In a June 2013 Proceedings article titled “Sustaining Undersea Dominance,” I outlined the submarine force’s strategy in terms of “People, Platforms, Payloads, and Partners.” The essential themes of that strategy remain intact and are serving us well. We continue to train and operate a force that deploys far forward with minimal external direction. We are building Virginia-class submarines, the world’s best attack submarines, at the steady rate of two per year in a program that is the national standard for delivering high quality, on time, and on budget. We are tracking to continue that success as we design the next generation of ballistic-missile submarines that will replace our Ohio-class SSBNs as they wrap up 42 years of service. We are developing new payloads to increase the reach of our submarines and the impact of our undersea-warfare partners in the surface, aviation, and mine-warfare communities. Our sailors achieve success on deployment, and when absolutely necessary turn around on very short notice for unscheduled deployments. We recently celebrated the 4,000th successful Ohio-class SSBN strategic-deterrent patrol. They prove every day that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert was right when he said that the undersea domain “is the one domain in which the United States has clear maritime superiority.”
There is a lot to be happy about in the forward-deployed performance of our SSBNs, SSNs, and SSGNs. However, the satisfaction we get out of these accomplishments has the potential to be a really, really bad thing. Satisfaction is a step away from complacency and could lead us to ignore the fact that the issues affecting the future of undersea warfare will be very different from the issues we faced in the past. Looking ahead, we should be ever mindful of Intel CEO Andy Grove’s famous quote (and book title), “Only the Paranoid Survive.”
We have a lot to be paranoid about, as it turns out. We have to deal with competitors who are investing heavily in the undersea domain along with several years of reduced U.S. defense spending. Our biggest potential challenge, however, will not be our adversaries or our resources; it will very likely be a lethargic acquisition process that rejects change, stifles innovation, and slows the introduction of game-changing capability. To overcome these challenges and to succeed, we need to skillfully execute a strategy that balances long-term investments that sustain our foundation with the agility and the speed to make shorter-term investment decisions that can sustain our dominance during a period of rapid change.
That balanced strategy requires that we:
• Own the best platforms
• Grow longer arms
• Beat the enemy system
• Get on the same page
• Get faster.
Own the Best Platforms: Highly capable platforms are the foundation of our strategy. The range, stealth, and payload capacity they bring reinforce everything else. For example, the mere possibility of a submarine in an area stimulates a disproportionate adversary response in both peacetime and war. Russia’s recent press release describing its effort on 7 August to “expel” a U.S. submarine from the Barents Sea at a time when the nearest U.S. submarine was thousands of miles away serves to show how even a sophisticated navy can struggle with very basic things like target detection and classification. The inherent ambiguity that undersea superiority induces in potential adversaries can be highly leveraged, provided we maximize the capabilities of these platforms. Owning the best platforms to dominate the undersea domain certainly means owning the best ballistic-missile and attack submarines in the world. However, it also means much more than that. It means that we need a sufficient number of antisubmarine-warfare (ASW)–capable Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and MH-60 helicopters. They are the foundations of surface and air ASW.
Grow Longer Arms: From each of our platforms, we must extend our reach by “growing longer arms” with innovative and affordable payloads. Access without ability to generate the needed campaign effects is worthless. Nuclear submarines are very important nodes in our strategy; however, each submarine must be leveraged with payloads that expand its realm of influence in all corners of the ocean. Long-range cruise missiles and torpedoes that can go deep into enemy territory are needed to hold opposing targets on land and sea at risk. Largely autonomous sensors in space, in the air, and under the sea can support precision targeting of these weapons to precisely identify and destroy the most important enemy targets.
Critics sometimes tout diesel-electric submarines as the logical replacement for nuclear submarines in times of constrained shipbuilding. Diesel-electric boats are certainly exceptionally quiet and capable, but they lack the mobility to have the meaningful impact needed by a world-class Navy. However, there is a true hybrid solution that marries this far-forward presence with capacity and economy. That solution is a fleet of nuclear submarines that seed autonomous unmanned vehicles (AUVs)—not just as stand-ins, but as a true force-multiplier. Likewise, expendable unmanned aerial systems (UASs) can put our eyes above the waves, extending the organic reach of individual submarines.
By developing a mix of advanced AUVs and UASs that range from the near-expendable to the multimission-capable, we can combine these devices strategically to balance capability, cost, stealth, and risk of loss. As endurance and autonomy continue to improve, these vehicles will network together, pushing command and control back to shore as the nuclear submarine moves among the herd, harvesting data while always ready to deliver or direct kinetic effects with extended-range weapons or weaponized UAVs. The additional capability gained by adding unmanned systems to nuclear submarines provides the best balance of capability and capacity. Therefore, the unmanned systems and the payloads they deliver should be given both a prominent role and a corresponding investment as we go forward.
Beat the Enemy’s System: Given that U.S. undersea superiority will be challenged by future adversaries, we need to assume that the future will include an undersea counterpart to the existing anti-access systems that are currently focused on air and surface. We need to prepare for that future. To move forward and make wise investments, we must be able to beat the enemy’s system by countering his future investments. There is a huge opportunity to apply asymmetric capabilities as very expensive submarine-detection systems can often be deceived, overwhelmed, or simply disconnected by inexpensive devices.
Get on the Same Page: Coordinating manned and unmanned systems to establish “undersea control” where and when needed requires multiple warfare communities to get on the same page. This mission will rest squarely on the shoulders of an organization we are about to launch called the Undersea Warfare Development Command. This organization will work closely with the surface and aviation-warfare development commands and the Navy Warfare Development Command. Getting on the same page means managing seams between the undersea-warfare capabilities of submarines, strike groups, land-based aviation, and mine-warfare forces. Led under a common domain vision, warfighters can maintain undersea superiority in theater with fewer gaps and more capability. This is not just about submarines. For instance, P-8 Poseidon maritime-patrol/reconnaissance aircraft will play a huge role in strategy. Maximizing their capability, however, requires that we cue them and shorten their kill-chain with unmanned systems that do most of the open-ocean search, allowing each airframe to spend much more time fixing and finishing enemy submarines. To accomplish this effectively, the P-8s must operate as far forward as our air superiority permits while our submarines conduct the ASW mission in the far-forward regions. Likewise, our surface combatants are making great strides with updated sensors and weapons to excel at both offensive ASW and strike-group defense.
Some better tools will be needed to manage the seams, however, because the delineation between ASW regions will blur in wartime. Our common operating pictures must truly be common. Our exercises must be realistic in both scope and complexity. We must also prepare for a world in which cyber warriors fight each other to a draw and there are few communications and no electronic common-operating picture. In this world, getting on the same page will mean something different. It will require looser command and control. The side that prevails will be the side on which individual commanders act independently using much broader commander’s guidance than we typically use today.
Get Faster: We gained our undersea superiority in an age when the government was the largest investor in research and development. That is no longer the case. The private sector now invests more and innovates faster. We need to get better at leveraging private-sector innovation. Our acquisition process makes this very difficult. While we work with the Department of Defense and Congress to streamline the process, we need to skillfully navigate the system we have in order to insert technology at the rate that it is created. Failure to do so will cede the future to adversaries not encumbered by our current Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process. The reduced cost and risk associated with unmanned systems make them the perfect point of departure from traditional acquisition norms.
Renowned technical business titan Steve Jobs once said, “Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower.” Maintaining undersea dominance in a rapidly changing world surrounded by fast-moving technology will provide opportunity for leaders who are willing to be proactive in a Navy that has historically been reactive. As we develop the force that will sustain our undersea dominance we must be aware that fortune favors the bold.