Insights from China’s Studies of the U.S. Coast Guard

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is striving to “build China into a maritime power”—a term conventionally defined by a strong navy.¹ But while the PRC is dedicating resources to growing the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), it is simultaneously—and deliberately—developing the China Coast Guard (CCG).  Created in 2013, the CCG already has the largest coast guard fleet in the world. Determining why the PRC created a coast guard might offer insight as to the operationalizing of the PRC’s future maritime policy.

A review of Mandarin-language academic journals reveals a surprising number of analytical articles on “coast guard” topics by Chinese scholars. Of note is their fixation on examining the U.S. Coast Guard. While open-source discussion may not correlate to forthcoming government action or policy, the attention lavished on the U.S. Coast Guard has foreshadowed CCG developments and reform of the PRC’s maritime laws with uncanny accuracy, suggesting academic journals could be a harbinger of state decision-making. Examining Chinese academic analyses of the U.S. Coast Guard could help identify the likely future state of the CCG and implications for the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Development of the CCG

The year 2013 was pivotal for the PRC’s maritime law enforcement agencies. President Xi Jinping launched the massive economic Belt and Road Initiative, much of it tied to maritime commerce. That same year, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague against the PRC’s sweeping claims of jurisdiction in the South China Sea. These events accelerated the PRC’s perception of a need for a unified coast guard. The CCG was created later that year by amalgamating four disparate maritime agencies.

The formation and growth of the CCG seems sudden, but thoughts of a coast guard appeared in academic journals well before its inception. Academics studied U.S. maritime forces, noting the inherent value of the Coast Guard as an instrument of U.S. national power. Beginning in the 1990s, Chinese academics began showing a striking interest in the U.S. Coast Guard.

A search of the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database of academic journals is telling: Thousands of articles include some discussion of the U.S.
Coast Guard. By mid-2021, there were 327 articles in which the service was the primary subject. Overwhelmingly, the authors of these works view the U.S. Coast Guard as the standard on which to model the CCG. The following is a sampling of this substantial body of academic work.

Analyses of the USCG

Leading up to the CCG’s creation, much review was done of the U.S. Coast Guard’s organizational structure. In the article “What Chinese Maritime Police Can Learn from the Development of the U.S. Coast Guard,” the author studied the service’s design, organization, and restructuring throughout its history.² The authors of the book Study on the Strategic Thinking of U.S. Maritime Security and Coast Guard focused on the strategic concepts behind its role in maritime security.³ One author stressed how much the PRC could learn from the U.S. Coast Guard, highlighting that studying its 200 years of development “can provide some ideas for the optimization and improvement of China’s ocean management agencies.”⁴

Originally, the CCG was a civilian agency. In 2016, two authors examined whether a U.S. Coast Guard cutter was a “warship” or a “government ship,” concluding that the United States classifies cutters as warships to obtain the highest latitude of authorities under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁵ Other scholars analyzed the U.S. Coast Guard’s unique homeland security role and national defense responsibilities as one of the armed services.⁶ Indeed, in 2018, the CCG was transferred to the Central Military Commission to “better defend sovereignty.”⁷

U.S. Coast Guard strategic concepts remain a matter of notable Chinese academic interest. One author evaluated the service’s strategic focus through an in-depth review of its 2010–19 financial data.⁸ After reviewing the U.S. Coast Guard’s Evergreen process (for instilling long-term strategic intent), one author called for its adoption within the CCG.⁹

With the PRC striving to further professionalize the CCG, several scholars focused on leadership development. Numerous authors studied the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, with one concluding that the Academy “has accumulated rich experience in the cultivation of student leadership,” which is “worthy of study and reference for China’s Coast Guard Academy.”¹⁰ One scholar even wrote an entire article on the curriculum of the prospective commanding and executive officer afloat training course.¹¹

Authors also identified holes in the PRC’s maritime legislation and the limitations of the CCG’s legal authorities.¹² One scholar studied the maritime legislation governing the coast guards of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, comparing their legal authorities against the perceived limited authorities of the CCG at that time.¹³ Another author determined that the “key to success” of the U.S. Coast Guard was the development of comprehensive maritime legislation and concluded the PRC should follow the U.S. model to guide its coast guard activities at sea.¹⁴

Use of force policy was studied extensively. In 2015, two authors highlighted the “urgent” need for the CCG to standardize law enforcement powers and policies on use of weapons and firearms to align with U.S. Coast Guard authorities.¹⁵ One author reviewed the structure of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces.¹⁶ Others studied at-sea law enforcement tactics.¹⁷ Sure enough, in 2021, the PRC passed a law granting the CCG authority to use force on foreign vessels in waters over which the PRC claims jurisdiction.

CCG’s Future State?

The growth of the CCG has mirrored many of the suggestions raised in academic journals studying the U.S. Coast Guard. CCG cutters even bear a “racing stripe,” an international norm pioneered by the U.S. Coast Guard. Given the nexus between past academic reviews of the U.S. Coast Guard and the current state of the CCG, expect the following in the future:

• The CCG increasingly will venture beyond the South China Sea. A critical component of the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative is trade along the “Maritime Silk Road.” Several academics have argued that the CCG should protect China’s burgeoning maritime trade routes. Perhaps most telling is one author’s claim that “national strategy requires the Coast Guard to go out of the country and conduct extensive cooperation with the maritime law enforcement forces of countries . . . to jointly promote the grand blueprint of the Maritime Silk Road.”¹⁸ As the PRC’s trade grows, so will CCG presence along the trade routes—one of which likely will be through the Northern Sea Route, which connects Northeast Asia with ports along the U.S. Atlantic coast. The PRC claims to be a “near-Arctic” state, so expect the Arctic to become a CCG domain.

• PRC maritime forces will grow in interoperability. Several Chinese authors commented on the strategic value in U.S. Coast Guard–U.S. Navy interoperability.¹⁹ Even before formation of the CCG, scholars called for integrating the PRC’s maritime police forces with the PLAN to create a layered defense akin to the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy.²⁰ Given the growing number of surface assets in the PLAN, CCG, and maritime militia, improved interoperability will increase the PRC’s maritime power considerably.

• CCG aviation will expand. Several academics examined the U.S. Coast Guard’s aviation capabilities and noted how the CCG’s lack of same hinders its operations, especially in reaching disputed features in the South China Sea or Senkaku Islands.²¹ The future likely will see an increase in CCG aviation assets, which will greatly improve the CCG’s maritime domain awareness and enhance its overall capabilities and effectiveness.

Policy Implications

By itself, the CCG’s growth and development is not necessarily alarming. With a huge coast and massive maritime economy, the PRC was overdue for creating its own coast guard. Even recent reform efforts that received international scrutiny (such as the CCG’s transfer to the military or the legislation authorizing the CCG to use force) are common attributes among many coast guards, including the U.S. Coast Guard.

The elephant in the room, of course, is the excessive area over which the PRC claims maritime jurisdiction and thus CCG authority. With its unilaterally asserted nine-dash line (which envelops more than 80 percent of the South China Sea and extends in excess of 1,000 miles from the Chinese mainland), the PRC’s jurisdictional claims substantially overlap the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of several littoral states. Equally troubling, the nine-dash line extends well beyond the maritime boundaries permitted by UNCLOS. Several “dashes” not only sit near the shorelines of other countries, but also are beyond 200 nautical miles from any PRC-claimed land feature, rendering those claims in violation of international law.²²

Further, rightful sovereignty over the island and land features behind the nine-dash line is a point of high contention. The PRC claims them all, and asserts maritime entitlements around features that do not warrant them, such as Mischief Reef. For example, although the PRC proclaims “territorial waters” in the vicinity of Mischief Reef, neither a low-tide elevation—which Mischief Reef is in its natural state—nor an artificial island—which the PRC converted Mischief Reef into—is permitted a territorial sea under UNCLOS.²³

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the nine-dash line claim is illegal, but to date, the PRC has ignored the ruling in its entirety—a decision that brought international condemnation. Afterward, the PRC sought ways to reinforce its excessive maritime claims while not drawing more attention and ire from the international community. Following extensive review of the U.S. Coast Guard, it understood the utility of the “coast guard brand” as a perceived instrument of “softer” national power.

Fortunately for the PRC, other South China Sea littoral countries lack powerful maritime forces. Given this gap, the PRC adjudged its coast guard to be a sufficient instrument to reinforce its excessive maritime claims. Using the CCG in local maritime disputes is ideal: Large, white-hulled CCG cutters have the size and firepower to intimidate smaller vessels but are far less provocative and threatening than a fleet of gray-hulled PLAN warships.

In addition, the CCG is used as much for its strategic messaging as for its actual capabilities. The CCG is an ideal tool as the PRC attempts to “normalize” its excessive maritime claims. In a region rife with maritime disputes, employing the CCG, a domestic law enforcement agency, in disputed waters is a not-so-subtle attempt to add a veneer of legitimacy to the PRC’s claims.

To further legitimize its sovereignty claims, the PRC passed a spate of maritime legislation in 2021, including a law requiring advance notification for vessels traversing its purported territorial waters. If the PRC seeks to claim waters as sovereign territory, what better optic than having a fleet of CCG cutters floating in them, attempting to enforce domestic law? By increasing its coast guard capacity and complementing it with robust maritime legislation it claims it can apply over disputed waters, the PRC is setting the conditions for the CCG to be the unrivaled maritime police of the South China Sea.

Next Steps

Looking ahead, policymakers, allies, and partners need to anticipate how an increasingly capable CCG with broad legal authorities will be used to advance PRC interests and what impact this will have in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

With the largest fleet of distant-water fishing vessels, the PRC is widely considered to be among the worst perpetrators of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. IUU fishing has a detrimental impact on communities, destabilizes regions, and harms local and national economies. Whether in the South China Sea or off the coasts of South America, Oceania, or Africa, there are increasing reports of PRC distant-water fishing fleets pillaging fishing waters. In August 2020, the Ecuadorian government requested U.S. Coast Guard assistance after receiving reports of nearly 350 PRC fishing vessels operating on the outskirts of its EEZ in the vicinity of the Galapagos Marine Reserve. With global fish stocks dwindling, it is in the interest of the world—and the PRC—for a growing CCG to better regulate China’s massive fishing fleet.

This leaves open the possibility for continued (albeit limited) cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard and the CCG on the high seas. The two services already participate with other regional coast guards to combat IUU fishing as part of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. As overall Sino-U.S. bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, so do opportunities for cooperation. Coast guard cooperation addressing common maritime issues—such as search and rescue or countering illegal fishing, transnational crime, and piracy—could be one of the few remaining “diplomatically palatable” channels for communication between the two countries (similar to how the U.S. Coast Guard has been one of the few open channels to Russia during lows in bilateral relations).

Cooperation is limited, however, when the PRC asserts that its so-called historic rights to waters within the nine-dash line supersede international law. If a Philippine or Vietnamese fishing vessel is inside the nine-dash line but fishing within its nation’s legally guaranteed EEZ, the PRC has unilaterally remade maritime legislation to contend that these vessels are in violation of Chinese law and thus under CCG jurisdiction. When CCG cutters swarm disputed waters and intimidate foreign fishing vessels, it is contrary to responsible and acceptable coast guard behavior.

The PRC now possesses a CCG increasingly capable of influencing the maritime domain to its liking. With this in mind, it is imperative that regional coast guard capacity is strengthened, especially for South China Sea littoral nations. Facing a growing CCG, regional countries need fundamental coast guard capabilities to protect their maritime jurisdictions and secure their waters closer to shore. By continuing efforts to enhance partners’ coast guard capacity, the United States and its allies and partners can help ensure maritime governance does not succumb to the PRC’s version of maritime sovereignty, in which a strengthened CCG has jurisdiction across the entirety of the South China Sea.

Study Presages Action

Chinese academics will continue to study and analyze the United States’ strengths. The parallels between Chinese scholarly articles examining the U.S. Coast Guard and the evolution of the CCG suggest the PRC takes a pragmatic approach—choosing not to “reinvent the wheel.” Publications studying foreign institutions the PRC wishes to model should be examined closely, as they may presage PRC policy and desired capabilities.

In a telling sign, a search for journal articles about the U.S. Space Force indicates it is a topic of growing study. Among the first search results? An in-depth article published by a People’s Liberation Army unit titled, “The Current Status and Analysis of the U.S. Space Force’s Institutional Changes.”²⁴