This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
"Modern Destroyer Bridge Design”
(See R. L. Scott, pp. 44-50, March, and pp. 113-114, June 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William S. Louchheim, Jr., U. S. Navy—Commander Scott has suggested that the conning officer no longer have the opportunity to have the delightful January North Atlantic breezes blowing gently in his face as he moves from wing to wing so that he is able to keep up with the happenings of his watch. These modifications woidd deny the commanding officer his traditional privilege of coming to the bridge, tripping over a mass of sound- powered telephone lines, so that he can hear five-minute-old information which has been interpreted by the bridge phone talker, who was obtaining his information from the CIC phone talker’s paraphrase of the CIC supervisor’s evaluation which was interrupted by the lookout’s asking if somebody had awakened his relief. Someone who goes along with the suggestions of Commander Scott might next recommend forgetting the pilot house completely, since this is only to be used as a secondary station and all orders will be relayed anyway.
As Command and Control Co-ordinator in the Ship Design and Fleet Engineering Branch of the Naval Ship Engineering Center, we attempt to prepare the arrangements for all the new and modernized bridge designs. In the past, proposals to develop the ship’s bridge through analytical (or just plain operational) requirements have met with two basic barriers:
(1)The design agent, usually NavShips, is convinced that he is unable to recommend changes to the “ship driver’s” domain. Even if such a recommendation were to be made, it is difficult to find any project manager who would fund an analysis and development of advances which encompass bridges for all type ships.
(2) From the operator’s side of the fence, there is objection to change, not only opposition to any change, but a reluctance to modify such a traditional area of the ship.
If any modifications are to be considered, each “ship driver” is convinced that he has more than sufficient knowledge to develop the changes for a bridge design. It has been said that anyone who stands deep in the confines of the Pentagon and asks for an expert on ships’ bridges will find himself trampled in the stampede.
How, then, is it possible to change this reluctance to modernize the bridges of ships with the most modern command and weapons systems? Hopefully, articles will interest people, especially those who no longer have to stand on the bridge, and start a program which, without influence of personal desires, will, analytically, take a look at today’s operational needs. Presently, the Naval Ship Engineering Center has been sponsoring (if yon can sponsor without money) a project which Destroyer Development Group Two in Newport, Rhode Island, has graciously undertaken. The basis of this project is to show and evaluate some new (to most combatant ships) equipment which could be developed for appropriate ship installations- The purpose of this project is to find some support and funding to take a look at what can be done to modernize today’s bridges-
Through the efforts of Destroyer Develop' ment Group Two, repair activities, and the ships concerned, several evaluations are underway which might be of interest. The USS Harlan R. Dickson (DD-708) has been steaming around for months with a submarine periscope poking through the top of her pilot house. Although this periscope was borrowed, and therefore not tailored to a destroyer’s requirements, true bearings contacts, other ships in formation and navi' gational aids could be taken from the protection of the pilot house with almost an unobstructed view of 330 degrees. One could imagine the commanding officer in CIC with a periscope or trainable TV to give himself an added aid or just plain visual assurance.
Also installed in the Dickson, one will find an automatic steering system. Besides the course-keeping “iron mike,” the system als° has a small, remote control box which can be placed at the conning position being used for any particular evolution. The remote box Permits the conning officer either to control the rudder or to dial in the course he desires. The conning officer has the pleasure of knowing his orders are correctly understood without yelling or confusion. There is also no need to remember the last course ordered, because it is shown on the remote unit. RePorts from envious colleagues in the Mediterranean say that the Dickson is still using the remote control to “dial a landing.”
Another automatic steering system is being installed and checked out in the USS demon (pD-840). Besides obtaining further evalua- (lon of the remote control box, it is also hoped that this steering unit can be connected to another shipboard system which can give course orders directly to the auto-pilot. This type °f installation could permit the conning officer t° switch to “automatic” instead of having a steersman “follow the pointer.”
The British and Canadian navies have already taken great strides in the improvement of the bridges on their combatants. It is about time we took a hard look, not only at periscopes and automatic steering systems, but also at automatic engine controls, collision avoidance equipment, which can reduce or eliminate the requirements for lookouts, daylight radar displays, automated chart projection tables, automated status boards, and automated data and log recording. We must take advantage of today’s technology and reduce man power while increasing the efficiency in ship control.
As Commander Scott points out, there are no technical problems which create major complications. We must do something now.
★ ★ ★
Commander Frank C. Mead, U. S. Navy— Ships of Destroyer Development Group Two located at Newport, Rhode Island, are en-
gaged in feasibility testing of new equipments that could easily fill some of the desirable requirements in Commander Scott’s proposed bridge design. Some of the ideas are not new, but they are new to destroyers. Most installations are the first prototype models which have many known flaws, but, as Commander Scott so strongly points out, the time is right for a quantum jump in improving ship’s control equipments.
With the new DX/DXGs now past the concept formulation stage, these new ideas must all be conceived, tested, and either approved or discarded, in order to ensure that the really good ideas get incorporated in this next generation of destroyers.
Auto-pilot permits one-man (OOD, JOOD, CO) control of the ship’s rudder angle and course through a small hand-held device or through a new-style, centrally located control stand. It permits immediate rudder response, reduces bridge noise and the possibility of an error in helm order, and reduces the bridge team by one. Extremely effective for alongside operations and pier approaches, it also provides excellent steering control in a following sea.
With a periscopic pelorus, located in the pilot house, one can take a three-point fix in 20 seconds, satisfy lookout requirements (when external lookouts are pulled inside the hardened bridge), and permit the OOD to see nearly 360° during formation maneuvers without racing from side to side. Add-on devices under consideration for the periscope are image intensification, electronic stabilization, increased magnification, ranging capability, and television repeating of the picture to other spaces.
Exterior television scan can be used to take navigational bearings, take CIC “out of the dark,” record significant operations on film and, like the periscopic pelorus, bring many of today’s bridge-wing functions “in out of the cold.”
Automatic data collection will provide for the recording of course, speed, weather, machinery conditions, and weapons readiness information by automatic means. It will increase reliability and decrease man power requirements.
These are but a few of the advances that are coming. More testing will be required.
Ultimate procurement will be expensive. But, as Commander Scott so clearly voices the concern of hundreds of destroyer COs before him, these devices and more must be built into the next generation of destroyers, if they are to stay ahead of the yet unstated challenges of the future.
★ ★ ★
Captain John D. Shea, Jr., U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Worden (DLG-18)— I know that many well-meaning and knowledgeable criticisms of the technical details of Commander Scott’s proposals will be generated by his article. The real issue, however, ts not in the pros and cons of the technical aspects of his proposal, for today’s technology can quite literally give us whatever we can accurately describe and have the funds to implement. Rather, it is his plea for action that must be heard and heeded. Those of us experienced in command must undertake thoroughly and accurately to define the requirements for shipboard command and control. Having defined our requirements, we must then develop a meaningful consensus capable of implementation into hardware’
Past efforts in task definition have been unsuccessful largely due to an understandable tendency to skip the important step of de' fining what must be done by command, 111 favor of the much more satisfying task °1 selecting and arranging hardware. Too, past efforts have for the most part been undertaken by well-meaning, sincere, but generally inexperienced junior officers or civilian study groups.
If stagnation in the past 20 years of bridge and command/control space design has taught us anything, it is that we who are experienced in command can no longer vacate our responsibility. One approach is to convene, under the aegis of a flag officer, a number of small boards composed of commanding officers and task them with the development of the requirements and objectives of command for particular ship types. The time given should be limited to, say, three weekS’ Each Fleet should then jointly review these requirements, consolidate common items an0 identify specific ship type peculiarities. The resulting document should then be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations. It wouldn’t be perfect, but it would be a beginning.
★ ★ ★
Constructor Commander T. R. Rumens, Royal Navy—Commander Scott has drawn upon his experiences in the FRAM destroyer to develop a most interesting bridge and CIC
arrangement.
In seeking to design the modern ship’s bridge, I believe that one has to examine the yider subject of the ship’s control system, that
includes:
(1) Collection of data from sensors;
(2) Processing of data;
(2) Transmission of data.
Each relies upon human, mechanical, and electronic elements. Traditionally, all three, for the situation external to the ship, are Presented and controlled from the CIC. It Seems desirable that a ship’s internal situation should also be brought to the CIC so that the total picture, internal and external, can be Presented and used to control the ship. Thus as radar, sonar, and missiles can be controlled r°m the CIC, so will the machinery, damage control, and ship conning functions be controlled or directed from the CIC. Then, as u°w, the control or direction may require Processing at, for example, the machinery Control position or bridge conning position.
If this analysis is accepted, then the captain °r his deputy will command the ship from the ftlC, or jnorc appropriately, the ship com- U'and center, where he can be given compre- cnsivc, processed data presentation and have c atively calm conditions in which to make ls decisions and to cause these to be acted upon by the ship control system. I appreciate at in a peacetime environment, where the <aptain will be more concerned with ship conning problems, he will want to use the tage. The small, upper conning position, 1 h a minimum of navigation and machinery ^untrols suggested by Commander Scott, t^uld seem adequate but will not persuade e captain to stay there in a war environ- °r a realistic exercise.
. tc location of the ship command center s important since, if it is hit, it will leave the *P at least temporarily disabled. Modern VeaP°ns make it very difficult to provide
protection in the destroyer hull, but damage can be minimized by placing the command position below the waterline. The lower position also reduces the effects of a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. This means that the captain cannot dash headlong between bridge and CIC. But should he? A fast elevator between bridge and CIC levels offers a compromise.
Once the CIC is detached from the bridge complex, we can seek to find the best position for it considering location of power sources, vulnerability, location of local control positions, weapons, and sensors. Who knows, perhaps the navies of the world will lift ship control into the 20th century?
A New Approach to Postgraduate Education
Lieutenant Commander Donald F. Mitchell, U. S. Navy, Offutt Air Force Base—In spite of educational programs of the Navy, there still seems to be some gap when it comes to postgraduate education. The Navy faces many problems in freeing sufficient numbers of people and funds for this type schooling, while at the same time meeting the vital requirements imposed by the operating forces and the shore establishment. These needs have already forced the establishment of an “eligibility bank” for selectees to the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School.
The person desiring graduate education is also beset with many problems, not all relating to the Navy. To obtain schooling as a duty assignment, he (or she) must be selected by an official board, accepted by the school in the chosen field of study, available, and ordered to the school. If any one of these criteria are not met, then the applicant must try to obtain his graduate work during off- duty hours. (This latter includes those who place such a high emphasis on graduate education that they become civilians.) Given the motivation to study during his free time, one must still be located near enough to a school that offers course work during these hours, and which offers it in sufficient quantity so that he can complete the degree requirements during a normal tour of duty.
Most problems can be solved by a relatively new approach to graduate education. Offered by the University of Oklahoma (The Advanced Program, 1700 Asp Avenue, Norman, Oklahoma 73069) and adopted by the Strategic Air Command, the new approach is specifically designed to meet the educational needs and professional requirements of government employees. It does away with conventional class and course structure and uses methods termed “intensive study” and “independent study.”
The “intensive study” consists of about 30 hours of classroom instruction given in any one-week period, followed by an examination. The courses during this time are offered at both military bases and the main campus. The student prepares for his week through the study of materials mailed to him. It is expected that the student will have completed this work before he enters the classroom.
“Independent study” consists mainly of directed readings in materials also mailed to the student. When the readings are completed, he prepares a report, or in some cases, an examination. A research paper, on a topic submitted by the student and approved by the faculty, is also required.
The program is designed to be very flexible, with no sequence requirements for any of the courses. Upon the successful completion of 32 hours of combined intensive and independent studies, and of a comprehensive exam, a degree of master of arts is awarded. The first degrees to military students are to be awarded this summer. They are in the field of public administration. In addition, a program for a degree in economics has been approved and it is anticipated that business and education degree programs will follow.
If this or a similar program were adopted by the Navy, there could be many benefits. First, a course in public administration is directly related to many of the duties assigned to an officer, even in the early stages of his career, when he is serving as a division officer or a department head. Second, since a bachelor’s degree is the prerequisite to enrollment, the educational level in the Navy is thereby raised. This would not only serve to raise the general educational level of the officer corps but would also seem to be an attractive career incentive. Third, since each course takes only one week of class time, no prolonged TAD or leave would be used. The week might even be scheduled at the base or unit level rather than by the Bureau of Personnel. Fourth, the concept financially seems possible from the viewpoint of both the student and the Navy. For the student, there are Tuition Aid or GI Bill assistance programs, which bring the total cost well within reach’
To stimulate study for both its officers and enlisted men, SAC of the Air Force encourages its commanding officers to grant permissive TDY (no-cost TAD) to students whenever possible. To the Navy, because the student would remain at his normal duty station, 3 cost analysis might show that the Navy could pay all tuition and TAD costs and still save money. There would be no permanent change of station; and no need to fill the student’s billet. The student’s transportation to the main campus might even be provided by scheduled proficiency flights in much the same manner that Naval Air Reservists are transported to and from drills.
Whatever the problems, however, this ne^ approach to graduate study offers many attractive features to both the Navy and the future student. It should be carefully coO' sidered for adoption.
"The Mysterious PG Selection Process”
(See E. VV. Lull, pp. 42-45, April 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander C. G. Hohenstein> U. S. Navy, Staff, Naval Postgraduate School) Monterey—One important course of actio1' for naval officers seeking higher education vv3s not mentioned by Lieutenant Command^ Lull, which may enhance selection for teehn1' cal programs, and is significant enough t0 consider here.
There are many officers who feel unprf pared academically for a demanding techi'1' cal curriculum. Officers in this category eithcf apply for oversubscribed quotas in the no11' technical programs or do not apply for p<,st' graduate education at all. Careful inspecti0’1 of the Postgraduate School catalogue revea*5 that many of these officers could successful pursue an advanced technical program if the) first attended the more fundamental eng1 neering science curriculum for six months' Although the academic qualifications admission to the engineering science curric11 lum are relatively low, 653 officer student have successfully used this program as 3
iasc or •au of K'i.iiiy .th the , there rrams, : reach-
rs and urages , nissive cnevef tudent lion, 3 Navy id still ianerh ill the
■tation o\dded ch the
sts are
is ne'v many nd the
Y con'
ess
»>
;dings) nstei*1’ ichooli actio3 on w3S iander techni' igh £0
unprf :cchni' cither" e non- r post' >cctio>’ reveal5
-ssfull)
if they
eng*'
ioiiths-
ns f°r
irric11' udent5 as a
I
)
a§e grades.
<3) The
Per)’
has
has
never studied calculus, who is weak
coll,
stepping stone into an advanced and technical Curriculum. This represents 56 per cent of the total enrollment of the engineering science Program. The transfer percentages of recent elasses have reached as high as 81 per cent. Thus, officers with weak technical backgrounds could enhance their probability of election for postgraduate training, if they fleeted the engineering science curriculum \f460) as their first choice.
Officers enrolled in the engineering science curriculum possess varied academic backgrounds, received in college in some instances as long as 15 years ago. Some have had exten- SlVe technical undergraduate training while °thers have taken only a survey course in Mathematics along with a liberal arts degree.
When the transcript of a prospective en- r°Hee is received, the Curricular Officer ,°r Engineering Science Programs reviews it ln detail, considering: the candidate’s age, rank, and length of service; his designator; and the undergraduate school which the Candidate attended, the degree received, n'ajor and minor fields, grades, and grade
trend.
. Then the candidate is tentatively placed mt0 one of four programs available. These Programs are designed to meet the diverse ackgrounds of the incoming students and to Provide each student with the necessary aca- miC tools he will need after transfer into an 'anced technical program. The four prodrains arc:
(1) The “high academic background” °S>am, designed for an officer who has ’’nplctcd differential and integral calculus a at least one year of college physics and nemistry.
Pr? The “average academic background” Srain, designed for an officer who has a '"Pleted at least differential calculus or 0i^<er|t course in calculus, and who has had
Year of college physics and chemistry with
err
“fair academic background (up- program, designed for an officer who tak nevcr studied calculus and who has not (a\ c°Hege physics or chemistry, o' ' The “fair academic background eij” program, designed for an officer
ege algebra and trigonometry, and who has not completed a year of college physics or chemistry.
After the prospective student reports, he is interviewed and the information in the undergraduate transcript is confirmed. A mutually agreeable decision is reached concerning the appropriate placement of the student within the four-level framework of the engineering science curriculum.
An added advantage which accrues to the engineering science officer student is that he is allowed, subject to annual BuPers quotas, to transfer into any technical curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School for which he is found acceptable. Thus, he is able to make his decision with respect to his postgraduate field of endeavor based on first-hand knowledge of the programs available at the Postgraduate School.
"The DER in Market Time”
(See W. J. Moredock, pp. 136-138, February 1967; pp. 104-105, January, and pp. 111-113, March 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James A. Barber, Jr., U. S. Navy, USS Hissem (DER-400)— Several recent articles have discussed the value of DERs in their present employment and their future as a ship type. Lieutenant Harold W. Segal recommends conversion and modernization of present DERs for a dual search and rescue and coastal surveillance role, while in the most recent article, Lieutenant J. E. Whitely, Jr., states a convincing case for the Navy’s continuing need for a small, high-endurance warship, and recommends the construction of a new DER class.
There is a very real need in the U. S. Navy for a seaworthy, high-endurance ship of the DER type. The requirements for DERs seem to be increasing rather than tapering off. In taking over the tasks of SOPA Admin Hongkong and Taiwan Patrol, as well as Market Time, DERs have released scarce destroyer assets for use elsewhere. Other operational assignments for DERs have reached the talking stage but have gone no further because the ships are already fully committed. Further, the recent Liberty and Pueblo incidents seem to indicate that our continuing requirement for ELINT collection would be better carried out by ships well equipped to defend themselves. If a ship
FAHEY'S EIGHTH EDITION
THE SHIPS
AND
AIRCRAFT
OP THE
US. FLEET
Compiled and Edited by James C. Fahey
An up-to-date listing by name and type of over 2,000 ships and 120 aircraft and missiles. Over 400 illustrations. 64 pages. Paperbound. List Price $3.50 Member's Price $2.80 A U. S. Naval Institute Publication
capable of putting up a good fight had been on the missions assigned to the Liberty and Pueblo, the incidents might never have occurred, or the outcomes probably would have been more satisfactory from our point of view. The DER type is well-suited to such a role.
The DER, though still fully capable of performing the tasks to which it has been assigned, is getting old. For the last several years, Pacific Fleet DERs have been spending the majority of their time deployed to the Seventh Fleet, with only minimal time between deployments. The ships have had no regular overhauls for several years and none are scheduled. Instead, at intervals of about 13 months, DERs receive an eight-or- nine-week-long restricted availability, which is intended to put them into sufficient state of repair to provide material reliability for one more cruise. The time is fast approaching when it will be necessary to spend a substantial amount of money for repair and modernization or put the ships out of commission.
Of the alternative solutions—repair, modernization or new construction—the latter would seem to have much to recoinmend it. An adequate repair and modernization similar to a destroyer FRAM would cost a substantial portion of the price of a new vessel) but without the long-term investment of neW construction.
In this regard, it is interesting to consider the new general purpose frigate constructed for the Royal Malaysian Navy by YarroW in Scotland. K. D. Hang Jebat, already launched and to be delivered to Malaysia in 1969, a modern, highly capable, long-range warship is of almost the same size as the present DER; it illustrates what a ne"f construction DER could be like.
K. D. Hang Jebat is 308 feet long over-alh with a 34-foot beam, 14.7-foot draft, and a design displacement of 1,600 tons; virtually identical to the DERs’ 306-foot length, 36.5' foot beam, 14-foot draft, and standard diS' placement of 1,590 tons. The new ship lS equipped with all basic sensors, and is both faster and more heavily armed than the DEE- K. D. Hang Jebat is powered by a Bristol' Siddeley Olympus gas turbine of 19,50^ s.h.p. and a Crossley Pielstick diesel of 3,85^ b.h.p., which should provide a top speed well in excess of 25 knots under turbine povveh while permitting a 16-knot cruising speed 011 diesel power. Heavily armed for a ship of hef size the Hang Jebat carries one 4.5-inch, dual' purpose gun, two 40-mm. antiaircraft guIlS’ a three-barrelled depth charge mortar, a quadruple launcher for Seacat surface-t°" air missiles, and is configured to carry ai’t* operate a small manned helicopter. Much 0 the equipment is automatic, which saves crew requirements. The intended comply ment is 140 men.
K. D. Hang Jebat is perhaps both faster and more heavily armed than is necessary i°( a new construction DER, but the ship doeS clearly demonstrate what can be included 1,1 a DER-size package. A similar vessel usi,1jj U. S. weapons might include a 5-inch a1’ a 3-inch dual purpose gun, Mk 32 torpe^° tubes with Mk 46 torpedoes, the Sea Sparr°'v missile system, an ASW utility helo, and } modern passive ECM installation. In an EEl^ configuration, electronics vans could ^C mounted on the helo flight deck, in lieu of d,f helicopter itself, to equip the ship for tfiose
ELINT assignments where a self-defense capability is desirable. Supply and support problems could be minimized by adapting the already proven GE J-79 gas turbine portion °f the Asheville-class power plant to the DERs at some reduction in horsepower.
What would this cost? Jane’s estimates the cost of K. D. Hang Jebat at £4,000,000. Series Production should bring the price down radically, but even without this saving, all 17 of the DERs now in commission could be replaced with new ships as capable as tbe Hang Jebat for the cost of one Bainbridge. A ship like the Hang Jebat can perform most of the missions of a full-sized destroyer with less cost and with half the crew, and her long legs
suit her for missions for which a steam destroyer has insufficient endurance. With continuing personnel shortages and an aging destroyer force, we badly need capable small sbips to carry some of the load.
What are we waiting for?
The High Price of Success”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 26-33, April 1968 Proceedings)
Commander Peter F. Block, U. S. Navy— Captain Hanks has noted that the NATO Alliance faces an uncertain future, and expresses the thought that, should NATO fail l° survive, it will probably be because the treaty organization will have “fallen victim t° its own success.” This seems a rather considerable oversimplification.
The end of the World War II found the j-ed Army in possession of all of Eastern tWrope; that is to say, Soviet troops were Physically present in each of the European Countries over which Communist domination 'Vas subsequently achieved, with the sole exception of Yugoslavia (where a strong rational Communist movement made their c°ntinued presence unnecessary). It is true nat Communist regimes did not in every Case assume power immediately, but it is also true that by 1948—the year before the ormation of NATO—Red regimes were rmly entrenched in each of the nations des- hned to fall into the Communist orbit. The Point to be made is that by May of 1945, in reTospect, the fate of these nations had al- rcady been sealed by the presence on their s°d of Soviet armed forces, and that subse- T'cnt to the end of the war there was in
Europe no “Red tide” of conquest of the dimensions described in the article.
Signature of the NATO treaty by the United States formalized an obligation inherent in the foreign policy then being pursued by this country. It can be argued in theory that in the absence of a formal commitment of the type signed in April 1949, the United States would not have been obligated to go to the assistance of a friendly European power which might have become the victim of direct Soviet aggression. In light of American national interests, as interpreted then and now, this appears not to be a credible conclusion. A more probable reaction to direct aggression in this general time frame is afforded by the action of the United States the following year in connection with the unprovoked aggression against South Korea, a nation to which there was at the time no expressed obligation to render assistance of any kind in the event of armed conflict.
NATO’s actual contribution to European stability over the years is difficult to assess. This is not to say that the armed might of the United States and its friends has not been a major factor in achieving whatever degree of stability exists today, but rather that it is not an easily demonstrable proposition that the same end result could not have been attained in the absence of a formal North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
International obligations are undertaken in order to advance the national interests of the participating states. Granting for the moment the thesis that NATO has, in fact, played a major role in deterring Communist aggression, it is most difficult then to visualize the organization “falling victim to its own success.” There is here a basic contradiction in thought. An international commitment which has succeeded in the purpose for which it was undertaken must be regarded as a successful commitment, for it has served the true interests of the participating nations. Such a commitment need not necessarily be continued any longer than persists the threat which brought it into being.
It is this threat which poses the key question with regard to NATO’s future. It can hardly be said that the nature of the threat remains exactly the same in 1968 as it appeared to be in 1949. Far-reaching changes
have occurred on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Those who would advocate the continuation of the military aspects of NATO must bear the burden of demonstrating that, first, the potential danger from the Soviet Union in Europe is today of such magnitude as to justify the effort and sacrifice required, and that, second, continued active participation in the Alliance is clearly to the benefit of each of the nations involved, including, most certainly, the United States.
"The Depths of Ignorance”
(See C. N. G. Hendrix, pp. 32-45, May 1968 Proceedings)
Ensign Stephen M. Andres, U. S. Navy— As a junior officer in the Nuclear Power Training program, I read the article with an avidness spurred by more than a passing interest.
With all due credit to our oceanographic research efforts, I find it very disconcerting that we must send out these magnificent boats, capable of such fantastic depths and speeds, on their vitally important missions
without adequate information on the underwater terrain over which they must travel. That this unfortunate situation exists through ) no one’s negligence but rather our lack of knowledge of the expanses of the sea should spur the Navy’s efforts in oceanographic i research onward at a pace at least equivalent to that of the Nuclear Power Program itself-
"The Congreve War Rockets 1800-182 5”
(See R. A. Hobbs, pp. 80-88, March, and p. 104,
July 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William A. Erwin,
Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve—William Congreve was on the right track when he moved the nozzles from the center of the base of his rocket to the periphery, but he did not go far enough. If the nozzles had been canted sufficiently to impart a spinning motion to the rocket while in flight, this would have stabilized the projectile and made the stick unnecessary. A successor of Congreve’s, William > Hale, did, in fact, develop such a spin- stabilized rocket, which was adopted by the services of several nations, including the
Relief map of a portion of the "underwater terrain” of the Atlantic Ocean.
© 1968 National Geographic Society
NtWFOUNUAND
LATEAl
tWaihmgton
-3900
IUIOOI
BAHAMA
SABl[
ISLAND
cm
ML TON ISLAND
tsssr
■t 1 V-310 iANKS
KELVIN SEAMOUNT
SOHM ABYSSAL PLAIN
■15900.
■15430.
NAMES, -19300. ABYSSAI PLAIN*
ITO RICO AtUntl^Oly
CAPE VEPDE ISLAM
United States and Great Britain. If I am not mistaken, the last use of Hale rockets by a major power was by the Royal Artillery during the South African War of 1899-1902.
Some of the rockets introduced during World War II were spin-stabilized, and so are some of the larger rocket weapons and Vehicles of today. But for relatively small, one- shot weapons, we have found stabilizing hns, in combination with a single nozzle centered in the base of the weapon, to be a Ampler solution to the stabilization problem.
Of course metallurgy was not nearly so advanced during the early 19th century and •t was very difficult to prevent or even detect haws in castings or seams used in rocket casings. Even the relatively modest pressure rocket propellant as used in those days cmght cause a casing to explode upon igni- hon, even if the propellant had not deteriorated in storage due to the effects of differen- hal heating. The nervousness with which the troops regarded these early rocket weapons is therefore quite understandable.
1 he Bureaus Go On Forever”
(■SwT. W. Ray, pp. 50-63, January, and pp. 105-106, 1968 Proceedings)
Captain W. H. Packard, U. S. Navy— t ran across the following statement by Admiral David D. Porter, U. S. Navy, concerning the bureau system. It was in the ecrctary of the Navy’s Annual Report for Iscal year ending 30 June 1884 on page 278. t seemed pertinent to the article by Thomas W.Ray: 1 X
When the present Bureau system was proposed it was the intention to thereby relieve ffie Board of Naval Commissioners of a great arr>ount of detail labor which it was difficult h)r them to properly supervise. The commis- S1°ncrs were to remain as the administrative Assistants of the head of the Department, to supervise all branches of the service under his mrcction. Owing, however, to the intrigues of an officer who desired to manage his own department without interference, the Board of ' avnl Commissioners was omitted from the plan ....
b has been proposed that the Secretary of o Navy should have a legally authorized adjutant or assistant secretary appointed from among the officers of the Navy, but the plan 01 a board of commissioners is superior to this
arrangement in every respect.
The advice of three persons is more apt to be judicious than that of one alone.
For upwards of a year I served in the Navy Department in the capacity of Assistant Secretary or advisor of the Secretary of the Navy on professional matters. That short period gave me a full knowledge of the defects of the Bureau system, and at the same time satisfied me that a naval officer, no matter what his rank might be, had no business in the Department as assistant secretary or professional advisor. He would soon lose all his friends and would make hosts of enemies. He would have to bear the blame if anything went wrong, and would receive no credit for any good that he might accomplish.
David D. Porter Admiral of the Navy
"The Communications Satellite 'A Faint Flutter of Wings’ ”
(See J. J. Dougherty, pp. 35-45, June 1968 Proceedings)
Captain Leslie R. Heselton, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—The article by Commander John J. Dougherty was a very interesting and comprehensive review of the history of the development of the communications satellite systems. However, the reader is left with the idea that satellites are the ultimate long- range communication method and that they will displace cables for transoceanic communication.
While it is true that satellite communications will eventually carry a large share of the world long-haul intercontinental telephone conversations in the years ahead, it does not follow that it will displace the submarine cable entirely. There are many reasons why the network of oceanic cables will continue and, in fact, be augmented. The radio frequency spectrum is not limitless and all radio communications, whether by satellite or otherwise, must fit into the spectrum. On the other hand, each cable possesses its own spectrum which is unique and unaffected by other cables. Cables are more reliable for high-speed wide band data, such as facsimile and computer transmission, than radio paths. Costs of communication by cable are more economical than by satellite at present.
The history of the underseas cable given was essentially correct, but could have noted a little more progress without detracting from the main theme. The cables laid in 1956 actually had 48 circuits per cable rather than the 36 stated, and the transatlantic cables laid in 1963 and 1965 each contained 128 circuits. Cables are presently available for 720 circuits; and, by 1970, systems will be available for as many as 1,200 or possibly 2,000 circuits. Although the cables presently crossing the Atlantic were laid with about 400 circuits, modern techniques have increased this number to at least 600 without additional cables.
The article states that cable systems are limited to terminals preconnected by wire, and thus implies that satellite systems are completely flexible. This is far from the situation. Satellite communications systems require exceedingly expensive ground stations, which must be capable of tracking the satellite as well as transmitting and receiving.
As an example of system misuse was the use of satellite for transmission of the past Winter Olympics. It was stated that the program was “live via satellite.” However, in reality, there was some six hours time difference in the action and the viewing. The action may have been transmitted “live” but then several hours were spent editing before public viewing. With the same time lag, the action could have been cabled to London, edited, flown by chartered aircraft to Newfoundland, cabled to New York, and re-edited for showing. All this could have been accomplished at many thousands of dollars less than the satellite telecast cost and still retain the same timeliness in viewing. Satellite transmission is wonderful for truly “live” viewing but is inordinately expensive where delayed programming becomes a factor.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
"The FDL Surfaces Again”
(See R. L. Madouse, pp. 54-66, June 1968 Proceedings)
Captain E. B. Perry, U. S. Navy (Retired) —This article is cleverly written in the attempt to defend an indefensible concept and program. It does so by the acceptance of best-suited dates; a changing and nebulous concept which is very much at variance with that originally proposed; a by-passing of very pertinent details such as costs, manning) labor relations, operational management) unconventional procurement and maintenance, which are contrary to accepted naval and maritime practices; and the general opposition of the maritime industry and informed members of Congress. It lays down many premises as facts, whereas they are, actually, conceptions. To refute the article, point by point, would require as many pages as the article itself and that should not be necessary. The FDL program has been the subject of much adverse and acrimonious discussion by men who know ships and shipping, and few are they who view it with other than alarm and misgivings.
The FDL program first made the headlines in late 1966. At that time it was generally known to be a brainchild of the Department of Defense. When it ran into stiff opposition from all arms of the maritime industry, it went under wraps for a time. Then it seems that the orphan was placed in the lap of the Navy; was indicated that it was a Navy project. Soon thereafter there was made available to the public a little pamphlet titled “The Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Project,” released by the Navy and dated October 1966. This stated that it was a Navy program, for the construction of “Navy” ships. This pamphlet became known as a defense of the Defense Department.
The original concept required a fleet of between 20 and 30 vessels of unconventional and untried design; propelled by non-maritime, aircraft-type engines; procured under unconventional practices favoring one bidder under a package deal for the civilian design, construction, maintenance, and operation of such a fleet, with the most vigorous nod being given to aero-space outfits rather than to experi' enced shipbuilders. It became apparent that
e suggest and require that the ships be put s°me useful purpose in the attempt to earn
the
sh
Pbr.
'P service. At the cost of ten vessels of the
type, we could have 100 first-class subsi
(&e\V
’Brien—The basic relationship be-
t\Vi
cost per ship of the package would run to about $50 million and a little financial aid ttfight be required to provide the shipbuilding facilities. Once constructed, these Navy ships, Clvilian manned and operated, would be under the direct control of DOD rather than the Navy. The ships would be stuffed with miliary hardware and supplies suitable for the needs of the Army for all locations and climes. Then, with skeleton civilian crews, they would ^e stationed, offshore, throughout the world In locations for U. S. defense needs. When Congress was asked for the funds to implement this concept, the answer was thumbs down.
If the FDL ships are to be vessels dedicated l° the purposes of war, and the proposers of lhe idea have stated that they shall never be eiriployed as peaceful merchant ships, they should be openly commissioned as naval vessels and put under the direct control of the 'i'ivy Department and manned by the Navy.
NVhile it is contended that FDLs are never to engage
in trade nor compete in any manner 'vUh the ships of our American Merchant Grille, that promise is as faulty as the FDL c°ncept. After some months of costly idleness,
))'hy should not the General Accounting Of- no
to
? Part of their keep? He who thinks differently “naive. They would pose a definite threat to privately owned ships of our merchant ded vessels readily available.
^ Admittedly the concept, project, and pro- j.rartl have undergone considerable modifica- ns; the Department of Defense would now lle for four such ships, as an entering wedge, ^ an estimated cost of $183.6 million; but the °le scheme is just as repugnant to the mari- lc lr>dustry as it was when presented in toto.
^he Six-Day War of 1967” • J- Kotsch, pp. 72 81, June 1968 Proceedings)
Thilip O
epn Israel’s officers and men—that ulti- °ty determined the course of the fighting fr 'Vas scarcely mentioned. All officers come th°ln nonc°mmissioned officer ranks. They, deeref°re, enjoy an unusual degree of confi- nce from their subordinates. None are the
products of the cloistered walls of an academy or university.
The Israelis have discovered and exploited the basic, fruitful relationship between officers and men. To start, their selection process eliminates all but a hard core of aggressive and dedicated applicants. No bribes of a college education or draft deferment are offered. For a marginal increase in pay, the new junior officer takes risks and responsibilities that only a labor of love could justify.
Approximately one-fifth of the casualties in the June war were officers. They not only led their men, but also made most of the tactical decisions that we are accustomed to leaving to staffs and preset operations plans. This trend was followed at all operational levels. The ^ahal (Israel Defense Forces) gained vital experience in this technique in the Sinai campaign of 1956. Battalions were loosed toward objectives with commanders breaking their own way and de facto writing their orders en route. In 1967, the process was repeated at the brigade and division levels.
In short, the Israeli officer typically has both the ability and the authority to lead. His proper efforts are neither hamstrung from above nor hindered by lack of positive support from below.
The strategic situation of the Arab armies just prior to the war should also be carefully reconsidered. Their unity was a myth. (Note the map on page 77.) Aside from probes and sporadic shelling, Syria’s army was inactive until the fifth day of the war. Recalling the lack of ^ahal troops in the Hula-Jezreel area, it was numerically strong enough to have bludgeoned its way across to Haifa. Even a halfhearted advance by one or two divisions would have precluded Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights and taken pressure off the Jordanians around Jenin.
Similarly, Jordan’s Arab Legion made no push from Kalkiliah to the sea; Iraq’s army largely failed to engage, although encamped on Jordanian soil and presumably battle ready.
Finally, I noted a cumulative nature to one part of the Israeli campaign. The temporary divisions advanced through Sinai commanded by three aluf (brigadiers): Tal, Yoffe, and Sharon. A fourth, Aluf Gavish, acted as coordinator. He moved between field comman-
The Flying Cloud -painting by Mr. Warren Sheppard which appeared on the cover of the April 196^ Proceedings is now available in full-color as large- size print (26"X22") suitable for framing. List Price $5.00 each. Member’s price $i.00.
Prints Available
ders by helicopter, helping establish a line of advance as Egyptian organization crumbled. There was no foretelling the full effect of the initial air strike. Nor could all the Egyptian brigades be accurately located. I doubt a sequential plan of advance even existed, beyond mission definition and structure of command. Objectives were frequently assigned in spot conferences or over the field radio. Sinai fell in four days. As unmistakable as the victory was, the details of planning will probably remain in doubt until another book, such as Moshe Dayan’s Diary of the Sinai Campaign of 1956, is published.
"A New Way for Officer Fitness Reports”
{See D. R. Ayres, p. 108, December, 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander J. Russell Henderson, Jr., U. S. Navy—The purpose of an officer’s fitness report is to both grade and guide him. He can be graded having never seen the report, but he will then lack the guidance afforded by this impartial assesment. In spite of the impartiality of this judgment, ill will can be generated between the evaluator and evaluated.
A reasonable solution would seem to be to print the fitness report form on no-carbon- required paper. In this way, a duplicate of the report can be prepared with no additional effort. The copy should be filed at the command and upon detachment of either the reporting senior or the officer reported upon, the fitness report would be turned over to the officer being evaluated.
This system would allow each officer to see his fitness reports at intervals of approximately 12 to 18 months, would give him 3 permanent record of his achievement, would reduce the requirements for visits to BuPerS solely to monitor his progress and would avoid the face-to-face confrontation which apparently undesirable.
"The Future of the Coast Guard”
(See A. A. Heckman, pp. 60-72, April and pp. lOS 106, July 1968 Proceedings)
Captain John J. Pechulis, U. S. Merchant Marine—Captain Heckman has proposed the creation of a bureaucratic octopus under the reins of a military service designed to ter place the logical civilian control of the marl' time industry’s varied operations.
From a humble origin in 1790, of “ten boats for guarding the coast against smugglers,’’ a service called the Revenue Marine W3S formed. As an organization it saw service n1 the War of 1812, against pirates and sla^ ships, Mexican War, Civil War (it provide men and ships for both sides), and the Spaa ish American War. In 1915, now known aS the Revenue Cutter Service, it merged wP the Lifesaving Service, received official recog nition as a military service, and assumed dlC present name of the Coast Guard. This first acquisition was to set a pattern for futuf take overs that would rival any of the preset day Wall Street conglomerates.
After World War I, the Coast Guard 1’^ the jackpot with generous appropriations a” the opportunity for expansion with the opd-3 tion of its “Rum Fleet.”* The repeal of P’e Eighteenth Amendment in 1933 made f°r
* See H. R. Kaplan. “A Toast to the ‘Rum Fleet, pp. 84-90, May 1968, U. S. Naval Institute Prow-1
aptain Heckman states that the “Coast
G
some retrenchment, but the Coast Guard was now three times its World War I size.
The field for take overs wasn’t too fertile from 1933 to 1939, so the Coast Guard consolidated with some of its diversified functions Such as the International Ice Patrol and protecting seals in the Bering Sea. In 1939, however, the conglomerate pattern was resumed ^teh the take over of the Lighthouse Service. I his same year saw the outbreak of World ^ar II in Europe and the Coast Guard involved with the Neutrality Patrol. In 1940, 0rt Security Operations and the Atlantic yeather Observation Service came under the C°ast Guard’s domain.
★ ★ ★
Ensign Louis Mills, U. S. Coast Guard Rc- Serve—The Coast Guard can and should take °Vcr more functions, principally to improve eEiciency of operation.
The consolidation of the Coast Guard with j. c Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the trans- r °f all hydrographic and cartographic rc- sP°nsibility to the latter, would provide one a8ency to collect, evaluate, and disseminate arts, notices to mariners, light lists, coast Phots, and other publications. The latent resources of information collection existing in e Coast Guard could be used more fully by cartographers and hydrographers in publishes lheir works. Buoy tenders are rich sources ^ ^formation on aids to navigation which ave been damaged, carried away, or other- Sc rendered inoperative. Patrol cutters can i h knowledge of hazards and bottom curves y providing information on soundings and ^ rent conditions. Present delays due to nature of extra-agency communications uid terminate, providing a more rapid or-agency exchange of data.
Car
Uard rnay eventually participate in the tjCace-keeping operations of the United Naas ■ • •” This does not seem likely as long jor 116 States maintains itself as a ma-
World power, and the Coast Guard as a 1 'Cry service of that world power. But is it
not possible to consider a North American Coast Guard comprised of a completely integrated U. S. and Canadian Coast Guard service, functioning as both do now, for two countries whose maritime frontiers are so interrelated? Search and rescue and aids to navigation coverage of the Pacific, Great Lakes, and Atlantic areas would be improved and increased were not national boundaries the demarcation lines that they are today. Perhaps this could be the beginnings of an international peacekeeping and law-enforcing force.
★ ★ ★
Captain S. Dombroff, U. S. Navy, Antisubmarine Warfare and Ocean Surveillance Division, OpNav—I do not agree with the reservations in Captain Heckman’s article with regard to the ASW capability of the new high-endurance cutters (HEC). With gas turbine engines and excellent sea-keeping qualities married to a modern sonar and the latest in ASW torpedoes, these ships would have a significant role in any ASW situation except in the protection of carrier strike forces.
Captain Heckman’s article was apparently written before the new cutters started coming into the Coast Guard and at a time when some action could have been taken to provide a cheaper and less versatile ship as a substitute. The new cutters were deliberately designed with an ASW mission in mind. Without this mission, they could get along with ten knots slower maximum speed and without their extensive command and control facilities. I consider the new class of cutter to be of a superb design which will enable the ships to carry out any of their missions without compromise. Although not yet extensively evaluated in the blue water environment, this ship should be carefully studied by anyone who is concerned with building a new generation of ASW or environmental data collection ship.
In a war at sea involving major ASW operations, the Navy could make excellent use of these ships. By any standards, the United States has meaningful and relatively cheap insurance in the 378-foot cutters.
★