Despite refusal of French and Spanish leaders to allow Air Force F-111s to fly over their countries, those Aardvarks and carrier-based Navy A-6E Intruders hit several targets in Tripoli and Benghazi simultaneously.
The only aircraft capable of Operation El Dorado Canyon were the Navy’s A-6E Intruder and the Air Force’s F-l 1 IF Aardvark. Attack Squadrons VA-34 and VA-55, based on board the carriers America (CV-66) and Coral Sea (CV-43), respectively, carried 10 A-6Es each. The Third Air Force’s 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) based at Royal Air Force Base Lakenheath in the United Kingdom was the only wing in Europe armed with the F-111F.1
The Intruder was outfitted with the AN/APQ-148 search radar and AN/AAS- 33 target recognition and attack multisensor (TRAM) system. With the radar and TRAM’s forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor, the bombardier/navigator could acquire and track targets at night and in adverse weather. The TRAM’s laser designation system could illuminate a target for laser-guided bombs or provide highly accurate range information for the automatic release of unguided ordnance. For a strike mission, the A-6E could load Mk-84 2,000-pound, Mk-83 1,000-pound, and Mk-82 500-pound general-purpose bombs and Mk-20 Rockeye and CBU-59 antipersonnel/antimateriel cluster ordnance.2
The F-111F was equipped with the AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack system, a night/all-weather, electro-optical target acquisition, laser designation, and ordnance delivery package. The combat system, which was operated by the plane's weapon systems operator, consisted of a search radar, low-light television, infrared imaging system, and laser designator. With Pave Tack, the Aardvark could deliver GBU-10 Paveway II 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs with devastating accuracy using a pitch maneuver known as the "Pave Tack Toss." For low bombing passes, the F-11 1F employed BSU-49 Snakeye 500-pound retarded-delivery bombs. The laser targeting system facilitated accurate delivery of the Snakeyes.3
The Aardvarks were divided into six attack elements of three planes each. Nine F-111Fs—call signs "Remit," "Elton," and "Karma"—would hit al-Aziziyah with four 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs each, while the “Jewel” element, also armed with Paveway IIs, would batter Murat Sidi Bilal. The remaining F111Fs—’’Puffy” and “Lujac”—would tear up the Tripoli airfield with Snakeye high drag bombs.4 Mauz would employ seven VA-34 “Blue Blasters” armed with Snakeyes to strike the Benghazi barracks and eight VA-55 “Warhorses” carrying Snakeyes and cluster bombs to hit the Benina Airfield.5 To enhance surprise, overwhelm defenses, and minimize U.S. and civilian casualties, Kelso issued the following strict guidelines: the Tripoli and Benghazi targets would be hit simultaneously, strike aircraft would make only one pass over the target, targets not positively identified would not be attacked, and all weapon and electronic systems had to be fully operational for a bomber to drop its ordnance.6
An armada of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft were to support the strike forces. Surface- to-air missile suppression groups would neutralize the air defenses around Tripoli and Benghazi. EF-111A Ravens from the 20th TFW and Marine EA-6Bs based on board the America would operate as stand-off jammers near Tripoli. The jammers would be joined by A-7Es off the America. The Benghazi “SAM busters” would consist of F/A-18s based on board the Coral Sea, America-based A-7Es, and EA-6Bs off both the Coral Sea and the America. The EF-111 As and EA-6Bs were equipped with the ALQ-99 advanced tactical electronic countermeasures (ECM) system. The A-7Es were armed with either AGM-88A high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) or AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missiles (ARMs); the F/A-18s carried HARMs. The America's F-l4s would protect the F-111Fs from Libyan fighters, while Hornets off the Coral Sea would provide fighter cover for the Benghazi strike. The carriers would operate E-2C Hawkeyes for long-range surveillance, strike coordination, and fighter control. KA-6D tankers would provide refueling services for the carrier-based aircraft, while a huge fleet of KC-10 Extenders and KC-135 Stratotankers would accompany the Aardvarks and Ravens to and from Libya.7 One of the senior Hornet pilots observed that “the planning and briefing stages of the strike were extremely thorough. Although complex, the plan allowed each pilot and naval flight officer to concentrate on a single task, rather than having one aircraft perform several missions.”8
1 Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), p. 413; Col W. Hays Parks. USMCR “Crossing the Line,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1986, 48-49; Col Robert E. Venkus, USAF. Raid on Gadhafi: The Untold Story of History’s Longest Fighter Mission (New York: St. Martin’s Press. 1993), pp. 6, 56.
2 Parks, op. cit., p. 49; “U.S. Demonstrates Advanced Weapons Technology in Libya,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 April 1986, pp. 20-21.
3 Bolger, op. cit., p. 414; Parks, op. cit., p.49; “U.S. Demonstrates . . . ," Aviation Week and Space Technology, pp. 20-21.
4 “Lessons Learned from Operations in the Vicinity of Libya, Dated 6 October 1987, Partially Declassified, Control No. 567-87, Records of CNO. Box 11. Series VII, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, pp. 33-34; Bolger, op. cit.. p. 415; Venkus, op. cit., pp. 69, 85-86.
5 Bolger, op. cit., p. 415.
6 Parks, op. cit., p. 49.
7 “Lessons Learned . . . ,” op. cit., pp. 33-34; “United States Air Forces in Europe,” Air Force Magazine, May 1986, p. Ill; “U.S. Demonstrates . . . ,” op. cit., pp. 19-20.
8 LCdr Robert E. Stumpf, USN, “Air War with Libya,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986. p. 48.