In the early 2000s, the threat of fast-attack craft and fast inshore attack craft in the Persian Gulf dominated tactical and operational decision-making. The littoral combat ship (LCS) was born from this environment and the operational mind-set it inspired. But the strategic seascape has changed with the reemergence of great power competition, and the Navy has shifted focus to coordinated theater campaigns. In this contemporary context, the deployment of a solitary LCS surface warfare (SUW) mission package marginalizes its combat effectiveness. Instead, the LCS deployment model should be built around a surface action group (SAG) of two or more SUW-configured LCSs.
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