Lessons in Stoic Leadership
(See J. Burroughs, pp. 66–70, December 2014 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, U.S. Navy; Vice Director for Operations, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff—Ensign Burroughs’ prizewinning essay is a must-read for every young leader as well as those of us with a few more years of service in our Navy. His clear articulation of stoic leadership is among the most useful writings on this subject. As I read through it, I reflected on the fundamentals of shiphandling, especially the understanding of controllable and uncontrollable forces.
Ensign Burroughs encourages leaders at all levels to focus on the things they can influence and not everything under the sun. His advice to young officers to “concentrate on acting honorably and their reputation will follow” is sage advice. Well done, Mr. Burroughs . . . very well done!
More Maritime Strategists—Now
(See M. Hooper and T. Pham, pp. 24–29, December 2014 Proceedings)
Captain R. Robinson Harris, U.S. Navy (Retired), Captain Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Captain Dick Diamond, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Hooper and Commander Pham’s excellent article, which addresses the need for and ongoing actions to improve the development and employment of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy, contains a factual error (p. 29) in listing the “Center of Naval Analyses–sponsored Strategic (sic) Discussion Group.” The group’s name is the Strategy (not Strategic) Discussion Group (SDG), and it is not sponsored by the Center for Naval Analyses. The SDG is an independent group that is not sponsored by any business or government agency or department. It is composed of active-duty and retired military personnel, civilian government officials, academia and think-tank scholars/analysts, congressional staffers, and business-community executives who share a common interest in fostering a robust discussion of predominantly maritime strategy and policy issues. The SDG traces its origins to the mid-1970s. It has mentored a number of young officers with an interest in maritime strategy and policy concerns over the decades.
Where Are the Citizen Soldiers?
(See W. McGee, p. 10, December 2014 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mark Swinger, U.S. Navy—Second Lieutenant McGee makes many good points on how we as a naval service need to do a better job narrowing the gap between the military and civilian population. However, some of the conclusions he draws in comparing our governmental policies and armed forces to those of 1914 are somewhat flawed.
The assertion that “Pre–World War I European militaries had become increasingly professionalized” really only applied to the very small, yet highly professional British Army. Mustering around 100,000 men, the all-volunteer British Expeditionary Force was all but annihilated by the First Battle of Ypres in early October 1914. After those murderous opening two months of the war, the British Secretary of War, Lord Kitchener, initiated a massive recruiting campaign that led to the enlistment of millions of Britons.
While the armies of Germany and Russia did indeed have a professional officer corps, they were, in contrast to the British, supplemented by a staggering number of “citizen soldiers.” In Germany, every male between the age of 17 and 45 was liable for some form of military service. This resulted in a peacetime active-duty strength of some 840,000, with another 1 million men in reserve who were between the ages of 20 and 32. Men older than 32 provided over another 2 million Landwehr (reserve) and Landsturm (home-guard) troops.
While these numbers are substantial, they pale in comparison to the “Russian Steamroller.” At the outbreak of war in 1914, the strength of the Russian armed forces stood at some 1.4 million. After mobilization was complete, this number increased to a staggering 5 million. While there were certainly professionals present in the Russian military, many of these 5 million men were peasants who were pressed into service, had little military training, and oftentimes went into battle without a rifle.
While Second Lieutenant McGee was correct in citing that the officer corps of that era came from the aristocracy, I disagree with the similarity he draws between the elite of 100 years ago and American society today. The main difference is that much like their middle- and lower-class counterparts, the aristocracy in 1914 were liable for service to their country and were publicly shamed if they didn’t carry it out (which, as our author alludes to, is certainly not the case today in America). Siegfried Sassoon, the famous British poet and highly decorated officer from the Great War, often wrote about how he hated both the service and war itself. When asked why he continued to serve, his reply simply was, “Because it is my duty.”
Second Lieutenant McGee is correct in that we need a better dialogue in our society so we think long and hard before going to war. However, comparing our policies and forces to those of 100 years ago may be comparing apples to oranges.
Island Chains and Naval Classics
(See B. D. Cole, pp. 68–73, November 2014 Proceedings)
Ryan D. Martinson, U.S. Naval War College—Dr. Cole’s article could lead one to draw the conclusion that Chinese strategists and policymakers spend their time poring over the writings of the great Western thinkers on naval and maritime strategy for wisdom, inspiration, and intellectual succor. Add to this knowledge a sprinkling of homegrown Chinese strategists—Sun Zi and Liu Huaqing—and presto, you’ve got the intellectual foundations of Chinese maritime strategy.
This conclusion is wrong. Chinese strategists do sometimes cite the great Western thinkers in their works, but their understanding of many of these foreign ideas is superficial at best. Take Mahan, for instance. It is difficult enough to slog through his overwrought prose in English, let alone a half-digested translation. And so much of what he wrote simply has no direct relevance to contemporary China. Chinese scholars do admit Mahan’s towering position in the history of naval thought, so they cite him to lend some aspect of authority to their work—that is for style points, not for novel insights useful to their own cerebrations on China’s plight.
Those who grapple with original Chinese texts understand that the “maritime strategy” (haiyang zhanlue) that Chinese commentators and policymakers speak of is primarily an economic, not naval, concept. It comprises those elements of China’s grand strategy that involve the sea. And at the heart of that strategy is economic development. This leads to power and wealth, two things that have long been sought by Chinese leaders of every stripe since at least the late 1800s, two things the current regime knows can go a long way to mitigate the many problems it faces.
Hu Jintao’s 18th Party Congress Work Report (2012) highlighted the goal of turning China into a “maritime power.” A single sentence spawned countless monographs about what it means to be a maritime power and how China can become one. If one wishes to understand China’s maritime strategy today, this is the place to start. The consensus is that one of the prime standards for “maritime power” in the modern world is the capacity to fully harness the wealth-producing qualities of the sea. This means developing industries like marine-related manufacturing, marine resource extraction, fishing, and shipping.
To be sure, there is a national-security dimension to the maritime-power concept. Chinese analysts and policymakers alike agree that maritime powers should be able to “safeguard maritime rights and interests,” a euphemism for advancing China’s island and maritime-boundary claims. Thus, China is striving to build the capacity to deter American intervention in a conflict in Asia and, if push comes to shove, compel neighboring states to do its bidding. But Dr. Cole doesn’t mention a second major component of Chinese coercive power, and that is the country’s large and rapidly growing coast guard. Chinese cutters were behind the successful usurpation of Scarborough Shoal, the attempted eviction of Philippine Marines from the BRP Sierra Madre, the undermining of Japanese administration of the Senkaku Islands, and countless other provocations. The problem is that the systematic use of maritime law-enforcement forces to pursue expansionary policies in peacetime is a fairly recent phenomenon, and Chinese strategists have not learned it from Mahan, Corbett, Clausewitz, and their ilk.
The Case for an Expeditionary Frigate
(See G. E. Van Hook, pp. 50–54, November 2014 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—Captain Van Hook stated, “Growing dissatisfaction from within the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense over the lethality and survivability of the two current littoral combat ship (LCS) designs has led Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to direct the Navy to curtail its LCS buy from 52 to 32 ships.” We now have spent billions of dollars for a ship nobody seems to want, that few think will survive in battle, and that even fewer think is lethal enough to make much of a difference in the littorals. Given all this, the Navy is still not willing to admit defeat and still wants 32 of these lemons, rather than just bag the whole ill-conceived program and start from scratch.
Even worse, the Navy has recently released a request for information to industry seeking ideas for “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to replace the LCS. Rather than give industry a laundry list of requirements for these new warships, the Navy is asking industry to recommend what should be on those ships. Isn’t that how we got into this mess in the first place? We literally started building the LCS before we knew how they were to be equipped and what their final design would look like. That’s like building a house with no final blueprints and making hundreds of adjustments along the way. And the Navy wonders why a small warship that was supposed to cost about $250 million now costs almost $600 million.
Captain Van Hook goes on to say that “Lockheed Martin and Austal indicate that they provided redesigns of the two current LCS designs.” Why in heaven’s name would we want an enlarged version of a bad design? And we haven’t even mentioned the various mission “modules” for the LCS that are still not ready for widespread use on board those ships.
And to add a final insult to the American taxpayer, a new Absalon-type frigate costs about $340 million, almost half as much as the smaller and much less capable LCS. So, in effect, with the LCS we are paying a lot more money for a lot less capability in a warship.
We should terminate the failed LCS program immediately. The LCSs already built could be used for low-threat but necessary patrol missions, such as antipiracy duties or anti–drug smuggling enforcement.
The Navy should then thoroughly examine what it wants in a patrol frigate and specifically list all of the electronics, weapons, and structural requirements that must be part of the ship before construction begins. Only then should shipbuilders create designs that meet those exact specifications. It is also important to only use weapons and electronics that are on the market today, and not create new electronic systems or weapons while the ship is being built.
We need a versatile patrol frigate now. If we do all of this homework before we build a single ship, we would probably discover that the Absalon class could meet or surpass all of those requirements.
Commander Ed Griffith, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—We now have two LCS ship types with two training pipelines and two logistic pipelines—so far (with armament unavailable and vastly overpriced, but the Navy says someone is working on it).
Captain Van Hook’s suggestions are logical only if we are going to have three separate types of frigates or destroyer escorts (DEs). The underlying assumption that we should have three separate types of small combatants is unjustified. For littoral patrols supporting Marines ashore and defending against small PT boats, I think I would feel safer in a World War II DE than one of the new improved models.The Knox-class frigates and Brooke- and Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates served long and useful lives. Not having enough honor, courage, and commitment to down-select unsuitable ships as promised is going to cost us dearly in the future. We did not draw the line at 500, 400, or 300 ships. Will we be able to maintain a Fleet of 200 ships amid this fraud, waste, and abuse?
It’s Not So Easy Being Green
(See J. A. Corlett, pp. 56–61, November 2014, and J. Adams, p. 8, December 2014 Proceedings)
Commander Steve Shatynski, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I thank Commander Corlett for his candid analysis and indictment of the current brazenly political approach in the U.S. Navy toward its energy future. The emperor has been without clothes for some time since this incomprehensible strategy was formulated approximately five years ago. No doubt, this charade was driven by an administration intent on implementing its will with respect to green energy no matter the negative consequences to our military readiness.
How refreshing it would be to see our senior Navy uniformed leadership stand up and defend common sense by insisting that this purely political Navy energy policy will unacceptably cripple our country’s naval service.
Commander Corlett’s contribution represents a terrific opportunity and inspiration for our Navy leadership to take a stand for what is right, irrespective of the consequence.
Mel Luter, NavAir Aerospace Engineer (Retired)—Bravo Zulu for a job well done by Commander Corlett. He brought up many valid points about how the Navy could spend its taxpayer dollars more wisely. Unfortunately, his article, even though outstanding, only peeled a few layers from the onion. Another example that sheds additional light on the subject is an article in the Imperial Valley News on 25 July 2014, in which Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced a contract to Pacific Energy Solutions for solar panels. The Photovoltaic Array Project will provide renewable electricity to Navy and Marine Corps bases on Oahu, Hawaii. The article states the project will save taxpayers $1.6 million in the first year and will deliver renewable energy for a term of 25 years. The construction of the system is expected to take one year.
Notice the article does not give the cost of the system. The website for government contracts showed the Pacific Energy Solutions LLC, Boca Raton, Florida was awarded a firm-fixed-price contract (No. CR-131-14, dated 11 July 2014) for $334,135,534. Either that is a typo or the taxpayers need to know the poor stewardship demonstrated by Navy leadership spending their money. Again, I really appreciate Commander Corlett’s article urging the redirection of limited resources toward warfighting capability.
The Intellectual Warrior
(See E. J. Catagnus Jr., pp. 36–41, November 2014 Proceedings)
Leonard G. Shurtleff—I can offer an anecdote which illustrates General Alfred M. Gray Jr.’s style of command. While I was American Ambassador to the Congo-Brazzaville in 1989, we received an official instruction that members of our six-man Marine security-guard detachment would not be permitted to attend embassy social events where representatives of “criteria countries” (the Soviet Union, East Germany and other Soviet Bloc states of Central Europe, and the People’s Republic of China) would be present. This would mean that my wife Christine and I could not invite our Marines to attend the annual Fourth of July reception where all of our diplomatic colleagues, representing countries with which the United States had diplomatic relations, would be present. At these national-holiday affairs, all Americans in-country are always invited.
My wife was outraged and wrote to Commandant Grey to protest. The Marine security detachment was amazed that she would go straight to the top; they were even more amazed when she received a reply from General Gray overturning the instruction. The Marines in the detachment made my wife an honorary gunnery sergeant, an accolade that has an honored place in her study. More important, the Brazzaville Marines attended that year’s Fourth of July reception as our guests.