The crisis facing Marine aviation appears to have hit the Corps’ F/A-18 Hornet fleet particularly hard. According to one report, as of April 2016, only 87 of 276 of these aircraft were flyable. Without enough mission-capable planes in which to train, Marine Hornet pilots were averaging just under nine flight hours per month, with some squadrons averaging far less.1 This is well below the minimum time required to maintain safety and basic proficiency.2
Marine leaders and their allies in Congress hope to address the Hornet crisis by directing additional funding to aircraft maintenance and supply programs.3 But could even this significantly improve readiness? Having been overworked during operations since 9/11, many of the Hornet airframes are simply worn out. According to William Taylor, Assistant Commandant for Aviation (Sustainment):
Just the fundamental material condition of the aircraft is almost unmanageable at this point. We send it to the depot, they peel back a panel, they find corrosion, they peel back another panel. There’s been, to my knowledge, at least half a dozen F-18s recently that were inducted into the depot only to be stricken halfway through when they realized it’s not even salvageable.4
Instead of trying to salvage the unsalvageable at great cost, it is worth considering an alternative—begin eliminating Marine Hornets altogether.
The Corps could decide to stop throwing good money into bad Hornets. It could immediately scrap the worst aircraft and deactivate a corresponding number of squadrons. This would allow the service to harvest spare parts for Hornets still in relatively decent condition (either in the Marine Corps itself or for Navy aircraft). Congress and Marine Corps leaders could shift maintenance dollars from F/A-18 depot maintenance to other programs in which there would be a greater return on investment. The remaining mission-capable Marine Hornets, together with the service’s best F/A-18 pilots and maintainers, could be consolidated into a few squadrons. Although fewer in number, they would maintain higher standards of proficiency, with safer and more reliable aircraft and many more training flight hours per pilot.
This course of action would leave the Marines with fewer operational fighter squadrons, at least until the F-35 is fully fielded. But in effect, that is the situation already. With so few aircraft mission-capable, only a fraction of the Marines’ Hornet force can be deployed. The choice is whether to focus on a few high-quality squadrons or retain a lot of inadequately prepared ones.
In the meantime, the impact on operational effectiveness will be limited. The air-combat element of the quintessential Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the battalion-based Marine Expeditionary Unit, does not include the Hornet. Larger MAGTFs could receive fighter support from Navy carrier-based Hornets or, if ashore for extended periods, from Air Force F-15s, F16s, and F22s.
The Hornet’s days in Marine aviation already are numbered. By accepting the inevitable and managing its obsolescence, the Corps could maximize the utility of the aircraft’s remaining years of service and avoid devoting precious resources to a failing platform. A decision to begin eliminating the Hornet would not be an easy one, but it might be the right one.
1. Jeff Schogol, “The Marine Corps’ Aviation Fleet Is in Peril,” Marine Corps Times, 26 April 2016.
2. Carl Forsling, “What Happens When Pilots Aren’t Allowed to Fly?” Task and Purpose, 26 July 2016, http://taskandpurpose.com/marine-pilots-arent-flying-nearly-enough/.
3. Jeff Schogol, “Pentagon Watchdog to Review Struggling Marine Aviation Readiness,” Marine Corps Times, 1 November 2016.
4. Megan Eckstein, “Marines: Ground, Aviation Readiness Depends on Increased Funding for Spares; Pilot Program Aimed at Keeping Hornets Available to Pilots,” USNI News, 6 April 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/04/06/marines-ground-aviation-readiness-depends-increased-funding-spares.