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In the United States, there is painful awareness of the existence of an un-pretty picture. Draft card burnings, defections of draft- e%ible youth to Canada, obstructions to operations at U. S. Army induction centers, and refusals to take the oath of allegiance have emphasized a disaffection of some young Americans with the Vietnam war and service 1,1 the Armed Forces, supposedly because of the war. The U. S. Selective Service Act has been denounced as antiquated, unfair, unnecessary, inadequate or improperly administered, yet, efforts to modify the law have had little success. And while many Americans worry about what to do, international Communist propaganda has magnified and aPplauded the dissent of American youth.
On 12 October 1967, at about the same time that responsible American individuals and organizations, private and governmental, were agonizing over the various questions that iuust be resolved in the administration of the Present draft law or the passage of a new one, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met in the Kremlin. Following a speech by the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei A. Crechko, which recommended the adoption °t a new statute for Universal Military Ser- Vlce, Soviet delegates immediately and unan- lrnously passed the law. Both the Soviet Fass and the world press dutifully reported lhe event, taking special cognizance of the fact that draft age was reduced from 19 to 18 and that the term of service for draftees was
reduced by one year. The new U.M.S. law became effective 1 January 1968.
It is improper to compare U. S. selective service with Soviet universal military service. Soviet law is not limited to the registration, selection, and induction of young men into the Armed Forces for a limited period, but is truly universal and embraces the vast spectrum of the military life of all men from preinduction through active duty, discharge into the reserves, reserve training, mobilization, and retirement. A previous U.M.S. law was adopted in September 1939, a short time after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and subsequent occupation of Polish and Roumanian territory by the Red Army. With considerable modification, the law survived World War II and the Cold War until January 1968. What prompted the passage of a new law at this time?
Although Marshall Grechko’s U.M.S. recommendations were quickly rubber-stamped into law by the Supreme Soviet, it appears obvious that there must have been many long, excruciating sessions within the Communist Party and the government before the final draft, basically agreeable to political, economic, military, and other interests, was assembled. As elsewhere, the employment of the nation’s manpower is the concern of many governmental groupings in the Soviet state. Since the whys and wherefores of governmental decisions are not openly debated in a totalitarian state, we must deduce why a new law was deemed essential at that time. We may accomplish this by examining the gen-
Soviet Universal Military Service
Having been taught the glorious combat history of the Soviet Armed Forces, as led by the invincible Communist party; having been alerted to the dangers of the decadent West, as led by the imperialist United States;
young Soviet citizen is not likely to burn the flag he kisses So solemnly in the poster on the facing page.
Sy Captain George Grkovic, U. S. Navy
eral situation within the nation, the new provisions in the law, and how these provisions and the whole law are propagandized in Soviet information media.
First, a brief perusal of the 104 articles that make up the law, with special attention to those areas of new obligations, should give an over-all impression of its capacity.
The basic provisions of the law are stated in the first three articles, cited with their respective constitutional source:
Article 1. Universal military service is law. Military service in the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. is the honorable duty of citizens of the U.S.S.R. (Article 132 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.).
Article 2. The defense of the nation is the sacred duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. Treason to the Motherland—violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage—is punishable with all the severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes. (Article 133 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.).
Article 3. All male citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of race or nationality, religion, education, domicile, social and property status must undergo active service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.
The next few articles define the Armed Forces, active and reserve, the various officer and enlisted grades and oath of allegiance requirements. Article 10 reduces draft age from 19 to 18. Article 13 defines the new terms for active service, basically two years for Army and Air Force personnel, including Navy air, and three years for Navy personnel afloat and at shore outposts. Young men going on to a higher education are deferred until completion of schooling and then serve only one year on active duty. The Minister of Defense is authorized to hold servicemen on active duty for an additional two months and can transfer men from one service to another, with a corresponding change in the term of service. A change from the previous law allows for two call-ups each year instead of one.
Articles 17 and 18 are novel in that they establish pre-draft training requirements for all young men throughout the Soviet Union. The training takes place in all general education schools, specialized secondary schools, and schools of the vocational training system.
These schools provide Soviet youth of high l school age with various instructional programs. In the U.S.S.R., children start school at age 7 and now follow a ten-year program before entrance into a higher educational institution. The law requires those young men who do not study in daytime educational j establishments to take pre-draft training at - training centers set up at various factories, institutions, and collective farms. Pre-draft training starts in the ninth school year, age 15, and, though not specifically defined, continues for the two years until graduation or until non-students reach draft age. Author- , ized military instructors conduct all pre-draft training. The law states that heads of enter- 1 prises, institutions, organizations, collective farms, and educational establishments must ensure that all young men take this training’ Pre-draft training, commencing in the fifth grade, was a part of the 1939 law, but that * provision was abolished after World War 11In addition to the general pre-draft training, the Voluntary Society for Assisting the 1 Army, Air Force, and Navy, (D.O.S.A.A.F.); is charged with the responsibility of training competent young men for the various operational and technical specialties required by the Armed Forces. This training starts at age 17. Presumably, in most cases, a Soviet boy would take the general pre-draft training during his last two years of high school, and then have one year of specialty training before induction. The Council of Ministers determines the number of specialists to be trained and the Defense Minister designates the specialties required and outlines the training programs.
All general pre-draft training and most specialty training is to be conducted without interrupting normal work or studies of young men prior to their being called up for active ■ service. Some specialty training can be done on a full-time basis in the fall and winter when men can be spared from rural work.
Succeeding articles describe procedures for registering and inducting physically qualified men into the Armed Forces and the qualifica- _ tions for deferment. Deferments are granted for family considerations when the draftee is the family breadwinner; however, a married man with one child is not exempt from the draft. To be eligible, he must have two or
more children or an invalid wife. Students continuing their education and men found temporarily unfit because of sickness are Qualified for deferments. Students who have n«t completed secondary school can be deferred until age 20, provided they have never dropped out of school. Voluntary dropouts cannot return to school to avoid the draft. If students of higher educational establishments are dropped for lack of proper discipline or Poor studies, they lose their right to repeated deferments to continue their education. All cases of deferment are periodically reviewed fer change of status and, if a change occurs, deferees can be called up prior to reaching the age of 27.
The law requires that all physically qualified servicemen, who have completed the ferms of active duty, be placed in the reserve uP°n discharge. The Minister of Defense is allowed to accept volunteers for extended active duty from servicemen completing their required term, or from men already in the reserve. Enlisted men remain in the reserve Until age 50 and take periodic active duty Taming according to past qualifications and age. As age increases, the frequency and duration of training periods decrease. Enlisted ’nen can be promoted to reserve officer status ny fulfilling special qualifications and passing an examination.
Officer service is divided into four groups: active duty and three reserve groups, according to age. Younger reserve officers are called up annually for training periods of up O three months, while older officers in the Uird reserve group may be called for only °ne two-month period. The Defense Minister can extend any training period an additional tWo months, and all reservists may be called |’P for inspection periods of up to ten days etween normal training periods.
Article 61b is new, in that the Council of hnisters can call up reserve officers to active utY in peacetime for periods of two or three years, if the officer’s specialty is required and e ls not more than 30 years of age. Additional articles define rights, duties and responsibilities of service personnel, active and reserve, and 20 articles are devoted to Military registration, which ensures that all cuale citizens are properly categorized for tlulitary purposes, and charges various indi-
vidual offices and organizations, including the police, to make individual compliance more certain. According to the law, there is no national review of complaints made by individuals to induction commissions. Decisions on complaints made at the union republic level are final.
The final five articles cover mobilization and demobilization procedures.
The preface to the new law states that “deep-going economic and social changes in the life of our society, the enhanced level of political development, the general education and technical training of Soviet youth and radical changes in equipping the forces with the latest military technology and modern weapons make new higher demands on military service.” It then adds, “The Soviet State acts on the principle that as long as imperialism is preserved the danger of aggressive war remains.” Marshal Grechko, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet, also pointed out that the adoption of the new law would be in accord with changes that have taken place and “conform to the spirit of the demands of the Party that problems concerning the defense of the nation constantly hold the center of our attention.” “The strengthening of the security of the nation is an indispensable condition for successfully completing the tasks of building Communism. Grechko used the Vietnam war, the Arab-Israeli war, and U. S. collaboration with a revanchist Germany as examples of “the deepening crisis of capitalism” that could cause another world war. Communist China was not mentioned.
A modern war, according to Grechko, will be a cruel war that will cover wide areas and involve the entire populations of the belligerents, as well as their armies. This means, Grechko continued, that the whole population must be trained to repel aggressors, and the military-patriotic education of the Soviet people must be improved to develop the moral and psychological qualities necessary to withstand the stern trials of war. Matters concerning the preparation of youth for service in the Army and Navy must be perfected, and the long-range defense capabilities of the nation must be improved. Grechko then explained that combat readiness of the Soviet Union’s Armed Forces would continue to im-
prove upon its present impressive state.
Because combat readiness is always of immediate concern to military commanders, the Ministry of Defense press, shortly after the passage of the law, began commenting on the effects of its implementation. There was quick acknowledgment that the reduction in terms of active service would require greater efforts to do in two or three years what had been accomplished in the three and four years previously available. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov warned that D.O.S.A.A.F. must provide the Navy with better trained specialists, and the official Ministry of Defense newspaper, Red Star, in an editorial on 21 March 1968 emphasized that improvement in combat readiness under the new conditions will require the best efforts of Navy commanding officers, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. The editorial stated that training programs must be improved and modernized and the most efficient use of time at training facilities must be made. Technical specialization, already narrow in the Soviet Armed Forces, is scheduled to become more restricted to save training time that was lost in the reduction of terms of service when the new law became effective.
Theoretically, to maintain the same number of soldiers in a combat status, the Soviet Army must now process at least half again as many troops each year than when the term of service was three years. This problem would be eased if large numbers of officers and men volunteered for extended active duty, but article 61b of the law indicated that junior officer shortages in critical specialties might have to be made up by recalling young reserve officers for two or three years. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, Armed Forces Chief of General Staff, in a Red Star
article on 4 January 1968, stated that the new law “was aimed at the peacetime consolidation of young officers in the Army and Navy and the improvement of their material and legal status,” and also, “now a whole series of measures are being worked on to elevate the role and to improve the material and legal status” of extended active duty enlisted personnel. This indicates serious concern for retaining experienced junior officers and enlisted personnel on active duty. The increased numbers of men being drafted under the new law should provide a wider manpower base for volunteers for extended active duty but the shorter draft term mitigates against any quantity improvement.
Marshal Grechko and others have said that the improvement in educational standards of Soviet youth over pre-war conditions has enabled today’s servicemen to master modern arms more quickly, thereby permitting the reduction in terms of service. They also admit that the growth of science and technology has increasingly complicated military weapons. It would appear that perhaps the claimed improvement in education would be offset by the increased complexity of weapons, 3 rationale which would not suggest a reduction of active duty time.
The reduction in age of draftees from 19 to 18 merely legalized the previous practice of inducting young men upon the completion of school. In recent years, until 1966, the Soviet Union had an 11-year school program- Since 1966, the ten-year program has been in effect. Because nearly everyone is graduated by age 18 there is no need for 19 to be the official draft age.
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The unique pre-draft training now i® effect certainly should help ease the change from civilian to military life. But, are two and>
ln some cases, three years of part-time instruction in school or factory equivalent to °ne full year of real military training? Obviously not, or the military leadership would n°t have placed increased emphasis on improving active duty training.
From a purely military viewpoint the So- V|f't Army and Navy were probably better °ff before the new law became effective, certainly combat readiness can be improved an increased effort of dedicated personnel, out wouldn’t that improvement have been greater if equal increased effort had been aPplied to training under the previous conditions?
In fact, the Defense Ministry has been additionally charged by Article 19 of the univerSal military service law to conduct all predraft training with military instructors in every secondary and vocational training school in the nation plus, where necessary, in }ndustrial establishments and kolkhozes. This *s not a small undertaking in a nation of over million people. General of the Army M. Shtemenko, then a deputy chief of the general staff involved with the pre-draft program, writing in Red Star, said 45,000 schools and thousands of industrial training sites had '° be supervised. The Ground Forces Command has been directed to conduct the preraft training through the regular chain-of- °mrnand of military districts down to the °cal military commissariats. The curriculum ls to include instruction in military-patriotic education, hygiene, physical education, and general literacy improvement, in addition to asic military and civil defense subjects. The ln°st important part of the course, according General Shtemenko, is the military-patri- °bc education. All but one of the subjects . ave a military essence. Why the Army is Involved in a literacy improvement program 's difficult to fathom. It could be an effort esigned to minimize the number of high Sch°ol drop-outs.
^ Jl> indeed, the Armed Forces have to work arder to maintain combat readiness, must Pr°cess about half again as many men each ^ear> and then take on the additional re- sP°nsibility of educating all the male Soviet j^uth in the basics of military life, it seems ’gbly unlikely that the military services themSelves requested a change from the “old” days.
There must be other reasons.
The training of the youth of a nation is obviously of great economic import for the future of that nation. A short stint under the disciplined conditions of military life should improve the ability of the average industrial or agricultural worker to adjust to various difficult Soviet working conditions. The technical, operational, and administrative training obtained in the Armed Forces is of real value in modern industry and in many cases, little, if any, retraining is necessary. The new law allows the Defense Minister to select the specialties that D.O.S.A.A.F. will teach, the services being qualified to train only those skills that are used by the military, but the number in each specialty is to be determined by the Council of Ministers, each ministry planning its needs for partially or completely trained manpower. This could mean that some specialists might not use their developed skills while on active duty.
After a tour of active duty, the average Soviet soldier or sailor without dependency problems or higher educational aspirations should be more amenable to being placed where his ability might be needed, even though the law requires that he be accepted at his previous place of employment, if in fact he had been an employee. He has broken his family ties and, after being away from home, the kolkhoz or village doesn t have the same attraction. He probably will not volunteer for the tougher life in the more desolate, but economically important, regions of Siberia, but after military indoctrination and some encouragement he will probably accept this fate for a stated period. Thus, the law should aid in the distribution of manpower.
The reduction of the draft age should help industry reduce the turnover of employees. There will be fewer teenage employees, and returning servicemen should be more stable and sure of the kind of work they desire for the future. The fact that, under the new law, they return to civilian life one or two years younger should ensure fewer personal entanglements that might hamper labor distribution. The twice-a-year call-up is definitely an advantage to agriculture and should be of no particular disadvantage to industry.
Economically, the new law can be con-
of
sidered a plus for the future of the Soviet Union, but, is that sufficient reason for updating the law?
Since 1939, a new generation has grown and its members, when properly qualified, will be occupying important positions in all Soviet endeavor. It is a generation that has not experienced the hardships of war nor endured the trials of the previous generation, when Stalin was converting the Soviet Union into the first “socialist” state. It is an educated generation that has seen very slow but gradual improvements in a still low standard of living, but it has witnessed fantastic feats in science and technology. Soviet propaganda has continuously extolled the greatness of the Soviet system, emphasizing the serious obstacles that had to be overcome to reach its present eminent position and lauding the efforts of the people in overcoming these obstacles, but the present younger generation has not accepted this propaganda with the proper enthusiasm. The Soviet press has often complained that the new generation is not properly preparing itself to accept the “relay baton” and confidently race off into the future toward Communism.
As a whole, the younger generation appears not to have taken an interest in politics, being content to work within the established system to get the most out of it materially. With the help of the older generation, they are searching for better salaries, better housing, and better working conditions, which do not require the political responsibilities of agitating the Party line. With the advent of better conditions comes the normal desire for still more improvements in individual circumstances, which could require changes in the Soviet system, and a possible loosening of control. An attitude such as this bodes ill for the future of the system.
The Soviet Communist Party has recognized this apathy of youth. Speaking to the Moscow organization of the Party on 30 March, 1968, Party leader Leonid Brezhnev said “the Party considers it a duty to do everything so that our youth—our young workers and collective farmers, men of the Soviet Army and Navy, college students— take an ever greater and more active part in the country’s public and political life.”
Convinced of the future of Socialism and
Communism, the regime evidently feels that past indoctrinational efforts have been insuffi' cient. Youth must be further indoctrinated to accept its responsibilities in building Communism. And always being realistic, there must also be positive control in the event that more definite measures need to be taken. Worse problems have been solved in the past to keep the nation on the Soviet version of the Marxist-Leninist road.
It seems that the problem of indoctrinating Soviet youth for the benefit of the future of the regime has, to a considerable extent, been turned over to the Armed Forces. As the preface to the law stated, “deep-going economic and social changes” and “enhanced level of political development” made “neWj higher demands on the military service.” The Soviet military has always had a part in the training of men in the Communist tradition) but never to the extent that it now faces. The Armed Forces now have control of Soviet youth for two sure pre-induction years, per' haps three, when specialty training is considered, plus an additional one, two, or three years of active duty, depending on educa' tional qualifications and branch of service- These are impressionable years, from 15 to 20 or 21. These are also busy years now, because nothing has been deleted from previous school requirements or active duty response bilities. There is less free time for persona* pursuits, and presumably less free time to develop individual thinking or cause diS' ciplinary problems. The younger generation will be taught the glorious combat history the Soviet Armed Forces, as led by the U1' vincible Communist Party. The horrors of the hateful, imperialistic, decadent West, led W the United States of America, will be end' phasized, with careful differentiation being made between the “ruling circles” and the “downtrodden masses.” The tough, strict military oath of allegiance to the Soviet
Union is not taken until the commencement
of active duty, but is then in effect as long aS one remains on active duty or in the reserve- Frequent group reaffirmations of the oat* is common practice.
Why should the Party entrust the militaO with such an important task? Party leade> Brezhnev on 3 November 1967, in his long speech in Moscow in honor of the 50th anni'
versary of the October Revolution, said, “the Army is boundlessly loyal,” using a term that 111 the past connoted all services, but in recent Vears has been expanded to “Army and
avy” in deference to the growing impor-
N
lance of seagoing forces. Most likely, Brezhnev’s statement was necessary to allay the ';ars of many of the representatives of foreign ornmunist parties then present. Western observers had noted increasing Soviet attention to military problems and had interpreted nis to mean over-influence on the part of the 'Military rather than genuine policy fully hected and backed by the Party civilian eadership. Marshal Grechko gave the Supreme Soviet his assurances of military loyalty t° the Party by noting that in 1939 only 11.5 Pcr cent of the Armed Forces were party '^embers while today 22 per cent had joined , e political ranks. He also pointed out that, ^oce 1939, the Young Communist League or onisomol membership grew from 41 to over u Per cent. This means, for all intents and Purposes, that all senior officers and leading folisted men are Communists and most Junior officers and important enlisted personnel are Communists or Komsomol mem- ers. As a comparison, about 6 per cent of the ul Soviet population are party members an<J about 10 per cent belong to the Komso- f°l- Other governmental organizations can oast of better percentages, such as the For- Ministry or the KGB, where party mem- srship is a probable prerequisite for em- ynient, but the Armed Forces figures are th ^ress*ve' P°r a party member, loyalty to . e Communist Party comes first, before the otherland or any other organization, resent party loyalty is not the only recom- I. udation for the military being a responsi- pe Racher of Soviet youth. The Armed °rces> particularly the Army, has had a
continuous history of protecting party interests since the Bolsheviki took over the Russian revolution. The Red Army waged the Civil War, subdued the bloody Kronstadt sailors’ revolt, aided Stalin in the collectivization of agriculture, occupied part of Poland and the Baltic States, fought tiny Finland to a stalemate, but won the peace, and, after disastrous defeats, recovered to fight all the way to Berlin in the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the way to Berlin and later, the Soviet Army “created the favorable conditions” for East European countries to “choose” Communism. The Soviet people can equate with the Army or Navy better than with any other organization. Every family has had or will have members serving in the Armed Forces. The military slogan “For our Soviet Motherland” is interestingly nationalistic as opposed to the international Party slogan “Proletariat of all Nations, Unite.”
Most Soviet heroes are military. In his speech extolling the achievement of 50 years of Communism, the only Party leader named by Brezhnev was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Previous leaders, surrounded by controversy, could not be mentioned. In a speech on 23 February 1968, honoring the 50th anniversary of Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Grechko listed 50 leaders and heroes and pointed out that Marshal J. V. Stalin was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces during World War II. The old Civil War heroes, Marshals S. M. Budenny and K. Y. Voroshilov, were the hit of both anniversary celebrations while Anastas Mikoyan, the sole untarnished civilian survivor of Party leadership over the years, was hardly noticed. What most Soviets citizens will remember about the celebration of 50 years of Soviet power is the military parade in Moscow’s Red Square, which portrayed 50 historic years of Soviet
military personnel and equipment. The greatness of Soviet power, manifested in the latest military apparatus, is paraded twice each year before Lenin’s mausoleum in Red Square. Todays’ heroes, the Cosmonauts, wear the Soviet Air Force uniform.
The Party has tasked a most capable organization to do the job, if it can be done. The universal military service law is certainly an adequate vehicle on which to base the work. It does not take a deep analytical effort to discover the control machinery made available by the law to be used as necessary. The first three articles are positive enough and leave little doubt as to their meaning. There is no provision for demonstrating dissent, but there is provision for loss of deferment if a student is dropped from an educational institution for disciplinary reasons. In addition, any student who has already completed his active duty requirement is in the reserve and bound by his oath of allegiance. Registration procedures are so strict that a draft-eligible youth finds it difficult to legally leave his place of residence, let alone attempt the impossible task of leaving the country. One never hears of a Soviet citizen refusing to take the military oath of allegiance, though perhaps some do, but anyone so foolish would immediately become an enemy of the people and suffer most drastic consequences. A citizen’s complaint about the legality or illegality of a military conflict in which the Soviets might be involved, as they have been many times in the past, is far too fantastic to contemplate.
An American, his life influenced by a Western moral upbringing might conclude that the new draft law was passed to curb a developing internal threat to the regime. While this may be true, it is not the way the Communist looks at the problem. Any antiCommunist view, or even an idea not in conformity with Party thinking, is considered alien, derived from a foreign source. As shown in the recent trials of dissident Soviet intellectuals, emphasis was placed on their being duped by a foreign organization, not on their alienation because of internal conditions. A person is a dupe, insane or improperly indoctrinated if he does not believe in the future of the Soviet system. In the so- called “advanced stage of political development” that now prevails, supposedly, in the
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1943, Captain Grkovic served in a battleship and two cruisers during World War If He has since commanded a destroyer escort, a destroyer, and a destroyer division. His i shore duty includes tours on ' the Staff, CinCPacFlt, at the Naval Academy, and in Washington, D. C. He studied the Russian Language at the Naval Language School in 1949 and took a refresher course before becoming Naval Attache, ^ Moscow, in 1965. After three years in Moscow, he is now assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. i This article was written before the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Soviet Union, there is no allowance for public dissidence or even a questioning. Inter-Party procedures are supposed to take | care of all possible views. Once a decision is made by the Communist “scientific’ method, it must be accepted. As Premier , Kosygin said in his interview with the editors of Life magazine, “It is the collective that works, And herein lies our strength. If one makes a mistake, others set him right. . . • implying that the system is seldom wrong’ I Nevertheless, it was felt necessary, even after 50 years of Communist power, to pass a military service law to help indoctrinate and control the population. And this because of apathy for the Soviet system, a system that i has throughout the years propagandized its ^ own infallibility to an extent previously unknown and at the same time has predicted the j demise of all opposition.
That the ideological threat from the West is of prime concern to the Communist Party ■ of the Soviet Union was further evidenced by j the agenda for the April 1968 plenary meet- i ing of its Central Committee. The meeting had been called because of the disturbing events happening in Eastern Europe. An edt- , torial in the Party newspaper, Pravda, eXplained the threat a few days after the meet- i ing in the following way: “The present stage , of historical development is characterized by a sharp intensification of ideological struggle 1 between capitalism and socialism. Striving ; to weaken the unity of socialist countries and of the international communist movement)
to split the progressive forces of our time, to undermine the socialist society from within and to break up its ideological and political solidarity, imperialism is staking mainly on nationalist and revisionist elements.” But the Soviet Communist Party, itself revisionist according to more conservative views, has other threats to consider.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the average Soviet citizen’s view of the Party’s preoccupation with Western problems is by repeating one of the many jokes popular in the Soviet Union on the subject. Yet another summit conference pits the Soviet Premier against the President of the United States and, as usual, no agreements can be made. At last, 'vith expert advice on both sides, it is decided that current decisions might be easier if both governments offer all available pertinent information to a computer with a request that *t forecast in simplest terms the kind of nation each would be in another 20 years. The computer is so programmed and, by lot, the U. S. Prediction comes first. The United States, jhe computer prophesies, will be a Commun- lst nation. The elated Soviet Premier then triumphantly awaits the computer’s reply concerning the future of his nation. He snatches the answer from the computer and stares at the paper. Anxiously, the American President asks, “What does it say?” A dejected Premier answers, “I don’tknow. I can’t read Chinese.”
The China problem was not forgotten in the writing of the U.M.S. law. The cruel Uiodern war that will cover wide areas and tuvolve entire populations, as described by Grechko, probably fits the description of what ^ught happen in a conflict with Communist V'hina better than in one with Western nations. There is little need to drum up ani- Ujosity against the Soviet Union’s giant ^astern neighbor—concerned apprehension °f what might happen is already prevalent in 'e Soviet Union. The need for training the "’hole nation to “repel aggressors” is just as valid for an Eastern threat as one from any °ther direction.
The new draft law will not be fully effective Uutil 1971. In 1970, the first of the pre-draft h'ainees start active duty and the last of the raftees under the three-year Army term will euter the reserve. The Navy will lose the last 0 its four-year men in 1971. Meanwhile,
there will be considerable frustration and confusion while the colossal pre-draft training apparatus is installed and adjusted to satisfy its designed requirements, and regular military units strive to adapt combat readiness standards to the shorter term. Extra effort will be made to retain experienced junior officers and enlisted personnel, but whether or not “improvement in their material and legal status” will be adequate to assure retention is problematical.
Whether action taken under the law can subdue the apathy now prevalent among youth is also problematical, but other, more repressive, measures can again be used if insufficient progress is shown. Certainly, as the years go by, more of the Soviet population will be trained “to repel aggressors,” thereby improving the nation’s long-range defense capabilities, a mission of the law stated by Marshal Grechko.
For the benefit of all, every nation should make some adjustments to the pressures of a changing world, but it now seems unlikely that present Soviet leadership will adjust sufficiently to allow enough freedom of movement within the Party, or elsewhere, for significant changes to occur. The passage of the U.M.S. law appears to be proof enough that a strict, hard line will continue to be followed. The Party seems determined that the Soviet people and the rest of the world must learn the hard way that, as the propagandists preach, “Only Communism is capable of solving the vital problems of social development, of delivering mankind from oppression . . . hunger and poverty . . . and affirming on our planet . . . peace ....
In the meantime, Soviet propaganda will continue its vicious attacks against the military and the “ruling circles” in the United States, promoting dissent against established law and order in the West, and attempting to obstruct any anti-Communist influences in the Soviet Union. Communism has survived to the present day only because of a tough, dedicated, ruthless organization that applies when and as necessary, the proper controls on the population. The Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Universal Military Service was passed primarily to update this organization for the control and indoctrination of the Soviet people.