From drug busts of narcosubs to overseeing U.S. and foreign navy ships at the Rim of the Pacific exercise, the Legend-class national security cutter (NSC) has proven its worth.1 The NSC has many successful deployments ahead, but the time is right to consider its replacement, the NSC(X).
Recent Coast Guard acquisitions for major cutters have taken 14 or more years from the beginning of the process to deployment. The Coast Guard began discussions with industry regarding the medium-endurance cutter replacement, the offshore patrol cutter (OPC), in 2010. The first OPC is scheduled to commission in 2024.2 The initial integrated product team for the next heavy ice breaker, the polar security cutter (PSC), was assembled in 2013, and the first ship is scheduled for delivery in 2028.3 The first NSC was commissioned in 2008 with a service life of 30 years, so the Coast Guard must start the process now to field the NSC(X) in 2038.4
The NSC(X) will serve throughout the 2040s and 2050s. The Coast Guard must consider the operating context for the NSC(X) to accomplish her missions, the composition of the rest of the fleet (both Coast Guard and Navy), and how these factors will affect the new ship’s design.
Operating Context
Of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions, the most relevant for the NSC(X) and the rest of the “white hull” cutter fleet are ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug interdiction; law enforcement; search and rescue; living marine resources; migrant interdiction; maritime environmental protection; and polar, ice, and Alaska operations; and defense readiness.
The operating context of these missions could change substantially during the service life of NSC(X). Polar, ice, and Alaska operations will be a mission of growing emphasis. Russia’s Arctic Policy 2035 identifies the region as one in which to accelerate economic growth and the Northern Sea Route as a critical transport line.5 China’s 2018 Arctic policy proposes a “polar silk road” to enhance trade and resource extraction.6 On the migration front, the United Nations predicts that climate issues will displace 143 million people worldwide over the next three decades, and a recent study estimated 30 million migrants could head to the U.S. border in the next 30 years. Search-and-rescue demand also could increase, as climate change likely will cause more extreme weather events.7 For the defense readiness mission, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted in its Global Trends 2040 study that the risk of interstate conflict will increase.8
The energy landscape during this time frame is uncertain. The International Maritime Organization 2050 greenhouse gas requirements will force substantial changes in marine fuels, but it is not clear which fuel will become the marine standard.9 Other relevant sectors for disaster response—such as automobiles, equipment, and outboard motors—are moving toward electrification.10
Changes to the Fleet
The Coast Guard’s 2038 fleet will comprise fewer but more capable cutters than today. The service plans to build 25 OPCs to replace 29 of the much smaller medium-endurance cutters. By 2038, all medium-endurance cutters probably will be gone, but the OPCs might not be fully built out.11 The 154-foot fast response cutters are nearing the end of their 69-ship production run, and by 2038 they will have replaced all 49 Island-class 110-foot cutters and the more than 70 Protector-class 87-foot marine boats.12 The Coast Guard’s ice-breaking fleet should increase from one heavy and one medium ice breaker to three PSCs.13
When working with the Navy on national defense, the size and potential mission profile of the NSC(X) most closely matches the small surface combatant component of the Navy’s fleet. Its missions include high-value unit escort, mine warfare, anti–small-boat, antisubmarine warfare, and presence. In 2022, the Navy carried out these missions with a total of 43 ships—a combination of littoral combat ships (LCSs), mine countermeasures ships, and patrol coastal ships. The Navy is retiring nine LCS hulls well before their service lives end.14 The patrol boats were all retired in 2023, and the mine countermeasures ships will retire soon.15 The first two of the much larger and more capable Constellation-class frigates are under construction and will take on some of these roles, but by 2038 the Navy might only have about 39 small surface combatants.16
Uncrewed systems will be a larger part of the future fleet for both the Coast Guard and the Navy. The Navy currently uses smaller uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) in the Middle East and soon in South America and is exercising a fleet of larger USVs.17 The Coast Guard released its Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan in March 2023 and envisions uncrewed systems as “a trusted component of the force structure” as well as a potential threat that needs to be countered, and the Navy and Coast Guard already deploy uncrewed aviation assets at sea from ships.18
Key Design Elements
Given operating context and Navy and Coast Guard fleet composition, the following key design elements will be vital for the NSC(X):
• Ice strengthening. The Coast Guard’s 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook identifies the Coast Guard “as the Nation’s primary maritime presence in the polar regions,” and disasters at sea requires a tremendous amount of presence, even in temperate waters.19 Having an ice-strengthened NSC(X) with robust communication capabilities, aviation facilities, and the ability to marshal uncrewed systems would be a force multiplier in an Arctic emergency. The NSC(X) should adopt an American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) ice classification that would allow it to work in concert with the PSC. It does not need a true ice-breaking hull.
• Speed. The ship must be capable of making 28 knots, the listed top speed of the current NSC. This speed has been sufficient for the NSC to support Navy efforts, and it is similar to the predicted speed of the Constellation class.20 In addition to working with Navy formations, this high speed will allow the NSC(X) to keep up with container ships and cruise ships, which can reach speeds of 24 or 25 knots.21
• Integrated power system. In an integrated power system (IPS), all engines create only electrical power, which moves the ship’s large propulsion motors and services the ship’s electrical needs. The Coast Guard already operates two IPS vessels: the USCGC Healy (WAGB-20) and Mackinaw (WAGB-83)—both ice breakers. Since both propulsion and house loads are electrical, IPS vessels have a large amount of electric power on tap. Using integrated power on the NSC(X) would give it a few distinct advantages.
If wired to export power ashore, the NSC(X) could provide electrical power in emergencies to run vehicles, equipment, and even entire bases.22
Excess electrical power could support future upgrades to sensors or weapons and charge battery-powered uncrewed systems.
It would be easier to repower the ship if a future shift in the marine fuel market demands changes to the engines. With a traditional propulsion layout, a new engine would need to fit roughly in the footprint of the old engine, and the engine speed would have to be matched to the reduction gear. This is not a concern on an IPS vessel since the engines only need to generate electricity.
• Weapons. The Navy’s small surface combatants will use the COMBATSS-21 combat system, which is an Aegis-derived system featuring an open architecture.23 If the NSC(X) has the hardware and software backbone for COMBATSS-21, then more robust capabilities could be added in the event of a crisis. During normal peacetime operations, the NCS(X) sensor suite should be minimal to save money.24 The ship will need a basic air-search and navigational radar, targeting sensors for the guns, and the necessary communication systems for the Department of Defense’s Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2)/Project Overmatch system.25
The standard weapon loadout should include a Phalanx close-in weapon system aft and a pair of super-firing Mk 38 Mod 4 mounts with 30-mm cannons. The 30-mm ammunition can accommodate a variety of projectiles, and airburst rounds with programmable fuses are being developed to repel swarms of uncrewed systems.26 The Mk 38 is pedestal-mounted with no deck penetration required, which increases the amount of interior space available in the ship and facilitates removal for up-gunning the bow area.
Assigning uncrewed systems will be the fastest way to add capabilities to the NSC(X). Uncrewed systems in the air, on the surface, and under the surface can already detect enemies and fire missiles as large as the SM-6.27 For uncrewed aviation systems, the NSC(X) will need a flight deck and hangar that can accommodate an MH-60—the current Navy standard and the Coast Guard’s future standard helicopter. Future uncrewed systems will likely fit in this footprint. For surface and subsurface systems, the NSC(X) should have deck equipment that can launch, recover, or tow these devices and enough internal space to accommodate maintainers and their equipment. The COMBATSS-21 combat system and JADC2 communications suite should be sufficient for command and control of these uncrewed systems.
NSC(X) must stop the pattern of trading hull numbers for capability, so the following concessions must be considered to keep the ship affordable to acquire and sustain:
• Keep the footprint small. The Coast Guard has relatively small bases with limited pier space and billions of dollars of shore infrastructure backlogs.28 Expanding piers to fit larger ships will stress the infrastructure budget even more. The NSC(X)’s size would allow it to use the current NSC maintenance facilities and new ones being developed for the LCS.29
• Eliminate the stern ramp. The NSC can launch and recover vessels from the stern ramp, but the OPC’s designers elected to forgo the stern-launch capability in favor of davit launching. This would reduce maintenance costs, open more deck space on the stern, and increase internal volume.
• Forego signature reduction. Reducing radar, heat, and noise signatures is an important consideration for Navy ships, and it will be tempting to include these technologies on the NSC(X). However, considering the operational profile of the vessel and the tremendous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that potential adversaries can muster to counter these technologies, it is not worth the cost to fit them onto the NSC(X).
• Reuse as much technology as possible. The PSC will incorporate numerous hull, mechanical, and electrical elements that could be applicable to the NSC(X). Its ice-capable azipods will be a particularly important potential technology. The OPC also tests some critical features, such as an all-davit small-boat arrangement.
• Forgo a bow thruster. If the NSC(X) has two powerful azipods, then it should have enough maneuverability for mooring. Eliminating the bow thruster will increase interior space, simplify the hull structure, reduce drag on the hull, and reduce maintenance costs.
An Analysis of Alternatives
An ice-strengthened, 28-knot IPS ship will be an asset to the service, but it will require a clean-sheet design. If the Coast Guard determines that requirements are more flexible, then the NSC could be replaced with ships being built now or that will be built in the required time frame. Here are some other options:
• Replace NSCs with OPCs. If the Coast Guard determines that keeping up with the Navy is not important and that the Arctic can be handled with the PSCs and partner forces, it makes sense to replace NSCs with more OPCs. OPCs should be capable of the worldwide law enforcement and search-and-rescue roles the NSC currently performs, and the production line should still be hot in 2038. If the Coast Guard decides to follow this path, it could add JADC2 communication equipment and the deck equipment for uncrewed vessels to the basic OPC design.
• Replace NSCs with NSCs. If the Coast Guard determines that compatibility with the Navy is important, but Arctic operations are not, a strong argument could be made to replace old NSCs with an updated version. Some NSCs will still be operating in the 2040s with well-established training and logistics pipelines, so this would be a low-risk course of action.
• Build more ice breakers. If the Coast Guard determines that Arctic presence is more important than compatibility with the Navy, it should consider building more icebreakers. Building more of the Great Lakes icebreaker (the Mackinaw-class replacement) could be an appealing option since it will be about a third the price of a PSC.30
Urgent Actions
The Coast Guard must take the following steps to ensure the successful replacement of NSC:
• Stand up an integrated product team (IPT). This group could start establishing requirements and gathering lessons from current acquisition programs. The IPT for the heavy icebreaker effort in 2013 comprised personnel from 28 different Coast Guard offices and eight other agencies. A similar effort should be undertaken for the NSC(X).
• Attack the biggest challenge. Creating a high-speed, ice-hardened hull will be the most challenging aspect of the NSC(X). The Coast Guard should engage the Naval Surface Warfare centers in Philadelphia and Carderock as well as the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore and the Coast Guard Research and Development Center to study the feasibility of such a design.
• Request the 12th NSC. Extending the NSC line, which Congress has expressed an interest in doing, would buy the Coast Guard time to assess the transition to the NSC(X).31 If analysis shows that replacing the NSC with an NSC is the best way forward, having a few more years with the hot production line would give the Coast Guard time to end production in such a way that it could be restarted in the future.
The Coast Guard is set up for success, but it cannot afford to delay planning for the next class of large cutters. The current NSC program performs well, and the ships can be expected to serve until the end of their planned service lives. Current or near-future shipbuilding programs will test key technologies for the NSC(X), and there is enough time to assess needs and consider alternatives. For the Coast Guard to take advantage of these opportunities, it must begin the replacement process now.
1. Megan Eckstein, “U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Tests Lethal Capabilities at RIMPAC,” Defense News, 11 August 2022.
2. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, 20 January 2012; Mike Schuler, “USCG’s Lead Offshore Patrol Cutter ‘USCGC Argus’ Launched,” gCaptain, 30 October 2023.
3. Sam LaGrone, “GAO: Polar Security Cutter Design Won’t Complete Until 2024, Delivery of First Hull Estimated in 2028,” USNI News, 3 August 2023.
4. CRS, Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs.
5. Julian R. Meade, “Russia’s New Arctic Policy 2035: Implications for Great Power Tension over the Northern Sea Route,” Insight (Bethesda, MD: National Intelligence University, 21 July 2020).
6. Jane Nakano and William Li, “China Launches the Polar Silk Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 February 2018.
7. Associated Press, “Climate Change Is Already Fueling Global Migration. The World Isn’t Ready to Meet People’s Changing Needs, Experts Say,” PBS, 28 July 2022; Abrahm Lustgarten, “The Great Climate Migration,” The New York Times, 23 July 2020; and USEPA, “Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate,” 26 July 2023.
8. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence March 2021).
9. John Kingston, “What Will Power Ocean Vessels under IMO 2050?” FreightWaves, 9 March 2023.
10. “Electrifying Transportation to Benefit Every American,” Office of Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 10 February 2022; Verified Market Research, Electric Outboard Motors Market Size and Forecast, March 2023.
11. CRS, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, 19 October 2023.
12. CRS, Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs; Keyon K. Jeff, “Bollinger Shipyards Delivers Final Marine Protector-class CPB,” The Houma Times, 11 October 2009; and Richard R. Burgess, “Coast Guard Reducing Some Marine Protector Patrol Boats, Commandant Says,” Seapower, 11 March 2021.
13. CRS, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, 31 July 2023.
14. U.S. Navy, “Naval Vessel Register,” www.nvr.navy.mil; “U.S. Navy Plans to Retire Nine More Freedom-Class LCS Hulls,” The Maritime Executive, 28 March 2022; and Sam LaGrone, “Navy Quietly Decommissions Littoral Combat Ship Independence,” USNI News, 31 July 2021.
15. Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Decommissions Last Coastal Patrol Ships,” Seapower, 28 March 2023; and David Axe, “America Is Getting Rid of Their Minesweepers,” The National Interest, 3 April 2019.
16. CRS, Naval Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issue for Congress, 4 October 2023.
17. MC1 Roland Franklin, USN, “U.S. 5th Fleet Launches New Task Force to Integrate Uncrewed Systems,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, 9 September 2021.
18. U.S. Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Coast Guard, March 2023); “Insitu Complete ScanEagle Installation on USCG Security Cutters,” Insitu press release, January 2021; and Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Is Sustaining 10 Operation MQ-8C Fire Scout UAVs; Rest in Storage,” Seapower, 31 January 2023.
19. U.S. Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Coast Guard, April 2019).
20. U.S. Navy, “Naval Vessel Register”; and Eric Wertheim, “The U.S. Navy’s Future Frigate,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 146, no. 7 (July 2020).
21. Mayur Agarwal, “What Is the Speed of a Ship at Sea,” Marine Insight, 26 April 2019.
22. Robert Goetz, “CPS Energy Rewards Randolph for Summertime Conservation Efforts,” JBSA News, 9 December 2010.
23. David B. Larter, “The Two U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships Will Soon Share a Brain,” Defense News, 14 January 2020.
24. “Integrating the Aegis Derived COMBATSS-21 with the Littoral Combat Ship,” Lockheed Martin press release, 1 January 2016.
25. Department of Defense, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 17 March 2022); and CRS, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),” In Focus, 21 January 2022.
26. Gina Harkins, “Navy LCS Gun Could Get Potent Airburst Rounds to Take Out Drones,” Military.com, 16 January 2020.
27. Tyler Rogoway, “This ‘Ghost Fleet’ Ship Firing an SM-6 Missile from a Modular Launcher Is a Glimpse of the Future,” The War Zone, 3 September 2021.
28. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlog of at Least $2.6 Billion (Washington, DC: February 2019).
29. “Austal USA Celebrates Opening of San Diego Waterfront Ship Facility,” Austal press release, 13 February 2023.
30. CRS, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program.
31. CRS, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement.
