The arrival of the F-35B Lightning II in the inventories of many NATO nations is likely to fundamentally alter how NATO conducts air support to amphibious operations. This aircraft will bring a new level of capability to core missions, including counterair, antishipping, and traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Amphibious task force commanders and their staffs will have to adapt to successfully leverage the capabilities provided by the F-35B. Its arrival will force a sea change and will require a deliberate effort to break the generational and service mind-set if the future amphibious force is to operate with a more integrated perspective.
NATO’s Aircraft Carriers
The next few years will see a dramatic increase in the capacity and capability of NATO’s amphibious forces, beginning with the availability of F-35s on board many smaller short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. Of the NATO F-35 partner countries, the F-35B variant is being planned for use on board the amphibious assault ships of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States and is being explored by Spain.1 Great Britain also is in discussions regarding deploying a U.S. Marine squadron on board HMS Queen Elizabeth within the next few years.2
In addition, the USS America (LHA-6) and Tripoli (LHA-7) do not have well decks, allowing for larger hangar decks with overhead cranes for aircraft maintenance and more aviation fuel bunkering. Although this design provides less overall flexibility to the amphibious force than LHDs (capable of simultaneous flight deck and well deck operations), it brings a significantly enhanced aviation capability. Some envision these ships operating as the striking arm of the task force (similar to the “Harrier carrier” model used in Iraqi Freedom), while the remaining ships and their embarked aircraft would support landing force movement.
Taking into account the increase in aircraft capacity on newer NATO STOVL carriers, as many as 30 to 40 more sea-based fighters may be available in a future amphibious task force (ATF). This increase, coupled with the increase in overall mission capability brought by the F-35B, means the ATF commander (CATF) will have more aviation capability at his or her disposal than ever before. Doctrine and operational concepts will have to be reviewed and adjusted to fully leverage these gains.
Lightning II Versus Harrier
The landing force traditionally contains an air component, comprising predominantly lift aircraft and strike helicopters for close-air support (CAS), as well as a small element of fixed-wing strike aircraft. For many NATO nations, this previously has been addressed using variants of the AV-8B Harrier.
Although the existing AV-8B Harriers have some capability to project power ashore, their primary role normally is CAS for the landing force. Ordnance load and range limitations restrict most Harrier deep-strike operations. In addition, the aircraft has only a rudimentary antishipping capability, largely because it lacks a data link between aircraft and the ship. Many nations also did not retain an air-to-air capability in their Harrier fleets, and ISR support has been limited to nontraditional roles stemming solely from the ability to steer the laser-targeting pod to capture imagery for intelligence assessment post-mission.
Not only will the Lightning’s capabilities eclipse those of the Harrier, but a single aircraft will be able to conduct an array of air power functions. NATO planners must start to conceptualize the changes the F-35 will bring, including in overland strike. The F-35’s stealth may enable a role as a deep-strike platform or, more aptly, a larger role as an enabler for other strike platforms.
Defensive Counterair
As a multirole fighter, the F-35B will be equipped with the latest air-to-air missiles, including the AIM 9X Sidewinder, AIM 120C AMRAAM, and AIM 132 ASRAAM.3 Depending on the phase of the amphibious operation, F-35Bs used for defensive counterair would be under tactical control of the air and missile defense commander (AMDC) in the same command and control (C2) model used by the carrier strike groups.4 Although the Harrier could have been used in a last-ditch intercept role, the capability to launch air defense missiles will be a new concept for the ATF, and the mechanics, concept of operations, and procedures must be ratified and adopted by both the CATF and the landing force commander (CLF).
Air Power Contributions to Maritime Operations
“Air power contributions to maritime operations” is the air missions flown in support of the maritime component. Nominally, the maritime component sources embarked air assets to defend the force. However, unless a carrier is part of the ATF, the capability of the embarked fixed-wing aircraft on most NATO amphibious assault ships normally is limited to small niches of the air power spectrum. Therefore, enabling functions usually are requested from the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) to support the Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and the ATF. This is also the case for antisurface warfare (ASuW) missions.
In a typical amphibious operation, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and armed helicopters may be sourced to fill the ASuW mission, but there are times when an enemy ship must be struck from the air and there is no MPA or properly equipped helicopter available. In this case in the past, joint air assets were requested to fill the support requirement. This is another area where the F-35B could be employed.
Not only do the weapons carried by the F-35 facilitate its use in an antishipping role, but its sensors and information exchange capability will be a generational leap forward. The F-35 will provide an ISR capability to the amphibious force that previously did not exist. In addition, the Lightning II’s missile launch detection sensors will augment the naval AMDC’s capability to defend the force. Previously, the AMDC had to wait until a maritime sensor, usually a ship-mounted radar, detected an inbound aircraft or missile prior to determining the best weapon system to employ for defense. Furthermore, integration of the F-35 and the Aegis weapon system has been discussed and concepts for operation are in development.
Excess Sorties to the Joint Force
As a joint enabler, the F-35 may reduce maritime components’ capability shortage for defense of the force and potentially reduce JFACC support requests. In addition, integrating the F-35 from the maritime component into JFACC strike packages offers another level of synergy between the services. These two concepts could alter the relationship between the JFMCC and JFACC early in any campaign, and synergy of effort should be sought out and exploited in this phase.
New Opportunities
The impending arrival of sea-based F-35s in NATO nation inventories offers an opportunity to rethink current approaches for maritime air employment in amphibious operations. Previously, the AV-8B Harrier typically was not part of any overwater C2 process, as it was unable to effectively fulfill those roles until the landing operation commenced. The CWC structure in use by the maritime force and the subsequent supporting elements and control networks/procedures of the AMDC and ASuWC are foreign to the pilots embarked on amphibious assault ships, as those missions have not been part of the portfolio of the previous generation of assault support aircraft.
NATO’s Naval and Striking Support Force (StrikForNATO) oversees operational employment of the unique capability provided by a U.S. carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group. However, its strengths lie in amphibious assault planning and execution, and it likely would require support should NATO be engaged in a more complex multidimensional maritime problem. Further, U.S. amphibious assault squadron commanders are faced with the same challenge: possessing significant experience in amphibious operations but a dearth of experience in other high-end maritime warfare (antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine) that would be enabled by and required of the sea-based F-35B. The concept of an up-gunned expeditionary strike group must take this into account when determining the most logical CWC structure for operations against a near-peer state actor with significant capability to influence the maritime domain.
Finally, NATO planners should establish a concept for F-35B integration into future amphibious operations by reviewing and questioning the old assumptions that drove the creation of today’s doctrine. StrikForNATO is exploring a review of seaborne air control concepts, such as the Maritime Air Operations Center, in an effort to improve the efficiency and integration of maritime air into joint operations (and vice versa). However, and perhaps most important, regardless of the C2 model in use on board a specific aircraft carrier, NATO joint doctrine provides a solid foundation for both air and maritime components executing joint air missions. Improving this element of inter-component coordination remains a primary focus of the maritime air coordination community. As evolutions in aircraft capability emerge, NATO maritime elements, to include Allied Maritime Command, StrikForNATO, and national maritime operations centers, should continue to review and revise air C2 doctrine to evolve in conjunction with the increased capability demonstrated by aircraft upgrades and emerging model types to ensure the amphibious force remains capable and relevant in the overwater air control domain.
As the United States begins F-35 deployments to the Pacific on the Wasp (LHD-1) class, with NATO and Middle East deployments likely to follow, addressing these issues within the NATO command structure is growing in importance.5
1. Spain has not yet selected a replacement for its AV-8B Harriers or determined if upgrades to the Juan Carlos will be made to permit crossdecking of other nations’ F-35s. Esteban Villarejo, “F35B may be in Spanish Navy’s future,” DefenseNews, 20 April 2016, www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/naval-aviation/2016/04/20/f-35b-may-spanish-navys-future/83270268/.
2. Jon Rosamond, “US Marine F-35Bs will operate from Queen Elizabeth Carriers, USNI News, 17 September 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/09/17/dsei-u-s-marine-f-35bs-will-operate-from-british-queen-elizabeth-carriers.
3. Lockheed Martin, “The Weaponization of the F-35,” white paper, www.sldinfo.com/whitepapers/the-weaponization-of-the-f-35/.
4. Air and Missile Defense Commander.
5. David Larter, “Marines’ deadly fighter jet to make its first ship-based deployment next year,” Navy Times, 28 April 2016, www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/04/28/f-35b-deploy-2017-marines-scott-swift/83659104/.