In what I hoped was a satirical ode to 1984, the large red sign with white block type read: GET THE BOOK OUT. READ THE BOOK. DO WHAT THE BOOK SAYS.
Sadly, this was not satire. These signs hung in Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) classrooms in Newport. The command trains midgrade and senior officers to lead the nation’s sailors in peacetime and future conflicts, but messages such as this contribute to developing officers with rigid mental models better fit for the slow, higher command–driven conflicts of the past rather than the agile, hyper-paced fights the Navy is likely to experience in the future.
Contrary to calls from leaders Navy-wide to think critically, these signs reveal a deeper truth. Although the Navy recognizes the value of new ideas, institutionally and culturally, it is reluctant to give them voice.
In an effort to intercept some possible criticism, I would like to make two concessions up front:
- When you are junior, you have a responsibility to learn processes as instructed and carry them out as such.
- Many standard operating procedures and instructions were written in sailors’ blood and must be diligently followed.
I purposely am highlighting midgrade to senior leader training at SWOS. The command also trains ensigns and lieutenant JGs, but for these recently commissioned officers and division officers whose sea time is still minimal, SWOS must continue to provide strict instruction. I am partial to the Pablo Picasso quote that one must “learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist.” In other words, when you are new or in a new assignment, read all publications and instructions and learn from the experience of those who came before you. Eventually you will have your turn to iterate.
Thinking Required
Unfortunately, some wisdom and iterations have come at great cost to national assets and to our shipmates. We owe it to their memory to learn and apply these hard lessons. However, how can you identify which instructions were written in blood? More directly, how can you tell which instructions are standing by to be rewritten in new blood?
No instruction has all the answers or is in final form. An excerpt from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident report on the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) collision illustrates this fact: “The NTSB has found that the operating procedures provided to the John S. McCain for the [Integrated Bridge and Navigation System] were inadequate. Specifically, procedures for the ganging of throttles and the transfer of steering and thrust control between bridge stations were incomplete or nonexistent.”1 In this case, it was unknown to the officers and crew that these procedures would require revision—and that it would come at such a high cost.
Because we cannot always know if an instruction is in need of revision, Navy leaders have a responsibility to question assumptions, experiment with alternative solutions when able, and encourage others to do the same. This will become only more necessary as the Navy continues to introduce new technologies to its ships and prepares to face ever more threatening enemies at sea.
The red signs that hang in SWOS’s classrooms undermine this imperative. Their messaging implies a focus on teaching the officer corps what to think, rather than how to think. Worse, it signals a leadership style that pays lip service to critical thinking, rather than attempting to internalize it.
The question I cannot help but ask is: In a future conflict, are instruction-bound, unimaginative officers the ones we want as leaders? I could not find that in the book.
1. National Transportation Safety Board, “Collision between U.S. Navy Destroyer John S. McCain and Tanker Alnic MC, Singapore Strait, 5 Miles Northeast of Horsburgh Lighthouse,” 35.