(See M. Hipple, D. Follet, and J. Davenport, p. 12, April 2015 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—Ironically, if the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program had been managed properly, we would have ended up with a small warship about the size of the highly innovative 450-ton Danish Flyvefisken-class patrol vessel, which used off-the-shelf technology for weapon “modules” that allowed the ship to be used for different purposes. This would have been a tremendous achievement, because we would have had a small, low-cost, and flexible LCS that would have been an ideal first command for young officers and a perfect training ship for inexperienced sailors. But now we’re stuck with a large, overpriced, frigate-sized LCS that is too valuable to turn over to an inexperienced junior officer. And despite the original reason for the LCS, the Navy probably wouldn’t risk an expensive and vulnerable warship like this in a high-threat area, such as off the coast of Iran.