“Have a seat please, sir, and I’ll go get your orders,” the clerk said. I scanned the waiting room of the Camp Pendleton Personnel Administration Center (PAC) orders section and chose one of the less-battered chairs. Magazines were strewn across tables—the room was a less gloomy version of a DMV office.
My phone buzzed—a calendar alert reminder that I needed to pay my toll account. Over the weekend our family had taken a road trip. California transit authority installed automated cameras at each exit along the toll road; pictures of license plates were taken as cars exited and the customer was sent an itemized bill at the address associated with the license plate. I navigated to the transit authority website and paid the toll online.
Why can’t the Marine Corps implement similar civilian technology for processing PCS orders? A clerk could swipe a Marine’s CAC-card to initiate a diary entry when they leave or join a unit—a far more efficient process to update pay and entitlements than the “wet signature” paper process. The labor saved would cover the start-up cost – probably within the first 60 days of use. In “First to Fight,” we’re told the Marine Corps heritage is one of ‘institutional theft’—a quality described as a necessary Marine Corps way of life.[1] Why not inject a little institutional theft into the archaic field of Marine Corps administration?”
Putting my phone away I looked around the waiting room. Chain of command photos posted by the entryway showed commanders from the lowest level up to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I heard these leaders, and anyone like myself born prior to the 1990s, have been dubbed “Digital immigrants.” Meanwhile the majority of the force, Marines who were born in the 1990s and 2000s, such as the clerk processing my orders, were “digital natives.” Born into an information-rich, densely interconnected world of the 21st century, digital natives have an ability to navigate an increasingly complex world which diverged radically from what dinosaurs like myself, thought as “correct” and “effective.”[2] Scanning magazines on a nearby table, a headline caught my eye: The Fine Art of Franchising. Leafing through it I learned how small franchises have begun using predictive analytics, the study and analysis of customer’s online activities and buying habits, to provide franchise-level customer-specific products and price points. “The franchise model,” the article said, “has seen its foundation transformed by breakneck advances in data analytics, turning what once were arts into hard science.”[3] A cursory Google search of ‘predictive analytics USMC’ on my phone produced few results.
This seems an area that could be of value to the Marine Corps. Based on what the corporate world is doing, there are benefits to be reaped from predictive analysis in the manpower field—particularly for recruiting and retention.
“Sir, I have your orders,” the clerk said, interrupting my thoughts.
Approaching the customer service desk I noted the fastidious layout of the orders section: two rows of clerks, each sitting behind a desk in an assembly-line proximity, with a printer toward the back of the room. In terms of physical layout, the PAC was a prototype of reductionist philosophies championed by 19th-century steelmaker Frederick Winslow Taylor. With stopwatch in hand, Taylor studied every facet of steel production, determining the optimal distance between the machinist and his tools, and the optimal speed for internal conveyor belts. Taylor became known as the pioneer of a revolutionary practice called “scientific management”—a hypothesis that the industrial workplace could be ruled by science.[4]
Several years ago these clerks (and their capability to record diary entries in the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS)—the “gold standard” for personnel information) were at the unit level. However, during the post-Cold War drawdown, an emphasis upon standardization and streamlined processes fueled the Corps’ development of a consolidated PAC. A concept originally announced in 1978, the PAC took over a decade to implement, when MARADMIN 441/99 directed that all Marine Corps units would consolidate their administrative functions “above the traditional battalion/squadron level.”[5]
Like industrial-era machinists toiling away on the assembly line, I observed clerks receive their action items, scanned copies of personnel administration documents called electronic personnel action requests (ePAR). Upon receipt of an ePAR, the clerk verified appropriate signatures were in place, researched and processed the appropriate alpha-numeric data entry, then submitted the material to the section supervisor who approved or rejected the entry. Section chiefs and officers oversaw the process, ensuring efficiency. The PAC was a prime example of reductionist theory in motion: the idea that everyone being their most productive leads to the best overall results.[6] The PAC construct would work in a constant environment; however, the process fails if any of the variables are modified—such as a decrease in PAC manning or an increase in the speed or volume of information fed into the system.
A recent Marine Corps Gazette article discussed the inadequate “baseline” information currently maintained by Marines. The authors, understanding the complexity of the future operating environment, urged the development of a means to identify additive skills and attributes such as the ability to think, adapt, and collaborate with allies and partners. The authors stated that these outlying skills could make the difference between success and failure in not only conventional and irregular missions, but measurably increase the overall quality of Marines and the effective ness of their teams.[7] Sports fans, and many manpower officers, will recall a similar argument made in the book “Moneyball” —a case study of the Oakland Athletics’ dissatisfaction with traditional baseball statistics.
The clerk slid the orders across the desk and asked “Can you please verify your name, EDIPI, and detach dates are right?”
Another hand-jammed product, another example of inefficiency, I thought as I reviewed the orders, looking for any indications of key-punch error. Imagine retail clerks punching in number sequences instead of using bar-code scanners!
Looking over the orders I recalled a manpower initiative discussed during the December 2017 ground combat element conference. The Ground Board 2-17 message highlighted the institution’s inability to “objectively measure impacts of personnel resourcing decisions to the force nor to the mission.” The service also “lacks adequate tools to analyze and manage its human resources decisions in a constrained environment” and that “staffing metrics and/or red lines need to be developed that take into account the impact of leader to lead shortfalls, grade/MOS mismatches, low demand/ high density personnel shortfalls, non-structured personnel requirements, and individual augments.”[8] These recommendations, while relevant and much needed, unfortunately would present additional reporting requirements onto an already inefficient MCTFS data entry process.
What if we stop pouring gas into an engine that won’t start? Maybe there’s a better way to increase the compartmentalized and inefficient MCTFS diary entry process, allowing commanders and manpower officers at every level to provide accurate information regarding readiness?
It’s well known that “Marines take care of their own.” Marine Corps leadership is without comparison. But when it comes to managing Marines, there is much to be desired. What is the difference between leadership and management? Well-led organizations develop strong teams in the classic definition of leadership—assembling a group of people in a coordinated effort to achieve a common goal, while a well-managed firm is considered one that has effective personnel policies.[9]
To become a well-managed organization, the Marine Corps must make the hard decision to go “back to the future” by providing commanders and their unit-level administrators with MCTFS diary entry capability. The PAC, despite its engaged leadership and host of knowledgeable, hard-working Marines, has surpassed its utility. Proponents of the PAC would cite the digitization of permanent personnel records, development of the ePAR electronic submission application, and an array of web-enabled MCTFS reports as evidence of increased accountability and versatility. Although valuable, these modifications are a zero-sum gain considering the hierarchical, lengthy nature of MCTFS records updates at the PAC – the point of entry.
The greater issue is our institutional reliance upon inefficient, industrial-era practices. Simply put, Commanders and their staff need to be reestablished in the span of control, able to directly oversee day-to-day personnel administrative support to their Marines.[10] It seems unconscionable for the Marine Corps to pursue employment of cyber teams at the company level, and yet unit commanders and their administrative staff cannot approve routine MCTFS data entries, such as updating a Marine’s duty status.[11] Additionally, the Marine Corps must seek ways to improve the fundamentally inefficient nature of administration. Through innovations such as CAC-card enabled diary entry and digitization of routine correspondence, commanders can quickly and accurately portray readiness, regaining ownership of basic administrative functions associated with command.
Though a minor component of warfighting, personnel administration nonetheless plays a major role in supporting the warfighter, effectively getting them “off their sea bag” and into the fight. In Military Adaptation in War, Dr. Williamson Murray argues that the willingness of peacetime organizations to encourage initiative and independent thinking will play a major role in their ability to adapt under the psychological demands of combat.[12] It is time we embrace organizational change to overhaul the PAC construct and antiquated administrative practices. Let’s employ some old-fashioned ‘institutional theft’ and use solutions the corporate world has provided to haul personnel administration out of industrial era and into the digital age.
[1] Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: an Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 153.
[2] Stanley A. McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York, New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 20.
[3] Quinton Skinner, “The Fine Art of Information,” Delta Sky, April 2018.
[4] Stanley A. McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York, New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 37.
[5] Patrick Allen, “The Consolidation of Administrative Functions for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 1.
[6] Stanley A. McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York, New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 47.
[7] Mundy III, MajGen Carl E., Col Travis Homiak, and LtCol Justin W. Dyal, USMC (Ret). “Innovating to Meet the Uncertainty Ahead: Older, Wiser Marines; A SOF Approach To Shaping Tomorrow’s Force.” Marine Corps Gazette, January 2018.
[8] Ground Combat Element Board 2-17 Report, AMHS Message R 212127Z DEC 17.
[9] Kane, Tim. Hoover Institution Press Publication. Vol. 681, Total Volunteer Force: Lessons from the US Military On Leadership Culture and Talent Management. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2017), 47.
[10] Jim Rethwisch, “Improve Personnel Admin,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 2012.
[11] Shawn Snow, “Closer to The Fight: Inside the Corps’ Plan to Deploy Tech Experts Alongside Grunts,” Marine Corps Times, 27 Mar 2018.
[12] Williamson Murray, “Military Adaptation in War,” Institute for Defense Analyses (June 2009): 8-5.
Major McNeil is a manpower officer currently attending United States Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previous operational assignments include battalion adjutant for 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division where he deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2007 and to Afghanistan in 2008 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.