To Upgun Seapower in the Indo-Pacific, You Need an Army
General Flynn and Lieutenant Colonel DeVine list several reasons why the Army has a critical role to play in the Indo-Pacific, but the arguments related to long-range fires, sustainment, and persistent forward presence have serious flaws.
The discussion about the “Ring of Fires” concept does not address a major roadblock to the forward deployment of U.S. ground-based missiles-—namely, which countries would consent to have such weapons on their territory. Japan is the only U.S. ally in Asia that has expressed a willingness to consider the deployment of ground-based missiles. But with Japan developing its own “counterstrike capabilities,” Tokyo might conclude it does not need to host U.S. missile systems, avoiding the domestic political headaches they inevitably would stir up. Australian officials are on record against hosting U.S. missiles; the Philippines and South Korea remain wary of provoking Beijing; and Thailand has eschewed an anti-China stance altogether. Moreover, many of these countries are already developing or purchasing long-range strike capabilities, obviating the perceived need to deploy U.S. missiles there.
Sustainment is another area in which the authors argue the Army retains its relevance in the Pacific. They point to the construction of distribution centers across the region and the deployment of an intratheater watercraft company as evidence of the Army’s value as the “linchpin force” for enabling joint operations. Yet, the distribution of supplies and personnel within the theater is contingent on long-range sealift getting those things there in the first place. This is a function only the Sea Services can fulfill: 90 percent of military cargo would be transported using sealift during wartime, according to U.S. Transportation Command (TransCom).
In this regard, the Army’s pitch as a joint enabler of intratheater logistics is weakened by the present state of the U.S. sealift fleet. As the TransCom commander—Air Force General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost—noted, the United States is “already a generation late in recapitalizing a ready sealift fleet to meet our national objectives.” Equally concerning is that the aging and shrunken Ready Reserve Force is currently short 1,800 mariners to crew its vessels.
Finally, the authors state that the Army can provide “staying power” through a persistent forward presence inside the first island chain to counter China’s malign influence. But it is not clear how adding more forward presence will credibly bolster deterrence against China, especially considering the vulnerabilities of the current U.S. posture to Chinese long-range missiles. A resilient and survivable posture that can withstand and recover from the initial volley of Chinese strikes requires dispersion and distance. Surging more ground forces to the first island chain to “influence” the local environment with support installations would just present Chinese planners with additional targets rather than give U.S. planners meaningful warfighting capability.
The Army’s role in the Pacific is far more circumscribed than Flynn and Devine describe. As defense budgets flatten out this decade, policy-makers should view these arguments with skepticism—while prioritizing the Sea Services.
—Matthew C. Mai, Defense Priorities
Collision Regulations Need to be Updated for USVs
International law consists not only of treaties, but of customary law: the acknowledged functional practices among nations. The strength of customary law, which is acknowledged from the International Court of Justice to the International Maritime Organization, is the reason the United States conducts freedom of navigation operations to functionally reject excessive claims even without needing to refer to written laws and decisions rejecting those claims.
Customary law is as much a part of “pax Americana” as written law—and as such, it should be considered when it is time to determine if unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) breach the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs). One can see the influence and vagaries of customary law in Rule 2(b), which refers to the “ordinary practice of seamanship.”
In the light of such practice, it is fair to consider autonomous and remote USV operations as acceptable practice—from the French and British unmanned mine countermeasures programs, to Singaporean patrol craft, to global commercial surveying, to the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Sea Hunter knockoff and Iran’s export to its Houthi proxies of suicide USVs.
Whether the Iranians and Chinese choose to posture by chasing USVs under the pretense of “navigational safety,” their own programs and practices reveal clear hypocrisy, and their protests are as easily dismissed legally as Fifth Fleet rejected Iran’s kinetically.
That said, customary and written law should avoid unnecessary conflict. The problem is not that USVs violate the written law, but that the written law does not reflect the customary reality. Lieutenant Suffern’s solution of updating that law is a correct one. Thankfully, the ColRegs continue to be a mutable document, having been amended seven times since their initial signing in 1972. It is time to encourage their update again.
But, in the meantime, functional embrace of remote and autonomous operations by friend and foe should be sufficient justification to continue USV development in compliance with customary rules and practices.
—LCDR Matt Hipple, USN
A Catastrophic Mishap
Every Sailor a Firefighter
Captain Beall notes firefighting qualification deficiencies among crews during ship availabilities and refers to Commander Holwitt and Captain Hays’ advocacy for the improvement of same. Both articles get it wrong—they do not recognize just how dire the situation is.
I served as assistant chief of staff for Aircraft Carrier Training and Readiness at Commander, Naval Air Forces. I oversaw both individual qualification levels and crew ship qualification events for every carrier in the fleet. Among the thousands of individual qualifications a ship needs to be considered ready for each step of training and subsequent deployment, firefighting was assessed as an area with some of the worst performances.
The surface warfare community operates and owns the firefighting schools, so I worked closely with them. I became familiar with qualification levels in other communities. The nuclear-powered aircraft carriers generally achieved qualification levels in the 80 to 90 percent range, while surface combatants generally fell in the 70 to 80 percent range.
Several barriers exist to improving the qualification level scores. These include funding for a longer accession training track and barracks capacity at Naval Station Great Lakes (to take advantage of open spots in the firefighting trainer that do not align with boot camp) and training sailors in firefighting after they report to their first homeports. But they are potentially solvable.
What is frustrating is that there is a military construction project that could fix this. An unfunded project sits on the shelf that would expand the firefighting trainer in Great Lakes, enabling this to be incorporated into boot camp. Imagine if every sailor was, in fact, a firefighter!
Undoubtedly, this would mean the Navy would train some folks who never go to sea. But isn’t that inefficiency a better problem to have than the inefficiency of trying to catch sailors for this qualification after they’ve checked in and gotten into the shipboard routine? In the wake of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) fire, a recommendation was made to create an advanced firefighting qualification for a small subset of a ship’s crew instead of focusing on enhancing the overall collective skill foundation. It is as if the solution to a 20 percent physical readiness test failure rate would be to turn the three fastest runners into Olympians.
The risk of another catastrophic fire in availability, pierside, or at sea is being transferred every day from the highest levels of the Navy to the Echelon 4 or 5 commanding officer. As the saying goes, “Show me where you (don’t) spend your money, and I’ll show you where your priorities are (not).”
—CAPT Dave Kurtz, USN
With regard to the litany of shipyard disasters in recent years, such as the Bonhomme Richard and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fires, and the lengthy delays that have regularly occurred, I have an idea that may help.
Suppose the Navy were to figure how much it is worth in dollars to have a ship come out of a maintenance period hitting all the quality marks, on schedule, and with no significant disciplinary events among the crew who stay with the ship (despite the known morale problems during these yard periods). Set that amount as a maximum “Yard Bonus” for the crew members who stay with or are assigned to the ship during that time, prorated according to time in the yard, to be paid out when the ship leaves the yard. The figure would be reduced as a percentage first by losses in quality, then crew discipline, and finally schedule slippage. Fires and damage would fall under the quality category and could essentially kill the bonus, depending on the severity.
Now, with potentially thousands of dollars on the line, you would have a lot of sailors—a lot of eyes—motivated to look out for any kind of trouble, whether among themselves or any contractors or other personnel working on the ship. Imagine that one sailor observes another leaving a bag of old rags on the deck and walking off or a group of others planning a party with no designated driver or a sailor wondering why some civilian worker is acting strangely in the corner.
A lot of people would be considering the various work activities, and extra sets of brain cells would be highly tuned to watch out for these dangers. This bonus program would basically pay for itself with ships delivered on time and ship shape!
I would add that schedule delays by themselves should never eliminate the entire bonus, as the scope and difficulty of such work may end up not being the crew’s fault at all, and the quality of the end result is most important.
—MSgt Chris Dierkes, NYANG
The War of 2026: Phase III Scenario
There is not a single shortcoming—too few launchers, too few reloads, lack of long range-strike capability that puts all platforms in China’s weapons engagement zone—that would not have been quickly apparent in any simple wargaming exercise or to any knowledgeable outsider with a few moment’s thought.
With all due respect to the Naval Institute, Proceedings, and the Pentagon, what has been going on for the past two decades?
—Kevin Goff
The Nimitz Way Still Applies
I noticed that, in the photo of Admirals Chester Nimitz and Bull Halsey on p. 77, the caption says the photo was taken in January1946. I thought that was a bit odd as Nimitiz was promoted to Fleet Admiral in December 1944, but he is wearing only four stars on his collar.
I would have thought that some of the sharper members of Nimitz’s staff would have figured out how to get him the correct insignia lest he be embarrassed that his next door neighbor, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, had his insignia created within about 48 hours of the announcement of the promotions.
Nimitz got his fourth star after he replaced Admiral Husband Kimmel in December 1941, and Halsey got his in October 1942. So, this photo could have been taken any time during/after November 1942 and before late December 1944 when Nimitz got his fifth.
I read Proceedings from cover to cover each month, and I’m thinking you tossed this one in just to see if I was paying attention!
As always, great articles.
—MGEN William D. Razz, USA (Ret.), Chairman, Board of Visitors, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Editor’s Note: Thank you for your keen eye. The error was of the typographical rather than factual (or testing you and other readers!) type, however—the photo’s original caption does indeed date it to 20 January 1943, taken at Naval Base Espiritu Santo.
Thank You For Your Service
I could not agree with Captain Stevens more. “Thank you for your service” is not a phrase that should be used exclusively for the military. Before I entered the Navy, I served as a congressional staffer for four years. Both representatives for whom I worked always extended gratitude to constituents they met who served the country, state, or local community in some way. A simple “Thank you for your service to our country/community” from a member of the House of Representatives could make someone’s day.
This became particularly poignant during the dark days of COVID-19, when medical personnel, police officers, firefighters, and others put themselves in harm’s way to serve their communities. Public servants in other roles are worthy of our praise, too. Many public employees eschew higher paying professions because of a desire to serve the public good, an instinct that is surely worthy of our praise. I now make a point of thanking police, firefighters, first responders, teachers, and other public servants for their service whenever I meet them.
Saying “Thank you for your service” to a civilian public servant does not detract from the sacrifices of my brave brothers and sisters in uniform. On the contrary, it helps carry on their passion for serving others. The health of our country depends on citizens dedicated to the public good. We must thus promote public service of all kinds to instill the civic virtue necessary for our country to thrive.
That can start with a simple “Thank you.”
—ENS Drew Roberts, USN
The Mouth of a Sailor: The Power of Language to Build an Inclusive Culture
Lieutenant Lemonick’s essay claims the Navy needs to change its language to build a more inclusive and presumably more empathetic, kind, and caring Navy. She offers opinions but no evidence of why this would make a more effective Navy.
My experience is that imposing “inclusive” language would—instead of adding to unit cohesiveness—make it more divided. Imposing mandates for “preferred pronouns” will cause sailors to walk on eggshells to avoid the risk of potentially offending any of our newly sensitive crew.
I fear that, once the nose of the political correctness camel is inside the tent, it will be hard to stop it before great damage is done. Should the Navy decide to go down this politically correct road of mandated “inclusive pronouns,” we may find ourselves with a new warfare specialty—social justice warrior. I wonder what that pin would look like.
—CAPT Thomas Pinney, USN (Ret.)