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Seen close up, the barrel of a 16-inch naval gun was awesome. So, too, were the results when a one-ton projectile was fired from a battleship (shown here is the New Jersey [BB-62] off Korea) and made a devastating crater many miles away. Naval gunfire and close air support were highly effective in both World War II and Korea. But that kind of firepower is little more than a memory now. How will we support and defend our troops in a future amphibious assault? Can we mount such an assault at all?
t
- he first assault waves have gone ashore. The de- nders are being attacked in front and in rear by ^r°ops landed simultaneously from high-speed air j-Us^i°n landing craft and from helicopters. U. S. °rce* established local air superiority by surprise air ^tr‘kes on the enemy’s airfields hours before. Simul- ar*eous surprise air strikes crippled enemy missile , °ats and badly damaged heavier warships in their ^atbors, and we have mined the harbor entrances. ,lriCe then, our aircraft have been heavily attacking j Senses in the assault area, suffering surprisingly losses from enemy surface-to-air missiles and atltiaircraft artillery batteries.
^he first reports are coming in from the beach. A j°eh°ld has been established, but we have sustained .^stating losses in marines, boats, and helicopters.
e surviving enemy antiair missile and gun bat- er,es have had a field day with the helicopters. Sur- V‘Vlng coastal artillery and tanks have pounded the Jault boats. The still lightly armed marines are in a operate predicament. Now we know we didn t up the landing area enough. The defenders in deep over there, saving their antiaircraft am- ^uition for the expected air assault. And we know °° that the air attacks did not put enough coastal §Uns and tanks out of commission either. Our de- ||r°yers were not able to help, we remember, because 5e enemy’s coastal batteries outranged the ships’
'■nch
guns
a pleasant scenario to think about, is it? But c°uld be a very real one. The U. S. Navy has got- ^ itself into a serious predicament. It has the ^/gest number, and the most sophisticated ships de- *gned for amnhibious warfare of anv navy in the
for amphibious warfare of any navy in the The U. S. Marine Corps continues to push e? state of the art in techniques, tactics, and P^ipments in this highly specialized mode of war- Qpre: invasion by way of sea. Yet in the crucial matter heavy fire support, the Navy-Marine team is defi- tnC and it seems to be becoming more so as time g0es on.
the
largely by naval guns, particularly those of battleships and cruisers, as well as those of destroyers. Carrier aircraft were always used as well, of course, but naval gunnery was the most effective tool in softening up enemy defenses in the critical time right up to the moment the first landing craft touched the beach. And, again, while beachheads were being secured, and for some time thereafter, surface ship guns provided the most effective supporting arms for the troops ashore. In Sicily, a counterattack by an armored division was beaten off by them. Before Cherbourg could be captured, German 1 1-inch coastal batteries had to be silenced by support ship guns.
Following the Korean War—the last war in which the U. S. staged large-scale amphibious landings— the Navy embarked upon a gamble. Because of the advent of high-speed jet aircraft, it began replacing dual-purpose gun batteries on surface ships with antiaircraft missile systems to better cope with the new air threat. But the replacement also nullified the multimount, multibarrel surface target capability that had been there. Against those targets, the Navy committed itself increasingly to reliance on ordnance delivered by carrier planes. As a result of this shift in philosophy, virtually all research and development in large caliber guns and in all shipboard gun fire control systems soon ceased. What the ferment of advancing technology might have done with those old, handy weapons would not be found out.1 But as long as the older gun cruisers and destroyers were still in commission, there was still a modicum of fire support artillery around. Now, however, all the heavy caliber gun ships—those most effective for the role—are gone.
Another evolution was occurring. Since the replacement of propeller-driven airplanes by jets, the Navy has not had a plane designed specifically for close air support of ground forces. For that job, a plane needs real terrain-hugging (rather than terrain
sfio
World War II’s amphibious landings against ^ng opposition, heavy support was provided
‘For footnotes, please turn to page 54
l0eedings / July 1979
51
avoidance) capability, the ability to take punishment for good survivability in the battlefield environment, great maneuverability, re-strike depth of armament load, and substantial on-station time.2 For one thing, the vulnerability of turbojet engines to ingestion of antiaircraft flak, and even of small arms bullets, as well as their susceptibility to defeat by simple heat-seeking weapons has been proved in combat. The Israeli Air Force losses to Egyptian and Syrian battlefield defenses in the 1973 Yom Kippur War were only the latest demonstrations.
How did we get into this situation? Many believe that large-scale amphibious operations, against heavily defended shores, are a brand of naval warfare that is now only a part of history and that we have been
funds f°r
wasting vast amounts of scarce shipbuilding ^
all those specialized ships. The other superp0^ does not seem to share these opinions: The ^ Union, with a naval infantry of some 12,000 has the second largest amphibious force in the^
and it was reestablished only in the early 1960s
addition, the Soviets have been acquiring a
sizai
ble
have
lift capacity since the late 1950s. They now some 25 landing ships of 3,400 to 4,500 tonS’ jjng more than twice that number of smaller la ^ craft, and there are active building programs m ^ categories.3 They obviously see uses for those ^ for something. Note also that both Moskva an «• classes of helicopter-V/STOL (vertical or short ta ^
and landing aircraft) carriers can be used in an
DOUGLAS A.RCBArr
There is only one major caliber gun in the active U. S. fleet today, the Mark 71 lightweight 8-inch mount on board the destroyer Hull CDD-945). But it is there only for test purposes; introduction of the automatic weapon to a large number of ships remains for the future if it is to happen at all.
hawk
PtOvp
* *°us role if desired.
°> I don't think we can afford to relegate op- abl landin8s t0 the past; we must retain the believ- j :aPabtitty at the very least. s there anything planned in future budgets to Car/% °ur shortage of firepower? The 8-inch major er lightweight gun—the prototype of which is crrently installed on the USS Hull (DD-945)—would ^ amly be a step in the right direction. Planned to S(e ackfitted into the 30 Spruance (DD-963)-class dew yersi already equipped with the relatively modern frrk gunfire control system, it was cut (again) tlle fiscal year 1979 budget. Whether or not it . survive the budget process in 1980 or later years 8Uestionable; it is expensive, and it does not have ill suPPort within the Navy. In addition, laser- 5 UtT1inated guided projectiles, in both 8-inch and t^1*1^ S'zes’ fiave always walked a tenuous path in ajr Procurement process. As far as optimized close
SuPport aircraft are concerned, there are none c°t9ing up.
Th • . .
pla nete are anrisuldace weapons being installed, and Po ne<^ t0 installed, on surface ships—the Har- n and Tomahawk respectively. But these are both Par Stl*P m*ssdes as currently approved. However, ^ °f the remedy may lie in adaptation of these Pons to land-attack versions. Should it not be las S'° 6 t0 Prov‘de Harpoon with an interchangeable er guidance package (a special warhead may not be k. , ’ and a similar one for the ship-based Toma-
Jn a longer term context? The technology is ! en> and there are forward area laser designators development. The modular universal laser equipment (MULE) is being developed by the Hughes Aircraft Corporation for the Marine Corps as a designator for all laser-guided weapons now operational or under development, and it will be compatible also with airborne laser target acquisition aids. The Army is sponsoring four others from Hughes.4 In this mode, a highly accurate close support artillery could accompany the troops well inland as the campaign progresses.5 This might also ease the burden of close air support. In addition, the versatility of ship-based weapons would be significantly enhanced.
However, such weapons would provide only part of the solution. They are very expensive, and the numbers carried per ship will always be relatively low. They would be excellent for precision bombardment, but there remains the problem of getting the troops ashore in the first place without suffering unacceptable losses in the process. And there has always been a need for relatively cheap ammunition that a ship can carry in quantity for many, many types of call-fire missions as well. Currently in these areas there are neither long- nor short-term solutions in the offing.
Can present or planned attack or fighter aircraft, equipped with new technology weaponry, do the latter two jobs in the future that heavy naval guns did so well in the past? For instance, in the just-prior- to-landing phase, it may not have been so much the naval gun’s accuracy that mattered, as it was the psychological disorientation the defenders suffered right up to the moment the first wave landed. They needed a while to recover enough presence of mind to fight effectively after the pounding they had sur-
vived. Aircraft pre-assault barrage bombardment could not be so tightly controlled in the past. In future, it may be possible to do so. The marine integrated fire and air support system is being developed. The former Marine Corps Commandant, General Louis H. Wilson, has stated that it will “. . . integrate, control, and coordinate mortar, artillery, naval gunfire, and direct air support— without stopping one for the other, as we have had to do in the past.”6 Most assuredly, to find out the answer, the Navy will have to devote more time to actual full-scale operational practice with opposed landing operations. Too often, the Navy and Marine amphibious forces drill by themselves. As Vice Admiral Robert S. Salzer, former Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, has suggested: “. . . what is basically | that assumption wrong. More than 10,000 • Marines, along with some 30,000 other troops r the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Nor" ^ Portugal, and the Federal Republic of Germany^ well as naval and air forces from the particip- 8 carried out successful operations with that obj6^1^ Such regular exercising of this vital combine a naval projection mission would do more than ^ produce serious thought and innovative approa ^ If there are no better weapons than heavy naval and propeller-driven or turbofan aircraft for chis sion, there will be enough attention drawn to ^ conclusions to enable revitalization of the re ^ and development necessary. The Navy’s troop ^ port capability is now in such a condition that it only get better. |
This must be reflected in training and operating fc" ~ B (AGC-17), USS Robinson (DD-562),
schedules on a continuing basis.”7 What no amount of analytical war gaming can bring to bear is the human experience in an operational setting. Operating personnel often devise innovative uses for the tools at hand that analysts fail to perceive. In fact, history has proved that to be the norm. For example, many have considered the amphibious reinforcement of NATO land forces to be virtually impracticable and unmanageable, but last September two exercises, Northern Wedding 78, and Bold Guard 78, proved | Caloosahatchee (AO-98) before entering the Nava ^ graduate School in 1957. After completing ^concc°' work in guided missile technology in i960, be c trated mostly in his subspecialty. Afloat he was p 5 owner Talos battery officer in the USS Long Beach (CGN-9), arK* Vgoff#c officer in the USS Galveston (CLG-3). He served ashore in the Missile Systems Project and in Headquarters, Naval Ordnance ^ ^ Command. His last sea duty as executive officer on board the ^ ju0e cord (AFS-5); he then spent the last few years before retiring 0^ 1978) at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia- ^ contributed a number of items to the Proceedings, including bis J 1979 Professional Note, "DDG-47: Aegis On Its Way to Sea. |
‘The only modern, fully American technology gunfire control system is the recently introduced Lockheed Mark 86, and it took over 15 years to develop. The only other new one—the Sperry-built Mark 92—is based on a family of Dutch systems. In guns themselves, the newest American 5-inch mount, the Mark 45, is actually a step backwards. There is nothing new about the gun itself; the mount is essentially a simplified, stripped-down Mark 42, with half the rate of fire. When the need was felt for a replacement for the obsolescent 3-inch/50, the Navy went to Europe in 1970 and came back with the Italian Oto Melara 76 mm. The 8-inch major caliber lightweight gun most likely will not go into production, and it is basically a 1950s-technology weapon. 2For one of the best treatments of these requirements, and jet deficiencies in fulfilling them, see John M. Verdi, "An Advanced Attack Airplane Design,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1978, pp. 130-135. 3Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, third edition (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, January 1978), pp. 37, | $tNc' 38, 69. See also Paul J. Murphy, "Trends in Soviet Naval Fore ture,” in Naval Power in Soviet Policy, Paul J. Murphy, editor (U- Force, Studies in Communist Affairs Series, 1978), pp. 122-125* 4Electronic Warfare Defense Electronics, September 1978, pp- 7$ ^ 5If the Navy could continue to hold sea and air superiority f°r tended period—almost a sine qua non for any offensive operations^ precision heavy artillery would go a long way to ease the fears who see the Marine Corps too lightly armed for extended land See, for example, William S. Lind and Jeffry Record, "Twilighf Corps?” Proceedings, July 1978, pp. 39-43. it 6"USMC Plans Ground, Air, Ship Fire Control Integration, Forces Journal International, November 1978, p. 18. pfoCt^' 7Robert S. Salzer, "The Navy’s Clouded Amphibious Mission, ings, February 1978, p. 33- -g pp- 8Russ Thurman, “NATO Exercises,” Leatherneck, December 1 34-37, is one of several articles written about the evolution. |
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Proceeding's / JuW