Naval Aviation and Weapons in Review

“When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is: ‘Where’s the nearest carrier?’”

—President Bill Clinton, 1993, on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)

Last year, an international incident once again prompted President Bill Clinton’s famous question—this time, it was the 7 October Hamas attack on Israeli military and civilian targets. Notably, the answer was (finally), “The USS Ford is operating nearby and ready to respond.” Thus, the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), with her embarked Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW-8), took center stage in the U.S. response to the attack on a key ally. After many years of frustration, the Gerald R. Ford was on the line and earning her keep.

The Gerald R. Ford’s inaugural deployment began on 1 May 2023—almost six years after President Donald Trump called the ship “a message to the world” during her 2017 commissioning ceremony.² That message was delayed in transmission by difficulties incorporating many of the new technologies critical to the carrier’s operation, including the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, advanced arresting gear, and advanced weapons elevators.³ The ship had completed a 53-day “service retained employment” in late 2022, but 2023 was the first time she deployed with a full air wing in support of a geographic combatant commander. Thus, the deployment offered the first full test against the Gerald R. Ford class’s promise of a 30 percent increase in operational effectiveness over legacy Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.⁴

The crisis in and around Israel offered another, more traditional test for naval aviation’s ability to generate and sustain combat-ready forces. The week after the attack saw four complete carriers and  air wing teams deployed around the world: the Gerald R. Ford and CVW-8 in the Mediterranean, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) and CVW-2 beginning deployment in the Pacific, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and CVW-5 conducting a regular “patrol” in the western Pacific, and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and CVW-3 sprinting across the Atlantic.⁵ All four deployments were previously scheduled and not directly in response to the Hamas attacks, but the Navy made these significant moves forward just as they were needed most. In fact, four carrier strike groups had not been simultaneously deployed since early 2021.⁶ Twice extended on her maiden deployment, the Gerald R. Ford learned in the last days of 2023 that she would finally return home in January after more than eight months away.

Manning, training, and equipping a ready carrier and embarked air wing is a significant investment of time and money—an investment that paid off as the curtain fell on 2023. After her sister carriers showed the importance of forward presence in the European and Indo-Pacific areas of responsibility during the first half of the year, the Dwight D. Eisenhower and CVW-3 demonstrated what U.S. carrier aviation ensures. Transiting the Strait of Hormuz to conduct flight operations in Iran’s backyard from the Persian Gulf in early November (the first time since 2020), Ike then moved to the Gulf of Aden in December.

From there, CVW-3 finished 2023 by providing air support to Operation Prosperity Guardian, the multinational effort to “tackle the challenge posed by this nonstate actor [Yemeni Houthi rebels] launching ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles [UAVs] at merchant vessels,” according to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.⁷ More than simply showing the flag, CVW-3’s F/A-18 Super Hornets helped shoot down missiles and attack drones from Yemen, and the  air wing’s MH-60 helicopters destroyed three Houthi vessels attempting to seize the MV Maersk Hangzhou in the Red Sea.⁸ The Dwight D. Eisenhower and CVW-3 simultaneously deterred Iran with forward naval presence while providing air cover to a kinetic operation against the Houthis at sea.

A Transition in Progress

The year 2023 was marked by mixed progress in naval aviation’s transition to the “air wing of the Future (AWoF).” Announced in 2022, the transition will combine fourth- and fifth-generation strike fighters (F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and F-35C Lightning IIs, respectively) with the advanced airborne command-and-control capabilities of the new E-2D Hawkeye (upgraded from the E-2C) and unmanned airborne refueling capabilities of the MQ-25A Stingray. The CMV-22B Osprey will replace the venerable C-2A Greyhound in the airborne logistics role, and EA-18G Growlers will continue to serve in the electronic attack role. Finally, MH-60R Seahawks and MH-60S Knighthawks will continue performing their multimission roles, but with reduced numbers on board the aircraft carrier.⁹

Strike Fighters

Strike Fighter Squadron 97 (VFA-97), on board the Carl Vinson with CVW-2, became the third squadron to deploy with the new F-35C and marked continued progress toward meeting Commander, Naval Air Forces, direction: “The primary driver right now is [to] get the maximum capability in fifth-generation platforms forward into the western Pacific.”¹⁰ With more squadrons transitioning from F/A-18Es to F-35Cs, the move toward AWoF continues, including a planned homeport change for VFA-147 to join CVW-5 in Japan.¹¹ The Indo-Pacific area of operations will continue to receive F-35C priority to address the growing threat from China.

E-2D

Upgrades from the E-2C to E-2D Hawkeye are even further along, with seven of nine squadrons having completed the transition. Incorporating significant advances in the “eyes of the fleet” radar and communications capabilities, and introducing aerial refueling capability, the Advanced Hawkeye proved its worth while monitoring the skies over Ukraine in 2022–23. Three of the Navy’s four air wings deployed in October 2023 included E-2Ds, while just one of the four boasted F-35Cs.

CMV-22Bs and C-2As

The transition from C-2As to CMV-22Bs also continued but hit a hurdle in 2023 with the grounding of all V-22 variants across the Department of Defense (DoD) following an Air Force crash in Japan in November. In a triumph of old over new, the Carl Vinson’s logistics needs were covered by legacy Greyhounds based in Japan.¹² The year closed with V-22s still grounded across DoD.

EA-18Gs

After a tumultuous 2022, in which the Navy’s proposed budget included cutting five expeditionary electronic attack (VAQ) squadrons (later saved by Congress), the EA-18G Growler fleet enjoyed a relatively predictable 2023.¹³ The AWoF includes plans to potentially grow the Growler footprint on the carrier, and the continued integration of F-35Cs facilitates tactical experimentation in carrier air wing electromagnetic warfare capabilities.

Rotary Wing

Rotary-wing presence in the AWoF has moved in the opposite direction. Largely to make space on crowded carrier flight decks, MH-60R Seahawk and MH-60S Knighthawk multimission helicopter numbers decreased to ten MH-60R (minus one from 11) and five MH-60S (minus three from eight) in each air wing. Many of these aircraft are typically distributed among the carrier strike group’s cruisers, destroyers, and combat logistics ships, so this change could result in as much as a 50 percent reduction in rotary-wing aircraft on board the carriers. Air wings are still working out how to best spread the remaining rotary-wing capacity.

One of the primary drivers for reducing carrier air wing helicopter capacity is the upcoming introduction of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) in the AWoF. The first of those systems, the MQ-25A Stingray, is an aircraft initially intended to perform aerial refueling duties. When Boeing won the contract to design and build Stingrays, it set 2024 as a target for initial operational capability (IOC). However, production delays pushed that IOC date first to 2025 and then 2026.¹⁴ Now, following a Government Accountability Office report critical of the Navy’s aggressive developmental test and evaluation plan, IOC looks likely to slip even further.¹⁵

Naval Aviation Also Happens Away from the Carrier

While the limelight was focused on the Gerald R. Ford and her fellow deployed aircraft carriers, naval aviation enjoyed real success—as well as challenges—outside the carrier strike group framework. Chief among those successes was the persistent, reliable performance of the P-8A Poseidon fleet. The maritime patrol community earned some well-deserved attention by hosting journalists during a flight over the Taiwan Strait in February, showcasing the crew’s professionalism and the aircraft’s impressive range.¹⁶ That patrol was one of many conducted in 2023, with separate P-8 patrols supporting NATO missions in the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas.¹⁷

Helicopter sea combat and helicopter maritime strike rotary-wing squadrons also continued long-running efforts to assist the Coast Guard with drug interdiction between South America and the United States. Often embarking on either variant of the littoral combat ship with a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment, MH-60R/S helicopters served as platforms to detect, identify, warn, and sometimes disable drug-smuggling vessels with sniper fire.¹⁸

Helicopter mine countermeasures (HM) squadrons flying the aging MH-53E Sea Dragon (a.k.a. “Big Iron”) continued to offer the Navy’s best and most reliable mine countermeasures capability. With permanent detachments based in Bahrain and South Korea, HM-15 is the last remaining operational MH-53E squadron in the Navy and supports both Central Command and Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPaCom) as its primary mine-hunting assets. Based on the H-53 design from the Vietnam era, MH-53Es have been flying in the Navy since the 1980s and are slated to finish active service in fiscal year (FY) 2027.

Unmanned Successes

While carrier aviation’s transition to a mix of manned/unmanned aircraft has been delayed by the MQ-25’s troubles, other uncrewed platforms, based ashore and on smaller ships, have seen success. The MQ-4C Triton reached IOC in September 2023 while performing maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in support of IndoPaCom. Flown by Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19 (VUP-19) based in Jacksonville, Florida, Triton aircraft operate from forward bases ashore, primarily Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.

The Navy also achieved success flying the MQ-8C Fire Scout UAV, primarily from Independence-variant littoral combat ships based in San Diego. Both the MQ-4C and MQ-8C are used to maintain situational awareness over large swaths of the waterspace, but they also serve as operational test beds for the use of unmanned aviation assets in the maritime domain.

Restocking Weapons But Not Extending Range—Yet

The FY23 weapons procurement for naval aviation included (much) more of the same: more AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs); the fourth year of AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided-Missile Extended Range (AARGM-ERs) procurement as a replacement for the legacy AGM-88 series of High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs); the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) as a replacement to the AGM-114 Hellfire; the AGM-158C-1 Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) in its seventh year of procurement; the Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDBII) in its sixth year of procurement; and upgrades to air-launched Mk 54 antisubmarine lightweight torpedoes with Mod 1 kits.¹⁹

While more weapons were needed, the FY23 purchases do not represent significant range improvements over older weapons. LRASM-ER (ER for “extended range”) will see initial procurement in FY24, and increased procurement of Mk 54 high altitude antisubmarine weapon capability (HAAWC; IOC in November 2022) can increase effective ranges of air-launched antiship and antisubmarine weapons in the next few budget cycles.²⁰

Aviation Manning

Commander Graham Scarbro’s essay in the December 2023 Proceedings, “Strike Warfare’s Inventory Problem,” highlighted significant, ongoing challenges for naval aviation, including a shortfall of pilots in the VFA, VAQ, and ariborn command-and-control (VAW) communities—all tactical air (TacAir) or “tailhook” pilots.²¹ However, the near-term pilot shortages will be even worse than he detailed and must remain a primary focus moving forward.

Besides pilots, naval aviation will suffer from the Navy’s 2023 challenges in enlisted recruiting, and the 7,464-person shortfall is unlikely to be spread equally across all ratings. For example, helicopter aircrewmen are required to graduate from the demanding Aviation Rescue Swimmer School, and that community already expects major shortfalls in production as accession rates plummet and drop-on-request rates surge. Last year’s 20 percent shortfall in overall enlisted recruiting presents amplified operational risk as squadrons and ships attempt to operate with acute shortages in highly trained specialties.

The continuing shortage of tailhook pilots is not simply the result of poor retention. As Scarbro detailed, significant flight school underproduction following the T-45C Goshawk jet trainer groundings in 2017–18 created a multiyear shortage of tailhook pilots of almost 50 percent.²² That cohort that entered the fleet in 2018–19 currently serves as overworked and undermanned instructor pilots.²³ This already thin group begins with officers commissioned in FY14, and they are now approaching their aviation department head screen board in 2024. Even if these communities could improve department head “opt-in” rates, they are starting with such shallow pools of eligible pilots that current TacAir department head gaps will almost certainly worsen over the next few years.

Unfortunately, the pilot shortage will not end there. Pilot production took another hit in 2022–23 because of another widespread T-45C grounding, this time prompted by improperly manufactured compressor turbine blades.²⁴ Once again, 2024–25 will see a major shortage of junior officers in TacAir squadrons, but this time there will not be a cadre of seasoned lieutenants and lieutenant commanders available to cover the gaps in deploying units. The substantial tailhook department head shortfall involving year groups (YG) 14–16 is going to overlap perfectly with a shortage of YG19–21 junior officers. The cake is already baked.

Insufficient flight school production presents problems that can only be mitigated and never solved until those former student naval aviators reach retirement age. Following the earlier T-45C grounding, the Navy mitigated junior officer shortages through creative detailing and sea tour extensions. With the senior lieutenant/junior lieutenant commander ranks already thinned by the 2017–18 production shortfall, those measures will not be available this time around, so other options will need to be considered. Most appealing is to “retain our way” through this challenging period. With nearly two thirds of TacAir pilots deciding to leave the Navy, there clearly is much work to be done here.²⁵

Pilot retention behaviors traditionally follow airline hiring trends—which are currently soaring—even if many separating aviators choose professions outside commercial aviation. They also are heavily influenced by experienced as well as expected “quality of service” factors: operational tempo, geographic stability, unit cohesion, and financial compensation. While it typically is true that “officers don’t stick around just for the money,” pay is the one factor the Navy can quickly improve. In addition, years of extended deployments (see the Gerald R. Ford) and COVID-19 restrictions portend exacerbated retention struggles if current compensation structures continue.²⁶

Fortunately, Congress authorized increased bonus rates that could help keep a few more of the highly trained and thinly populated prospective aviation department heads around. The FY23 National Defense Authorization Act approved an increase in aviation retention bonuses from $35,000 per additional year of obligated service to $50,000.²⁷ The Navy should use this new authorization, along with a proposed 50 percent increase in monthly flight pay, to boost retention ahead of this year’s aviation department head screen board. In fact, failing to use these measures could do additional harm if on-the-fence naval aviators become resentful on realizing they are not being paid as much as their Air Force peers.²⁸

The Navy is moving toward a 40-60 split between unmanned and manned aircraft on board future aircraft carriers.²⁹ However, with the MQ-25’s struggles in development, that goal seems further away than ever. Until pilots are replaced by technology, naval aviation will continue to rely on highly trained men and women to take great personal risk by flying tactical aircraft into harm’s way. The simultaneous deployment of four fully manned carrier air wing teams was a significant accomplishment in 2023, but it may not be possible to replicate that feat in the next few years without new measures to address these predictable manning shortages.