Bring on the New Workhorses

Since the earliest days of the American republic, a small investment in coastal cutters has always provided a tremendous value and service to ensure national economic security. One suspects both major maritime strategists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett would have agreed on the vital but nonglamorous role these ships play in maintaining sea lines of communications or joining the main fleet to mass numbers for battle on the open seas. These coastal cutters have been called upon in every major conflict and yet when not at war, they are on duty providing a public service just offshore. They perform the endless and thankless dirty work of maritime-domain awareness, patrolling, inspecting, and protecting in all kinds of weather. The last set of these vessels was built 25–50 years ago. It is time to provide new ships to address emerging issues and maintain a tactical advantage in maritime security.

A medium endurance Coast Guard cutter (WMEC) is always assigned to the ocean region from Nova Scotia to the Hudson Canyon. Commander Task Unit (CTU) 44.1.1 is in charge of the waters from the shoreline out to 200 nautical miles or the edge of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This single ship embodies the nation’s sea power as the sole military and law-enforcement presence there. The major ports in this area annually move 215 million short tons of cargo, or approximately 10 percent of the national maritime commerce. The thousands of fishing vessels in the region collectively harvest 635 million pounds of fish worth over $1.1 billion.¹ The cruise-ship industry reports approximately 700 annual departures from the ports of New York and Boston alone.² And on this teeming, bustling sea, one aging asset from the Cold War era struggles to maintain a modern layered-defense strategy in an increasingly complex world.

A Tradition of Presence

The orders given in 1791 to Hopley Yeaton, the first master of the revenue cutter Scammel, from Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton were not very different from the duties imparted to Coast Guardsmen today, except that they have grown in scope and complexity. Departing from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the Scammel was specifically tasked to patrol the waterways and not stay in a fixed location. Hamilton stated, “You will have a right for examination, and it will be your duty to seize vessels and goods in the cases in which they are liable to seizure for breaches of the Revenue laws.”³ This is not unlike today’s USCGC Campbell (WMEC-909) departing from Portsmouth for the same purpose over 200 years later. Compared with the Scammel, the Campbell is a larger vessel with a similar size crew, with ten primary missions. There were six previous cutters named Campbell. (The most recent, WPC-32, fought in World War II; she rammed and sank U-606 off Greenland in 1943 during convoy duty.) Today’s Campbell routinely patrols the waters off New England inspecting fishing vessels, responding to search-and-rescue calls, stopping drugs and illegal immigrants from entering port, practicing national defense drills, patrolling the maritime boundary, reporting oil spills and stranded whales, reporting aids to navigation that are not watching properly, and if necessary, acting to execute Maritime Security Response Operations using specialized forces to stop any hazard threatening the U.S. coast. Since the founding of the Revenue Cutter Service, this has been the principle of “effective presence,” having the right unit in the right place at the right time to create maritime security.⁴

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a useful framework to discuss maritime-security issues. The United States has still not ratified the 1982 treaty but accepts it in whole as customary international law. A seaborne threat to the United States should be stopped as far away from the shoreline as possible. This “reactionary gap” gives time for government institutions to implement countermeasures to keep the public safe. The high seas, defined as the area beyond 200 nautical miles from shore, would be the optimal place to stop a threat, but it is a very large and empty location with little surveillance or assets. It is unlikely a threat would be discovered or stopped in this zone. The EEZ, 12 to 200 nautical miles, is an area that traditionally has the effective presence of a WMEC to project sea power for maritime security. It is the zone with the best chance of detecting a threat and then stopping it before it can reach American shores. The territorial sea, from the shore out to 12 nautical miles, is a very congested area. It has heavy recreational and merchant traffic and is festooned with response assets from federal, state, and local municipalities. Unfortunately, this best and last line of defense is not optimal when responding to potential future threats confronting the U.S. Coast Guard.

Old Cutters and the OPC Solution

The 270-foot Campbell, a Famous-class cutter, was built in the 1980s and has 12 sister ships rapidly nearing the end of their service lives. The main battery on these vessels is the 76-mm Oto Melara cannon, a design approved for use in 1975 for the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates. The Perrys are currently being phased out, with the remaining ships scheduled for decommissioning in 2015.⁵ Support for the Oto Melara will quickly become extremely difficult. The design of the Famous class meanwhile has its weather limitations: In the mid-1990s the Coast Guard sent the USCGC Harriet Lane (WMEC-903) to the Bering Sea to test her capabilities. The results demonstrated the class could not safely operate in the waters off Alaska, and since that time all Famous-class cutters have been stationed on the East Coast. Finally, the cruising speed of these aging assets is only 12–14 knots; moving any faster consumes too much fuel and greatly limits endurance. Maximum speed, only 18 knots, is rarely achieved without risking major damage to the engines. This degrades the ability to counter a threat quickly. Another Cold War–era ship in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, is the USCGC Reliance (WMEC-615); at 210 feet and with a keel laid in the 1960s, she has even greater limitations than the Famous-class cutters. All these factors have eroded the effective presence of these assets in a modern age.

The world of 2025 could bring significant new challenges to maritime defense. The instability in the Middle East continues to generate terrorist threats that could lead to new types of attacks on the American economy and infrastructure. More world leaders are accepting global warming as a reality and perceiving climate change as having the potential to open new maritime routes and create natural disasters of greater intensity.⁶ Finally, globalization has brought about the potential for the quick spread of pandemic diseases that threaten the well-being of entire nations. The WMEC is the best maritime-defense platform, but the current version was designed to counter a naval and air attack from the Soviet Union. Over time the Coast Guard, being a flexible service with highly trained personnel and an efficient use of limited funds, has made due with these assets and adapted them to meet the demands of the 21st century. But these new threats could be more than a tired Cold War holdover can manage.

Fitting, then, that the Coast Guard has declared its nascent offshore patrol cutter (OPC) program “the service’s highest investment priority.” According to its official program description, the OPC “will provide a critical capability bridge between the national security cutter, which patrols the open ocean in the most demanding maritime environments, and the fast response cutter, which serves closer to shore.” In early 2014 the Coast Guard awarded preliminary and contract design awards to Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, Eastern Shipbuilding Group, and General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works. From that first design phase, the Coast Guard will select one vendor for phase-two construction of as many as nine OPCs, ostensibly as Fiscal Year 2016 wraps up; 25 vessels are planned in total.⁷

“The OPC will be the backbone of Coast Guard offshore presence and the manifestation of our at-sea authorities,” declared Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft. “It is essential to stopping smugglers at sea, for interdicting undocumented migrants, rescuing mariners, enforcing fisheries laws, responding to disasters, and protecting our ports.”⁸

Extremists—and Extreme Weather

The long-serving WMECs will finally be getting some relief, in other words. And that relief can’t come too soon. Islamic extremism has waged a campaign against American interests over the past decade-plus. Groups from al Qaeda to Isis well know they cannot fight U.S. forces conventionally—the horrors of 9/11 providing the most salient example of success by unconventional means. Water-borne terror incidents have occurred as well—the small-boat attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in 2000, the 2008 fishing-vessel attack in Mumbai—and measures have been applied to thwart future attempts via such methodologies. But the untried maritime terrorist threat vector would be to take over a large tanker or container vessel, drive her into a busy harbor, and detonate a large explosive to damage the port facilities and infrastructure. Such an attack would take a high level of sophistication and coordination, and since 9/11 maritime-intelligence capacity has grown significantly. But in this potential scenario, even if there is advance information about the hijacked vessel bound for New York, even if you know the threat, how do you stop it? A large vessel will take miles to stop during normal operations. If you depend on your territorial-sea law-enforcement assets to intercept, it will be too late because the terrorists will have developed “relative superiority,” and nothing short of a major air strike by combat aircraft is going to stop the threat. Even if you do, terrorists may still claim a degree of success in having blocked the port and alarmed the general public. A fast, well-equipped OPC could intercept the threat in the EEZ and use noncompliant-vessel procedures to stop and board her. If the enemy fired back, with a reliable gun system the cutter would have enough firepower to defend herself, disable the target, and wait for further backup from other military forces well out of public view. It would be the only military asset on duty that could immediately assess the situation and stop the attack with appropriate means to push the U.S. maritime-defense zone outward.

Global warming also will create significant challenges for maritime defense. In the next ten years, polar caps will continue to melt and storms may grow in severity. Increased maritime operations near ice will be normal. The Northern Sea Route increased transits from 46 vessels in 2012 to 71 ships in 2013; those approximately 1.3 million tons are projected to grow to 65 million tons by 2020.⁹ The Northwest Passage has the potential to experience similar growth. The current inventory of WMECs is not ice-capable; they cannot work near ice without a threat of puncturing the hull. This U.S. Coast Guard would instead use oceangoing buoy tenders for Arctic missions. While these are very capable ships, they lack a flight deck, armament, personnel, and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and recognition (C4IR) capabilities necessary for long-range national defense and enforcement of international laws and treaties. The melting of the older ice doesn’t mean the northern transit lanes will be ice-free; in a seasonal cycle it means more new ice would be formed each winter, potentially covering a larger area. The winter of 2012 saw the largest freeze of the Bering Sea in over a decade as the ice came down below the Pribilof Islands. The medium icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB-20) had to assist the Russian tanker Renda in delivering fuel oil to Nome, Alaska, for home heating. Conducting maritime-security operations near ice conditions is a problem for the foreseeable future.

An increase in extreme events and violent storms is very likely in the coming years.¹⁰ In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated the Eastern Seaboard, killing more than 200 people, shutting down all major airports, and knocking out power for 7.9 million businesses and households. The storm resulted in a state of emergency being declared, National Guard troops being recalled, and over $60 billion dollars in damage.¹¹ With increasing sea-level rise, more communities will be vulnerable to flooding and tidal surge. A vessel with an embarked helicopter could remove people from rooftops; with enhanced C4IR she could maintain air and sea control of relief assets, and with the requisite speed and endurance she would be able to be first on scene and remain available through the crisis.

Deadly Cargo?

The final scenario to discuss is the containment of a highly contagious disease on board a merchant vessel or cruise ship coming to the United States. An outbreak of H1N1 (a strain of swine flu) occurred in April 2009; by June the World Health Organization had declared a pandemic.¹² More recently, viral hemorrhagic fever (Ebola) has exacted a horrific death toll. In the years ahead there will most likely be a disease that spreads like the flu and has a mortality rate similar to Ebola. While airports and physical borders can be closed, the 95,000 miles of U.S. coastline would remain a porous entry point.

The effective presence of a cutter develops and maintains maritime-domain awareness. Off New England the CTU cutter is constantly monitoring ships’ transponders, the Automated Information System for vessels over 300 gross tons and the Vessel Monitoring System for all registered fishing vessels. This creates a common operating picture that is shared with the cutter and the other five shore-based sector commands in the area. An infected vessel would be required to provide the sector commander ashore with a 96-hour Advanced Notice of Arrival. This could be passed to the cutter, which could intercept the vessel and ensure she goes to the appropriate quarantine anchorage.

Currently there are two major problems a WMEC faces if an infected vessel is noncompliant with the captain of the port’s order to go into quarantine. First is the cutter’s limited speed. Most modern ships are faster than the WMEC, so her ability to intercept is not all it should be. The second problem is the very finite capability to decontaminate personnel. The cutter has a decontamination passageway and one head as the shower. It was designed for the crew to don their protective gear and survive a nuclear blast (or chemical or biological attack) and then get out of the area. If it became necessary to send personnel to the noncompliant vessel, the WMEC would have great difficulty decontaminating the boarding personnel from a deadly airborne virus.

If sometime in the future a pandemic grew to a large-scale outbreak, an enhanced-capabilities offshore patrol cutter would be crucial to maintaining order at sea. Space at quarantine anchorages is extremely limited, and the OPC would need to establish an organized system. She would be the check-in point for vessels coming from the sea and traffic director establishing good locations for vessels to anchor. She would enforce safety zones established for public protection, and would direct air assets to provide surveillance and deliver logistics. She would respond to any emergencies reported by the armada of anchored vessels. Finally, she would help execute the release of vessels from the quarantine after they were properly cleared.

To Better Serve the Public

In New England, the WMECs toil on just like the first revenue cutters, providing a public service, quietly working offshore with little recognition. They routinely inspect mariners for proper safety gear and save them when they are in a storm. They board fishing vessels and protect the bountiful resource off the coast. They check vessels for illegal immigrants, drug smugglers, and criminals evading the law. They run drills and practice war games to be ready to integrate with the U.S. Navy at a moment’s notice. They report hazardous spills, protect endangered species, and are stewards of the environment. The fact that these Cold War assets continue to operate and provide the American public an acceptable level of effective presence is a testament to the dedication and ingenuity of their crews. But it’s a situation that cannot persist much longer.

Thankfully, the Coast Guard is in the process of acquiring the OPC to replace the WMEC. The new improved cutters will provide the American public better service at lower costs than trying to keep propping up an aged fleet. The WMECs served their purpose, and while they prepared for a third world war, they continued to live up to their revenue-cutter heritage, protecting the public every day. And now it is time now to put the WMECs out to pasture and to invest in the OPC, ensuring a new workhorse capable of stopping future threats and to keeping the nation safe.

1. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center, “Principal Ports of the United States,” www.iwr.usace.army.mil/About/TechnicalCenters/WCSCWaterborneCommerceStatisticsCenter.aspx. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Science and Technology, “Commercial Fisheries Statistics: Fisheries of the United States, 2013,” www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/commercial-fisheries/fus/fus13/index.

2. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “North American Cruise Statistical Snapshot,” www.marad.dot.gov/documents/North_American_Cruise_Statistics_Quarterly_Snapshot.pdf.

3. Alexander Hamilton, “Letter of Instruction to the Commanding Officers of the Revenue Cutters,” 4 June 1791, www.uscg.mil/history/faqs/hamiltonletter.pdf.

4. Coast Guard Publication 1: Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, February 2014), 74, www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/Pub_1.pdf.

5. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “FY15 Projected Ship Inactivation Schedule and Update Remaining FY14 Ship Inactivation Schedule,” www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2014/NAV14152.txt.

6. United Nations Climate Change Blog, “Leaders must Act” www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2014/11/leaders-must-act-urges-ban-new-un-report-warns-climate-change-may-soon-irreversible/.

7. U.S. Coast Guard, “Acquisition Directorate: Offshore Patrol Cutter,” www.uscg.mil/acquisition/opc/pdf/opc.pdf.

8. Ibid.

9. Kathrin Keil, “Evaluation of the Arctic Shipping Season 2013” Arctic Institute Center for Circumploar Security Studies, 13 January 2014, www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/01/evaluation-of-arctic-shipping-season.html.

10. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report,” www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPM.pdf.

11. Kate Sheppard, “2 Years After Sandy, U.S. Disaster Policy is Still a Disaster,” Huffington Post, 29 October 2014, www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/29/sandy-congress-disaster-policy_n_6070880.html.

12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009–April 2010,” www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm.