough to permit all guns and missiles to bear on the target. As we closed the distance, the man on the low-light-level television, operating in high-power mode and with the sensor situated high in the ship, reported that the contact appeared to be a fishing boat rather than a gunboat. The pilot of a patrol aircraft confirmed this and also reported he thought there were a number of Americans on board. Could these men be a portion of the Mayaguez crew which had not been located in their containership or on the island?
When they were within hailing distance I called over our topside loud speakers:
"Are you the crew of the Mayaguez?” "Yes, Yes” came back a chorus of shouts.
"Are you all there?”
Again a chorus of "Yes, yes.”
Then—"Lay alongside, you are safe now!”
The Henry B. Wilson's crewmen had the fishing boat secured to our port quarter quickly and assisted the Mayaguez crew members aboard. The hospitalmen swiftly examined them. I welcomed the Master of the Mayaguez, Captain Charles T. Miller, on board, and, with the ship’s intelligence officer, we debriefed him and fired off the appropriate reports. He confirmed that we had recovered the entire 40-man Mayaguez crew.
The fishing boat and its five-man crew were Thai and had been held captive by the Cambodians for several months. The Mayaguez crew had been held prisoner on board this boat. Captain Miller stated he was sure that if U. S. forces hadn’t reacted when they did, he and his crew would probably have been prisoners deep in the heart of Cambodia. The Thais requested they be reprovisioned and allowed to proceed home, a request we swiftly honored.
The executive officer insured that the Mayaguez crew’s wants were all supplied and brought me the pleasant news that all 40 crewmen were in good health. We turned back toward Koh Tang and headed for the Mayaguez which was now under the tow of the Harold E. Holt. Captain Miller indicated he wished to get his crew on board the Mayaguez as soon as possible in order to get the
:ffective method of controlling
reefers going and save as much of his refrigerated cargo as possible. We closed the Mayaguez to a few hundred feet and ferried the Mayaguez crewmen back to their freed ship with our gig.
The transfer completed, the Henry B. Wilson returned to Koh Tang to carry out the remainder of her mission: supporting the Marines ashore.
U. S. Air Force aircraft were maintaining a continuous rain of bullets, bombs, and missiles on the enemy positions as the Marines fiercely defended their positions. As we rounded the northwestern tip of the island, an enemy machine gun opened up on us. It was quickly silenced by our counter-battery fire. The airborne command post, as well as the other aircraft pilots, commenced designating targets to us.
We held no common charts of c area, and what appeared of Koh Tang ^ a chart was very small and not accurate. Therefore we could not conventional grid-chart methods or ignating targets or spotting fire- foliage was too thick for us to visu see our targets, except on those o sions when the enemy revealed hirn5^ by firing at us. We were not sure or ^ locations of the Marine front lines, result, we quickly devised a crude ^
the
gunfire ashore. The pilots could see rarget locations by looking d° ^ :hrough the trees, particularly when ;nemy machine guns opened up °n Marine positions. The pilot would g1
jowever, our careful bottom survey in- cated there were no nasty surprises H'der the surface. When enemy gun ^placements opened up on us we Un^ them to be not particularly accu- e and they ceased fire immediately aen we returned fire. The close-in track Ppcared desirable for several reasons:
e had already pulled 13 men from sea and there might be more in the
e wanted to be ready to support and ,CUe any U. S. personnel on the island ^ ° tnight chance a dash to the water.
Us a reference point, such as a large rock °n the beach. We would put the first r°und in the water just seaward of that P°mt. Then, spotting from each hit, he ^°uld walk the rounds around the fiendly positions and onto the target. Ur plotting teams would then mark e position on our charts for possible uture reference. We soon had a routine established which resulted in a short Period of time between the initial mark- lng round, "commence rapid continu- °Us fire,” and "target destroyed.” During this gunfire support portion the day, we cruised a track we estab- lshed along the six-fathom line loCated off the northern and northwestern es of Koh Tang where the action was t°ricentrated. This took us within ^000-3,000 yards of the beach. This was *t close for uncharted waters and presented a tempting target to the e- After an initial slow pass at 3 knots,
the
^ater close to shore. - -
resi
> r\
ne to the heavy foliage we wanted iu ^aintain as accurate a visual picture of ^ c situation ashore as possible.
c was essential that we locate accu- tely the Marine positions as quickly as
Possible
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we thought that our close-in presence *ght intimidate the enemy and lend a ychological lift to our forces.
Coincident with our gunfire support, Air Force helicopters made a series of attempts to land in the vicinity of the Marines but were driven off by extremely heavy gunfire. On one occasion an enemy gunboat (a former U. S. Navy PCF Swift boat) opened fire from the northern cove with her three .50 caliber machine guns on one of our helicopters attempting to land. A few five-inch rounds later, it had been destroyed and sunk by our gunnery team.
Dusk was rapidly approaching and it was determined that a massive effort would be made to recover our forces from the island as soon as it became dark. After dark it would be very difficult for us to accurately direct the fire from our two five-inch guns. The friendly and enemy lines were exceptionally close to each other. We decided to arm our gig and send it in close to the beach where it could:
► Draw hostile fire away from the recovery helicopters.
► Suppress hostile fire and destroy enemy gun positions.
► Act as a rescue boat for any helicopters which might be shot down.
► Stand ready to pick up anyone who made a dash for the water.
This was a very dangerous mission and volunteers were called for. A large number of good men immediately responded. Eight were picked for their familiarity with weapons and past "brown water navy” experience in South Vietnam. These men deserve special mention for their very heroic actions— Lieutenant Larry W. Hall (Skipper), BMi Jessie M. Hoffman (Coxwain), EM2 Gregory B. Elam (Engineer), RM2 Eddie
J. Oswalt (Radio Operator), GMTi Alvin
K. Ellis (Machine Gunner), OSi Thomas K. Noble (Machine Gunner), GMT2 Donald W. Moore (Machine Gunner),
and OS3 Michael D. Williams (Machine Gunner)—and each received the Bronze Star, except for Lieutenant Hall who was awarded the Silver Star.
The "specially manned and equipped” gig headed into the north cove at dusk. The Air Force laid down a barrage of fire and then the first evacuation helicopter approached the sandy beach area near one of the Marine positions. As the helicopter hovered over the landing zone an enemy gun emplacement opened up on the helicopter with a hail of fire. Our gig charged toward the tracers and took the position under fire. A fire-fight ensued between the shore and the gig crew as the helo settled down, picked up a group of Marines, and safely departed the island. This action was repeated again and again in the northern and northwestern coves until all the Marines were off Koh Tang. Every man on the Henry B. Wilson, who could be spared from his battle station, lined the topside and watched the operation. Through the night observation devices we could see the darkened gig racing back and forth, in and out, as it avoided enemy fire. The happiest moment of my life was when the gig finally returned to our side after two hours of heavy action with those eight American sailors safe and sound.
Our mission accomplished, we departed Koh Tang and rendezvoused with the Coral Sea around midnight to take a long drink of fuel. This was not a moment too soon as we had been reduced to burning the diesel fuel for our emergency diesels in the boilers.
The next morning we returned to Koh Tang at first light to determine if there was any possibility that there were any Americans left on the island. Only smoke, a few fires, and the detritus of battle remained. A few Cambodians were seen on the beach, but they quickly disappeared into the trees as we closed the island.
Later, on 16 May, we rendezvoused with the Harold E. Holt and took on board 101 Marines. It was a crowded but happy destroyer which arrived in Subic Bay five days later. The friendships between our crew and those tough Marines, forged in battle and annealed in a shared experience of heroic proportions, have lasted long beyond the events of the Mayaguez affair, a long day in May that seemed to go by in a few minutes.