U.S. and allied missile strikes on Syria’s chemical weapons infrastructure—at first glance—appeared symbolic and ineffectual. Critics were quick to point out that the strikes were ineffective and that “one night of airstrikes is not a substitute for a clear comprehensive Syria strategy.” Some notable experts claimed that the mission accomplished nothing because the attacks did “little to protect Syrian civilians from further atrocities at the hands of the Assad regime.”
The truth is—as closer examination bears out—the strikes were a model for operational and strategic planners to emulate. Assessment of the strategic effectiveness of any military operation must start with an understanding that war—or the use of military force—as an instrument of policy is typically a much duller knife than renown strategist Carl von Clausewitz has led military thinkers to believe. It is easy to forget that in some previous military operations, the United States has used much more force to achieve much less, at significantly higher costs in the nation’s blood and treasure. U.S. forces have occupied capitols and overthrown regimes but still left the United States wanting in terms of long-term strategic success.
Successfully combating the proliferating threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction requires a credible threat of limited strikes and a willingness to execute them if necessary. Detractors perpetuate three myths to discredit limited strikes. First, they argue that the risks of limited strikes escalating into a wider conflict are almost never worth the gains. This hyping of escalation risks quickly becomes paralyzing and can serve as the rationale to do nothing. Failure to act—even in a limited way—underpinned the United States’ reluctance to punish Assad for crossing red lines during the Obama administration. That failure also thwarted arguments that the United States should take military action to slow efforts by North Korea and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Inaction has allowed these festering problems to become increasingly intractable.
While no previous set of post-Desert Storm U.S. missile strikes came with as much escalation risk as those recently conducted against Syria, the administration adeptly controlled escalation and avoided the real risk of being drawn into a wider conflict with Russia or Iran. Escalation was avoided through careful target selection, superb military execution, and the uncommon collaboration of our key allies.
It is notable that while the United States has conducted more than a dozen punitive missile strikes over the last quarter century, this was the first time the United States, France, and Britain acted in concert to conduct restrained strikes in defense of their common values and interests. Bringing together these key allies—all members of the U.N. Security Council—likely limited the possibility that Russia and Iran would respond militarily and escalate the situation. The strikes avoided escalation while steering clear of the perils associated with regime change. At the same time, the strikes preserved U.S. and allied options to conduct additional strikes should Assad again unleash chemical weapons against his citizens.
The strikes on Syria also dispelled the second myth that the United States is incapable of conducting strikes that are “both effective and limited.” That argument follows from the belief that the U.S. military’s strong cultural preference to suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) would transform what begins as “an ostensibly limited attack” into a much broader air campaign that would inevitably trigger escalation.
The recent strikes illustrated that despite Syria’s substantial air defense capabilities—not to mention Russia’s deployment of world-class air defenses to Syria—the U.S. military conducted these strikes without a traditional SEAD campaign. The Syrians proved incapable of responding and only managed to fire some 40 missiles after the allied missiles had struck their targets.
Designing effective limited strikes challenges planners to discern precisely the right amount of force to achieve what are inherently limited ends. This precision can be focused on Syria’s chemical weapons infrastructure—as they were on 14 April 2018—or on a North Korean missile launcher. These types of focused, precision strike missions can be accomplished successfully without extensive SEAD, widening of the air campaign, or escalating into full-scale conflict.
The “pin prick” nature of limited missile strikes feeds a final myth that “unless you can get it all, it is not worth striking.” Avoiding targets near Russian and Iranian forces constrained planners’ ability to exact a heavier price from Assad’s regime. It also restrained their ability to eliminate completely his military’s capacity to use chemical weapons. The fact is that limited strikes likely never will be sufficient to dismantle an adversary’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. However, as demonstrated by Israel’s 1981 strikes on Iraq’s Osirak reactor and the United States’ 1986 strikes on Libya, limited strikes can substantially slow weapon development programs, punish bad behavior, and buy time for diplomatic and economic measures to exact a toll. Most important, they can dissuade leaders who inevitably will appear weak in the face of unanswered punitive strikes.
Messaging is one of the most powerful aspects of a limited strike. Limited strikes are akin to early 20th century gunboat diplomacy. They allow the United States to deliver a shot across the bow to signal that belligerent behavior will not go unanswered. The strikes on Syria were effective because they sent a strong signal that the United States and its allies are able and willing to take combined military action to enforce the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. This action also proved that the United States and its allies can strike—with relative impunity—to punish a belligerent and degrade his WMD capabilities.
The past two decades have shown that bad behavior and serious threats from rogue regimes do not get better with U.S. inaction. The strikes on Syria suggest that limited actions—even given their very limited gains—can sometimes be better than no strikes at all. The impact of the operation against Syria will reach much farther than Damascus. They signal that the United States—with or without allies—is now willing to reinforce important diplomatic imperatives with limited military action if necessary.
That message already is resonating with other aggressors.
“Western powers drew a red line on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and they acted,” explains Dakota Wood, a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation. “So if the U.S. now says that it will not tolerate North Korea's offensive nuclear capabilities, Kim's government will have to take that statement seriously and consider potential military consequences."
The U.S. willingness to conduct effective, limited strikes in Syria is a game changer. Kim Jong-Un’s new affinity for denuclearization may have come out of the kindness of his heart or it may have come from fear of incoming missiles.
Captain Adams retired from the Navy in 2016 after 31 years of service. He commanded Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost, Afghanistan, the USS Santa Fe (SSN-763), and the USS Georgia (SSGN-729B). He is a frequent contributor and a contributing editor to Proceedings.
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