The Navy and Merchant Marine relationship is a storied one. Originally, the two were almost indistinguishable. In fact, John Paul Jones—generally considered the “Father of the U.S. Navy”—spent much of his life as a merchant seaman like many sailors of his day. Over time, however, the Navy-Merchant bond has waxed and waned. In times of war, the services remain close; in times of peace, they often grow apart. Technology, politics, legislation, and economics also drive this dynamic relationship.[1] Today, the Navy sailor and merchant mariner are more-or-less formally estranged.
In 1978, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). This convention “promotes safety of life and property at sea” by standardizing seaman training and certification.[2] STCW has become the global standard; some nations even have extended its requirements to their navies. The United States is not one of those nations. Title 46 of the U.S. Code (USC) enacted the STCW requirements into domestic law, but unfortunately, because warships are considered “public vessels” Title 46 does not apply to them.[3] As a result, the Navy has never trained to STCW standards.
Policymakers now are looking at ways to bring Navy sailor and merchant mariner training into closer alignment. This effort is the focus of the Military to Mariner (M2M) program, a congressional initiative that breaks down the legal and administrative barriers between Navy and Merchant Marine credentials. Doing so serves three pillars of national security.
Strategic logistical depth. If the United States should fight a conventional maritime war with a near-peer power, the Merchant Marine will have to carry the logistical load. Merchant Marine manpower, however, is not at a capacity to do this and training new mariners is expensive and time-consuming. Credentialed former Navy personnel could make up the difference—if their Navy training counted toward or included Coast Guard licensing.
The problem of personnel shortages is not new. Prior to U.S. involvement in World War I, the Merchant Marine was insufficiently manned to support the war effort. Now, Congress sees a similar weakness as near-peer competitors China and Russia expand maritime influence. Consequently, Congress enacted legislation to supplement a poorly manned Merchant Marine. Of some 41,000 U.S.-flagged vessels, only 82 operate internationally. The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure foresees a debilitating manpower gap, noting that U.S. mariners are nearing retirement age without sufficient replacements.[4]
Logically, Navy-trained sailors ought to be able to fill this gap—but the Navy has not been credentialing sailors in compliance with 46 USC. For this reason, section 568 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires service secretaries to “identify and rectify gaps that exist between current military standards and commercial credentialing standards.” This requirement is the core of the M2M program, which has begun to overcome the barriers established by 46 USC and repair this significant national security deficit.
Surface navy professional development. In the wake of the 2017 collisions, the Navy has adopted several Merchant Marine practices to improve surface warfare officer (SWO) training. The “Comprehensive Review of Recent Force Incidents” postulates that: “Naval professionals develop practical experience by applying what they learn in the classroom with the tasks they perform at sea.”[5] The problem is that the Navy does not provide all the requisite classroom instruction, damaging an officer’s ability to practice or “perform at sea.” M2M overcomes this gap by connecting Merchant Marine curricula with Navy schoolhouses. A good example is the Navy’s decision to use accredited Merchant Marine classroom radar training. Competent radar operation is the sine qua non of safe navigation—and yet, until now the Navy has never had accredited radar training. It is thus unsurprising that the Review often cites poor radar operation as a causal factor.[6] M2M is bringing the fundamentals of Merchant Marine training to the Navy.
Economic security. M2M benefits the economy by making the lucrative maritime industry accessible to separating sailors. The merchant credentialing process is prohibitively complex for former Navy sailors—but M2M eases this burden, making a career as a professional mariner newly viable for many.
There are two barriers to credentialing that M2M helps remedy. First, at present a separating naval officer’s at-sea experience does not count for much. M2M allows 60 percent of sea time, plus a modest portion of training, to count toward STCW license endorsements. Unfortunately, M2M does not wholly satisfy STCW requirements.[7] Hence the second barrier: filling the training delta. Ideally M2M someday will translate a SWO’s experience directly into a merchant license; this is not yet the case.[8] When the program reaches maturity, the Navy will be able to produce Merchant Mariners en masse, benefitting both sailors and the economy as a whole.
M2M is moving in the right direction, but it is far from fully developed. For the program to reach its full potential, the Navy needs to make a substantial course correction. The M2M program should be given formal recognition within the navigation and seamanship warfare areas. This would mean a full academic sojourn for post-division officer SWOs. Through rigorous training at Kings Point or one of the six state maritime academies, a junior officer could return to the fleet with their 3rd Mate license in hand in one academic year. They will embed new expertise into the fleet while remaining capable of supporting wartime logistics if needed.
Fleet Admiral Ernest King argued in World War II that “The Merchant Marine is a strong bulwark of national defense in peace and war, and a buttress to a sound national economy.”[9] He could not have been more correct. Today, the Merchant Marine and Navy have an estranged yet symbiotic relationship. Some separation is inevitable, but M2M rebuilds the bridge that once proudly connected the two. The way ahead is clear: bring M2M to maturity.
[1] The most notable piece of legislation pertaining to the Navy-Merchant relationship was the Jones Act of 1920, a protectionist measure enacted after the strife of World War I.
[2] International Maritime Organization, “International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978.
[3] “Public Vessels” United States Code, title 46, sec. 2109 (2010).
[4] RADM Mark H. Buzby, USN (Ret.), “The State of the US Flag Maritime Industry,” Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (12 January 2018).
[5] US Fleet Forces Command, “Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents,” (Norfolk, VA: US Fleet Forces Command, 2017), 43.
[6] Ibid.
[7] There are two parallel credentialing requirements: STCW, which is the IMO requirements, and “National Endorsements,” which are established by the United States and apply only to U.S. Mariners. Currently, the US Navy does not credential any National Endorsement. Here, “STCW license endorsements” refers to both requirements.
[8] STCW requirements can be daunting and even indecipherable in some cases. In these respects, M2M provides resources, information, and a support system through the Navy Credentialing Opportunities Online app.
[9] Philip Kaplan, U-Boat Prey: Merchant Sailors at War, 1939-1942, (Great Britain: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2014), 99.
Lieutenant Henry commissioned from Massachusetts Maritime Academy, is a Surface Warfare Officer, and holds a 2nd Mate’s license. Until recently, he served at Surface Warfare Officers School and was a founding member of the M2M program. He will be reporting to the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) as a department head in the spring.