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The scene depicted below reflects the imagination of an artist, but it should also capture the imagination and consideration of a good many naval officers. For it is likely, if not certain, that naval wars of the future will involve exchanges of surface-to-surface cruise missiles. Soviet strategy is geared to the quick kill at sea. Will we be ready?
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number of Arab patrol boats and merchant ships
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the missiles having to be destroyed by close-in ship defenses.
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The cruise missiles in the hands of lesser sea P1
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trajectories tend to be low or sea skimming, but ^ warhead sizes vary greatly, as does the character otc
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-A. he antiship cruise missile now offers a form of long-range offensive striking power to those navies which have not been able to afford the luxury of sea- based, manned tactical aircraft. Although the carrier- based attack aircraft has supplanted the battleship’s heavy gun as the dominant weapon on the oceans of the world, Admiral S. G. Gorshkow, the head of the Soviet Navy, writing in Morskoy Sbornik in 1967 suggested that the cruise missile had become the primary form of offensive power at sea: “Combat capabilities of aircraft carriers, even the atomic powered ones, cannot stand comparisons with the strike capabilities of (missilearmed) submarine-air forces.’’
But the introduction of the antiship missile involves far more than just a possible increase in the offensive power which can be exerted at sea. There are significant changes in naval strategy, tactics, and ship design also indicated. Such changes stem not only from the character of this new weapon but also from advanced technologies which help to optimize its usage. A new kind of naval warfare, different from carrier warfare, seems to be evolving. Hence, some rough guesses as to the impact of the cruise missile on sea warfare should be useful for a navy which, with its preponderant strength in manned aircraft, will less acutely feel the effects of this weapon, but will nevertheless have to adjust to it.
Cruise missiles comprise a family of long-range, antiship missiles which can be launched by aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Virtually all of the very long-range missiles (over 100 miles) are jet-powered, but a sizable number of shorter-range missiles are solid- fuel, rocket-propelled. They range in speed from just under subsonic (about 600 knots) to several times the speed of sound (1,500 knots or greater). The cruise missile exists in a wide variety of sizes, airframe configurations, warhead sizes, and internal electronics. Although all are costly, the cruise missile generally does not require complex shipboard installations. It requires little on board maintenance and is easily launched after relatively simple tactical maneuvering and fire control direction to start it on course. The in-flight trajectory is normally correctable by broadcast directions, and it can terminally seek a target over a wide expanse of the ocean. It is hence readily proliferated to a variety of platforms and into the navies of even the less technologically developed maritime nations.
Actual wartime usage of the cruise missile has occurred only in recent years and between lesser sea powers in coastal waters. Such experience, while demonstrating the potential of this weapon, may not, however, be particularly pertinent to the use of the cruise missile between leading maritime nations whose battles are most likely to be fought far at sea. A review of cruise missile warfare is helpful in order to show some of the
basic changes which the missiles seem to create in sc3 warfare and the implications of their—as yet unprove
—tactical usage by major sea powers.
In the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the cruise missile engagements involved small, high-speed, 0115 sile-carrying patrol craft in inshore battles. The Israeli5' although using the Gabriel missile with about half the range of the Arabs’ Styx (a Soviet-exported missile o about 25-mile range), were able to sink a considerab
orn, reportedly, the loss of a single Israeli missile boar The Israelis’ high-speed surface craft tactics, coord'
diverting the Arab missiles (reported as 55 Styxes in °n^ battle) from their trajectories, resulted in only a few
Israel'
It is apparent that the Israelis were made aware
launchings in sufficient time to optimize the use electronic warfare to prevent getting hit by the l°n» range and earlier-fired Arab missiles. This would phasize the great need for the element of surpnse missile attack.
dian patrol craft fired nine Styx missiles at Pakis'311 completely out of action.2 The attack was outs'1 the-horizon hitting accuracy of the cruise missile an
startling results of the initial wartime use of this we*P' in 1967. Then, two Egyptian Styx missiles fired ! t harbor-concealed Egyptian missile craft sank the's destroyer Eilat 12 miles away.
have, for the most part, been bought on the °P^ world market to fit their inshore needs. Hence 1 have little identifiable general character. Their cru's
terminal homing technology. , J
On the other hand, there may be a definable c acter for high-seas cruise missile weaponry— from the tactical and technological limitations 0 type of weapon. The Soviets, who place primary ^ liance on this weapon, and who are in the forefm ^ cruise missile developments, have evolved a se3A strategy for the best use of the missile. And ft001 J strategy they have developed a philosophy character of cruise missiles. ,,
It is questionable whether a navy with a strategy would develop the Soviets’ kinds of 011
But
the
e theory behind this strategy seems to be that ltl 7 highly destructive cruise missiles—when attack- ^ *n a Tuick, massive strike—will produce a new di- 'vh1|Sl°n confusi°n- Enemy defenses will be over- Vaj^rr'ed, with consequent destruction of the higher ^ ships of a force. Such high weapon effect, it is ti y Soviet writers, should cause a rapid disintegra- su]t' t^le organization of an enemy’s defenses, re- t^le ^ast arr‘v*n8 missiles getting a free ride 7/heir targets and producing devastating effects. cjjt- ls is a somewhat different strategy than the tra- °nal sequential strike attacks used by sea-based
they apparently feel that their strategy magnifies ttuise missile’s strengths and minimizes its weak- ncsses. And perhaps theirs is the optimum way to use |.n Unmanned aircraft with built-in electronic intel- Sence. The Soviets’ sea strategy is based on the use cruise missiles of great warhead power in a brief, passive, coordinated, surprise strike against hostile °rces-3 it cajjs for veIy g00Cj intelligence on enemy dements, and this can be provided by an ocean-wide etw°rk of collecting units, including satellites. With lckly developing operations, a substantial number of ^ Sl*e-carrying naval units are moved swiftly and for ^ most part unobserved to diverse areas of the ocean j out any semblance of tactical formation or group- I 8- Then, with a high element of surprise, missile nch would follow rapidly on orders from a command sj ter 'n Soviet territory. This would ensure a near- jj taneous attack of large numbers of missiles, from 0r7Se directions and with many varying trajectories, si| ■ e entire alignment of the enemy’s forces. The mis- 3U(JStri^C Would he carried out by those air, surface, 3bleSUkrnar’ne f°rces which were geographically avail- at a tactically favorable instant in time, fhi tiary
tactical air forces. In the Soviet strategy, a sea battle has to be decisive in the opening moments with a single strike, because all the power which can be mustered is thrown into this single concentrated effort. No followup attack is contemplated. Mop-up operations to fully annihilate the enemy are expected to be carried out by missile units in individual strikes of massed weapon power. Thus, a Soviet submarine with eight cruise missiles could produce an eight-missile strike against a crippled warship.
Consistent with Marxist-Leninist dogma, this Soviet strike strategy is designed to gain the initiative in the first salvo—a use of maximum employable force—and then to maintain the advantage gained through the initial strike. The Soviets feel that cruise missiles, in near simultaneous attack, allow them to produce a far higher level of weapon effect than even the attacks generated by sea-based tactical aircraft. They also consider their surface ships to be expendable early in a war. To maintain the advantage gained by an initial strike, nuclear submarines and land-based, long-range aircraft, working together, will do the follow-on job.4
Extending this strategy globally, the Soviet’s missile- strike strategy calls for a beating of the enemy to the punch with all the weapon power which could be massed in either initiation of war or in its earliest moments. Global coordination of attacks against enemy forces in several oceans of the world was strikingly illustrated in the Okean exercises of 1970 and 1975. These exercises demonstrated the Soviet goal to launch their missiles from ships and aircraft in all oceans almost simultaneously against the deployed major enemy forces which were within the Soviet range of operations. In effect, this range was determined by the land bases for their aircraft and their range of effective operations. A 90-second response was announced as their goal for coordinated strike timing. It was an undeniable attempt to impress the world with the Soviets’ high level of communications, command, and control of their worldwide forces—and to show that their strike strategy provides a viable threat to the major navies of the world. Comprehensive broad ocean surveillance, computerized data flow, computerized decision-making at high levels of command, and centralized coordination played a major role in showing how a strategy— which is highly dependent upon quickly developing operations and a high degree of surprise—can be made to work.
This strategy makes sense when the nature of Soviet cruise missiles is recognized. It can be estimated from the missiles they’ve produced to date that fundamentally they are all-weather in operation, are readily and rapidly launched, require only simple fire control inputs, and are capable of terminally homing on their
the incoming missile, call for an expendable miss'c platform which emphasizes offense rather than defense Additionally, the feasibility of electronic jamming the reasonably close launching ships’ fire control rad215 places a premium on highly maneuverable, small wtf ships which can suffer considerable force losses andstl launch enough missiles of high weapon power to Pr° duce decisive effects in battle. Redundancy in units thus appears desirable for inshore warfare.
Israeli success in countering Arab missiles by of electronic warfare measures can be attributed 00.' partially to the high maneuverability and speed of1 missile craft. The Israelis also appear to have had amP warning of the time and direction of Arab missis 2 tack. But, had the Arab missile boats received surtc lance and fire control support from shore install^10 j they could have operated passively as a type of c°aSt artillery in offset, surprise fire—greatly reducing
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and weight limitations and the very short time
of missiles for the likely engagement ranges, sce^0 make destruction of the missile firing platform
targets with high accuracy. The Soviet cruise missiles have varying trajectories in flight and various angles of attack on their targets, seem relatively simple in their internal electronics (ensuring high reliability in flight), have large, powerful warheads of 1,100 or 2,200 pounds using high explosives, and are designed to overwhelm the enemy by numbers and diversity of attack rather than by sophistication of built-in countermeasures. Thus, the missile is kept as simple as possible to hold down the cost and allow for a stockpiling of large numbers.5 Their technological simplicity is thus offset by the great numbers of missiles which can be employed in a coordinated attack. Even if a single Soviet missile is considered only a low-threat weapon, their numbers raise the threat level to one of great concern.
Since all Soviet cruise missiles have very large warheads with large radar cross sections, it can be assumed that their main purpose is to destroy the enemy’s big ships by brute force. The primary intent of Soviet design appears to be the achievement of absolute certainty of destruction when the opportunity is presented to attack U.S. carriers.
Soviet missiles have a regular development pattern which tends to fill gaps and deficiencies. The Soviets improve their missile capability and hold costs down by frequent and modest updates of a few basic types of missiles. Successive missile developments show a pattern of steadily increasing speed—increasing and compounding the problems of defense against such missiles. These continuing changes provide their missiles with a capability to stay ahead of future responses or counters to their effectiveness.
The Soviets, then, have indicated a character and usage for the cruise missile on the high seas which is somewhat different than that which is applicable to inshore waters—as evidenced by wartime experiences to date. Hence, the impact of the cruise missile on coastal warfare is first examined so that generalizations which appear applicable to this type of warfare are readily recognized as not necessarily being valid for the kind of naval war which the United States will tend to fight with her high seas fleet.
The earlier cited wartime actions involving the use of cruise missiles show that missile-carrying craft—with their small radar cross sections—enjoy a high degree of visual and radar concealment. They are thus difficult to distinguish in the coastal clutter of small boats, small islands, navigational buoys, etc. Consequently, such craft can produce a high degree of surprise in their missile attacks.
The inshore tactical environment also favors the small missile-armed warship. The short ranges of coastal missile engagements, the short reaction times involved for
defense against missile attack, and the predominant uS| of low-flying missiles to minimize detection range 0 ing time of missile attack. In this mode of operai surprise attacks of great weapon power are likely t0 overwhelming to even a large warship which move into a coastal area. The added threat of m° shore batteries of long-range cruise missiles tend force any threatening warship, regardless of size, &0 to sea.
Even the peacetime “presence” of the large becomes highly hazardous in inshore waters exists the threat of small, unfriendly missile-arme1 trol boats in significant numbers. Lesser sea powers now mount a coastal area threat out of all proport1011, their investment in ships. Thus, whereas the small sile-armed warship appears to assume a dominant in inshore waters when used in considerable num ^ her combat successes are not necessarily translata0 warfare far at sea. It should be recognized that m'sS^ armed craft have only a small range of operations- markedly reduced in their effectiveness by bad we*1 ^ and are highly vulnerable when away from the t°s environment
The infeasibility of adequately arming small W^ with near-absolute defense systems, due mainly t0 it can fire of first importance in battle in inshore w2 Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, Royal Navy, sum111 this thought:
d (J
“Advantage is likely to lie with the offensive ^ the defensive (in the antiship missile environ ^ This is because, with highly destructive nothing but a hundred percent defense is g01
Prevent heavy loss, and a hundred percent defense is *8hly unlikely. ’ ’6
^his.
A --------------------- . j
e Platforms to ensure that some portion of attacking
’ again emphasizes the need for redundancy of mis-
*arsh
[ps get their missiles headed for the enemy. e impact of the cruise missile on amphibious as- atl concepts appears to be more profound than for ran 0t^er type of naval operation. The extremely long cruise missiles in mobile shore batteries (as hundreds of miles), the substantial increase in . ctlveness of broad ocean surveillance, and the mis-
Th
sault
t'hich*11 ^art'cular jeopardy the large amphibious ships
power inherent in even the small coastal warship, eiace
w°uld have to close the coast for offloading of heli Car&oes- Thus, the concept of using sea-based (he °^tcrs hor a vertical assault might be ruled out by
their
the eXCCss'Ve operating ranges which can be imposed by C-he threat. Troop landings using small amphib-
qu- a t may also suffer markedly from the long travel
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through unfavorable seas and the long expoSh accurate> long-range shore defenses. sarr,e°^e bombardment by guns is suffering much the Costly It becomes the height of folly to commit o*ps close to a hostile, missile-protected coastline
SUre to
in order to use their 5-inch guns effectively. Experience in the Yom Kippur War similarly shows the high missile hazard to tactical aircraft which provide close ground support and short-range tactical air strikes. The alternative to gun bombardment and close support aircraft appears to be the use of the terminally guided, stand-off cruise missile, even though it seems exorbitantly costly for this function. But the precise hitting accuracy of this high-power weapon may make it a cost- effective replacement for the traditional, less accurate bombardment weapons.7
These new relationships in inshore waters would seem to indicate that the advantage in missile warfare is likely to lie with the defense. Ships offshore are readily targeted, whereas coastal defense units and other high-value targets enjoy a good deal of concealment. On the high seas, however, ships which need to be protected are difficult to conceal from the increasingly effective broad ocean surveillance inherent in new technologies such as the satellite. Their defenses are confronted with short warning times and great detection difficulties against attacking weapons—particularly if the weapons are launched by submarines or stand-off aircraft. The advantage thus tends to shift to the offense—with surprise a key factor in offensive effective-
all
tack on many enemy missile platforms spread out
ness. (The Soviets have indicated their belief that this is true in modern naval warfare and have stressed the arming of their naval units with offensive systems to the detriment of their defenses.)8 This seems apparent for a missile environment where nuclear warheads are used and perhaps for the 2,200-pound high-explosive warheads credited to the Soviet Navy. Moreover, navies which don’t have a major job of protecting merchant shipping or specific high-value warships like the carrier may find it practical to emphasize the offensive. But for any navy, the practicality of placing major emphasis on offensive systems seems related to the effectiveness achievable by the use of considerable numbers of long- range expendable weapons in attacks of short duration.
The emergence in many of the navies of a potential for concentrating great missile power against a high- value ship seems to affect the concepts of naval warfare for even a navy which holds superior and unmatched assets of sea-based tactical air power. Tactical air war at sea thus becomes quite different because of the injection of expendable unmanned aircraft (cruise missiles) into the relationships of offensive sea warfare. On the one hand, the manned aircraft must be husbanded in battle, and sequential attacks are traditional in their employment. On the other, the expenditure of unmanned aircraft in a single coordinated and concentrated effort becomes an effective use of cruise missiles.
Since attack by cruise missiles can be initiated by many different types of platforms, including submarines and aircraft, and since a coordinated missile attack can be generated by several platforms from diverse sectors of the ocean, the concept of a threat-axis for orienting defenses becomes quite meaningless. Even attacking missile-armed aircraft are likely to make their standoff attacks from several different sectors, in the missile strikes described by the Soviets.
Concentration of forces to maximize weapon effect in a battle, a principle of war, gives way in missile warfare to a concept of wide dispersion of forces with missile firers coordinating their attacks so as to provide a concentration of weapon force on the target. Thus, there is virtual elimination of tactical formations for the utilization of missile-firing ships both in deployments and in battle.
Maneuvering in battle by platforms, it can be observed, becomes of little importance in missile warfare, whereas maneuvering of weapons in their trajectories is of great tactical importance. The traditional naval battles between task forces or fleets (which have been dominated in the past decades by sea-based tactical air forces) have involved a concentration of force on only a few well-defined and relatively bunched targets—the carriers or other important major warships of the enemy. In cruise-missile warfare, however, every missile
platform with its potential of high weapon power must be a target for rapid destruction. This, then, creates2 great dispersion in attack effort which will require d*1' ferent concepts of command and control of forces. Smce the ranges involved between antagonists may be gre3t and in widely diverse areas of the oceans, the possibility of destroying missile platforms before weapon firing15 seriously reduced. .
For a navy with great assets of sea-based tactical alf power, this suggests that coordinated attack manned aircraft and ship-launched antiship missiles becomes a means for near-simultaneous mass weapon at'
over the ocean. In any case, the diverting of missiles their trajectories or the destruction of the missile itse^ may be of growing importance in battle as compare to the past, “when every effort of the opposing side5 was directed toward the destruction of the weapon pl3t forms.”9 (In this context, the carrier-based manned air craft which can destroy missiles in flight far out frolC their targets, such as the F-14 Phoenix system, might be considered an offensive weapon system). Thus, 171 e£! sures to destroy or to divert the unmanned missile aif craft away from its target by causing it to head *° wrong targets or to make it lose its homing logic. *** important.
Concealment on the oceans from long-range ident1 fication takes on a new meaning in today’s antisb'P missile environment. Absolutely first-class intelligenCJ on the enemy’s location is required before coordinate^ massive missile strikes are employed, both because the high cost of the weapons and their relatively linlltC numbers. Admiral Ashmore observes:
“The key to success is obtaining constant, accufat
and up-to-date target information. The required
is therefore for very high-class surveillance of en£ .
units. This entails a large deployment of reconfl**5
sance aircraft and foolproof communications bem’e
aircraft and the missile ship.”10
. . ef
With broad ocean surveillance increasingly mom ^
ficient and with missile strikes heavily dependent up
the factor of surprise, there is a more critical ern*
on measures to provide covertness in operations, P j
dally through increase in the level of concealm^1^
forces. Additionally, successful missile strikes will
pend heavily upon misleading the enemy through
ception and preventing him from guessing one’s i°tC^
dons. But of primary importance is the capability
deny the enemy his intelligence-gathering activl
(mainly through electronic warfare) while prosecfl1
quickly developing operations to minimize enemy
actions.
Carrier task forces are, at a disadvantage in this
^ronment because they are the prime targets for missile lrers and are most easily located and identified on the 0ceans- Yet the oceans are still so vast for surveillance c°verage, mainly by electronic means, and the environmental anomalies at the surface of the oceans are so equent that with proper use of concealment and electronic warfare measures, an antiship missile-armed en- is likely to find the opportunity to put together ^ lngredients for effective missile strikes. But some- at different concepts for the operations of forces, ^ch rely mainly on sea-based air, seem indicated, wctronic warfare assumes a key role with cruise mis- ’es’ more so than manned tactical air systems where e human intelligence can be carried close to the target 0r last-minute identification and fire control. The Ufldamental need for intelligence gained by electronic rr'eans, both for long-range targeting and to deny the C"emy s use of surprise in attack, and the similar em- °yment of electronics to achieve surprise in missile attack, receive particular emphasis in Soviet concepts 0r missile warfare. Admiral Gorshkov notes that elec- tr°nic warfare is “a most important trend in the c levement of surprise in a battle or operation.”11 Another factor in missile warfare which assumes a sCw levcl of importance is speed. This could mean eed ln positioning missile platforms for coordinated **es> or rapidity of developing operations, or even
speed in the missile itself in order to confound enemy missile defenses. The high speeds of ships and aircraft, combined with new technologies for rapid communications and split-second computerized decision-making, make quickly developing operations possible. These thoughts are particularly emphasized by Admiral Gorshkov for his Navy:
“ . . . swiftness is becoming a more and more important and indispensable feature of a strike, an operation and a battle. . . . Only quickly-developing operations combined with surprise make it possible to beat the enemy to the punch. ”12
Platform speed and reliability for getting into strike position are essential. Thus, on the high seas the small heavily armed missile craft is likely not to be able to use her speed in heavy weather, and hence little dependence can be laid on her to meet suddenly developing opportunities. Large numbers of small, low-cost missile-armed vessels are not likely to be effective missile- strike systems. But the attractiveness of the 100-knot, good-seakeeping surface effect ship as a missile platform has been noted by strategists who are developing concepts for the sea wars of the future.
The adaptability of the antiship missile to unsophisticated platforms, the relatively modest demands on shipboard personnel who maintain and use such a
weapon at sea, and the feasibility of carrying such a weapon covertly, may cause a rebirth of the armed merchantman in sea warfare. Observations on the present use of the Styx missile by navies of lesser sea powers would lead to this conclusion. The armed, and clandestine-type merchant raider, like the Confederate Alabama in the Civil War, may thus, be a viable and effective component in future wars at sea. It’s a form of guerrilla war at sea which seems to have become feasible with the widespread use of the antiship missile.
Conventional missile-armed submarines, despite their shortcomings of lack of mobility, low submerged endurance, and poor surveillance capability have a new usefulness in areas of low antisubmarine effort and relatively close to their own bases. Thus, coastal defense and advanced-base defense appear to be their logical missions.
The nuclear submarine has assumed, in the Soviet view, a first importance in naval warfare. With long- range missiles, she can destroy or neutralize the most dangerous antisubmarine warships, well beyond their active detection ranges. This allows the submarine to reserve her torpedoes for easier targets and greatly increases her efficiency in war. But the submarine’s best asset is her low susceptibility to electronic warfare.
Other thoughts on strategies, tactics, and ships which are changed by the advent of missile warfare can be generated with more reflection. The broadly ranging guesses which have been made are quite obviously only the tip of an iceberg which needs more consideration and definition.
But one thought predominates which seems to have a disturbing urgency. Cruise missiles provide the wherewithal in weapon power and flexibility to cause a lot of Pearl Harbor-type attacks worldwide if this potential for warfare is underrated and not adjusted to. The high level of power of naval weapons, not only in the hands of major sea powers with sea-based tactical air assets but also in the hands of the smallest of navies, indicates the need for a far higher state of readiness for naval units, at all times. And shooting first or immediate counteraction seems absolutely necessary to stay in contention:
“Delay in the employment of weapons in a naval battle or operation inevitably will be fraught with the most serious and even fatal consequences, regardless of where the fleet is located, at sea or in port.”-' Admiral S. G. Gorshkov13
Captain Ruhc, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. && of 1939, served in submarines throughout World War H ^ until 1952. Next, he had a mix of sea duties involvingsever destroyer commands, a submarine division, and finally- [1][2] [3] [4] cruiser command, the USS Topeka (CLG-8) in 1964. LatCf shore assignments involved major ASW studies, and his l*51 Navy assignment was as Deputy Director of Program P,3fl ning in the Office of the CNO. After a year on the staff of the President’s 6°^ mission for Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, Captain Ruhe jo‘pe General Dynamics as Director of Marine Program Development. In thlS capacity, he has been assessing the impact of developing naval technology 0,{] new naval programs and the effect of our energy shortage on new commcrcl energy opportunities.
7 Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, “The Marines Now and in ^ Future,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1975 (Naval Review Issue)* P 111.
4 ‘There has been some rudimentary examination of the use of ship-t°'sUf^ missiles in gunfire support roles, but the trade-off of expensive and sc „ missiles for cheap and plentiful gun ammunition does not seem promis1^' ^ Despite what the general says, the trade-offs must also include the high ^ loss of the gunfire support ship in an antiship missile environment in co3St waters.
8 N. I. Belavin, “Rocket Bearing Ships,” (Moscow: Military Publishers of
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, 1967). t0
“An age old struggle between kill-weapons and passive defense apP***[5][6] [7] have been resolved in favor of the offense. It is natural, therefore, ^ (designers) are forced to search for new ways of assuring survivability of °3V ships. ’ ’
’9 Admiral Gorshkov, “The Development of the Art of Naval Warfare,’
10 Admiral Ashmore, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
11 Admiral Gorshkov, “The Development of the Art of Naval Warfare,” P" ^ 12 Ibid.
13 Admiral Gorshkov, “Navies in War and in Peace,” November 1974. P‘
’P
>
[1] Charles Mohr, “Israel Claiming Heights,” The New York Times, 11 October 1973, pp. 1, 19. In the article from Tel Aviv, Mohr reported naval missile engagements of 10 October between the Syrians and the Israelis at the port of Latakia. Two Syrian missile boats were reported sunk. Robert Aldcn, “Israel is Accused in U.N. Of Sinking a Soviet Ship,” The New York Times, 13 October 1973, pp. 1, 14. This article cited reports from Damascus, Syria, which credited the Israelis with sinking Soviet, Greek, and Japanese merchant ships in missile
' boat attacks on the ports of Latakia and Tartus.
[2] Lieutenant Commander Ravi Kaul, Indian Navy, “The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1973 (Naval Review Issue), pp. 190, 192.
i Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Soviet Navy, “The Development of the Art of Naval Warfare, ’ U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1975, p. 56.
[4] Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, “Navies in War and in Peace,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974, p. 62.
[5] F. K. Neupokoev, Firing Anti-Air Rockets, (Moscow: Military Publishers of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, 1970), p. 39.
“Guidance technology should be as simple as possible, have the least number of measuring devices, and not require an unduly complex computer component. These requirements, however, are always subordinate to tactical mission requirements.”
[6] Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, RN, “Guided Missiles, Fiction and Reality,”
NATO’s Fifteen Nations, February-March 1972, p. 60.