Navy and Marine Corps integration must improve so the Sea Services can compete against peer competitors in the future operating environment (FOE). For Navy officers serving in Marine Corps units, this integration is standardized with the Fleet Marine Force Warfare Officer (FMFWO) program and exhibited by the FMFWO insignia. While the insignia represents a level of familiarity and experience with the Marine Corps beyond that of most Navy officers, it fails to adequately prepare them. The Navy and Marine Corps must restructure the FMFWO program to develop sailors capable of seamless collaboration between the Sea Services.
The current FMFWO program has poorly defined objectives and fails to represent a specific skill set or ability. SECNAVINST 1412.10A, which governs the FMFWO program, provides minimal guidance. It states that the FMFWO designation “signifies an achieved level of excellence and proficiency in Marine Corps operations and indicates a fundamental understanding of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and its components.” This fails to identify the level of excellence, proficiency, and understanding it calls for. This lack of clear guidance has left the program ill-equipped for success and misses an opportunity to develop sailors that can add significant value to the Marine Corps’ mission.
The Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) that outlines the training and education required to earn the FMFWO insignia omits skills and knowledge necessary for Navy officers to successfully integrate with a Marine Corps unit. The most obvious shortcoming is that the PQS fails to use MCDP 1, Warfighting, as a primary reference. Navy officers, qualifying for a designation intended to represent “excellence and proficiency in Marine Corps operations,” are not properly exposed to the philosophy that underpins Marine Corps operations. In addition, while the PQS does introduce candidates to tactical fundamentals, it falls short of adequate preparation for a combat environment. The axiom “every Marine a rifleman” permeates throughout the organization. Yet, Navy officers who wear the Marine Corps uniform are not held to the same basic combat skills standard. These issues must be addressed if Navy officers are expected to operate with Marines in the FOE.
The FMFWO curriculum does not include a look toward the future of Marine Corps operations. As the nation emerges from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, military thought is evolving to address new threats and environments. In the Navy and Marine Corps, many of these new concepts, such as expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), are still in their embryonic stage. They should be in the curriculum. Medical providers must understand the nature of these concepts to provide appropriate medical care. Medical planners must understand the complexity of distributed operations to develop casualty evacuation procedures. Civil Engineer Corps officers must understand the tactical requirements of such an environment to equip Navy construction battalions to support Marines. Candidates for the FMFWO insignia are the closest touch point between the services and therefore have a professional responsibility to understand the FOE.
Addressing the problems with the FMFWO program must begin with a revision of the governing instruction. The language must be clear and precise to create a framework around which an appropriate PQS and training program can be built. This revision must include a requirement for candidates to achieve a level of military knowledge and tactical proficiency that enables them to effectively participate within the framework of a maneuver warfare campaign. The governing instruction must make clear that wearers of the FMFWO insignia, while still Navy officers, are capable of assuming the role of provisional Marine rifleman.
To properly equip Navy officers to serve as a connecting link to the Marine Corps, the FMFWO PQS must be restructured. It must be grounded in MCDP 1. In addition, the revised PQS must place a premium on tactical proficiency and survivability. Critical to this is the Battle Skills Training (BST) program and a requirement that all candidates complete it. The FMFWO program must integrate itself into this existing Marine Corps program that directly addresses many of its weaknesses.
Addressing the future of Marine Corps operations is a necessary and integral component of a competent FMFWO training program. Close consideration and study of the FOE must be required of all FMFWO candidates. Including concepts such as EABO into the curriculum will further this end. In addition, candidates must demonstrate their ability to integrate and apply the skills specific to their military specialty to such an environment. In doing so, the program can ensure that Navy officers who earn the FMFWO insignia are capable of informing policy and doctrinal decisions that affect the Sea Services.
A new governing instruction would solve the fundamental flaw in the FMFWO program: a lack of direction. The revised instruction would require candidates go beyond the current standard and demonstrate themselves capable of fully integrating with Marine Corps units across the range of military operations. This direction guides candidates and instructors toward a program that emphasizes an ability to apply the knowledge gained throughout the curriculum.
A restructured PQS that emphasizes the philosophy of MCDP 1 and the tactical proficiency measures of the BST will develop officers capable of integrating into Marine Corps units. Armed with the philosophical knowledge of MCDP 1, they also must demonstrate tactical proficiency through completion of the BST. The BST provides an opportunity for Marines to annually demonstrate their proficiency in those skills deemed most critical. The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) describes a future in which “war’s violent essence will never change” and in which Marines and sailors will face “ danger, fear, exhaustion, and privation.” For sailors to operate in such an environment, they must be trained in the same battle skills as the Marines they fight alongside.
The relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps is critical to the nation’s ability to project power from the sea, and the FMFWO program perhaps is the best example of that relationship. However, as the global military landscape evolves, so too must the FMFWO program. The FMFWO officer program must build a better framework to develop Navy officers who serve as the link between the services.