January 1924 Proceedings—“The Departments of War and Navy have begun a movement to bring about a closer coordination,” Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam, U.S. Navy (Retired), wrote in “Co-Ordinating the Navy and the Army.” “This ideal was sought years ago under the administration of President Taft, when an ‘Army and Navy Joint Board’ was first organized with Admiral Dewey at its head. . . . It began a work that promised substantial results and sensible preparations that would enable the Army and Navy to co-operate promptly and effectively at the first alarm of war.”
January 1974 Proceedings—In “Full Systems at Launch,” Lieutenant Commander D. P. March, U.S. Navy, wrote, “Operational requirements, the Navy ‘can do’ attitude, and the tempo of combat carrier operations have frequently led to launching aircraft sorties with less than the optimum aircraft configuration and component capability and availability. . . . Commanding officers who enter into a ‘competitive sortie race’ (i.e., launching more sorties than a sister squadron) whether justified or not, transmit this pressure to their pilots and maintenance personnel in the form of an edict such as ‘if it is safely flyable and can drop bombs, launch it!’”
January 1999 Proceedings—In “The Silence of the Admirals,” former Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb Jr. wrote on why he resigned. “I decided that I would not walk the fleet back from our goal of 600 ships into the bathtub where the Navy now resides. Why is this happening again? Because Navy leaders were unable or unwilling to make the case for a larger Navy, and as a result failed to educate Congress and the public. They didn’t fight at 600 ships. They didn’t fight at 500. They didn’t fight at 400. They are telling the world that 300 is fine and doable.”
A. Denis Clift
Golden Life Member
