On-scene leadership and initiative have defined Coast Guard boat crews since their wooden vessels were powered exclusively by oars. Their response model also has changed little over the past two centuries: receive a report of distress or a breach of law, launch a boat with people and equipment capable of stabilizing the situation, and once on scene, allow those experienced and trusted leaders with a first-person view to make decisions and take actions that bring about the best possible resolution. It is a model that has proved successful and scalable, viable for cases requiring only a lone boat as well as for more complex incidents that necessitate the sortie of all available vessels.
But the culture is shifting. Advances in communications and tracking technology carried on board the high-powered aluminum boats now employed at the service’s multimission stations, coupled with the maturing of a tactical-level command-and-control scheme centered on commissioned officers and an enlisted rating of professional radio watchstanders, threaten to end the long-standing and successful tradition of on-scene leadership.
Coast Guard boat stations operate more like a local fire or police department than a traditional military unit. Crews conduct regular underway patrols and stand ready 24/7 to provide assistance in emergencies or to act on intelligence. Enlisted personnel in pay grades ranging from seaman apprentice to chief petty officer staff the boat crews in duty shifts. According to the Coast Guard blog, “When the Coast Guard saves a life, 80 percent of the time, the individual thanks a Coast Guard boat crewmember. Seventy-seven percent of all boarding and sightings are due to Coast Guard boat crews protecting our shores.”1 Prior to 9/11, oversight of boat operations primarily was a function of the parent station, which maintained its radio guard and provided a knowledgeable officer of the day to support underway assets by making required notifications, dispatching additional resources, and acting as a sounding board for questions or concerns.
The commanding officer or officer in charge was responsible for the entire enterprise and by policy served as an approval authority for certain high-risk evolutions, such as the deployment of a boat swimmer or operations in shoal water. Search-and-rescue mission coordinators (SMCs) at the group level in the chain of command were responsible for the prosecution of specific search-and-rescue missions, but they only were assigned to lengthy cases when the search object was not immediately found, when the scope of the incident involved multiple units or agencies, or when media interest was especially high. In large part, decision making was left to those on scene risking their lives, with shoreside infrastructure providing a supportive rather than command-and-control role.
This long-standing dynamic shifted after 9/11 with the establishment of sectors and the service’s adoption of new communications and tracking equipment, notably Rescue 21 and the Automatic Identification System. Together, these developments have created an avenue for direct operational control of boat crews by those on shore, a situation junior officers and professional radio watchstanders seem to view as an opportunity to get documented involvement in crisis without getting physically involved.
Sectors consolidated operational command and control for all Coast Guard surface units within their assigned region regardless of their mission type. Multimission boat crews now report to the same command center and chain of command as vessel safety inspectors and pollution investigators. And what a complex chain of command it is. In a best case scenario, for a crew to reach an officer with authority to suspend a search following a false alarm requires briefing the command center watchstander, the command center supervisor, the response department chief, and then, often on a conference call with all these parties, the SMC, who then decides whether to suspend the search. The model was intended to improve unity of effort across distinct mission types, but operational crews view it as a frustrating labyrinth of junior officers and command center staffers removed from the scene who unnecessarily delay decision making and jam radio frequencies and cell phones with incessant briefing and notification requirements.
More troubling are the orders that can be generated at each level of this chain of command, some from positions without clear authority. The “U.S. Coast Guard Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue [IAMSAR] Manual” clearly illustrates the problems with its illustration of the chain of command for search-and-rescue at the district and sector levels.2 Unlike the IAMSAR manual, which provides a simple four-tier linear chain, the addendum interjects, with a combination of solid and dashed lines, two command center watchstanders, a command center duty officer/operational unit controller, and a command center chief or supervisor, all in line between the on-scene coordinator (OSC), normally the first unit on scene that acts as the decision maker, and the SMC, the on-shore decision maker responsible for the overall prosecution of the case. For two decision makers to talk in this model requires three to four additional conversations with radio and phone watchstanders, whose biggest interest generally is ensuring proper documentation of the response.
The district model seems to bypass the OSC role entirely by linking individual search-and-rescue units to the sector with no direct connection between the OSC and the sector. An element not captured in the manual is the boat crew’s parent station, which likely maintains its own communications watch, an officer of the day, a command duty officer, and a commanding officer or officer in charge who continues to retain approval authority for high-risk situations.
Depending on the disposition of the local station command, many boat crews also will be required to make parallel briefings to the sector and the command-and-control infrastructure in place at the parent unit. If there are disputes between these competing commands, the decision-making process becomes even more delayed and confused. Adding this element to the addendum’s chain of command complicates efforts to maintain a culture of on-scene initiative, as each level exerts its own real or assumed authority on a boat crew.
Sectors increasingly have touted and formalized their role as a tactical command with launch authority and now are able and expected to monitor and direct the movement of boats and the response to every case from start to finish, demanding regular updates and briefings prior to any underway crew taking independent action. They now serve a predominantly command rather than support function. In the latest references, the commands of local stations have largely been removed from the operational decision-making process, despite their authority to approve high-risk evolutions, and are instead relegated to ensuring logistics and training needs are met to keep boats and crews ready to sortie.
Because search and rescue is the highest priority mission of the service, the lengthy chain of command documented in the addendum has permeated all mission areas, to include port security and law enforcement. Notably, the command duty officer position at sectors has been identified as the standing initial incident commander for all incident types, a designation inconsistent with basic principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), which advocates command be assumed by someone who is physically on scene.
How did it happen that a service known for empowering its on-scene personnel has inserted so many levels in its operational chain of command?
When the Coast Guard established the operational specialist (OS) rating it created a group of professional watchstanders who justifiably needed to carve out a niche. Similarly, newly established sectors created large enclaves of junior officers eager for command and operational relevance. Because the OS rating and junior officers staff sector command centers, and because they are responsible for running the technical software that creates maritime search patterns, they were offered roles in updating the addendum and in writing the manuals defining the roles and responsibilities of sectors and command center staffs. This allowed them to formalize manufactured roles and gain greater authority over operations. Boatswain’s mates, who command boat crews and stations, seemingly raised no objections to what can only be termed a sector power grab. For that failure they now suffer the delays and frustrations of having to make repeated briefings and to ask for permission, or if they take initiative, to justify and defend their actions to multiple layers of command.
A return to the long-standing culture of on-scene leadership for response boat crews is a worthwhile goal, but how do we start?
First, it is important to understand who is physically in charge of a boat when under way. Leading every crew is a coxswain, a title that identifies an experienced and knowledgeable leader vested by Coast Guard regulations with total authority over the boat and those on board. With this authority comes an expectation that the coxswain will lead his or her crew to successful completion of all assigned missions and respond at all times to hazards to life and property and violations of law. The regulations manual creates the framework for on-scene leadership, but it was published in 1992, while the references focused on the tactical command-and-control role of sectors are newer and in greater number.3
Attaining certification as a coxswain is no easy or rapid process. It requires certification as a crewmember and months of on-the-job training, testing, and self-study. Throughout the process, prospective coxswains are under way as members of operational crews, performing missions, building trust with their peers, and gaining experience. When they have completed the break-in process and successfully demonstrated their knowledge and ability during an oral board and check ride and command of their parent station certifies them, there is confidence in their ability to lead crews, to respond appropriately to assigned missions, and to respect their limits and know when to ask for help and support.
In contrast, many sector watchstanders qualify to positions of authority over a coxswain without ever leaving the confines of a command center.
Coxswains have the knowledge and experience to lead at the scene; watchstanders and their supervisors have the means to support their efforts. Both roles are critical to a successful outcome, but authority in most cases must rest with those risking their lives and performing the work at the scene. This dynamic must be realized and captured in policy and doctrine, and command centers must embrace a more supportive rather than authoritative role.
Districts and sectors should provide objectives then allow crews to determine how best to achieve them, avoiding micromanagement and standing ready to provide support when needed. Radio watchstanders should be just that, personnel answering radios and directing calls, not unnecessary and redundant insertions into an operational chain of command that impede efficiency and communication. Anything less risks the safety of responding crews and that of the people they work so diligently to aid.
1. Commander Mark Moland, USCG, “OSMS and YOU: Boat Forces Operations,” 1 April 2015.
2. U.S. Coast Guard, “U.S. Coast Guard Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual” (2013).
3. U.S. Coast Guard, “United States Coast Guard Regulations” (1992).
Editor’s Note: This essay won second prize in the 2017 Coast Guard Essay Contest.
Chief Petty Officer Null is an accomplished operator across the Coast Guard’s full range of search-and-rescue, law enforcement, security, and disaster response missions. He currently is assigned to the service’s training center in Yorktown, Virginia, as the supervisor of all Boatswain’s Mate “A” School underway training.