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Some of the finest chapters in the annals of the Coast Guard relate to saving lives at sea. But, unless new and drastic action is taken soon, the Coast Guard will not be ready in the future—any more than it is today—to rescue personnel trapped in distressed submersibles.
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vessel will not necessarily be present at the scene
o viable system exists for the rescue of personnel trapped in a non-military submersible. Indeed, there is a lack of agreement as to who is responsible for their rescue. It is contended that the U. S. Coast Guard has the legal responsibility to provide such a system and must begin now to prepare such a system in order to cope with or to prevent the inevitable increase of submersible disasters in the future.
The problem of rescuing personnel trapped in a distressed submersible (DiSub) from an extremely hostile environment will impose a number of very difficult tasks upon the U. S. Coast Guard—tasks never undertaken before in its long and illustrious history of saving lives at sea. Compared to the Navy Deep Submergence
Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) program, the relatively short life support endurance of the small scientific, industrial—and eventually the recreational—submersible, increases the complexity of these tasks by requiring a more expedient response in order to attain any degree of success. In this regard, the two most critical phases of this operation will be the delivery of the rescue submersible to the distress scene in time, and the location of the DiSub. In addition, the Coast Guard must adopt a completely new concept of "rescue by salvage to accomplish the rescue of personnel successfully.
Perhaps because no two submersibles are exactly alike, no two definitions of submersibles are alike. F°r the purpose of this discussion, a submersible is define^ as a small, manned submarine capable of operating with or without a surface support ship and able to withstand pressures at various depths while maintaining an internal pressure of one atmosphere. This definition poses an even greater degree of difficulty on the underwater search and rescue problem because a surface supp°r^ the dive. With the trend towards more exotic propul' sion and life support systems, and the advent of the recreation submersible, the surface support vessel—the most expensive part of submersible operations todays will not be as common in the future. Therefore, afl accurate search and location system must be developed by the Coast Guard. If it can be shown, then, that the Coast Guard is ultimately responsible for search and rescue under, as well as on the high seas and watets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, then the Coast Guard must start now to develop a systeUj that is capable of a rapid response, rapid location, and "rescue by salvage.”
The cost. There are those in the Coast Guard who classify submersible operations as extra-hazardous, corn' paring them to space ventures and, therefore, argue that people who take such high risk should be prepared to suffer the consequences.
There are others who say that due to the relatively few submersibles in our waters today, the benefit/cost ratio doesn’t justify the expenditure of time and money necessary to assume the responsibility for rescue. Bn1 at what magic number does the benefit of saving liveS outweigh the cost involved? Until recently, these same people had argued that, there has never been any losS of life associated with submersible operations. Sadly? this is no longer valid. As a result of apathy or a "let the Navy do it” attitude, little has been done to pr°' mote an effective rescue system for the disabled submersible.
The proliferation of non-military submersibles. As th£ cost of submersibles becomes competitive with othcf forms of marine recreation, more and more recreation
subrnersibles may traverse our coastal waters. Dr. John nauss, Dean of the University of Rhode Island’s raduate School of Oceanography, has stated that he e teves the United States will see more submarines and underwater habitats widely used for recreation in another 20 years.
The recent Report of the Commission on Marine Clence> Engineering, and Resources predicted that by 98°, the average American will be spending twice what he is now spending on marine recreation. As mass production lowers the cost of the small acrylic sub- ersible, an increase in the number of recreational u rnersibles is just a question of time. Designs of e t-propelled submersibles for recreational use are beginning to appear, and for shallow water operation, e cost may be low enough to create a substantial tnarket. Today, a German firm manufactures a fiber 8 ass submersible priced to sell at $2,500, although no epth capability has been reported.
It should be obvious that there will be a significant number of submersibles, with their attendant problems, 0 the coast of the United States by 1980. Although Present activity is inadequate for projecting future growth, if the growth rate of the snowmobile is any ’ndication of what to expect, then the total number 0 subrnersibles will be much higher than even the °ptimists have predicted.
Existing Situation. The Coast Guard today, with t e if any underwater expertise and no underwater assets other than divers, has chosen a coordinating role, ymg on the Navy and the civilian submersible community to provide the assets and the expertise. In the . Ca Link submersible disaster off Florida, which resulted ^ che loss of two lives, about the only function the k ast Guard performed was to have a patrol boat to eeP sightseeing boaters out of the immediate area.
. The Coast Guard cannot rely on the Navy to do ts underwater search and rescue. First of all, the Navy not responsible for civilian SAR and has its own erwater commitments which may require its as- l^tS' ^ec°ndly, the DSRV is compatible only with the rger submarines such as the SSN and the SSBN. The luting rescue technique employed by the Navy will Work on a civilian submersible. To use the mating it i ni<Tle’ a rescue submersible would have to position • e' 0ver a universal escape hatch located on a DiSub such a way as to allow the survivors to enter the rvivor sphere of the Search and Rescue Submarine v ^s) through a pressurized bell or shirt fitted flush stlt the hull of the DiSub. Because the Navy has a ^andardized escape hatch, they can mate to the DiSub fcscue Navy submariners. Other features are neces- siz^ ^°f system to he successful. The shape and e °f the small submersible hull are important. In
Among the assets committed by the civilian submersible community to the Sea Link rescue efforts in the summer of 1973 was the Perry submarine PS-2. Perry Oceanographies, Inc., the only major company now producing commercial submarines in the United States, has had no fatal submarine accidents since it began manufacturing them 18 years ago.
order to position a SARS on top of the DiSub and maintain that position while the survivors board the SARS, a flat, smooth resting place or bearing surface is needed on the hull surface. However, as the diameter of the largest research submersible is only 17 feet, and recreation submersibles will be even smaller, the curvature of the hull will not support a SARS in a stable attitude. Even the DSRV needs an exotic series of thrusters around the rim of the bottom hatch to offset lateral movement while resting on the bearing surface. As the Sea Link disaster vividly demonstrated, currents can be very strong and unpredictable throughout the water column. Other factors that militate against such a system include the possibility that the DiSub may be lying on its side, which precludes the mating technique, and also the SARS would have to be larger in order to accommodate a survivor’s sphere, and more exotic in order to carry out the mating evolution.
For the civilian submersible community to provide rescue submersibles would be even more difficult. Not all submersibles located around the United States are capable of unlimited search and rescue. Some are constrained by depth, some by a lack of search equipment, and others by a lack of manipulator arms essential for freeing the DiSub. It has been calculated that if a submersible such as the Alvin was unable to surface from a depth of 1,500 feet, only about 40% of the submersibles would have the depth capability to attempt a rescue. In all probability, a high percentage of these qualified volunteers would not be near enough to the distress site to effectively accomplish the mission prior to the time life support terminated.
Furthermore, under existing laws, the Coast Guard would be unable to reimburse the volunteer submersible owner for his cost in the operation. Historically, Congress has refused to fund civilian participation in marine rescue operations, relying on the Coast Guard to carry out this mission.
Lastly, no immunity from liability for worsening the condition of the DiSub during a rescue attempt would be granted because, under existing laws, the Coast Guard cannot hire a civilian craft as a search and rescue vehicle with or without a Coast Guard crew, and it can be presumed that the term craft includes submersibles. Title 14, United States Code, paragraph 2, as amended by public law 91-278, is quite specific as to the Coast Guard’s responsibilities.
". . . shall develop, establish, maintain and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under and over the high seas and water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; . . .
". . . and perform any and all acts necessary to rescue any persons and protect and save property; . . .”
Recent rulings applicable to this subject have held that the Coast Guard does not have the authority to contract for search and rescue services.
. . If Congress intended the Coast Guard to hire vessels as in a bare boat charter, it would have so provided; therefore, in the absence of statutory authority to hire vessels as discussed, it is concluded the Coast Guard is without authority to hire private vessels to perform Coast Guard functions, manned by Coast Guard personnel . . .”
In view of the existing law, and the legal opinions, no immunity from liability may be granted. It seems doubtful that any submersible owner would offer assistance unless he was operating in the immediate area of the distress and was motivated by the humanitarian principles of the sea.
To have a complete system, the Coast Guard must develop a functional underwater SAR system as well as sponsor legislation aimed at preventing accidents and enhancing the probability of rescue by requiring submersibles to carry specific locator equipment.
Search and Rescue Submersibles. The SARS should have several design and instrumentation features incorporated to improve its efficiency as a search and rescue vehicle. It is unrealistic to expect a SARS to descend and immediately locate the DiSub, (especially if it lS not transmitting a homing signal), attach a lift cable, and surface. Looking at past cases such as the Alvin incident and the Sea Link, this would be the exception rather than the rule. Hooking a line to a padeye which may take only seconds on the surface, can require many hours under the surface. Standardized lifting lugs on all submersibles, coupled with training under realistic conditions, could significantly reduce this hook-on time. In the case of an underwater search for a silent submersible, a search area of 10 square nautical miles will be an extensive undertaking when you consider that the track spacing will be much less than a half a mile. In order to adhere to the tracks of the search plan, a navigator must keep an accurate running plot of the geographic position relative to the datum point- Course and speed over the ground will have to be determined and compensation made for underwater currents. Therefore, not only will the SARS need to be equipped with good scanning and side-looking sonar, but will also need an exotic and expensive navigation suite to prevent poorly executed search tracks.
The pilot of a rescue submersible must have better
Vlsibility than the pilot of a research submersible. Losing the DiSub, as well as avoiding obstacles that maf have caused the distress in the first place, will require all-around visibility. This requirement for a 6 ass sphere is compatible with keeping the weight of k e SAR-S to a minimum. Low light television should incorporated for final approach prior to gaining ^isual contact. The SARS should be equipped with at ^ast four of the strongest and most maneuverable arms at the state of the art can provide. Two of the arms ^°uld he used to hold the SARS to the DiSub while e °ther two attempted to free the DiSub or to attach hft cable to the padeyes of the DiSub. By being e to hold on to the DiSub with two of the four arms> the pilot can concentrate on the rescue techniques Without having to continually maneuver the SARS to aintain position. The weight of the SARS should be
off the shelf without any significant modification. Inasmuch as this helicopter will be an integral part of the overall air mission of the Coast Guard, and can logically be considered as a "follow-on” to the present HH-3F helicopter, it is not a special piece of equipment solely for the use of the underwater SAR program. Certainly this component of the system would be cost- effective.
The speed of the helicopter is a function of payload and drag. In this situation, the SARS would be carried externally, stabilized fore and aft and have the equivalent of 20 square feet of drag. Under these conditions, the average outbound speed would be about 153 knots for an eight-ton SARS. Based on an eight-ton payload, the helicopter would have a 275-mile unrefueled radius. But this is academic as the CH-53E can be air refueled from a C-130 aircraft. Slight modifications to existing
k
liv^ ^°Wn t0 compatible with the helicopter dt 16 ' Skstem which at present is capable of carryin: th^?0'5 externally. The Deepstar 2000 weighs nine ton;
tCn t0nS’ can d*ve to 2000 feet- Th should not exceed nine tons. js * Icopter. The other primary piece of equipmen the e^C0Pter> perhaps the Sikorsky CH-53E. It may b is ^ 0st ‘mportant part of the proposed system as i c0C °ne piece of equipment that will make the emir Cept feasible. Unlike the SARS, it can be purchaset
by salvage.”
CH-53E/SARS C-130/Ship/SARS
Coast Guard C-130s would be required in order to air refuel, but this evolution is well within the capability of both the planes and the pilots. Because of the air refueling capability, fewer helicopters would be needed inasmuch as most of the incidents will probably occur in the more densely traveled areas closer to shore.
In order to bypass surface support completely, the helicopter must be capable of lifting with its winch as much as it can carry. The CH-53E, for example, is equipped with such a winch and an 18-ton cargo hook- Although the operational radius with a 16-ton load slung beneath is practically zero, the CH-53F. could lift a 12.5-ton submersible and transport it 100 miles without having to refuel. The helicopter may also winch or fly the submersible off the bottom depending on the total submerged weight and, if applicable, the additive effect of bottom breakout force. Excess weight could be overcome by attaching a deflated rubberized buoyancy pack to the DiSub with inflation by a self contained gas generation device from the SARS. In fact, with required attachment points on all U.S. submersi- bles, this lift could be the primary means of "rescue
A comparison of the helicopter delivery method versus a ship delivery method appears in Figure 1, based on a scenario off Block Island, Rhode Island. In ordet to arrive at a comparison, the most favorable conditions were assumed for the ship delivery. The ship delivery system involves only two C-130 air transportable SARS on both coasts. These would be located at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and San Francisco, California, where the Coast Guard C-130 aircraft are located. With the helicopter system, the submersibles would be based at strategically located Coast Guard Air Stations along the coasts of the United States.
Scenario. At 1330 on Sunday, 25 May 1977, the Fits1 Coast Guard District Rescue Coordination Center was notified by a member of the Rhode Island Explorers Club of an underwater distress. A leased submersible, the Plaything III, with two people on board had been diving to investigate a World War II German submarine in 174 feet of water, and had failed to surface from a scheduled two hour dive. The submersible ha^ been diving 23 miles S.E. of Block Island in position L40°53'N, and Long 71°13'W. The Coast Guard U»' derwater Search and Rescue Manual listed emergency l<fe support endurance for the Plaything III as having an eight hour maximum capability. Therefore, unless the life support system could be extended, all life support would be used up by 1900 that night.
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Alternative 1. The Coast Guard has alerted Elizu-
beth City Air Station and the Cutter Vigorous out
New London, Connecticut, to commence immediatel) the ship delivery underwater SAR plan. In the mean
tlrne> Commander Eastern Area has assumed SAR Co- 0rdinator for the mission.
Alternative 2. The Coast Guard has alerted the °ast Guard Air Station at Otis AFB, Falmouth, Massachusetts, to transport the SARS to the scene. Further Instructions are to be delivered en route via radio. First strict is the SAR Coordinator in the intradistrict
operation.
v'able underwater SAR plan in existence today, cou- tc with the lack of progress toward implementing realistic underwater SAR plan, is evidence that we are Progressively worsening an already bad situation. The Popular argument that many of the U. S. owned re- SCarch submersibles are not in use today, thus indicating regressive growth in submersible activity, just doesn’t r^nd up under scrutiny. The reason for the lack of mersible activity on the part of the oceanographic ornmunity is not as a result of a lack of interest, it Suite simply due to a lack of funds for oceanographic esearch. If funds were available to operate these sub- jUersibles and their more expensive support vessels, the lrie would form at the rear.
Through simple mathematics (See Figure 1), it can e deduced that the ship will not put the SARS in the water until 0300 in the following morning, some five a half hours after life support would have ceased. che case of the helicopter, the SARS would be in e Water by 1445 that afternoon, exactly 45 minutes ter being notified by the District Rescue Coordi- tation Center. .
. |t is obvious that the age of the submersible is in lts 'ttfancy, and it should be just as obvious that a large timber of various types of submersibles will be sailed r°ugh U. S. waters and the high seas above the continental shelf in the near future. The fact that there is
Prom the economic point of view, the time for the j 0ast Guard to act is now. The Coast Guard could t^ase a submersible on today’s market very cheaply. As ^ C ^-oast Guard is capable of providing its own sur- k Ce support services quite easily, the overall cost would arr"nimal. Now would be the time to start building to g1* exPertlse on submersible operations in order tr • etter develop a SARS, a delivery system, personnel ^ain'ng, search patterns, and a SAR plan. This expertise j U u also lend itself to improving the writing of the ^gtslation the Coast Guard will need, indeed should is^ n°W’ *n t^ie submersible safety. Legislation
sj needed to standardize safety features in order to t plify the location and "rescue by salvage” problem a point where it becomes a viable concept of opera- Legislation should be prepared to cover installa- n °f a high and low frequency pinger for homing ar ,rL°ses' Lifting lugs and padeyes should be stand- 12ed and brightly and clearly marked for ease in
underwater identification. An approved protuberance or horns that would allow the SARS to hold on to the DiSub when working alongside should be a part of all submersible hulls. Multiple female fittings, where an air probe could be inserted in order to extend life support, should be an integral part of every new submersible constructed in the United States. Standardized attachment points on the periphery of the hull for attachment of gas generation lift packs should be required. Lastly, legislation is required to have primary and secondary tethered buoyed transmitters, capable of broadcasting a distress on the surface, on all U. S. owned and operated submersibles. This concept would allow the SARS to trace the tether to the DiSub, which would greatly simplify the location problem.
In conclusion, the time has come for the Coast Guard to, at the very least, commence research and development on an underwater SAR plan and associated SAR equipment, as well as the formulation of safety legislation. Whether or not it is the proposed helicopter-delivered system is of little concern at this point; what is of concern is that the Coast Guard’s motto, "Semper Paratus”—Always Ready—may not be apropos in the future unless it fulfills its obligations to rescue the submariner from the ocean floor. It can no longer afford to abdicate its responsibility to the U. S. Navy. The Coast Guard must, of course, ask the Navy to help formulate and develop an underwater SAR capability. To pass up that wealth of expertise would be unthinkable, but it is the Coast Guard that must shoulder full responsibility for performing any and all acts necessary to rescue persons on, over, and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. To that task it must begin to dedicate itself with the same vigor with which it has always responded to challenges in the past.
A graduate of the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in 1961, Lieutenant Commander Joseph served on the High Endurance Cutter Barataria, an ocean station vessel in the North Atlantic. Subsequently, he commanded the Loran "A” Station on the island of Miyako Jima in the Ryukyu Islands. After reporting to the Academy in 1965, he served as an instructor, teaching ASW, Nautical Science, and Navigation. In 1969, he reported to the High Endurance Cutter Wachusett as the Executive Officer, during which time he was selected to attend the Naval War College. While attending, he obtained a master’s degree in Marine Affairs from the University of Rhode Island. He is now serving on the faculty of the Naval Staff Course at Newport for middle grade international officers.