Japanese soldiers load equipment into an amphibious assault vehicle on the USS Ashland (LSD-48) during exercise KAMANDAG 2 in October. KAMANDAG is an acronym for a Tagalog phrase that means “cooperation of warriors of the sea.” (U.S. Navy/Joshua Mortensen)
Since the end of the tumultuous Cultural Revolution in 1976, China’s focus has turned outward. The country once more seeks global power and recognition, and its return to the oceans is seen in China as a form of manifest destiny. President of the People’s Republic of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping aims to realize “The China Dream,” which projects that China needs a strong military to protect its national interests and thus be prosperous. The Chinese military’s advancing capabilities in the past two decades support this dream. The official defense budget is more than $175 billion (with unofficial estimates much higher) and is expected to increase more than 8 percent next year.1 The growing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) boasts a 300-vessel fleet, including 2 aircraft carriers and 63 submarines. Its strategic focus on “offshore waters defense” has expanded to include “far seas protection,” a sign of growing global aspirations.2
The Art of Maritime War
Chinese naval strategy is heavily influenced by Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Retired Vice Admiral Fumio Ota, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, says China sees many principles in the ancient military work that are applicable to today’s strategic environment.3 In particular, he emphasizes three of Sun Tzu’s ideas—“all warfare is based on deception,” “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” and practice disintegration warfare to disrupt enemy alliances—as the essence of current Chinese naval strategy.4
Deception is demonstrated by the classic tale of strategist Zhuge Liang (181–234 C.E.), as recounted in the 14th-century work The Romance of The Three Kingdoms.5 The states of Wu and Shu were at war with the more powerful Wei enemy and joined forces to prepare an attack. The leaders tasked Zhuge Liang with an impossible order—obtain 100,000 arrows just days before the battle. Zhuge Liang set out in secret along the Yangtze River with a fleet of ships, each with a small crew alongside dozens of straw figures. The enemy launched its arrows at the imposing armada only to hit the sails and straw sailors. Once Zhuge Liang had captured enough arrows, he withdrew and returned to his surprised superiors. The tale is taught in schools, modeling the ideal of an inferior opponent who masterfully deceives the enemy without firing a shot.
China employs the principle of winning without fighting very well. On the surface, China espouses a nonconfrontational approach to power projection in the South China Sea, and in 2017 the State Council Information Office reported China seeks “mutually beneficial cooperation.”6 Yet China also cites historical rights (rejected by an international tribunal) to vast territory bounded by the “nine-dash line” and parts of the “first island chain” (see map on pp. 20–21).
In 2013, China began an island-building campaign in the Spratlys, an archipelago just inside the nine-dash line and contested by several other nations. The islands are important because they can serve antiaccess/area-denial purposes as a base for aircraft, missiles, and ships to challenge the U.S. Navy and its allies. Author and naval strategist Robert Haddick has told Congress that China’s land-based coastal missile systems are approaching ranges up to 1,000 nautical miles, posing a serious threat to forward-deployed U.S. naval forces even outside the line.7
The United States estimates China has reclaimed more than 3,200 acres from the sea and barrier reefs.8 Construction on these islands is incremental and covert, so that international attention abates with time. Chinese maritime militia and coast guard vessels may harass U.S. and other nations’ ships, enjoying the asymmetric advantage of being considered non-military threats. In this way, China gains strategic ground without fighting.
Disrupting Alliances
These developments make the role of alliances more critical, as the United States cannot project sufficient power solely with its own ships or bases. The U.S. Navy maintains a global presence, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. forces are forward deployed to Pearl Harbor, Guam, Yokosuka, and Singapore. The country maintains strong defense ties with South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Australia. This “give[s] the impression that the U.S. Navy is using its alliance framework to suppress China’s rise,” according to retired PLAN Major General Yao Yunzhu. Following Sun Tzu’s advice to disrupt an enemy’s alliances, China’s naval strategists compete with the United States for strategic partners. This is one of the major goals of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The U.S. National Defense Strategy outlines the current strategic outlook. It details a “weakening, but resilient post–WWII order” in which U.S.-led “alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security.” It labels the reemergence of long-term strategic competition with revisionist powers, particularly China, as the primary threat to U.S. national security. Should the competitive trend continue unchecked, the Defense Department’s position is that the United States will be less capable of deterring aggression. It provides a view of China as using its military power to coerce neighboring states, achieve hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, and in the long-run replace the United States as the global superpower. The Department of Defense aims for a transparent and non-aggressive relationship with China. Moreover, it aims to deter aggression, maintain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and support partners against coercion.9
The Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” outlines the challenge in commerce-governed Mahanian terms. It presents China as coercive and competitive, seeking to achieve its goals through intimidation and action short of armed conflict. The CNO provides four main lines of effort, one of which emphasizes expanding and strengthening the network of partners. Here, the focus is on prioritizing key relationships with countries that share U.S. values and interests.10
Philippine Marines pose for photographers on board a ship anchored off Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has been more conciliatory toward China than his predecessors but has maintained a military presence around the disputed territory. (Associated Press/Bullit Marquez)
China’s competition for alliances is seen in the recent shift with the Philippines. The U.S. Navy historically enjoyed a positive relationship with the Philippines. After obtaining post–World War II independence, the Philippines allowed the United States to construct several bases there, and the two countries have had a mutual defense treaty since 1951. Despite most U.S. bases closing in 1992, the relationship was renewed in 1998 through the Visiting Forces Agreement, which has provided the foundation for annual joint naval exercises. President Rodrigo Duterte’s 2016 election, however, has distanced the country from the United States and led to a closer relationship with China. Most important, Duterte largely has ignored China’s construction on territory the Philippines claims. This marks a significant change to the status quo.
Duterte’s erratic personality may be partly to blame, but the change also signals the power China has exerted in persuading foreign leaders. Also, U.S. credibility as a defender of world order is seen as relatively weak, and U.S. Navy power projection arguably has been less assertive as the United States has sought Chinese cooperation regarding North Korea. The Philippines is concerned with development and security and wants to expand assurances of those cornerstones by pursuing better relations with a more powerful China.
Continued naval engagement can help. In 2017, the U.S. Navy and Philippine forces conducted counterterrorism training (Exercise KAMANDAG) and operations (Tempest Wind), highlighting ongoing, if limited, cooperation.
Strengthening alliances
The U.S.-Japanese alliance often is taken for granted as a regional stabilizer, but it will continue to be among the most valuable deterrents to Chinese island expansion. Japan remains the strongest U.S. ally in the region; Seventh Fleet depends on the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in deterring conflict. Japan’s long, complicated history of conflict and distrust with China only heightens Japan’s security concerns. Therefore, Japan and China do not make likely partners. Japan’s democratic government shares U.S. interests in free trade and a liberal world order, and the country is the world’s third largest economy. A more robust Japanese Navy—at present a defensively postured force—could help the United States push back against China in contested waters.11
In particular, Japan is a logical partner with whom the U.S. Navy could conduct additional freedom of navigation operations to uphold international law. Conducting them with allies lends more weight to the action. Such operations call attention to China’s excessive claims while reducing the likelihood of a maritime flashpoint—because they are not outright provocations—over something that is not an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland.12 The United States also can demonstrate the strength of its security commitments by conducting some operations close to the Japanese-administered Senkaku islands that China claims and often patrols with coast guard and militia vessels. The United States recognizes an obligation to defend the islands under Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.
There also is a case for forging a deeper alliance with India, the world’s largest democracy.13 It has the world’s second largest population and a booming economy, and it is expanding its naval capabilities. The U.S.-based Center for Naval Analyses notes that India views China as a long-term threat because of territorial disputes and increased Chinese power projection through naval deployments to the Indian Ocean.
While India has departed from its Cold War–era non-aligned policy, the United States and India may never agree to a formal alliance because of distinct national interests. Nevertheless, two easy areas of cooperation could be antisubmarine warfare and information sharing. India primarily is concerned with the Indian Ocean, not the South China Sea, and believes that China would not restrict its commercial trade in the latter. Therefore, India has avoided conflict over China’s island building and has not participated in freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea. But India would consider more joint operations in the Indian Ocean, such as the 2015 Malabar naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal that included the United States and Japan.14
Understand to Win
A stronger network of partners has many advantages. As the U.S. Navy demonstrates greater power projection with a more competitive strategy, it could reassure leaders across the region. It could bring greater joint dialogue, help deter threats through multilateral action, and demonstrate limits to Chinese hegemony. A U.S. strategy that matches interests and alliances will help advance a competitive, nonaggressive stance to deter Chinese coercion—and resist Chinese attempts at “disintegration warfare.” A wise course, as outlined by retired Admiral James Stavridis, would be one where the United States confronts China when necessary but cooperates with it when possible.15
1. Brad Lendon, “China Boosts Military Spending 8% Amidst Ambitious Modernization Drive,” CNN, 5 March 2018.
2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,” 15 May 2017, 24, 37, 40, 65.
3. VADM Fumio Ota, JMSDF (Ret.), “Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly, 73, no. 2 (April 2014).
4. Sunzi and Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963): 66, 88.
5. VADM Fumio Ota, JMSDF (Ret.), Center for Regional Studies (lecture, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, September 2017).
6. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, Beijing, January 2017.
7. Robert Haddick, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States,” testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Cong. (2015).
8. Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress,” 12.
9. U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” January 2018: 2, 3, 4,.
10. U.S. Department of the Navy, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” (Washington, DC: 2016),.
11. Andrew Erickson, interview by Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat, 25 April 2017.
12. Robert Manning and James Prystup, “Stop the South China Sea Charade,” Foreign Policy, 17 August 2017
13. ADM James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 193.
14. Michael Connell, Nilanthi Samaranayake, and Satu Limaye, “The Future of U.S.-India Naval Relations,” CNA, February 2017: 1, 17, 21.
15. Stavridis, Sea Power, 197.
Ensign Bilden completed his temporary assigned duty upon commissioning on board the Mexican Navy’s ARM Cuauhtémoc BE-01 as its invited U.S. Navy guest junior officer. He is a surface warfare officer on board the USS John Finn (DDG-113) in San Diego. This essay placed second in the Naval Historical Foundation’s Voices of Maritime History Competition.