With more accurate, up-to-date information, Marine units tasked with emergent humanitarian missions such as Continuing Promise 15 in Leogane, Haiti, will be better prepared to conduct civil-military operations. (U.S. Marine Corps / James R. Skelton)
Routine reconnaissance missions can provide Marines with vital planning information.
During January 1991’s Operation Eastern Exit, “The information ... in Mogadishu possessed by the mission’s forces was dated and inaccurate. The two CH-53Es had to fly over embattled Mogadishu for 20 minutes searching for the Embassy compound.”1 This precarious experience illustrates the critical importance of continually confirming, evaluating, and updating suitable entry points. Even though the time and location of the next military operation is unknown, phase zero for that operation has already begun. Accurate, off-the-shelf reports confirming entry points and key terrain are vital to crisis response and will reduce risk for future Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders. Through routine and episodic phase-zero reconnaissance missions, the service must build a repository of information to plan crisis response in time-constrained environments.
Obstacles to Overcome
Under the geographic combatant command (GCC) structure, the Marine Forces component command has no functional authority over Army, Navy, or Air Force assets. When a West Coast Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) departs homeport, operationally it falls under the maritime component, primarily focused on littoral and deep waterways. In contrast, the land component command does not own expeditionary ground reconnaissance (EGR) units, nor does it have any tasking authority over the MEUs. The theater special-operations command has formal tasking in the campaign plans for operational preparation of the environment (OPE), and yet the Special Operations Command (SOCom) does not have the manpower needed for such a large task. The Marine Forces component command, on the other hand, is a long-term stakeholder in the success of MAGTFs abroad. However, they never receive operational control of the MEUs, nor do they own major operational plans from which to derive information gaps that drive EGR tasking. This is how the current command structure in the GCCs clouds what role each should play in approving phase-zero reconnaissance.
Another major barrier is found in embassy defense attaches (DATTs). As power brokers for all military operations during peacetime, DATTs have unique personalities and often ambiguous objectives. Their collection requirements pertain more to human intelligence than to MAGTF-specific requirements. Furthermore, the time needed to brief and gain approval for reconnaissance missions through an embassy is far greater than that required to assemble a MEU.
Finally, no demand signal has been registered for routine phase-zero reconnaissance missions, meaning there is no process in place that indicates the need for them. When planners try to imagine future conflicts, MAGTF entry points for a crisis in an unidentified country for an unknown military objective may not seem urgent. However, urgency should not be conflated with importance. Under the current system, intelligence requirements (IRs) that support crisis operations are either assigned a low priority or not prepared at all. Therefore, MEUs receive no list of IRs to collect against before they deploy. Despite abundant capability, the demand is not being registered or disseminated.
Landing zone reports collected during the 11th MEU’s phase-zero recon were used within two months, here by a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter providing relief after floods and mudslides in May 2017. (U.S. MARINE CORPS / JAMES R. SKELTON)
Exploit the Opportunity
The Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs) and MEUs already have the capabilities to conduct phase-zero reconnaissance in permissive environments. Training and readiness manuals already include measures defining what constitutes mobility, reporting, and force protection in built-up areas. MEFs and MEUs train to these standards in small teams. They have the equipment, task organization, and leadership to succeed at these missions. As a small piece of the MAGTF, they are suited to move throughout permissive environments collecting information on physical terrain and infrastructure relevant to amphibious landings and other operations. All of this is valuable for ship-to-shore connectors. As long as the recon missions do not surpass these training-and-readiness standards, no additional legal authorities are necessary.
This solution has the additional benefit of invigorating intelligence repositories among the service and stakeholders throughout the Department of Defense. The Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Enterprise is already tackling this and making great strides. The results of phase-zero reconnaissance missions help with both refining operational plans and conceptualizing contingency plans. Those responsible for maintaining these repositories should be required to compare the data obtained with needs as they arise. Such an ongoing comparison will yield gaps that provoke new collection efforts. The repositories should not merely hold information of potential value, but also illuminate areas that could be vulnerable during time-constrained execution.
Among the secondary positive effects of this concept, the more MAGTFs begin to send small teams into permissive regions, access to the surrounding areas by larger units will likely increase. As the Marine Corps Operating Concept notes, “There is a strategic relationship between forward presence and access.”2 Continuous reconnaissance missions in and around permissive environments could be the origins of a robust and effective amphibious advance force operations.3
The Concept Realized: A Recent Case Study
During its 2016 WestPac deployment, the 11th MEU successfully hurdled these barriers and executed a proof of concept reconnaissance mission. According to the after-action review (AAR), the MEU sent a six-man reconnaissance team into Sri Lanka for the sole purpose of conducting overt collections in support of potential MAGTF crisis operations. The team included a reconnaissance captain to interface with the DATT and other foreign officers, and a staff sergeant team leader with most of his organic recon team. For 13 days, the team surveyed 20 different sites in 4 major cities, generating helicopter landing zone reports, beach landing site reports, port reports, and airfield reports. To make it more advantageous for the DATT, the recon team agreed to conduct three engagements with the host nation military and to answer six additional IRs. The intelligence section of the MEU analyzed the final products, and a 106-page intelligence summary of the entry points throughout Sri Lanka was created and sent to higher headquarters for wider dissemination. Informal copies were sent to SOCom’s Integrated Survey Program team, the DATT, and Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.4
Forty-six days after the EGR team left the country, a Reuters article stated: “Floods and landslides in Sri Lanka have killed at least 91 people while more than 100 are missing after torrential rain ... as soldiers fanned out in boats and in helicopters to help with rescue operations.”5 The deputy DATT later informed MEU leadership that a landing zone report that had been provided during this proof-of-concept operation was already in use for military humanitarian assistance operations near the flood zones. Thus, the concept proved to be feasible, repeatable, and valuable.
Challenge the Status Quo
As with any innovation, arguments against this concept abound. One is that phase-zero reconnaissance is a part of OPE, which is a Special Operations Force function only. The theater special operations commands have positioned Pacific Command augmentation teams in nearly every embassy in the Pacific theater, and similar teams by other names in the other geographic theaters. Additionally, SOCom has the Integrated Survey Program that accomplishes a task similar to that of phase-zero reconnaissance. These activities have been operational for more than a decade, yet the Marine Corps still lacks a repository of confirmed MAGTF entry points for each region.
The Pacific Command augmentation teams are undermanned and overwhelmed with their own objectives. The Integrated Survey Program focuses on diplomatic facilities—which could be valuable to the MAGTF, but not necessarily. Neither program places any priority on entry points for amphibious surface connectors and Marine rotary and tilt-rotor lift. Phase-zero reconnaissance should be viewed as complementary to, not competitive with, Special Operations Force activities in the OPE realm. Tenets for successful implementation of the Marine Corps Operating Concept include conditions where Marine forces “both contribute [to] and benefit from unique and complementary capabilities” as they integrate with Special Operations Force units.6
A second argument is that MAGTF commanders, specifically those of a MEU, do not “own” the battlespace, so they cannot conduct reconnaissance. However, during peacetime phase-zero operations, no one—not even the geographic combatant commander—owns battlespace. All land is owned by sovereign nations, and U.S. embassies have the final approval for any U.S. actions that take place within those borders. This does not negate the responsibility of the Marine Corps to shape its future operations within a given region—just as it does not prevent Special Operations Forces from conducting OPE. While many activities require special authorities or operational directives, reconnaissance of key terrain and physical infrastructure does not. There is no need to hide the true objective from the host nation, nor to seek any additional legal authorities.
A third argument against phase-zero recon is that any outstanding IRs will be collected using overhead imagery when needed. This presumes that overhead imagery alone is enough to plan crisis operations. But overhead imagery has its limitations, and reporting from trained Marines who have walked the ground should never be discounted. Furthermore, satellite resources will be even more scarce immediately following a crisis. The time-compressed environment inherent to crisis response will exacerbate this scarcity.
How to Facilitate Action
Implementing this concept on a broad scale only requires some creativity and innovation; there is no gap in capability in the operating force. No change in doctrine, organization, or training is needed. Instead, the Marine Forces component command, as a primary stakeholder in crisis response, should advocate for shared responsibility within the task of OPE in the GCC campaign plan. The MEFs must conduct initial planning and approve reconnaissance missions long before MEUs sail from homeport. Multiple levels of Department of Defense and Department of State bureaucracy must approve these missions before execution. Finally, even though the Marine Forces component commands, in concert with Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, already maintain repositories of data, managers of these repositories must actively identify gaps of information relevant to MAGTFs. These gaps will signal the need to create tasks for MEUs and other EGR units, provided that ongoing analysis and interpretation of the databases occur holistically.
If each MEF and deployed MEU were to conduct one phase-zero reconnaissance mission per year, the Marine Corps would accumulate entry point data for more than 80 countries or regions in just 10 years. These missions are low-risk and low-cost, but they will pay huge dividends during crisis response. As the AAR of Operation Eastern Exit in Somalia indicates, it is vital to have accurate information on key terrain before a crisis occurs. Phase-zero reconnaissance should not be seen as a new concept, but rather a familiar capability to be employed more aggressively. Episodic MAGTF ground reconnaissance missions in permissive environments can be implemented immediately; they are necessary to buy down risk for future MAGTF commanders and executors.
1. Adam Siegle, “Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991,” Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, 1991, vi.
2. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operating Concept (Quantico, VA, 2016), 11.
3. Jim McCallum, “Helicopter Doctrine Development (HMX-1),” Flight Line 1, no. 4 (8 July 2014), https://www.mca-rnarines.org/2014/07/08/helicopter-doc- trine-development-hmx-1.
4. 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, “After Action Review: Proof of Concept for Phase Zero Reconnaissance during the WestPac 16.2 Deployment” (USS Makin Island ARG, 2017).
5. Reuters, “Sri Lanka Landslides, Floods Death Toll Rises to 91; Over 100 Missing,” 26 May 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-disaster-idUSKB- N18M0ZN.
6. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operating Concept, 9.
Captain Williams is a warfighting instructor at The Basic School. He has deployed on three MEUs and one Special Purpose MAGTF crisis response as an infantry officer, reconnaissance officer, and Special Operations Force liaison officer. He commanded the recon company attached to the MEU where he observed phase-zero recon in action.